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Hegel is not a very agreeable philosopher—that much can probably be 
agreed upon. From Schelling and Kierkegaard to Derrida, his name has 
come to stand for the imperialism of an all- appropriating spirit, cold 
magisterialism, and Prussian state control. Yet, his work does not always 
agree with this reception. Some of the more interesting recent readers of 
Hegel today fi nd in his philosophy a transformative thought in progress, 
a restless openness to contingency, and an ecstatic vulnerability.1 The in-
compatibility of these two strands of Hegel’s reception goes to prove that 
what we refer to with the one name “Hegel” still moves.
It is widely accepted that Hegel introduced philosophy to a dynamic 
notion of truth. Tropes of Transport: Hegel and Emotion locates the tropes 
that render truth dynamic in the emotional register. Focusing primarily 
on the Phenomenology of Spirit, I read his work—using the tools of literary 
and rhetorical analysis—in dialogue with literary texts contemporary to 
Hegel or to us.2 The latter constellation serves to explore how Hegel reso-
nates with some of our concerns today. In my reading, I trace how emo-
tionality (dis)organizes the logical, quasi- existential, and narrative unfold-
ing of Hegel’s text. Emotions transport consciousness, the protagonist 
of the Phenomenology, across its various stages of self- refl ection, and draw 
the reader into that process of self- refl ection. I call this (dis)organizing 
force the “emotional syntax” of Hegel’s text. Through a thorough analysis 
of the emotional syntax of Hegel’s philosophy, Tropes of Transport contrib-
utes both to the recently begun reevaluation of Hegel’s philosophy, and 
to the burgeoning interdisciplinary studies of affect and emotion.
Emotionality clearly forms a primary, albeit much neglected con-
cern in the explication of Hegelian philosophy. With its account of emo-
tional temporality, Tropes of Transport elucidates the cross- vectored tem-
porality of Hegel’s text. It describes Hegel’s speculative logic as a logic 
of sympathy that undoes the dichotomy of rationality and emotionality 
by drawing on emotion to propel self- refl ection and on self- distance to 
thicken the experience of emotion.
Intervening in the multidisciplinary study of affect and emotion, 
Tropes of Transport illustrates that a fresh analysis of Hegel’s philosophy 
offers an important resource for a cutting- edge theory of emotionality.3 
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In particular, it explores how Hegel’s thought and textual practice of 
mediation, plural subjectivity, impersonal subjectivity, and sympathy ad-
vances such a theory.
Mediation
If the form is said to be in parity with the essence, then it is for 
that very reason a bald misunderstanding to suppose that cogni-
tion can be content with . . . the essence, but can do without the 
form.
—Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, § 19
If it is usually assumed that the force of intensities and the sincerity of 
emotions depend on their immediacy, I explore to what extent media-
tion—and therefore a certain degree of fabrication and manipulation—
is constitutive of emotionality. Hegel serves as a particularly helpful inter-
locutor for such an exploration not only because he offers a sophisticated 
analysis of mediation, but also because the notion that feelings are im-
mediate and therefore non- refl ective dates from the Enlightenment era, 
and Hegel, as this book shows, is one of its earliest critics.
The idea of mediation plays such an important role in the long 
and complex history of the Marxist reception of Hegel that it might be 
confusing to encounter the term here, in the context of a discussion 
of transports. Indeed, I am not concerned with the concrete forms of 
mediation—between man and nature or between classes—that Marxist 
theorists have foregrounded. Capital, the media, or labor are not my pri-
mary interests here (although my irritation at the fact that the discipline 
of philosophy is interested in the emotions only when they labor in the 
service of epistemology or morality, and the fact that this emotional la-
bor is unevenly divided across gender lines, was an important motivation 
for this work). Instead, I draw on the structural notion of mediation in 
Hegel, according to which the immediate appears as simple, straightfor-
ward, and unrelated to other things, whereas the mediated is complex, 
indirect, related to other things, and resultant. Hegelian thought shows 
that every certainty that seems immediately evident and fresh to a par-
ticular consciousness proves, from a different perspective, indeed socially 
and historically mediated. Hegel relentlessly criticizes the idea that we 
have immediate access to the truth, or rather that there is such a thing as 
a simple truth independent of our practices of refl ection.
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I apply to the context of feeling this wide meaning of mediation 
that we know mainly from the epistemological context in Hegel. Modern 
philosophical, literary, and everyday discourses of emotion are highly 
charged with anxiety about the authenticity of feelings and the sincerity 
of their expression.4 But if, as I argue, emotions are—in the most pared-
 down description—modes of relationality, they cannot be simple, pure, 
whole, consistent, and “at one with themselves.” Thus, emotionality is in-
herently ambivalent, contaminated, disrupted, confused, and incongru-
ous with itself—or, in one word, inauthentic—and we necessarily have 
a hard time experiencing emotions fully and expressing them sincerely. 
Both pleasurable and painful at the same time, they never quite fi t the 
categories elaborated by centuries of classifi catory impulse (they shift 
between love and hate, fear and desire, grief and relief—to name but 
a few of the more obvious examples of emotional ambiguity). In addi-
tion, they are split between the singular and the common: an emotion 
feels both urgent in that it concerns me in my singularity, and banal in 
its commonality. The experience of grief, joy, and so on is possible to the 
extent that I share it with another (this other could be myself), which 
means that I never “fully” experience these transports (even if the other 
I share them with is myself). For all these reasons, we need to attend to 
the double modality of emotionality: that, on the one hand, emotions are 
real and, on the other hand, they are manipulations, performances, or 
cultivations of the real. Hegel’s structural notion of mediation helps us to 
get into view both the mediatedness and the immediacy of emotion.
This has several implications—epistemic, critical, and ethical. The 
fact that emotionality is inherently ambivalent, confused, and incongru-
ous does not mean that it is irrational. Conversely, we will observe in 
Hegel that attention to the forms of refl ection and self- refl ection inher-
ent in emotionality changes the rules of rationality. The idea that feel-
ings should be purely immediate leads to more or less willful denials of 
mediation, which in turn make it only easier for external manipulations 
to take hold.5 Attention to the social and historical mediation of feel-
ing can serve as a fi rst step toward criticizing the economic and political 
capture of affect, but it also implies that feeling cannot and should not 
be immune to critique. Finally, and most importantly for the current 
study, Hegel offers conceptual tools and analyses that make it possible 
to shift from an ethics of truthfulness to an ethics of sympathy. A single 
individual without interpersonal interactions, without recourse to the 
imagination of interpersonality, or without the ability to relate to herself 
as another, would have no emotions. Hegelian transport is always shared; 
that is to say, it creates a texture of sympathy.
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Plural Subjectivity
By “transport” I mean an emotion—strong or slight—that carries one out 
of oneself and to a different self. The self- refl ection of spirit, which He-
gel traces in the Phenomenology of Spirit, relies on such transports.6  Hegel 
describes the logic of transports as one of “determinate negations.” This 
logic—which Hegel famously characterizes by exploiting the multiva-
lence of the German term for “negating,” Aufhebung—suggests that there 
is an overlap between negation and affi rmation. Hegelian subjectivity 
is the capacity to self- negate without self- destroying, to generate new 
selves out of the contradictions of former selves. What Hegel abstractly 
calls “negativity,” this book renders more concretely with descriptions 
of emotional processes. Hegelian negativity manifests, for example, as 
tremble, brokenness, laughter, or release. While these transports enable 
the emergence of different selves, they also expose and breach the bound-
aries of the self- suffi cient subject. Aufhebung, since it preserves what it ne-
gates, divides the subject. In the transition from one subject to the next, 
the former subject does not simply disappear. The new self encompasses 
and is forced to relate to the remains of its former manifestations. As 
modes of self- relation, transports thus project new selves and remember 
old selves. The history of cumulative Aufhebungen multiplies internal dif-
ferences and makes the subject more emotional with each step.
This brings me to an important challenge of Hegel’s quasi- literary 
text: its temporality.7 While philosophical texts traditionally make 
atemporal truth claims, the Phenomenology’s conceit—that we are accom-
panying the self- assessment of exemplary worldviews or epistemes—not 
only temporalizes truth but does so by creating a complex temporal plas-
ticity. The Phenomenology has often been read as a narrative, more spe-
cifi cally as a bildungsroman.8 I argue rather that the text intertwines the 
temporalities of the three major literary genres: the syncopating mea-
sures of poetic rhythm, the virtual present of theatrical enactment, and 
the folded sequence of narrative. This intertwinement of different, in 
themselves disrupted and complex, times contributes to the emotionality 
of the Hegelian text.
The subject of the Phenomenology of Spirit is the path of spirit’s self-
 refl ection or of its coming- to-know- itself. Hegel defi nes spirit as a plural 
subject: “the ‘I’ that is ‘We’ and the ‘We’ that is ‘I.’ ” The double genitive 
of the title indicates that spirit serves as both the agent of the phenom-
enological inquiry and its subject matter. This means that the subject of 
the Phenomenology is divided between spirit in the form of the protago-
nist and spirit in the form of the phenomenologist. In other words, the 
book has two characters who manifest and propel spirit’s self- refl ection: 
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the phenomenologist and the protagonist, called “consciousness.” He-
gel refers to the phenomenologist in the fi rst- person plural (“we”), indi-
cating that the author and the reader share in the plural subjectivity 
of the phenomenologist and reinforcing the slippage between author, 
reader, and spirit. The protagonist is also a plural subject. Indeed, I argue 
throughout this book that the Phenomenology does not trace the linear de-
velopment of one consciousness, but presents the constellation of many 
fi gures or shapes of consciousness. Therefore I will sometimes speak of 
protagonists in the plural. Strictly speaking, the protagonist is neither 
singular nor plural because the many fi gures of consciousness all have 
their own identities and are also versions of one another. It is thus pos-
sible to refer to the constellation of different fi gures of consciousness as 
the protagonists or as the protagonist (then understood as manifoldly 
divided within).
Trembling—one of the tropes this book explores—literalizes or 
materializes the back- and- forth movement of the self between its various 
shapes. The self trembles with fear before the transition to a new self and 
such tremble propels the transition, yet the new self is also shuddered 
through by the old selves. The trembling movement blurs the shape of 
each self. Indeed, it blurs the border between intra- and intersubjectivity. 
Another trope that jumbles the prefi xes intra- and inter- is “acknowledg-
ing,” which renders thinking, cognition, and recognition as always again 
incipient movements toward an other self and also toward the practice of 
thinking and knowing itself. Hegel’s speculative logic demands consider-
able plasticity in casting the self- relationality that emotionality essentially 
is in at times intra-, at times intersubjective modes. Thus, rhythm emerges 
as an important characteristic of emotionality that this book explores. 
Emotional subjectivity is plural subjectivity in the sense that it moves to 
multiple, incongruent beats and incessantly combines dynamic and com-
plex shifts between self- reference and external reference.
Impersonal Subjectivity
Hegel’s notion of “objective spirit” offers an effective tool for an account 
of emotional processes going on outside the heart or the mind. Since 
Hegel does not think of subjectivity as the exclusive attribute of per-
sons, the emotional relations that oscillate or tremble between the intra- 
and the intersubjective are often transpersonal or entirely impersonal 
in character. The still- pervasive habit of attributing emotion exclusively 
to human subjects requires a critical analysis. Terada has developed a 
8
I N T R O D U C T I O N
deconstructionist theory of emotion based on the insight that a unifi ed 
subject as traditionally conceived could not possibly experience emotion 
(Terada 2001). Riley locates emotion at the interstices of the human, in 
particular in language, where she observes “impersonal passions” that 
don’t quite coincide with the felt emotions of individual speakers (Riley 
2005). Despite these and other advances in thinking emotion as imper-
sonal or anonymous, we still tend to project a person who “has” or “ex-
presses” the emotion whenever we speak of emotion (as different from 
affect). This book follows a different approach and explores, especially 
in its second part, the impersonality and exteriority of emotion. I am 
aware of the fact that it is quite counterintuitive to think of emotion 
as not primarily human, especially since humanity is often regarded as 
synonymous with the capacity to have feelings. Still, my point here is not 
to extend the faculty of emotion to non- human animals, as Nussbaum 
does (Nussbaum 2001, 89– 138). I am not concerned with emotions as 
stable attributes that animals or other organisms might “have.”9 Nor do 
I agree with Nussbaum when she argues that emotions “always involve 
thought of an object” even if “this doesn’t necessarily include refl exive 
awareness” (Nussbaum 2001, 23). Rather, I submit that emotions always 
include refl exive  awareness but that this refl ection does not require a 
human self. I consider emotions as dynamic self- relations of emotionality 
to itself. That is to say, I subjectivize non- human sites of emotionality. To 
adjust to this counterintuitive idea, it helps to anthropomorphize emo-
tionality. Broadcast on the right wavelengths, “emotionality” sounds like 
a proper name, and there is reason to appreciate the agency and subject 
status that the proper name confers upon the phenomenon. Of course, 
I recommend such anthropomorphizing with a winking eye and only as 
a strategy to relativize the strained anthropomorphizing of humans that 
we practice every day. As much as possible, I push toward exploring emo-
tionality in its own right and not merely as experiences or expressions of 
human actants.
Sympathy
Hegel’s textual practice generates an almost inadvertent sympathy with 
the protagonist/ s in the reader, just as Hegel’s logic demands sympathy 
of the thinker with the subject of her thought. Sympathy poses a threat to 
the idea of autonomy.10 The “free agent” in the classical sense—whether 
inner- directed or tradition- directed (to fall back on Riesman’s infl uential 
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but dated terminology)—knows who he is and can tell right from wrong; 
he is at one with himself, single- minded, and calm. Pinkard argues that 
such self- suffi ciency might be a beautiful idea, but it “cannot survive its 
confrontation with other putatively self- suffi cient agents—unless the 
agents in question are gods” (Pinkard 2007, 15). Pinkard refers to He-
gel’s discussion of the dialectic of mastery and servitude as evidence for 
the problems with conceiving freedom as self- suffi ciency. A less divine 
but more workable notion of freedom values the emotional turmoil of 
challenging ourselves and others, of adopting a negative, refl ective, or 
ironic stance toward our own and others’ beliefs and feelings. It appreci-
ates the wounds and the tears (Zerrissenheit) through which others enter 
the self.11 And it embraces the notion of a plural self enacting many 
roles. This freedom—which, I argue, is Hegel’s notion of freedom—
demands that we reconcile ourselves to emotionality—not that we repair 
what is torn.
Hegel sees this model of freedom exemplifi ed in the “self- alienated 
spirit” of Rameau’s Nephew. The nephew abandons individual selfhood to 
become all the voices of existence. He
“piled up and mixed together some thirty airs, Italian, French, tragic, 
comic, of all sorts of character; now, with a deep bass, he descended 
into the depths of hell, then, contracting his throat, with a falsetto he 
tore apart the vaults of the skies, alternately raging and then being pla-
cated, imperious and then derisive.” (§ 521)12
The “inverted and inverting, disrupted” performance of the nephew 
proves contagious; it infects the philosopher- judge with an inadver-
tent sympathy (§ 653). The calm and sincere consciousness (Diderot’s 
“Moi ”)—who usually “in all honesty composes [setzt] the melody of the 
good and the true in . . . one note”—is not quite sure what to think of the 
nephew’s performance (§ 521, trans. modifi ed). He remains torn in his 
judgment of the nephew and, thus torn, ends up imitating or nachempfi n-
den the entire gamut of emotions that the nephew just performed:
For the motionless [ruhig] consciousness . . . this speech appears as a 
“blather of wisdom and folly, a medley consisting of as much skill as it 
did of baseness, of as many right as of false ideas, of such a complete in-
version [Verkehrtheit] of sentiment, of such consummate disgracefulness 
as well as of such entire candor and truth. [The supposedly motionless 
consciousness] will be unable to refrain from going into all these tones [in alle 
diese Töne einzugehen], and from running up and down the entire scale 
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of feeling, of moving from the deepest contempt and depravity to the 
highest admiration and stirring emotion.” (§ 521, trans. modifi ed, ital-
ics: my emphasis)13
The honest consciousness turns into a reiteration of the disrupted con-
sciousness. Such contagion or inadvertent sympathy shows that the model 
of subjectivity that is bound up with emotionality and freedom, as Hegel 
sees them, does not emphasize individuality and does not clearly distin-
guish between the singular and the plural. Even the consciousness whose 
honesty consists in sticking to one note inadvertently becomes several.
Hegel’s notion of freedom and his analysis of contagion imply an 
ethics of sympathy.14 By “ethics,” I don’t mean a substantive defi nition of 
goodness, or a procedural defi nition of right action.15 What I consider 
“ethical” lies at the intersection of ethics, aesthetics, and philology.16 It 
is the practice of paying close attention to subtle complexities, acknowl-
edging alterity, and appreciating the confused and often messy process 
of juggling contrary pulls and negotiating differences. Sympathizing 
with the unfamiliar while retaining a gait of one’s own, adjusting to an-
other rhythm without losing one’s beat: these are the domains of emo-
tionality. To avoid such negotiations by reducing, denying, or stabilizing 
differences seems to me unethical. But to engage in these negotiations 
requires the willingness to temporarily be wrong, do wrong, be done 
wrong, and allow for forgiveness. It is an ethics beyond good and evil, if 
that is possible. This emotional ethics is obviously too large and complex 
a topic to be dealt with adequately here, but I can isolate two aspects of 
it that are relevant to the book: emotional ethics demands a practice of 
sympathizing with (one’s) other selves (including impersonal selves) and 
an extreme plasticity of the self (or a practice of self- fi guration).
Trilling observes that, around the time when sincerity emerges as 
both a value and a problem (with the increase in social mobility begin-
ning in the sixteenth century), interest in “the villain” rises. Originally, 
a “villain” is simply a man at the lowest scale of feudal society, but “the 
villain of plays and novels is characteristically a person who seeks to rise 
above the station to which he was born,” and thus becomes morally vil-
lainized.17 He is not what he is, in the double sense of denying his given 
social identity and playacting (using fl attery and deceit) in order to get 
ahead. Not only is Rameau’s nephew a villain in this sense, but all the 
shapes of consciousness and formations of spirit that the Phenomenology 
presents, its protagonist/s in general and even its phenomenologist/s, 
must come across as villains. Consciousness makes its way through the 
phenomenological narrative by relentlessly rising above its presup-
posed identity. At the same time, the narrative cannot advance without 
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the villainous or insincere involvement of the phenomenologist/s. The 
phenomenologist/s must be what they are not, must play the role of 
“natural consciousness” and sympathize with the protagonist/s in order 
for the text to unfold. Spirit is multiply divided, and each of its personae 
acts in the double consciousness of being both the hero and the villain 
of this story. The syntax of Hegel’s text refl ects this singularly plural sub-
jectivity of emotionality: it articulates—that is, it separates and joins—the 
different formations of spirit and the various shapes of consciousness in 
such a way that it is impossible to decide whether the text has one pro-
tagonist (who appears in many incarnations) or many protagonists (who 
tend to get collapsed into one by the conventions of the developmental 
narrative). Rameau’s nephew thus exemplifi es the structural alienation 
of emotional subjectivity that is at work in each and every instantiation of 
the phenomenological subject. He models the plasticity of shifting freely 
between the singular and the plural—the plasticity that I have described 
as one aspect of emotional ethics.18
Hegel uses a philosophical version of free indirect discourse—a 
narrative technique that blurs the distinction between the voice of the 
narrator and the voice of a character. Hegel presents the theories (or 
“certainties”) and insights of his protagonist/ s by oscillating often im-
perceptibly between the protagonist’s voice and the phenomenologist’s 
voice. In doing so he creates a plastic syntax of emotionality in the Phe-
nomenology. Throughout this book, I call attention to Hegel’s use of this 
literary device and analyze its various effects. They range from allowing 
for intimate knowledge of highly problematic and thus commonly dis-
missed positions, to creating the refl ective distance necessary for emo-
tion to register, to generating perspectival shifts within and between the 
protagonist/ s themselves. As already noted, Hegel thoroughly abandons 
the idea of the strictly in-dividual subject—all subjects of the Phenomenol-
ogy are divisible and internally divided without completely falling apart 
or losing all coherence. Free indirect discourse presents the difference 
between internal and external differences and exchanges as hard to pin 
down and the distinction as impossible to maintain. Overall, free indirect 
discourse enhances the plasticity of emotionality and facilitates an ethics 
of sympathy.
Chapter Overview
The present study falls into two parts. The fi rst part (“Emotional Sub-
jects”) focuses on Hegel’s thematic accounts of emotionality and the sec-
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ond part (“Emotional Syntax”) on his performative accounts of it. With 
literary and rhetorical analyses of the Hegelian text I hope to reveal, in 
the fi rst part, some of the shortcomings of straightforward readings of 
Hegel’s explicit thematizations of emotion. To read the Phenomenology 
of Spirit at face value is to miss some signifi cant challenges of this quasi-
 literary text. The fact that the Phenomenology has a protagonist (“conscious-
ness”) and a fi rst- person plural narrator (“we”—the phenomenologist/s) 
demands that the reader attend to the differences between the perspec-
tive of the author, the perspective of the narrator, and the perspective 
of the protagonist. That is to say, when Hegel discusses “feeling” or “pa-
thos,” he doesn’t develop his theory of emotion. Instead, he offers a 
critical analysis of the assumptions at work when one conceives of emo-
tion as feeling or as pathos.
The book opens with a chapter on the trope of the “Heart.” It ad-
dresses Hegel’s response to schools of thought that give matters of the 
heart a philosophical value (eighteenth- century sentimentalism and 
philosophical mysticism). Hegel derides this celebration of feeling. He 
describes feeling as an ineffi cient way of relating to the world, one that 
indulges in nebulous idealizations because it lacks the “strength” to 
take a clear stance in words and actions. Reading Hegel on “the feeling 
heart,” one wonders whether Hegel values the signifi cance of emotion.19 
In this introductory chapter, I remind readers that Hegel does not dis-
parage feeling as such, but criticizes only the sentimental and mystic un-
derstanding of feeling. I argue that he does so for two reasons. First, the 
sentimental and mystic preference of feeling over reason reproduces the 
dichotomy between rationality and emotionality. Second, the fi gure of 
the heart relegates feeling to interiority. Thus, this introductory chapter 
familiarizes the reader of Tropes of Transport with two important demands 
of Hegel’s philosophy of emotion: fi rst, that reason and emotion be mu-
tually implicated, and second, that thoughtful “transports” or emotional 
thoughts call into question the construction of interiority.
This brings me to the second thematic fi gure of emotion, namely 
“Pathos,” which plays a crucial role in Hegel’s theory of the tragic. Hegel 
defi nes pathos as an absolute commitment to a particular ethical calling. 
Pathos has two advantages over the fi gure of the heart: because it calls for 
action, it escapes Hegel’s critique of mere interiority, and in that it takes 
a clear stance, it integrates emotionality with rationality. Nevertheless, it 
cannot properly be described as a trope of transport, since the passion-
ate stance absorbs the person so fully that she is absolutely congruent 
with her ethical commitment. Far from effecting a transformation, pa-
thos leads to the tragic annihilation of the individual who is under the 
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sway of this trope—it quite literally comes to a dead end. For this reason, 
I contend, Hegel grows rather disenchanted with philosophical invest-
ments in passionate characters and instead shifts to an analysis of how 
the theatricality of tragedy affects the trope of absolute sincerity, which is 
pathos. I argue that Hegel’s preoccupation with theatricality importantly 
informs the composition of the Phenomenology. The theatrics of the Phe-
nomenology builds ambivalence into the structure of the emotional sub-
ject by dividing the subject of the Phenomenology into a protagonist and a 
phenomenologist. I argue that the different roles of this plural subject 
both invigorate and break one another. Yet, they also serve as remainders 
of one another, so that there is never any complete destruction of the 
subject in the Phenomenology.
The analysis of Hegel’s critique of heart and pathos enables me to 
identify ex negativo three main points of his own conception of emotion: 
(1) that reason and emotion implicate one another; (2) that thought-
ful “transports” or emotional thoughts foil any clean- cut separation be-
tween, or hierarchical organization of, interiority and exteriority; and 
(3) that transport generates a plural subject, spoiling any desire for co-
herence and unifi cation.
At the end of this fi rst part—on “Emotional Subjects”—it becomes 
evident that where emotion is the explicit subject of analysis, the account 
inadvertently unifi es and stabilizes the emotional subject. In order to 
reach an affi rmative view of the non- unifi ed subject and of emotion as a 
vehicle for self- transformation, we need to turn to non- reifying, that is, 
performative presentations of emotion as transports. We need to analyze 
what emotions do in Hegel’s text, how they carry the self- refl ection of 
spirit. Thus, in the second part of Tropes of Transport I explore how the syn-
tax, not the subject matter, of Hegel’s speculative logic moves thought.
Most discussions of Hegel make the assumption that the promise 
or threat (depending on the discussants’ taste for grand narratives) of 
Hegel’s philosophy is to overcome divisions. This book challenges that 
assumption. The second part—“Emotional Syntax”—explores how the 
emotional syntax of Hegel’s Phenomenology both creates a plural or mani-
foldly divided subject, and connects the different parts of this plural sub-
ject (the series of fi gures of consciousness that make up the protagonist, 
as well as the author and the readers who share in the subjectivity of the 
phenomenologist) in a moving, mutually informing and deforming syn-
thesis.
The emotional syntax of the Phenomenology features specifi c tropes 
of emotionality, such as “release,” “juggle,” “acknowledging,” “tremble,” 
and “broken.” I have organized each chapter of “Emotional Syntax” 
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around one of these fi gures, which are key words from Hegel’s Phenom-
enology of Spirit. These key words involve a tropic dislocation in the sense 
that they are used not quite according to common sense. The most com-
mon meaning of “trembling,” for example, in the context of a study of 
emotion, would be the shaking movement of a human body affected 
with great fear. Tropes of Transport employs the term in a defamiliarized 
way to describe the shaking movement of the Hegelian text, arguing that 
Hegel’s text trembles.
“Emotional Syntax” opens with a chapter, titled “Release,” that dis-
cusses the ending of the Phenomenology of Spirit. Rather than in absolute 
knowledge, the text ends in a tear: a dash, from which two lines of Schil-
ler’s poem “Friendship” drop. The supposedly grandiose narrative of 
the Phenomenology “releases” its grasp of the subject and its grip on the 
reader by speaking in another’s voice. Yet no one remains intact here. 
This chapter demonstrates that numerous shapes of consciousness have 
been ruined, that the Hegelian text falls short of coherence and closure, 
and that Hegel alters the verses he cites. Chapter 3 argues that the mu-
tual syncopation and disintegration of self and other are requirements 
for the experience of emotion. It is thus an act of friendship when Hegel 
alters Schiller’s lines and when he allows his own text to be interrupted 
and torn open to future readers. At the beginning of the second part of 
the book, this argument demonstrates the appropriateness of my own 
method of reading, which is to remain true to the Hegelian text by trans-
forming it.
Building on the argument developed in the preceding chapter—
that emotionality is an effect of dissonances—chapter 4, “Juggle,” shows 
that Hegel’s language is not one with itself. The chapter analyzes what 
Hegel means when he contends that the phenomenological exposition 
must juggle the rationalistic syntax of predicative propositions and the 
dynamic syntax of the Hegelian “speculative judgment.” Arguing that 
Hegel rhythmically interweaves the two different functions of the phe-
nomenologist (author and reader) by mutually syncopating authorial 
will and reader expectation, I propose a Hegelian ethics of sympathy. 
When Hegel asks his readers to identify with consciousness on its path, 
he demands of them to do what he does in his writing, namely, to march 
to the beat of (at least) two drums at a time.
Via a linguistic and poetic analysis of Anerkennen, the next chapter, 
titled “Acknowledging,” explores the non- closed or unending temporal-
ity of knowledge as well as the plural subjectivity of consciousness. Bring-
ing passages from Hegel’s Phenomenology into dialogue with Hölderlin’s 
poem “Remembrance” and Goethe’s poem “Reunion,” chapter 5 ques-
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tions Hegelian claims to completion and perfection. I show how Hegel 
tries to perpetuate the ecstasy of love by repeatedly changing the sub-
ject. While Goethe’s poem establishes self- suffi ciency as the ideal, I read 
Hölderlin’s poem as chiefl y concerned with the question of how con/ 
versing can foster an always transient mutuality. And I argue that Hegel 
understands recognition as a mutual acknowledging of transports (of 
one’s ceaselessly becoming someone else). Translating Anerkennen as ac-
 knowledging, rather than recognition, I highlight the constitutive social-
ity and incipience of knowledge.
Analyzing Hegel’s brief but stunning passage on “absolute fear” in 
the dialectic of mastery and servitude, chapter 6 makes two arguments 
about the trope “Tremble.” First, it shows that no individual conscious-
ness in the Phenomenology ever actually experiences absolute fear. If by 
 “individuals” we mean undivided, self- identical beings, then individuals 
cannot experience transports. Only tremulous subjects, moving from 
one fi gure of themselves to another, riddled with intervals that intertwine 
exteriority and interiority, are transported with fear. That said, chapter 
6 makes a second argument. It shows that the syntactical arrangement 
of the different shapes of consciousness produces absolute fear. Specifi -
cally, the transitions between the chapters of the Phenomenology are mo-
ments of absolute fear. They are intervals of trembling: a back- and- forth 
movement that breaks with the linearity of any narrative of progress the 
Phenomenology might construe or be construed as. These transitions are 
not irrational or alogical but rather constitutive of the emotional syntax 
of Hegel’s speculative logic.
The twentieth century has read the Phenomenology as a triumphant 
story of progress. The seventh chapter of Tropes of Transport tells the 
story of spirit’s consumption and dismemberment. “Broken” notes that 
Bildung is experienced as torture because it repeatedly shatters self- 
certainty. The chapter argues in favor of an ethics of emotionality that 
calls for a reconciliation with disruptedness rather than of the dis-
rupted. After exploring Hegel’s description of the Phenomenology as a 
path of despair, I proceed with a discussion of two exemplary moments 
of breaking spirit: the breaking of the phrenologist’s judgment and the 
breaking of the “hard heart.” This chapter concludes my analysis of the 
Phenomenology’s emotional syntax by demonstrating again the overlap of 
emotionality and rationality in Hegel: I argue that the analytic activity 
of the under standing fractures the phenomenological text and thus en-
hances its emotionality while the self- refl ecting emotionality of despair 
emerges as a lighthearted transport.
In the epilogue, “Against Emotional Violence,” I modulate the 
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tropes of transport addressed in this study for a fi nal argument against 
approaches and paradigms in affect and emotion studies that amplify 
their vehement, passionate, or violent force. Instead, I foreground the 
incongruence and plasticity of emotional subjectivity and offer tools to 
attend to dispersed feelings and fl eeting emotions that give a texture of 
the provisional to experience—opening onto an ironic and even light-







From its inception Western philosophy has produced, sustained, and re-
produced a fi erce antagonism between rationality and emotionality. To 
expel emotion from the sphere of reason must be considered one of the 
foundational gestures of philosophy as a discipline. In the eighteenth 
century, this antagonism is attenuated somewhat as sentimentalism and 
philosophical mysticism give matters of the heart a philosophical value. 
Hegel derides this new celebration of feeling. He describes feeling as an 
ineffi cient way of relating to the world, one that indulges in nebulous 
notions and edifying idealizations because it lacks the strength to take a 
clear stance and to do the work of the concept. Reading Hegel on the 
feeling heart, one wonders to what extent Hegel really recognizes the 
epistemic signifi cance of emotion.
Yet I argue in this chapter that Hegel does not disparage emotion-
ality per se. Rather, he targets the specifi c conception of emotionality 
that is encapsulated in the sentimental and mystic trope of the feeling 
heart. His critique of this trope brings into view two important concerns 
of his philosophy: the reconciliation of rationality and emotionality, and 
the dismantlement of interiority.1 In regard to the fi rst concern, Hegel 
critiques the sentimentalists and philosophical mystics for valuing feeling 
over analysis without resolving the dichotomy between rationality and 
emotionality. In regard to the second, he denounces the fi gure of the 
heart for relegating feeling to interiority. Rather than locate emotions 
inside, Hegel offers a performative account of emotionality as moving 
one outside and beyond oneself; that is to say, he considers emotions as 
transports. In sum, this fi rst chapter introduces two demands of Hegel’s 
philosophy of emotion: that reason and emotion be mutually implicated, 
and that thoughtful transports (that is, emotional thoughts) call into 
question the construction of interiority.
Hegel spends a good part of the preface to the Phenomenology of Spirit 
defending what he calls a scientifi c philosophy against the philosophy of 
feeling (Gefühlsphilosophie) advanced by many of his contemporaries. He 
chiefl y attacks Schleiermacher—who claims that “the essence of religion 
lies neither in thought nor in practice, but in intuition and feeling”—but 
also Jacobi, Görres, and Eschenmayer, who all in some way or another 
argue for an extrasensory or inner intuition as the faculty that distin-
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guishes reason (Vernunft—derived from vernehmen, “to hear”) from the 
understanding (Verstand).2 Hegel charges this kind of philosophy of feel-
ing with (a) excluding rational approaches in favor of pure feeling, and 
(b) withdrawing from the outside world into inwardness. According to 
Hegel, these limitations are the result of a misguided insistence on the 
sacred and metaphysical quality of the absolute and thus of a failure to 
understand that spirit is manifest in physical reality.3
As if anticipating Nietzsche—who of course included Hegel in 
the list of German veil- makers (Schleiermacher)—Hegel seems to pun on 
Schleiermacher’s name when he underscores how the philosophers of 
feeling revel in obscurantism and nebulous ideas.4 Even though he is 
critical of what he calls “abstract” rationality or Refl exionsphilosophie—be-
cause he associates it with fi xity rather than fl uidity—Hegel does not 
endorse the move to the other extreme, that is, to a philosophy that re-
nounces rationality altogether.5 In the preface to the Phenomenology of 
Spirit, he instead famously praises the work of analysis as the power of the 
understanding. Clearly, a philosophy to his taste must combine a unifying 
perspective with analytic acumen. The latter is quite familiar to the dis-
cipline of philosophy; we know that “the activity of parting [Scheiden] is 
the force and labor of the understanding” (§ 32, trans. modifi ed). But do 
we properly understand philosophy’s emotional capacities when we rel-
egate the unifying perspective to feeling, and when we oppose intuitive 
feeling to the understanding by conceiving of feeling as an immediate 
sense for the whole or as an overwhelming sense for the immediate? He-
gel does not think so.
While recognizing the politically progressive aims of the philosophy 
of feeling, he also worries about the dangers of its being co-opted by es-
tablished political powers.6 He charges the philosophers of feeling with 
retreating into interiority all the while promoting change and transfor-
mation. He chides them for having abandoned the reality principle, as 
it were, and for having instead indulged in fantasy and wish- fulfi llment 
dreams:
When the proponents of that view abandon themselves to the un-
bounded fermentation of the substance, they suppose that, by throwing 
a blanket over self- consciousness and by surrendering all understand-
ing, they are God’s very own, that they are those to whom God imparts 
wisdom in their sleep. What they in fact receive and what they give 
birth to in their sleep are also for that reason merely dreams. (§ 10)
Hegel combines his denunciation of religious experience (espe-
cially of the pietistic fl avor, because of pietism’s testimonies to the inef-
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fability of the sacred) with an attack against aesthetic experience when 
he ridicules both as “the shapeless roar of the pealing of bells, or that of 
a warm vapor fi lling a space [eine warme Nebelerfüllung], or that of a musi-
cal thought which does not get to the concept [das nicht zum Begriffe . . . 
kommt]” (§ 217, trans. modifi ed). Attacking the “powerless beauty” of the 
beautiful soul’s moral sentiment because it “detests the understanding,” 
he also critiques Kant’s aesthetic experience for its self- centeredness 
(§ 32). While the “beautiful soul” is by defi nition naive, that is, unaffected 
by rational judgment, aesthetic pleasure lies in suspending the judgment 
of knowledge about the object, in not forming a concept of the intuition 
(nicht zum Begriffe . . . kommt), but in refl ecting on the subjective state of 
the subject instead. Likewise, the inner intuition of the sacred might be 
uplifting—so Hegel—but the pleasure it affords remains a private sensa-
tion: “Instead of grabbing hold of the essence [statt das Wesen zu ergreifen], 
consciousness merely feels and has thus fallen back into itself” (§ 217, 
trans. modifi ed). In all these observations, Hegel’s point of contention is 
that the feeling heart feels only itself and does not reach the other.
When Hegel disparages his contemporaries because, according to 
them, “the absolute is not supposed to be conceptually grasped [begriffen] 
but rather to be felt and intuited [, and] it is not the concept but the feel-
ing and intuition of the absolute which are supposed to govern what is 
said of it [das Wort führen],” he is concerned not only with a relation to the 
absolute that is different from theirs, but also with a way to articulate this 
relation (§ 6). Whenever intuitive feeling has the say (das Wort führen), 
it has literally a (i.e., one) word; that is to say, it doesn’t use discursive 
language but puts forward single words that are supposed to be fraught 
with signifi cance: “The beautiful, the holy, the eternal, religion, and love 
are the bait demanded to awaken the craving to bite,” Hegel mocks (§ 7, 
trans. modifi ed).7 It is Hegel’s position that these words do not signify 
anything unless they unfold or divide into predicative propositions. That 
is to say, Hegel considers propositional statements as the self- analyses of 
words or the self- diremptions of the concept. He generally holds that 
spirit manifests itself physically, and he thinks of language as one mode 
of this physical manifestation. Because any physical manifestation is nec-
essarily fi nite it must call forth a multiplicity of manifestations in view of 
giving existence to the whole of infi nite spirit. For the realm of propo-
sitional language, this means that each word generates many sentences, 
that each subject can be predicated in various ways, and that spirit tends 
to manifest itself therefore in discursive language. We discuss Hegel’s 
critique of predicative propositions in chapter 4, when we take a closer 
look at his idea of the “speculative proposition,” but in this context it 
is important to note that Hegel welcomes the analysis of the name into 
22
E M O T I O N A L  S U B J E C T S
propositions before he can dance with them to the rhythm of speculative 
logic. While this dance—Hegel’s “bacchanalian revel”—might remind 
one of the “ferment of enthusiasm” (gährende Begeisterung) with which he 
charges the philosophers of feeling, Hegel nevertheless claims that his 
revel embraces “the cold forward march of the necessity of the subject 
matter [die kalt fortschreitende Nothwendigkeit der Sache]” and its discursive 
analysis (§ 7, trans. modifi ed). Hegelian Bacchantes reel and wobble be-
cause they understand and grasp themselves.
This is not to say that Hegel ignores the signifi cance of emotion. On 
the contrary, we will see throughout this book what an important role—
both thematically and syntactically—emotionality plays in his thought. 
Nevertheless, because much of his philosophy hinges on transports that 
not only function as mediating but also emerge as mediated, Hegel does 
argue against a philosophy that considers feeling to be immediate and 
uncomplex. For fear of killing the feeling with words, the feeling heart 
might try to preserve the integrity of its intuition in single- word expres-
sions, but Hegel believes such simplicity to be illusory. His philosophy 
brings to the fore the analytic, self- differentiating, self- disrupting—even 
self- lacerating—and self- refl ecting quality of emotion.
Heartthrob of Law
The Phenomenology’s section on the “law of the heart” explores some of 
the philosophical tenets of eighteenth- century sentimentalism, in par-
ticular Rousseau’s culte du coeur and its reliance on the idea of natural 
law. With his culte du coeur, Rousseau celebrates feeling as free from being 
corrupted by the vicissitudes of refl ection. Since he cannot completely 
deny the self- refl ective aspect of feeling, Rousseau tends to construct bi-
nary differences within the fi eld of emotion: between natural feeling and 
decadent passion or between amour de soi and amour propre. He then 
idealizes the side that is less mediated by culture, refl ection, or imagina-
tion, and condemns the other. Rousseau thus establishes the dichotomy 
between nature and culture as the most fundamental difference, with 
good, virtuous, pure—in short, authentic—feeling falling on the side of 
nature, while culture opens the realm of refl ection and therefore alien-
ation.8 Rousseau naturalizes feeling and vigilantly protects the authentic-
ity of “natural feeling” against the elements of simulation and theatrical-
ity that inevitably come with refl ection, mediation, or representation.
From today’s point of view, two reasons might justify Rousseau’s 
relentless worry about the possible insincerity of emotions. The fi rst is 
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the emancipatory role that emotion plays for the emerging bourgeoi-
sie. In the eighteenth century, countering birthright with emotional alli-
ances and defi ning the emerging bourgeoisie via a culture of emotional-
ity against the calculated esprit of the nobility were driving forces in the 
emancipation from the Old Regime. The propagation of love, care, and 
natural virtue as characteristics of the new, bourgeois family, set against 
the economic and political self- interests (or amours propres to use Rous-
seau’s term) of the fi rst estate, made the early members of the bourgeoi-
sie feel morally superior to the aristocracy (see Kontje 1998, 4). As one of 
the most important assets of this new class, emotions had to be protected 
against infl ation. In this light, the modern concern with authenticity in 
matters of the heart makes good sense. But this concern does not apply 
to today’s context anymore, since the once emerging class has established 
itself quite thoroughly at this point, and the emancipatory thrust of emo-
tion is largely lost. Unfortunately, we have now an all too thorough knowl-
edge of the suppressive character of the bourgeois ideology of emotion. 
Emotionality was only briefl y embraced by the paterfamilias and then 
quickly relegated again to the private and passive sphere of women and 
children where it served patriarchal control rather than emancipation. 
Today, the more we move beyond the public- private, active- passive, and 
male- female or masculine- feminine divide, the more reactionary and 
manipulative the gesture of celebrating immediate, pure, and genuine 
feeling must appear. Therefore the opposition of true versus false emo-
tion will lose its appeal to contemporary theories of emotion. This chap-
ter will show that Hegel was one of the earliest critics of authenticity and 
its inherent violence.
The second reason for Rousseau’s urge to protect sentiment from 
the intrusion of refl ection lies in the disorienting skepticism introduced 
by enlightened rationality. This reason still persists today or has been 
renewed by deconstruction’s assaults on what has passed for too long 
as “common sense.” The current investment of cognitive philosophy in 
emotions as providers of salience in decision- making processes is surely 
a reaction to such assaults.9 With the confession by the Savoyard vicar 
in Emile and later in Les reveries du promeneur solitaire, Rousseau portrays 
“the frightening inner life of the doubter” and shows how an individual 
could become engulfed by a personal skeptical crisis (Popkin 1992, 290). 
The emotional charge of this crisis of rationality is indisputable, and yet 
Rousseau proposes that feeling offers protection from such fright. Rous-
seau and a host of followers seek remedy against the analytic frenzy that 
preys on their mind by “listening to the Voice of Nature in the most hid-
den part . . . of [their] intimacy” (Olaso 1988, 56). Olaso’s phrasing here 
bespeaks an important new requirement. In order to provide a reliable 
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reference point in this disorientation created by the pervasive skepti-
cism of rationality, feeling has to be thought of as interior. It has to be 
constructed as hidden away in the deepest intimacy of the heart so as to 
protect it from analytic negation and from the indifference of objective 
universality.10 In this light, the preoccupation with interiority, which is 
still widespread today, appears as a protection mechanism. While such 
desire for protection deserves attention, I think that the harm done by 
a strong investment in the interiority of emotion outweighs its benefi ts. 
Hegel helps us see some of the important benefi ts of exposure and of 
thinking emotionality as an experience of exposure.11
With the section on the “law of the heart,” Hegel offers a critique 
of the Rousseauian dichotomy of natural and naive feeling versus preten-
tious and self- refl ective feeling by staging the internal tensions of Rous-
seau’s position and by placing the entire discussion within the chapter on 
“Reason.” He thereby suggests that the sensibility of the fi gure of the “law 
of the heart” might be cultivated as a counterweight to rationality, but it 
is fundamentally part of and in line with reason. “Reason” in Hegel re-
fers not to a mental faculty or a psychological process, but to a particular 
worldview. From the abstract “I” to objective reality extends the sphere 
and age of reason. The subjective and the objective dimension of the 
concept mutually penetrate and embrace one another in reason—but it 
is abstraction that buys the universality here.12 The relation of the pure 
“I” to the world is animated by two interrelated yet contradicting prem-
ises, that of rational reality and that of interiority. It is by defi nition rea-
sonable to consider the real to be rational and the rational to be real.13 
The rational “I” therefore seeks to fi nd its mental and moral organization 
(the categories that determine its thoughts and its actions) in all other 
minds, all social institutions, and all of nature—that is to say, in objective 
reality in general. Short of being able to mirror itself in everything and 
everyone out there, it takes comfort in the idea that reason surely is be-
hind it all, that the inner essence of everything and everyone is rational, 
and that reason is at the heart of all external reality. It thus comes dan-
gerously close to saying that rational reality is a merely inner ideal rather 
than a fact. In an attempt to bind interiority to exteriority, the sphere of 
reason therefore “creates the law that says that the outer is the expression of 
the inner” (§ 262).
With the fi gure of the “law of the heart,” Hegel shows how the 
culture of sensibility and the philosophy of natural law build on each 
other. In his description, the promoters of sensibility strive to lift the 
pressure placed on the individual by the laws of convention and the de-
crees of the powerful, which together form a “violent order of the world” 
(§ 369). They worry about people being subject to laws they don’t iden-
25
H E A R T
tify with and to laws that the inner nature of their heart doesn’t resonate 
with. That is why they develop the idea of natural law or of the “law of 
the heart.”14
The phrase “law of the heart” couples universality with individual-
ity: on the one hand, laws are by defi nition binding for everyone subject 
to them, a principle which in this case applies without restriction, since 
natural law claims universal validity; on the other hand, the heart func-
tions as the fi gure for the inner nature and personal self- feeling of the 
individual. Sentimentalism believes in the inalienable right of all people 
to follow the voice of their heart to their fullest potential and to live in 
harmony with their own nature. It views alienation as cruelty, and self-
 realization as a normative value. This self- realization is obviously not to 
be taken in the frivolous sense of looking to satisfy every whim—that was 
the subject of the previous section, “Pleasure and Necessity”—but in the 
grand sense and “seriousness [Ernsthaftigkeit] of a high purpose, which 
seeks its pleasure in the exhibition of its own admirably excellent essence 
[Darstellung ihres vortreffl ichen eigenen Wesens] and in bringing about the 
welfare of mankind [Hervorbringung des Wohls der Menschheit]” (§ 370).15
The tension between universality and individuality at work in the 
phrase “law of the heart” could generate speculative transports. The in-
congruity at the center of this fi gure of reason could make the heart 
throb across difference; it could open the heart for transport and trans-
 subjective fi guration and for the transformation of worlds. But the pecu-
liar seriousness of the sentimentalist resists such emotionality. Instead, 
sentimentalism tries to regulate the fraught link between the universal 
and the singular via the normative ideal of organic self- expression. It 
thus naturalizes feeling instead of spiritualizing it or rendering it specu-
lative.
Hegel agrees with one part of the normative thrust of the “law of 
the heart,” namely, that it is not enough that the welfare of mankind 
and the excellence of the individual’s own nature exist as ideals some-
where in the imagination. They need to be brought about (Hervorbrin-
gung) and exhibited (Darstellung).16 Only the real is indeed rational. But 
he doesn’t agree with sentimentalism’s condemnation of alienation. In-
stead, he conceptualizes realization—or what he calls “actualization”—as 
a form of alienation, of ironic reversal and of self- emptying rather than 
fulfi llment.17 He critiques the naturalizing conception of feeling and its 
expression because—as we will see in a moment—this naturalizing con-
ception actually makes the realization of feeling impossible. When the 
advocates of the “law of the heart” link the universal purpose of promot-
ing the welfare of mankind with the particular purpose of displaying the 
excellence of their own nature, they claim organicity: the promotion of 
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the welfare of mankind is supposed to naturally grow out of one’s char-
acter just as the achievements of such promotion are supposed to refl ect 
back on that character, evincing its excellence. One is the expression of 
the other. The ideal of expression demands the organic unfolding of 
the singular inner core or heart into a universally recognizable external 
reality. It follows a logic of integrity, in the double sense of uninterrupt-
edness or wholeness, and of moral incorruptibility or honesty.18 “Expres-
sion” as an ideal leaves no room for the irony, the alienation, or even the 
indirectness of spirit’s model of self- realization.
In addition to not endorsing this organicism of the “law of the 
heart,” Hegel demonstrates that sentimentalism, itself, is not as sincere as 
it claims in its valuing of organic expression. Despite supporting reason’s 
claim that the inner mental world and the outer material world funda-
mentally cohere, sentimentalism establishes and upholds a fi rm opposi-
tion between the public sphere of external reality and the privacy of the 
heart. Across this fi rm opposition the values of singularity and universality 
switch sides, but they never actually come together. The all- too- admirably 
sensible individual starts out by claiming the heart’s universality against 
the particularity of the positive laws, but then—once it has established 
its law—feels frustrated to have lost its singularity and self- feeling to the 
alienating objectivity and heartlessness of the public sphere.19 As soon as 
the values of the heart are exhibited and put forth as statutes, the indi-
vidual can’t feel its own heart beating in them anymore.
It is the paradox of self- realization “that the individual in putting 
forward [aufstellt] his own order no longer fi nds it to be his own” (§ 372). 
While Hegel embraces this kind of self- alienation, the sentimental indi-
vidual resists it and insists that his heart be his possession. This resistance 
to alienation evinces for Hegel that the sentimentalist neither feels much 
nor actually thinks, since Hegel regards acknowledging the alien within 
the self as a constitutive part of emotional and conceptual transport. 
Thus, for Hegel, the sentimentalist doesn’t so much conceive (denkt), but 
rather conceits (dünkelt). “The heart- throb for the welfare of mankind” 
(das Herzklopfen für das Wohl der Menschheit) has turned into Eigendünkel or 
self- conceit, a cold arrogance that dehumanizes large parts of humanity: 
“the individual . . . now . . . fi nds that the hearts of people are opposed 
to his admirable intentions, and that they are thus . . . to be loathed” 
(§ 377; § 373). The naturalizing efforts of the theory of natural law end 
up denaturalizing all those who do not have the face of the excellent 
(vortreffl ich) individual. Hegel offers here an important critique of sen-
timentalism, exposing its (more or less inadvertent) backing of social 
and political injustice.20 He shows that sentimentality’s universalist rheto-
ric of recognition based on true feeling proves rather limited in scope. 
27
H E A R T
Only the cultivated soul that has achieved a certain degree of emotional 
self- mastery enjoys this recognition—everyone else gets dehumanized as 
heartless rebel. The section on the “law of the heart” has been read as 
an allusion to the Karl Moor character in Schiller’s The Robbers.21 Schiller 
depicts Karl Moor as the avenger of the disappointed and maltreated 
and the judge of tyrants and exploiters, but his conversion back into 
normative society at the end of the play is largely driven by his newfound 
conviction that the people he led in his sentimentalist battle fall short of 
sentimental excellence: that they are nothing but robbers and murder-
ers.22 From the perspective of the subaltern, this change of heart from 
compassion to disdain effectively reinforces the violence against human-
ity that the sentimentalist originally condemned.
Overly protective of his precious possession (his heart), the well-
 meaning sentimentalist is clearly not ready to “entrust” (anvertraut) 
his inner life to the alienating forces of mean reality (§ 374). Having 
just been on the verge of losing its beat, the sentimentalist’s heart now 
pounds in a fury for self- preservation: “The heart- throb for the welfare 
of mankind . . . passes over into the bluster of a mad self- conceit [ver-
rückten Eigendünkels]. It passes over into the rage of a consciousness which 
preserves itself from destruction” (§ 377). Hegel helps us understand 
why the sentimentalist turns on his initial goal to fi ght for human wel-
fare, why he begins to shun the political in favor of what Berlant calls 
the “juxtapolitical”—that is to say, why, rather than act in the pursuit of 
political transformation, the sentimentalist now prefers to share his cri-
tique with a public that feels intimate (thus pitching his critique in the 
register of complaint).23 The sentimentalist has found that his heart stops 
beating once he begins to enact the law of his heart. It is therefore self-
 preservation—the desire of the heartthrob to continue the heartthrob—
that motivates his withdrawal from the pursuit of actual change. The 
heartthrob for the welfare of mankind turns from a motivation for action 
into a goal in itself: the cultivation of feelings for the sake of feeling, be it 
that of self- pity. The result is a psychic paralysis that Hegel calls mad.24
Pitting the private interior against the public exterior, the culture 
of sensibility has created a double and mutually exclusive imperative. 
On the one hand, the values of the heart must be realized. On the other, 
their private or “originary” character must be preserved and their pe-
culiarity must not be abandoned (preisgeben) to the alienating forces of 
the public (§ 311).25 Despite or rather because of the idealized demand 
for expression, the heart remains the inner and private locus of the self. 
And the treasure of the self’s innermost nature remains locked in the 
heart when the sentimentalists—ventriloquized by Hegel—claim that, 
“through its actualization, the law of the heart precisely ceases to be a law 
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of the heart” (das Gesetz des Herzens hört eben durch seine Verwirklichung auf, 
Gesetz des Herzens zu sein, § 372).
This verdict echoes the second line of Schiller’s distich on “Lan-
guage,” “When the soul speaks, alas, it is no longer the soul that speaks” 
(Spricht die Seele, so spricht ach! schon die Seele nicht mehr).26 Both state-
ments suggest that language defi les the beauty of inner life—to use lan-
guage for self- expression is like getting embroiled with a band of rob-
bers. Stylistically, the two propositions are very similar. Both repeat the 
same phrase (Hegel: “Gesetz des Herzens,” Schiller: “spricht die Seele”) 
but shift the stress from the fi rst to the last word of the phrase in order 
to make their point. Their arguments thus rely on nonverbal elements of 
speech, such as intonation and emphasis. And the more or less discursive 
style both use requires that prosodic elements be signaled by typographic 
styling—both use italics to emphasize Seele or Herz in the second itera-
tion.27 Hegel, I wish to argue, parodies the literature and philosophy of 
sensibility epitomized in Schiller’s line—in particular its demonstrative 
use of paralinguistic elements to communicate the subjective intensity 
of inner life that is supposedly lost in language. His mimicry shows that 
while the nonverbal elements make the argument (that language defi les 
inner beauty and gets it embroiled in a band of robbers), they also un-
dercut that very argument (since language actually acts rather success-
fully here). Both Schiller’s and Hegel’s lines are concerned with the ap-
pearance of spirit in the so-called real world. According to the model that 
we fi nd epitomized in Schiller’s distich, matters of the heart, the soul, or 
the living spirit cannot, or rather must not, take shape in time and space. 
But while Schiller asks—or, indeed, declares and prescribes—why the 
living spirit fails to appear (“Warum kann der lebendige Geist dem Geist nicht 
erscheinen?”), one of the main interventions of Hegel’s philosophy is to 
argue that spirit does indeed appear, that is to say, that it does take shape 
in space and time.
Text versus Expression
Hegel argues that spirit takes shape in space and time, but he does not 
think of this actualization or manifestation along the lines of expres-
sion.28 The law of expression or self- expression that many recent readers 
of Hegel take to be the heartland of Hegelian philosophy in general is 
in fact the particular province of reason.29 Spirit, on the other hand, puts 
itself in a textual relation to itself.30
Expression is supposed to refer back to an inner truth. It makes 
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manifest for myself and others an inner nature, voice, or impulse that was 
previously hidden or latent.31 Two models of expression concern us here: 
the outward display of an inner character, state, or agitation through 
facial, vocal, gestural, linguistic, or artistic means; and the organic un-
folding of an inner core, understood along the lines of Aristotelian en-
telechy. Hegel’s “reason” vaguely combines both notions of expression, 
that of ostensibly immediate communication and that of inner teleology. 
A fi gural organicism—idealizing organic development in the cultural 
sphere of representation—drives the conception of linguistic, artistic, 
and physical expression at work in the realm of reason.32 For example, 
the “rational” ideal of a life path feels organic because such a life follows 
an inner logic that rules out contingency and disaster. The organicism 
of the sphere of reason is strongly invested in continuity, coherence, and 
integrity.
But spirit welcomes alienation (Entfremdung),33 externalization 
or self- emptying (Entäußerung),34 and—as I will argue throughout this 
book—disruption. Hegel sees language use and active conduct not as 
expressions but as utterances (Äußerungen) or exposures.35
Speech and labor are utterances [Äußerungen] in which the individual 
in himself no longer retains and possesses himself; rather, he lets the 
inner move wholly outside of him and he thus abandons it to the other. 
For that reason, we can just as well say that these utterances [Äußerun-
gen] express [ausdrücken] the inner too much as we can say that they 
 express it too little. Too much—because the inner itself breaks out in 
these expressions, no opposition remains between them and the inner; 
they do not merely provide an expression [Ausdruck] of the inner, they 
immediately provide the inner itself. Too little—because in speech and 
action the inner makes itself into an other and thereby abandons itself 
[sich preisgibt] to the mercy of the element of transformation, which 
twists the spoken word and the accomplished deed and makes some-
thing else out of them than what they, as the actions of this determinate 
individual, are in and for themselves. (§ 312, trans. modifi ed)
Utterances always express both more and less than they are supposed to. 
That makes them emotional, and yet their very emotionality, when reg-
istered and embraced, has already converted the expression into a text. 
Unlike Schiller, Hegel does not blame the medium for the inadequacy of 
expressions, but rather blames the user for insisting on adequacy and for 
conceptualizing self- realization as expression in the fi rst place. The ex-
pressive individual considers his inner life to be the measure, the proper 
essence, and the proprietor of the external marks of expression. The 
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 external marks are supposed to be expressions “in which the individ-
ual . . . retains and possesses himself [worin das Individuum . . . sich behält 
und besitzt].” Yet, by the same token, he just as often ends up feeling 
restrained and possessed by his own inwardness. If they are measured 
against the expressive ideal of continuity between inner and outer, ut-
terances always “express too little,” in the sense that the individual can’t 
recognize itself in them. It cannot fi nd in external reality what it meant 
to express and, thus, it remains locked in the heart.
Hegel’s alternative to the model of expression consists in a textual 
notion of utterances (in the broadest sense, which includes actions) that 
serve as escape routes from the prison of interiority.36 Across the vast in-
terval between Bataille’s sovereign destruction and Hegel’s dogged labor 
of the negative, Hegel’s utterances, where “the inner itself breaks out 
[ausbricht],” resonate with Nancy’s version of Bataille’s “unleashing of 
passions” (Nancy 1991, 32).37 Nancy de- dramatizes Bataille’s “passion,” 
and Nancy’s version of “unleashing” is related to Hegel’s unusual cele-
bration of alienation as the double of self- realization. Nancy’s version 
understands “unleashing” or ausbrechen (lit.: “to break out”) as “not the 
free doing of a subjectivity” (be it Bataille’s sovereign individual or the 
rational expressionists who actively, even though in the latter case with 
considerable agony, press through the walls of their cages), but as the 
uncontainable effect of communication understood as contagion (ibid.). 
Passion, then, is never mine to begin with, nothing inside me to be ex-
pressed, but “always already” out there, unleashed, passing through.
The slight shift in the terminology of Hegel’s passage, from Aus-
druck (expression) to Äußerung (utterance), makes all the difference. 
While Ausdruck refers back to an inner authority and remains solipsis-
tic in scope, Äußerung exposes to others. It is thus synonymous with En-
täußerung—and I am indeed tempted to translate both words as “expo-
sure.” Such utterances or exposures “do not merely provide an expression 
of the inner, they immediately provide the inner itself [sie geben nicht nur 
einen Ausdruck des Innern, sondern es unmittelbar].” Nothing is held back for 
future excuses. Hegel abandons the idea that the essential is left inside 
while the outside manifestation is simply a representation, a portrait so to 
speak, that more or less resembles the original. Nancy’s reading of Hegel 
crystallizes for us that there is no agent or knowing subject beyond, be-
hind, or before the utterance for Hegel: “Manifestation surges up out of 
nothing, into nothing. The manifested is something, and every thing is 
manifested. But there is no ‘manifester’ that would be yet another thing 
than manifestation itself. Nor is there a spectator to manifestation” who 
would be exempt from manifestation (Nancy 2002, 33). While manifes-
tation surges up out of nothing, it is always in the plural since the acts 
31
H E A R T
of witnessing and reading the manifested themselves manifest what is 
manifest. “Manifestation is therefore of itself”—and thus divided within 
or plural—“it is of itself as much as it is of nothing” (ibid.). It is not that 
an individual’s deed gives an indication of her real internal character, 
but “the deed is this, and its being is not merely a sign, it is the thing itself 
[die Sache selbst]. The deed is this, and the individual person is what the 
deed is” (§ 322). Hegel’s almost obsessive repetition of the verb “is” ham-
mers home the point that, instead of a hierarchical opposition between 
material existence and ideal meaning, he proposes the unranked and 
interwoven multiplication of refl exive instances of being. As in the spec-
ulative proposition, where the subject is dragged into the predicate, here 
the inside is drawn to the outside.38 In that sense, what used to be called 
“inner” has already become other; it is alienated in a good sense.
Expression is beholden to subjective intention—or to put it slightly 
differently, in the model of expression the individual is beholden to it-
self. But in Hegel’s textual model of self- realization, the subject relin-
quishes, exposes, even carries to the market and puts a price on (sich 
preisgibt) its insides, without therefore being caught in an economy of 
possession or sacrifi ce. “Manifestation makes a return and is nothing but 
this return. But, because this return does not come to a presupposed 
substance, it is return to nothing—or it is not a return, and it only comes 
back in throwing itself forth . . .—being thrown out of self as self, being 
this throw itself, and thereby its own passage into the other” (Nancy 
2002, 39). The text—made of words or acts—sends forth and carries 
on. Rather than being the result of my intention (mein Meinen), its being 
(Sein) is its own (sein): the text is a self- refl ective subject in its own right. 
The self- refl ection of the text’s materiality or being (Sein) in its posses-
sive pronoun (sein) introduces a slight discrepancy between the mirror 
images (here in the form of an upper- and a lowercase s) that makes 
the text restless. This restlessness is its capacity for transport or self-
 transformation, for “its own passage into the other.” Through exposures, 
exertions, utterances, the individual “abandons itself to the mercy of the 
element of transformation, which twists [verkehrt] the spoken word and 
the accomplished deed.” While such negativity—the capacity for self-
 affectation, emotional self- refl ection, and transport—would have been 
locked into interiority in the model of expression, in Hegel’s textual 
model of emotionality, this inner difference manifests as outer differ-
ence. “Unrepresentable by any individual sign, emotion is represented 
by traces in a differential network. Textuality offers an alternative to ex-
pression and indication” (Terada 2001, 45). The Phenomenology of Spirit, 
as textual manifestation of spirit’s textual relation to itself across its vari-
ous shapes, puts to work what Terada describes as “a concept of emotion 
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as the phenomenology of the textual difference between ideality and 
substance” (ibid.). According to Terada, emotion registers textual differ-
ence. In Hegel, we see that the textual difference within spirit (between 
ideality and substance or, as Hegel would say, between for- itself and in-
itself) transports spirit from one manifestation of itself to another. That 
which exists transforms—“continues on his own to grow [es wächst für sich 
fort]” (§ 372)—that is to say, it enjoys its own spirituality, emotionality, 
and subjectivity.39
An utterance made is always duplicitous: “The act as an accom-
plished piece of work has the double and opposite signifi cance of being 
either the inner individuality and not its expression; or, as external, to be an 
actuality free- standing from the inner [vom Innern freie Wirklichkeit], which 
is something entirely different from the inner” (§ 312). The individual is 
beside itself with manifestation, and, as such, it has become another. Any 
such “being- of-itself- outside- itself- in-the- other” is already double if not 
triple (Nancy 2002, 35). The singular exists only in the plural. No spec-
tator of manifestation or reader of text can be outside of manifestation 
and textuality; therefore every view will itself be another manifestation 
and every reading another text. These texts will refl ect one another and 
get embroiled in one another without therefore being the same. The 
text model of self- realization interrupts the focus on the individual. It 
unbinds or dislocates the self, and unleashes “the passion of singularity 
as such” (Nancy 1991, 32). Every utterance passes. Passes into an other. 
We can describe this with Nancy as “the sharing of singularities in move-
ment” (Nancy 2002, 78) or with Hegel as the entangling of one in the 
other: “through the actualization . . . he gets himself entangled [sich zu 
verwickeln]” (§ 372).
When Hegel argues that “the force of spirit is only as great as its 
exertion [Äußerung], and its depth goes only as deep as it trusts itself to 
disperse and lose itself in its display and interpretation [in seiner Ausle-
gung sich auszubreiten und sich zu verlieren getraut] of itself” (§ 10, trans. 
modifi ed), he doesn’t refer to an organic unfolding of an inner core, 
but describes a self- loss and discontinuity—an Auslegung, like the display 
of unrelated goods in a discount store or like the hermeneutic process 
that adds one interpretation to the other without necessarily digesting all 
previous interpretations. “The self is what does not possess itself” (Nancy 
2002, 36). Hegel suggests not that the subject gets to realize its own integ-
rity, but that it gets entangled in others.
Manifestation is necessarily fi nite, and “fi nite being always presents 
itself ‘together,’ hence severally” (Nancy 1991, 28). Hegel describes spirit 
therefore as “the I that is we and the we that is I” (§ 177).40 The sphere 
of reason, on the other hand, does not yet have a sense for plural and 
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palpable difference. It has in a rather rash and undifferentiated way sub-
lated singularity into universality and therefore doesn’t have much of a 
conception of community. Its notion of self- realization as self- expression 
is tortuously focused on the individual. This focus leaves its heart frustrat-
ingly empty—“an empty depth” (§ 10).
Why does the sphere of reason produce solipsistic individuals? So 
far we have shown that this is so because of its peculiar notion of emo-
tionality. The sphere of reason is more concerned with the true expres-
sion of somehow preexisting feelings than with transports (which are 
textual and performative generations of and identifi cations across radi-
cally different worlds and life forms of spirit). Therefore it produces ab-
stract individuals and abstract universals. But how was it possible for this 
abstract notion of emotionality to gain traction? How is it possible for 
reason to completely elide the plural? In order to address this question 
we need to examine the birth of reason. While, so far, we have analyzed 
a particular fi gure of reason (the sentimentalist and his law of the heart) 
and compared the worldview of reason in general with the worldview of 
spirit in general, I will now go back in the phenomenological narrative 
to offer a genealogy of reason.
Hegel’s chapter on reason in the Phenomenology opens once the “un-
happy consciousness” has abandoned all agency, self- knowledge, and sat-
isfaction, that is, once it has effectively renounced personal freedom and 
has turned itself into a thing. Through what is easily identifi ed as the 
customs and rituals of the Catholic Church—the centrality of the priest, 
the purchasing of sin- forgiveness with the abdication of the will, and the 
blind following of uncomprehended rites, in particular the liturgy per-
formed in the foreign language of Latin—self- consciousness has, after a 
long process of halfhearted attempts, eventually succeeded in “having in 
truth emptied itself of its I [seines Ich sich entäußert], and . . . having made 
its immediate self- consciousness into a thing, into an objective being” 
(§ 229). At this point, the unhappy consciousness truly bows to its lord, 
that is, to its own conception of an unchanging truth.
The pleasure gained from this masochistic performance comes in 
the form of the “certainty for this consciousness that, in its individuality, 
it . . . is all reality [Gewißheit des Bewußtseins, in seiner Einzelnheit . . . alle 
 Realität zu sein]” (§ 230, trans. modifi ed). By making itself into an ob-
ject of knowledge, the “unhappy consciousness” has posited that con-
sciousness is not the agent of the ongoing epistemological endeavor, but 
rather is subjected to the phenomenological drive of a bigger subject—
what Hegel calls spirit. In the transition to reason, consciousness learns 
to be an object, not for itself but for others—a “being for an other,” as 
Hegel puts it (Sein für anderes, § 351). To be precise, since others in the 
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plural (andere) have at this point not yet entered consciousness’s hori-
zon of experience, all that the protagonist has learned (advancing in 
baby steps throughout) is to subject itself to a singular and neutral other 
(anderes)—its lord or its conception of truth as unchanging. By thus ren-
dering itself the object of a knowledge that operates with the truth cri-
terion of inalterability, this consciousness refuses to get a sense for the 
self- humbling, self- emptying, and self- transforming of spirit. It misses its 
chance to recognize that absolute knowledge is not a positive knowledge, 
but a regulative principle, as it were, that gives individual manifestations 
of spirit the freedom to break away from their certainty or “naturalness,” 
as Hegel would put it, and thus generate a multiplicity of different mani-
festations.41 Instead, consciousness is quick to identify with its lord. In 
the blink of a transition, it has already installed itself in the position 
of certainty again and has reduced all difference to its own identity: it 
is a “certainty for this consciousness that, in its individuality, it . . . is all 
reality” (§ 230). But certainty of course differs from truth; it is truth only 
“for consciousness,” not “in and for itself.” Since certainty as such is thus 
insuffi ciently mediated, consciousness in the position of certainty has 
something abstract, immediate, or “merely natural” to it.
The sphere of reason immediately unites universality (“all reality”) 
and individuality in the abstract “I,” without attending to the differences 
among the many. From a later, more mediated perspective we can see 
that this kind of abstraction is enabled by the textuality of spirit. He-
gel’s retrospective description of the transition from self- consciousness 
to reason reads: “The unhappy self- consciousness emptied itself of its 
self- suffi ciency [entäußerte sich seiner Selbstständigkeit] and agonizingly ren-
dered its being- for- itself into a thing [und rang sein Fürsichsein zum Dinge 
 heraus]. As a result, it returned from self- consciousness into conscious-
ness” (§ 344, trans. modifi ed). Textual difference is legibly at work here. 
The passage offers a typical example of Hegel’s easy shifts in perspec-
tive—part and parcel of his use, as I argue, of free indirect discourse 
throughout the Phenomenology. The extra- linguistic referent for the per-
sonal pronoun “it” in the second sentence is not the same as the referent 
for the subject of the fi rst sentence (the unhappy consciousness). Rather, 
“it” refers to the new fi gure of consciousness—“observing reason”—
which indeed behaves as consciousness relating to the world. The un-
happy consciousness does not relate to the world since it has (that was the 
point) renounced its subject status. Nevertheless, according to syntactic 
conventions, “it” refers to the subject of the previous sentence. This pas-
sage thus shows beautifully how Hegel treats the different shapes of the 
protagonist as fi guring one another—that is, as able to stand in for each 
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other and therefore as both different and identical. Thematic reference 
and syntactic reference differ but imperceptibly slide into one another. 
Hegel continues, “However, this, which is thing, is self- consciousness . . . 
the immediate unity of being [des Seins] and what is its own [des Seinen]” 
(§ 344, trans. modifi ed). Here he synthesizes both references, remind-
ing us that what is now the object of “observing reason” used to be the 
subject of the fi rst sentence—a self- consciousness unhappily trying to 
escape from its self. As the result of an itinerary that is, in good Hegelian 
fashion, preserved in the outcome, the world being observed, which pre-
sents itself as thinghood in its sheer material being (Sein), thus carries 
with it its prehistory as a subject and thus retains the power to refl ect on 
itself and to possess itself (Seinen). The slippages in reference, drawing 
the memory of one into the other, transform the dejected self not just 
into a physical thing, but into a physical thing with self- awareness: “Self-
 consciousness found the thing as itself and itself as a thing; i.e., it is for 
self- consciousness that it is in itself objective actuality” (§ 347). Despite the 
fi nitude of its embodiment, despite its individuality, this self- conscious 
thing enjoys the pleasure of knowing that it is “in itself objective actuality” 
or “all  reality.” Its happiness comes courtesy of the easy shifts in refer-
ence. These shifts have allowed consciousness to identify or confuse itself 
with the supreme other (anderes)—the position of objectivity and stable 
truth—and, in doing so, they have elided the existence of others in the 
plural, of other rational things, with whom this rational thing might have 
had to share reality and to whom it might have had to expose itself. This 
is to say that the felicity of the sphere of reason (which, as we know, 
will soon give way to a feeling of emptiness that will battle with heart-
throb madness) is sponsored by the textuality of spirit.42 Textual differ-
ence underlies expressivity.
Force of Interiority
We will now explore the textual emotionality of spirit from a different 
angle by focusing on how Hegel’s work dismantles the construction of in-
teriority and entangles rationality with emotionality. Once again, we will 
pursue a genealogical approach: this time we will trace the emergence of 
interiority in the Phenomenology.
Interiority makes its fi rst appearance in the Phenomenology of Spirit in 
the chapter on “Force and the Understanding”—not as the inner life of 
human subjects, but as “the inner of things [Innres der Dinge]” (§ 136). I’d 
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like to take seriously the fact that Hegel presents inwardness as primarily 
not human. It is the fi rst step in dismantling the sentimental construction 
of interiority as the touchstone of true humanity.
The focus on “the inner of things” also allows us to take a closer look 
at the understanding’s analytic mode of thinking, which I have bracketed 
with the worldview of reason under the category of rationality. To those 
who like to follow the linear development of the Phenomenology chrono-
logically, I have to send out a warning. It may seem strange to relate 
the much earlier and (within the chapter on “Consciousness”) relatively 
small confi guration of the understanding to the later chapter and much 
larger sphere of reason. But there is a Hegelian reason for this: reason 
unites consciousness and self- consciousness, and the understanding is 
the fi gure of transition from consciousness to self- consciousness. Once 
the temporal distinction between consciousness and self- consciousness is 
“relieved” in reason, the understanding actually functions as the mode of 
thought internal to the worldview of reason that bridges the moments of 
consciousness and self- consciousness. I will, however, also make a further 
leap and draw on Hegel’s extra- narratival remarks in the preface while 
analyzing the specifi c fi gure of consciousness that is the understanding. 
In the preface, Hegel describes the understanding as a specifi cally ana-
lytic mode of thought that not only severs the inseparable, but fi xes, sta-
bilizes, or reifi es what it has thus severed.
The fi gure of consciousness that Hegel calls “the understanding” 
has lost faith in perception and sense- certainty. It considers what nature 
presents to the senses as mere appearance—an appearance that lies 
and deceives—and imagines that there must be “a supersensible world as 
the true world” behind the veil of appearance (§ 144). The understand-
ing imagines that truth must be hidden in the “inner of things.”43 Why 
does it come up with this strange idea that vacillates between the po-
litically progressive (fi nding agency and interiority in non- human be-
ings and thus challenging the modern apotheosis of human being) and 
the paranoidally metaphysical (suspecting that things lie when they pre-
sent themselves)? Because the object has dissolved in front of its eyes, 
as it were, into a play of forces. Rather than offering up for perception 
more or less substantial things, the objective world presents itself to the 
suspicious understanding as an anchorless and unpoised (haltungslos) 
web of forces that disappear as soon as they appear: “The force as actual 
exists purely and simply in the exertion [Äußerung], which at the same 
time is nothing but a self- negation [ein sich selbst Aufheben]” (§ 141, trans. 
modifi ed). While the understanding can isolate and identify particular 
forces, it quickly realizes that a force doesn’t exist as isolated, but only 
in a precarious and dynamic dependence on its opposite force: “These 
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two forces exist as essences existing for themselves; but their existence 
lies in the kind of movement of each against the other so that their being 
is even more a pure being- posited through an other, which is to say, that the 
pure meaning of their being is even more that of vanishing” (§ 141). 
Upon close consideration, the object has thus revealed itself as a dynamic 
interplay of transient forces.
With the discovery of this interplay, the understanding has found 
infi nity within the realm of fi nite physical existence. This infi nity—which 
Hegel defi nes as the trembling “sameness of the non- same as the non-
 same [Gleichsein des Ungleichen als Ungleichen]” (§ 160) and at the same 
time as the tension- producing “repulsion of the homonymous, as the 
homonymous, from itself [Abstoßen des Gleichnamigen als Gleichnamigen 
von sich selbst]” (ibid., trans. modifi ed)—brings with it a great deal of 
restlessness, especially since the movements of self- division and self-
 unifi cation have themselves ceased to function as stable opposites (“the 
distinctions [within and between] estrangement [Entzweiung] and coming-
 to-be- in-parity- with- itself [Sichselbstgleichwerden] are likewise only this move-
ment of self- sublation [diese Bewegung des sich Aufhebens]” (§ 162). Hegel 
indeed describes infi nity as the “absolute restlessness [absolute Unruhe] of 
pure self- movement” (ibid.).
Now, one could say that the understanding projects an inner space 
of truth and calm because it doesn’t like all this agitation. That would be 
a relatively familiar critical move—exposing the affect (in this case irri-
tation, suspicion, paranoia) that motivates the ostensibly rational stance. 
One could add that the understanding remains too “natural” or dense a 
shape of consciousness to be comfortable with this kind of transient self-
 overcoming of the spirited world. Yet Hegel proposes something slightly 
different and much more unsettling. According to his account, the un-
derstanding manages to dissociate emotionality from rationality by split-
ting the “inner of things” off from the interplay of forces. It posits the 
interplay of forces as the restless, moody, and self- negating outer appear-
ance of things that is opposed to the perfectly rational and stable inner 
truth of those things. In doing so, the understanding simply does what 
it is supposed to do as understanding: it separates the inseparable. Yet 
in this rather matter- of-fact pursuit of its business, the understanding 
is one dimension of restless infi nity—the activity of “dividing . . . what 
is undivided” [Unterscheiden des Ununterschiedenen]”—and therein lies its 
contribution to the emotionality of spirit (§164, trans. modifi ed).
Rationality has emotional qualities in Hegel’s account, while the 
emotionality at work in his philosophy has rational qualities. In the world 
of spirit, emotionality and rationality are entangled. As I have proposed 
earlier, emotionality is analytic and self- refl ective in that it registers and 
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thus reinforces self- incongruity. At the same time, rational analysis gener-
ates tears (Zerrissenheit) that are emotional.44 It is therefore no accident 
that, when Hegel enlists the analytic capacities of the understanding in 
the service of spirit, he turns up with something very much akin to psy-
chic work:
Spirit is this power not as the positive that avoids looking at the nega-
tive, as is the case when we say of something that it is nothing or that 
it is false, and then, being done with it, go off on our own way on to 
 something else. No, spirit is this power only when it looks the negative 
in the face and lingers with it. (§ 32, trans. modifi ed)
The understanding performs a kind of “working- through,” where the 
rational and the emotional cannot be separated from one another.
It is true that the understanding, by itself, is unable to supply the 
unity of estrangement and self- sameness, which is the other dimension of 
restless infi nity. It is the restless “dividing of what is undivided,” but it can-
not register what it is doing as emotional—both because it doesn’t hold 
together what it severs (it is the fi gure that will bring us self- consciousness, 
but it isn’t quite self- conscious yet), and because the activity of separat-
ing the inseparable is precisely what defi nes the understanding and in 
this activity the understanding is thus actually not incongruous with itself 
(§ 164). This self- consistency is the reason why the understanding identi-
fi es with the calm rationality of the supersensible world—“raised above 
perception, consciousness exhibits itself as merged with the supersen-
sible world by virtue of the middle term of appearance [durch die Mitte 
der Erscheinung] through which it gazes into this background”—and thus 
transitions to self- consciousness (§ 165).
I sense an irony in Hegel’s predication of self- consciousness as 
“raised above perception [erhoben über die Wahrnehmung].” The protago-
nist’s identifi cation with calm rationality here in effect solidifi es infi nity; 
it thus produces not so much a consciousness that has attained higher 
wisdom as a consciousness that proves unspirited and aloof. While He-
gel has a fl uid notion of infi nity—which he describes as the “absolute 
restlessness of pure self- movement”—and while the understanding de-
serves credit for being the fi rst fi gure of consciousness to discover the 
spiritual notion of infi nity, this fl uidity gets lost in the Platonic ideas of 
the understanding (§ 163). The understanding is the power of fi xation; 
it turns even infi nity into a fi xed idea by isolating it from fi nite existence 
and assigning it the virtual space of interiority.45 This kind of stable infi n-
ity is surely just as bad an infi nity (schlechte Unendlichkeit) as the one that 
is posited by the Romantics as unattainable, which Hegel disparages. It 
doesn’t register spirit’s emotionality.
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While the understanding hopes in this way to have anchored the 
play of vanishing forces, we will see shortly that it has dropped its anchor 
into nothingness. At the end of the chapter on the understanding, dur-
ing the transition to self- consciousness, it becomes clear that the inner 
is indeed empty, that the veil of appearance hides nothing: “It turns out 
that behind the so-called curtain, which is supposed to hide what is in-
ner, there is nothing to be seen unless we ourselves go behind it, just as 
much so that there be somebody who does the seeing as so that there be 
something behind the curtain that can be seen” (§ 165, trans. modifi ed). 
The phenomenality of the vanishing forces is indeed infi nitely richer 
than this virginal space of interiority that the understanding has cracked 
open—and yet consciousness is drawn to this empty space.
Even when consciousness fi lls the room behind the veil to look at 
itself, there is nothing to see. Consciousness has no content other than 
the objective world at this point. After having gone through the dialec-
tics of sense- certainty, perception, and the understanding, consciousness 
knows nothing about itself as such. The textual itinerary has not given 
us any information about what consciousness might be, apart from its 
perspective on the world out there. Now that consciousness wants to be 
exclusively “for- itself,” it has nothing to show for itself but empty ideality. 
Nancy reminds us that “the self reveals itself to be nothing other than 
negativity for itself. But negativity for itself is not a thing . . . ‘Self’ is noth-
ing that preexists ‘for itself’ ” (Nancy 2002, 36– 37). In the subsequent 
struggle for life and death, self- consciousness will become embodied and 
gain a sense for its precarious life. Then it will slowly create more and 
more threads of attachment and thus shape a more and more concrete 
identity. But at this point, we encounter the unreal (perhaps awesome) 
self- refl ection of pure interiority without any exteriority: “the gazing of 
the inner into the inner” (§ 165)—the gazing of nothing into nothing-
ness. Out of nothing, the magic of the understanding, we know, will 
create something. But in this moment—when the “inner of the thing” 
and the inner self stare at each other and into each other’s void—a sense 
“surges up,” as Nancy would say, that “ ‘being for itself’ is to be ‘for’ this 
absolute non- preexistence” (Nancy 2002, 37).46
The transition from the understanding to self- consciousness dem-
onstrates in an exemplary fashion how the phenomenologist/ s are af-
fected by the mindset of the protagonist/ s they observe. Or rather—
since this formulation still presumes the independent preexistence of 
sophisticated phenomenologist/ s who might or might not fall for the 
 naïveté of their subject—I should say that this passage shows how the phe-
nomenologist/ s develop together with the protagonist/ s. The pronoun 
“we,” in the phrase “there is nothing to be seen unless we ourselves go be-
hind it,” includes the protagonist/s as much as the phenomenologist/s. 
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The evidence for this identifi cation lies in the specifi c meaning of two 
terms used in this passage: “free” and “concept.” When the phenomenol-
ogist/ s claim that “this infi nity is, to be sure, already the soul of all that 
came before, but it was in the inner that it itself fi rst freely emerged [frei 
hervorgetreten],” they don’t use “free” in the full- fl edged Hegelian sense of 
being able to act in full acknowledgment of the self- alienating dynamic 
of action and of one’s interdependence with others in a sociality, but in 
the simple sense of free from, meaning in this case that infi nity is isolated 
and no longer obscured by fi nitude (§ 163). Similarly, when the phenom-
enologist/ s state that “what is an object in sensuous covering [in sinnlicher 
Hülle] for the understanding is now there for us in its essential shape 
as pure concept,” they don’t use “concept” in the full- fl edged Hegelian 
sense of the self- differentiating unity of self- refl ecting materiality and 
self- actualizing ideality, but in the more common sense of an intellectual 
notion, a mental entity that is fundamentally different from and suppos-
edly superior to its material instantiation or sensuous covering (§ 164, 
trans. modifi ed). Clearly, the narrator of the Phenomenology, or the phe-
nomenologist/ s, use the terms “free” and “concept” here in the sense in 
which the understanding uses them.
The fact that the protagonist and the phenomenologist co-develop 
their terminology and thus their interpretations of the world says some-
thing important about Hegel’s notion of “absolute knowing.” While it is 
the common reception of Hegel that the phenomenologist has “absolute 
knowledge” from the beginning, it takes perhaps a literary reading—
one that eschews the typically philosophical (even though not Hegelian) 
habit of abstracting from the temporal dimension of the argument and 
instead attends to strategies of narrative development—to bring into 
view that this is indeed not the case. On the verge of becoming self-
 conscious, the protagonist identifi es with those who observe it—that is, 
the phenomenologist/ s—not because they know more, but because this 
shift in perspective opens the gap that allows “natural consciousness” to 
negate its naturalness and to construct a second nature. The identifi ca-
tion between protagonist and phenomenologist/ s is mutual: the phe-
nomenologist/ s (readers and narrator) identify with the protagonist in 
order to gain experiential insight into one of the life forms of spirit, and 
the protagonist identifi es with the phenomenologist/ s in order to gain 
self- consciousness. In this mutual identifi cation, the phenomenologist/ s 
have precisely nothing to offer. There is no hidden treasure of superior 
knowledge that lies at the heart of inwardness. The immaterial, supersen-
sible “inner of things” is an empty abstraction, and neither the protago-
nist/ s nor the phenomenologist/ s can fi ll it with given knowledge about 
the future of spirit. Hegel does not think of spirit as some kind of sack, 
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inside which one might fi nd something positive—a knowledge, a feeling, 
or “all sorts of faculties, inclinations, and passions.”47 If it is anything, 
interiority is the space of negativity; it can perhaps best be described as 
the reifi ed gap within the subject. A fully saturated phenomenality would 
be a world without transport—but the understanding’s rational analysis 
has cracked phenomenality and has therefore introduced emotionality. 
The space of interiority, which is opened by the understanding, gives us 
the sense of self- incongruence that transports the subject beyond any 
“natural” or given fi guration.
The fact that interiority has made its fi rst entrance on the scene of 
phenomenology as the interiority of the thing shows that it is an abstrac-
tion from, and a derivative of, exteriority. The “inner” is not to be taken 
as something positive, neither at the beginning of the protagonist’s path 
nor at the end. The “inner” cannot be felt, nor rationally determined, 
nor “unfolded,” nor attained—as if it were some thing. Its role is to un-
bind the rich web of attachments and determinations characteristic of 
the empirical world. With its abstract analysis, the understanding cracked 
open the phenomenal world. This crack both allows for self- refl ection 
and prevents the mirror images from coinciding. It is the negativity or 
incongruity that sets thought into motion and unsettles (or makes emo-
tional) nature and mind at every stage of their passage.
The expression model of self- realization is of no use for Hegel be-
cause it treats spirit as a sack—it presupposes that there is something 
positive inside the individual that can or should subsequently be ex-
pressed. In Hegel’s text model, outside and inside leap simultaneously 
“out of nothing, into nothing” (Nancy 2002, 33). Negativity is at work in 
the outside world; “the ‘phenomenon’ is not appearance: it is the lively 
transport of self and the leap into manifest existence” (ibid.). But the un-
derstanding isolates this work, abstracts it from the phenomenal world, 
reifi es it and arranges the space of interiority for it. It internalizes the 
sense of nothingness and tends thereby to lose it. Instead of allowing all 
determinations to pass, the understanding holds on to a representation 
of negativity, to the image of an interior space—like a pit, as we will see 
in the next section—carved into a stony body.
The Pit
In the “Psychology” chapter of the Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences, 
Hegel describes human intelligence as a pit, shaft, or mine (Schacht). 
This pit is obviously another fi gure for interiority, and this time we have 
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to take it at face value, since the Encyclopedia is a fairly straightforward 
philosophical text with no protagonist or narrator who could allow the 
author to assume an ironic distance from the thought fi gures under dis-
cussion.48 Hegel’s discussion of this fi gure of interiority is again bound 
up with a discussion of language. We will see once more that Hegel’s con-
ception of language is quite different from the expressive language that 
the sphere of reason is so fond of. Also, the vector of his discussion here 
is different. While the proponent of the “law of the heart” was concerned 
with expression, with giving an external reality to what is harbored inside 
the heart, Hegel here analyzes the inverse movement: how do external 
things get inside, into our minds.
He conducts this analysis under the heading of Erinnerung. The 
word usually means recollection, but Hegel uses the term in the literal 
sense of “inwardizing.” In Hegel’s account, perceived objects are inward-
ized (erinnert), or their images are transferred from outer intuition into 
the pit of intelligence, where—quite surprisingly—they are not depos-
ited but disappear. It is grossly naive, according to Hegel, to think of this 
pit of intelligence as a physical space, where ideas are deposited in “spe-
cial fi bres and areas [besonderen Fibern und Plätzen].”49 The space of the 
inner pit is not divided like empirical space, but has its own indivisible 
spatiality. In the process of inwardizing (Erinnerung), the intuitions thus 
lose the spatiotemporal coordinates that are a given in the outside world. 
Hegel uses another metaphor to hint at this utter lack of empirical coor-
dinates, describing the pit of interiority as “nocturnal” (nächtlicher; Hegel 
1971a, § 453, Zusatz). Across and beyond these imperfect metaphors, the 
“inner” has to be thought of as rigorously immaterial, ideational, and 
indeterminate. But in Hegel’s philosophical world indeterminacy means 
lack of reality. It is in this sense that the images disappear in the pit of 
intelligence like in a black hole or an abyss.
One particular kind of image is the written word. (Hegel actually 
prefers the term “name” rather than “word.”) In addition to, let’s say, the 
dagger as object, we can look at the script dagger and we can transfer this 
image into the nocturnal pit of our intelligence. Nevertheless, Hegel in-
sists that the image of the script is special. Unlike other sensual images, 
the script image is for him the result of a history and an archive of lay-
ers of mediation.50 The written name or word is, strictly speaking, a sign 
for a sign for the recollection of an inwardized intuition or, rather, for 
repeated recollections of repeated intuitions. Therefore the script is 
not simply internalized the way immediate sensory images are. In this 
case, Hegel does not speak of inwardizing (Erinnerung) but of memory 
(Gedächtnis). The script is an external interiority: the material memory of 
previous acts of inwardizing and externalizing.
43
H E A R T
Here is the kind of history that is archived in the external memory 
that is the script: after the original literal “inwardizing” (Er- innerung) 
of the intuition of a dagger and its disappearance in the interiority of 
the nocturnal pit, repeated vanishing acts of the same kind have slowly 
built up the affective and cognitive energy that then surged up again 
as a recollection (now Erinnerung in the common sense—“sogenannte 
Erinnerung”—as opposed to literal inwardizing) out of the nothingness 
of the immaterial pit (Hegel 1971a, § 454). The immateriality or negativ-
ity of the black hole of interiority has received further density from the 
recurring counter- vectored movements of recollecting and inwardizing. 
This proto- linguistic texture has generated a somewhat external internal 
space—the “inner workshop [innere Werkstätte],” where the “imagination 
which creates signs [Zeichen machende Phantasie]” then has produced a 
sign for this complex event: the name dagger (Hegel 1971a, § 457, Zusatz, 
trans. modifi ed). The name was produced fi rst in the form of a spo-
ken word. The written word, dagger, Hegel insists, is a sign of the second 
order. It stands not for the meaning of the word dagger but for the spo-
ken signifi er “dagger.” This relative distance of the script from the dag-
ger facilitates the dislocation of signifi er and signifi ed that Hegel gener-
ally postulates when he insists on the arbitrary character of signs.
We know, especially since Derrida’s analysis of Hegel’s semiology, 
that Hegel differentiates between sign and symbol and that this distinc-
tion is based on the arbitrary character of the sign as opposed to the 
motivated character of the symbol. The symbol illustrates its meaning. 
Signs, on the other hand, are apt to transport meaning without bringing 
it into view.51
As a matter of principle for Hegel, Western languages consist of 
signs. That is also why he prefers to speak of “names” rather than of 
words—names are “externalities which of themselves have no sense, and 
only get meaning as signs” (Hegel 1971a, § 459, Zusatz, trans. modifi ed). 
Yet he calls attention to the fact—and draws considerable capital from 
it—that, as profi cient readers, we tend to treat written words like hiero-
glyphs.52 We forget that they are written signs for spoken signs. Without 
having to vocalize the words while reading we know immediately what is 
meant, or rather—and this is taking it one step further—we don’t even 
bring to mind the meaning of the word, but mechanically string together 
words that we know inside out. Reading is like thinking in this: both 
reach their characteristic speed precisely because they do not have to 
take a detour via the pronunciation of the words, or the representation 
of their meaning in the mind, let alone the visualization of the objects in 
the imagination. Hegel refers to this economy of thought when he claims 
that “we think in names” (Hegel 1971a, § 462, Zusatz).
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Profi ciency in reading and thinking not only undoes Hegel’s dis-
tinction between sign and symbol, it also undermines the proper working 
of both. While he had originally defi ned names as signs and hieroglyphs 
as symbols, reading and thinking now turn out to operate by way of sym-
bols, but of symbols that do not symbolize: they don’t bring meaning into 
view. This absence of meaning in turn shows that signs have also ceased 
to properly signify. The mechanical stringing together of words that we 
know inside out, as it were, brings to the fore the more than radical ar-
bitrariness of signs: their fundamental insignifi cance and impropriety. 
Signs gain a peculiar kind of literality or materiality in this display of 
their catachrestic character. The written word now becomes the thing it-
self, without referring back to a putatively antecedent reality: “The name 
is thus the thing as it . . . counts in the realm of representation [die Sache, 
wie sie im Reiche der Vorstellung Gültigkeit hat]” (Hegel 1971a, § 462). The 
mechanical “memory which retains names [Namen behaltende Gedächtniß]” 
thus not only establishes a strangely externalized space within interior-
ity, but it completely turns the pit of intelligence inside out, it magically 
creates being out of nothingness: “This supreme inwardizing [höchste 
Erinnerung] of representation is the supreme self- emptying of intelli-
gence [höchste Entäußerung], in which it renders itself the mere being, 
the universal space of names as such, i.e. of meaningless words” (Hegel 
1971a, § 461/ § 463, trans. modifi ed). Signs are in view without meaning. 
Such is their monstrosity. It overlaps with the monstrosity of Hegel call-
ing intelligence an “unconscious pit” (bewußtloser Schacht; Hegel 1971a, 
§ 453, Zusatz; trans. modifi ed).
With his semiology Hegel “relieves” the clean- cut divisions between 
inside and outside, subjectivity and objectivity, ideality and materiality 
and turns them into textual (i.e., self- differential) differences. He even 
tackles the distinction between signifi cation and insignifi cance: “Memory 
[Gedächtniß] is in this manner the passage into the activity of thought, 
which no longer has a meaning [Bedeutung], i.e. the subjective is no lon-
ger severed from its objectivity, and its inwardness is existing in itself [an 
ihr selbst seyend]” (Hegel 1971a, § 464, trans. modifi ed). Thought doesn’t 
mean; it is. That is to say, the activity of thinking creates reality, and it does 
so without any return to meaning, which, in fact, has no effective reality 
(Wirksamkeit). A meaning (Bedeutung) beyond this reality of thinking and 
reading would be a Meinung (opinion) or a mere Gemeintes (intention), 
that is to say a mere subjectivity without objectivity, an inner without an 
outer, or a narcissism that expires without making a change: “The in-
wardness, which is supposed to be the true, is the ‘ownness’ [Eigenheit] of 
the intention and the individuality of being- for- itself. Both are the spirit 
which is aimed at [der gemeinte Geist],” or my (mein) spirit, but not actual 
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spirit (§ 320). Only the insignifi cance of thought—the fact that it “no 
longer has a meaning”—makes thought real.53 Real thought is, thus, im-
personal thought: it is a thinking that exists and develops independently 
of the individual mind. It is the thing itself, which, for Hegel—unlike the 
noumenon for Kant—is available for (broken) experience.54
By literalizing Erinnerung Hegel specularizes it, as it were. The in-
wardizing he describes results in a more radical exteriorizing than that 
of recollection, which dredges things up from the recesses of the mind 
into the strangely reifi ed space of interiority, but not into actual exteri-
ority. Hegel thus uses Erinnerung as a speculative word, that is, a word 
that means one thing and its opposite. In Hegel, it denotes both the 
inward and the outward movement.55 In speculative Erinnerung or in the 
meaningless thoughtness of Gedächtnis, objects vanish repeatedly: layer-
ing traces that refl ect each other and thus building the affective and 
cognitive textuality of the interior, they im- materialize into names, which 
are things in themselves, that can be perceived, and inwardized, and so 
turn into other names, which in turn refl ect on and thereby enhance the 
emotional and mental textuality of the pit. Language thus functions not 
as expression, but as a self- constructing texture that traverses materiality 
and immateriality, entangles exteriority and interiority and refl exively 
enhances impersonally emotional and rational life.
Hard Heart
The last version of the fi gure of the heart in the Phenomenology is not a 
fi gure of interiority anymore. It presents the limit case of the conception 
and practice of feeling. I am referring to the “hard heart” and its double, 
the “beautiful soul.” The epithet of “beautiful soul” usually—and most 
explicitly in Schiller’s taxonomy—stands and falls with the naïveté of the 
person. Her or his purity depends on ignorance, on not knowing how 
beautiful, true, and good s/ he really is.56 Hegel offers a different account 
of naïveté. The hyper- conscientious beautiful soul enjoys an extreme pu-
rity not because its feelings are pre- refl ective, but because they are com-
pletely transparent to it and others. It harbors no secret; it claims no 
Meinung that differs from outer display; it has abandoned all inwardness. 
This excessively self- conscious purity spells the death of natural feeling, 
and, as I will discuss in more detail in chapter 7, it is the beginning of an 
emotionality without drama: a lighthearted transport.
The beautiful soul speaks beautifully. What it says is crystal clear, 
its language is “completely transparent” (das vollkommen Durchsichtige, 
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§ 658). Its speech is an immaculate expression of its spirituality. “The ab-
solute self- certainty of itself is immediately converted into a . . . sound” 
(schlägt ihr unmittelbar in ein Austönen um, § 658). The beautiful soul thus 
consummates the ideal of expression developed in the sphere of reason: 
its speech “is the pure form of translating” from the interior to the exte-
rior, without distortion (§ 396). It is perfectly satisfi ed when it hears itself: 
everything it says represents it properly.
In this fl awless self- expression the outer is bound to the inner and 
the inner bound to the outer to the point that the two collapse into the 
extensionless point of the “I” with its voiceless voice and shapeless shape. 
What the beautiful soul puts forth it retains as its own: the echo of its 
voice returns only to itself.57 Nobody else hears it. Its words are “a dying 
sound” (Austönen, § 658). It is as if they never made a sound. When the 
beautiful soul speaks, it is a “quiet coalescence of the pithless essentiali-
ties of [its] evaporated life” (stille Zusammenfl ießen der marklosen Wesenheiten 
des verfl üchtigten Lebens, § 659, trans. modifi ed). It might just as well say 
nothing. Its “activity alters nothing and opposes nothing” (§ 396). It “has 
the appearance of the movement of a circle, which within itself set itself 
into motion and moves freely in the void, and which, as unimpeded now 
enlarges now contracts and is fully satisfi ed in playing such a game within 
itself and with its self” (§ 396, trans. modifi ed). The heart of the beautiful 
soul expands and contracts in a rhythm that is regular and undisturbed 
because the beautiful soul speaks only to its kind. It has surrounded itself 
ad infi nitum with equally beautiful souls and thus knows no other who 
would resist it. But the satisfaction it gains from being recognized by the 
likes of it leaves a fl at aftertaste: “The spirit and the substance of their 
bond is thus the reciprocal assurance of both their mutual conscientious-
ness and their good intentions; it is the rejoicing over this reciprocal 
purity, the refreshment received from the glory of knowing, articulating, 
fostering and cherishing such excellence” (§ 656). The communion is 
perfect and the recognition is vapid. The beautiful soul fi nds no other to 
thrust its heart against. It goes against no one and doesn’t touch anybody. 
Thus fl oating alone in infi nite space (even though it is surrounded by 
like- minded souls), the beautiful soul longs for real friends.58 “Its activ-
ity is a yearning” (§ 658). Like the “unhappy consciousness,” who in its 
attempt to rise to God has “fallen back into itself” (§ 217), the beautiful 
soul, in its gesture to communicate with friends, merely “falls back on 
itself, [and] merely fi nds itself as lost” (zurück zu sich fallend sich nur als 
Verlornes fi ndet; § 658). Together with its words, “its own fi re consumes it 
and dies out, and the beautiful soul vanishes like a shapeless vapor dis-
solving into thin air” (§ 658, trans. modifi ed).
The (self-)transparency of the beautiful soul comes at the expense 
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of difference; it really amounts to a refusal of emotionality.59 In its ethe-
real existence, the beautiful soul has lost its voice before it begins to 
speak. It understands language as the universal and transparent medium 
of the universal self, and it sees universality and singularity, like the pure 
and the stained, as mutually exclusive.60 By embracing universality, it opts 
against “the natural consciousness, i.e. impulses and inclinations [Triebe 
und Neigungen]” and turns into the hard heart (§ 643).61 Its untainted 
self- expression remains empty: “the hollow object which it generates to 
itself thus now fi lls it with the consciousness of emptiness” (§ 658). For 
its language to gain signifi cance it would have to be saturated with “the 
so-called sensuousness” (sogenannte Sinnlichkeit) that the beautiful soul 
despises—with “the caprice [Willkür] of the individual, and the contin-
gency of his unconscious natural being” (§ 643, trans. modifi ed). Such 
“sensuousness” is only “so- called”; it cannot be named appropriately be-
cause, according to the idea of language harbored by the beautiful soul, 
the sensual is supposed to exist only prior to language, before it is sub-
jected to the universality of a generic concept.
With the notion of an absolutely transparent and therefore empty 
language, the beautiful soul is at odds with Hegel’s own conception of 
language. For Hegel, language has its own “sense- nature” in the materi-
ality of the signifi er. It has its own “impulses and inclinations” and emo-
tionality in the self- incongruity of “the self- moving permeation [sich bewe-
gende Durchdringung] of the universal . . . and individuality” (§ 394). With 
the Phenomenology, Hegel famously constructs the concept (Begriff) as at 
the same time reaching through (durchgreift) and embracing (umgreift) 
both universality and individuality. The last fi gure of consciousness in the 
Phenomenology has driven to the extreme the abstract notion of language 
as universal that was the insight of the fi rst fi gure of consciousness. While 
“sense certainty,” the fi rst fi gure of consciousness, loses its sensuous self 
in the universal dimension of language, the hard heart loses the sensu-
ous dimension of language in its universal self. The materiality and inner 
life of language, the impulses and inclinations of words, the self- refl exive 
density and subjectivity of the medium are lost on the hard heart, whose 
ethereal transparency has congealed into an unexpectedly unnatural 
solid—a heart of glass.
At the extreme of perfect self- expression, feeling is exhausted. In 
order to explain what I mean by this, I need to expound a little bit upon 
the Kantian background of the fi gure of the beautiful soul. The beautiful 
soul avoids impulses and inclinations (Triebe and Neigungen). Operating 
on minimal affectivity, it only allows for two pure kinds of feeling: on the 
one hand, the pure self- feeling of the transcendental synthesis of apper-
ception (the extensionless “I”) and, on the other hand, the feeling of dis-
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interested pleasure in the aesthetic experience of beauty. The fi rst kind 
of feeling is posited as a universal or natural ground of all cognition, 
and the second kind is naturalized through the procedure of taste. The 
postulate of universal communicability (allgemeine Mitteilbarkeit), which 
motivates the individual to impute (ansinnen) its aesthetic judgment to 
virtually everyone, naturalizes feeling along the lines of: “you would all 
feel this pleasure if only you had taste.” Both kinds of feeling evince the 
non- propositional status of “feeling,” and support the Romantic idea that 
feelings are not appropriately expressed in discursive form. The “I think” 
that must be able to accompany all of my thoughts and representations is 
a unifi ed and unifying feeling that needs no articulation. Aesthetic plea-
sure is a feeling voiced for others, but voiced without voice because those 
“others” have no resistance to offer: they are themselves but extension-
less extensions of the self. If the source of aesthetic pleasure lies in the 
harmony of the faculties within the mind (Gemüt), this concord perpetu-
ates, strengthens, and reproduces itself in the conformity of judgment 
among “all” minds.62
At the same time, this idea of natural, authentic, substantive, and 
self- harmonizing “feeling” brings us to the verge of the conception of 
“emotionality”—as the negative, supplemental, and hollow feeling of 
self- discord.63 Kant’s other aesthetic experience, the sublime, indicates 
and performatively reinforces the ineffability and unrepresentability of 
the most precious and infi nite faculty of the mind—reason—and thus 
offers the theoretical groundwork for the hard heart’s refusal to external-
ize its inner beauty—its refusal to expose it to real difference, that is, and 
not just to a community of taste. The sublime also presents the traumatic 
destruction of the integrity of feeling—the breaking of the hard heart.
Thomas Pfau argues that, with his aesthetics of the sublime, Kant 
profoundly alters the essential bond between interiority and expression. 
Pfau describes the sublime as the shock of the absence of the feeling of 
pleasure and the fabrication of the quasi- feeling of “respect” (for the 
supersensible quality of reason) to fi ll in the void. This procedure “trans-
forms the entire conception of ‘feeling’ from an inward authentic event 
into something essentially notional and fi gural in kind”—something fab-
ricated or fi ctional—and “throws into relief the strictly ‘virtual’ charac-
ter of all feeling, including that of the beautiful, to begin with” (Pfau 
2005, 42/ 43).64 The (non-)experience of the sublime means the death of 
natural feeling. From hence on, the duplicity of the hard heart will undo 
the naive simplicity of the beautiful soul, and self- refl exive emotionality 
will not ground cognition, as “feeling” did, but transport concepts from 
one fi guration to the next.
With the hard heart, the beauty of naturalized or “organic” feel-
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ing is exhausted and the trope of interiority breaks. Even though spirit 
is spirit only when it actualizes or realizes itself (its values and beliefs), 
we have traced in this chapter how “we”—or spirit through us —come to 
discover that the trope of the heart (fi guring interiority) actually makes 
this self- realization impossible. We have seen that the sentimentalist pre-
fers feeling the mad throbbing of his heart to losing heart in the alienat-
ing endeavor to bring about actual political change. It has become clear 
that the logic of expression leads to a frustrating double imperative to 
withhold what is to be communicated (epitomized in Schiller’s sigh of 
the soul). We have followed this double imperative to the fi gure of the 
beautiful soul, who carries the logic of interiority to extremes by down-
right refusing to expose any part of its precious interiority to an alienat-
ing exteriority, so that not only the expression but even the experience 
of feeling becomes impossible.
In between, we have explored Hegel’s alternatives to the logics of 
expression, purity of feeling, and interiority. We have seen that spirit 
has a textual rather than an expressive relation to itself. We have dis-
cussed one of Hegel’s strategies to imbricate rationality and emotional-
ity. Rather than dismiss intellectual analysis for interfering with, perhaps 
even threatening, the holistic intuition of feeling—as the philosophers 
of feeling do—Hegel proposes that the analytic activity of the under-
standing actually produces and furthers emotionality. As a strategy to 
dismantle the construction of interiority, we have analyzed how Hegel 
twists together the counter- vectored movements of internalizing and rec-
ollecting by literalizing Erinnerung, and thereby undoes the inner- outer 
opposition.
In the end, the beautiful soul has led us to the verge of a radically 
new conception of emotionality, where authenticity depends on fabrica-
tion. The beautiful soul’s duplicity (be it within the hard heart or between 
the fi gures of the hard heart and the ironist into which the beautiful soul 
splits) will in a later chapter (chapter 7) provide a prime example for 
the broken syntax of emotional thought and thoughtful emotionality 
in the Phenomenology. But before we address the syntax of emotionality 
in more detail in the second part of this book, we will turn to another 
important thematic account of emotionality in Hegel, that of “pathos.” 
Pathos is less severely criticized by Hegel, because—even though it tends 
to come across as another naturalizing fi gure of emotionality—it is less 
unambiguously stuck in that naturalizing register than feeling is. In fact, 
we will see that the Phenomenology offers a naturalizing and a theatrical 
account of pathos. It thus builds on the lesson of the sublime that, in the 
absence of feeling inside, pathos must be fabricated and exhibited on 




Hegel sometimes distinguishes Pathos (pathos) from Leidenschaft (pas-
sion) and at other times he uses them as synonyms. When one term 
stands in for the other, Hegel usually wants to confer the ethical prestige 
of tragic “pathos” upon “passion” in order to argue against the rational-
ist (Kantian and Socratic) tendency to view passions as by defi nition ir-
rational and immoral. When the two terms are differentiated, Leidenschaft 
refers to an intense but temporally circumscribed and ultimately selfi sh 
motivation to act, whereas Pathos is described as a temporally unlimited 
or categorical identifi cation with an ethical cause.
Pathos clearly has two advantages over the fi gure of the heart: be-
cause it calls for action, it escapes Hegel’s critique of mere interiority; 
and in that it takes a clear position, it integrates emotionality with ratio-
nality. Yet the intractability of pathos—the fact that the passionate stance 
absorbs the person completely, defi nes his entire life, and leaves no room 
for ambivalence—leads to the tragic annihilation of the individual who is 
under the sway of this trope. Because of this obduracy, I contend, Hegel 
grows rather disenchanted with pathos and shifts to an analysis of how 
the theatricality of tragedy affects this trope of absolute sincerity.
Nietzsche exposed the difference between a character- defi ning pas-
sion and a passing passion as one not of essence but of perspective. In 
retrospect, he points out, we might realize that a passion that seemed 
absolute to us in the moment was indeed relative and has passed.1 Ana-
lyzing Hegel’s account of tragedy in the fi rst section of this chapter, I 
argue that Hegel, like Nietzsche, reveals the difference between pathos 
and passion (Leidenschaft) as merely one of perspective. I thereby arrive 
at two different accounts of pathos: the naturalizing or dramatic account 
from the in-the- moment subjective perspective, and the theatrical or 
light hearted account that draws on refl ective and ironic distance. My 
dramatic account of pathos attends to the fact that the dramatic char-
acter sincerely believes in the absolute, universal, and ethical quality of 
his pathos, but my description of this account as “naturalizing” already 
suggests that the dramatic character produces or constructs his pathos 
by aggressively gating out other perspectives. My theatrical account of 
pathos addresses the fact that Hegel merges two realms of reference—
real life and theater—in his discussion of the pathos of “ethical life” 
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(Sittlichkeit). This account attends to the oscillation between these two 
realms, which renders the passionate character ontologically ecstatic and 
therefore lighthearted.
Both accounts can be applied to the textual pathos of the Phenom-
enology. Read dramatically, the pathos of the Phenomenology consists in 
consciousness having to suffer for knowledge—this is the pathos of ex-
perience. Wahl has best articulated the self- dramatizing economy of He-
gelian dialectic, arguing that each contradiction has to be sharpened 
into a tragic collision before the phenomenology can move to the next 
form of spirit.2 Yet I will show that experience, understood as a dramatic 
pathos, cannot effect a transformation of self—it cannot move some-
one to become a different person or move consciousness to become a 
different “shape of consciousness.” Instead it leads (quite literally) to a 
dead end. To transport consciousness to another version of conscious-
ness requires the doubling and duplicity provided by theatricality.
The last section of this chapter introduces “acknowledging” as the 
Phenomenology’s preferred mode of learning. This mode of knowledge 
is able to transport the protagonist. “Acknowledging” develops out of 
the pathos of experience and carries its suffering, but it is also the light-
hearted passion that drives the movement of the Phenomenology. This sec-
tion gives an account of Aufhebung as lifting the weight off of pathos and 
offers a preview of what I mean by “transport”—something that I will 
develop more extensively in the second part of the book.3 I contend that, 
in the composition and syntax of the Phenomenology, Hegel draws more on 
his analysis of the theatricality of tragedy than on his theory of the tragic 
confl ict. The Phenomenology’s theatrics build plasticity and ambivalence 
into the structure of the subject. It constructs the subject of the Phenom-
enology as a subject to transport by dividing it into a protagonist and a 
phenomenologist. I argue that the different roles of this plural subject 
affect, undo, and transform one another, but that they also serve as re-
mainders of one another, so that there is never a complete destruction 
of the subject in the Phenomenology.
While throughout this book I maintain that the quasi- literary text of 
the Phenomenology intertwines three different literary spatio- temporalities 
(complex narrative, theatrical enactment, and poetic rhythm), this chap-
ter focuses on theatrical enactment. The peculiar reality of the theater, 
which combines the authenticity of present- tense embodiment, feel-
ing, and insight with the self- refl ective supplement of an internal spec-
tatorship, doubles the meaning not only of acting, but also of feeling 
and of thinking. If Hegel’s philosophy is fundamentally a philosophy 
of  Bildung, which maintains that spirit must negate or shape itself into 
forms of nature and second nature, and nature must negate or educate 
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itself into the ideality of spirit, then the theater seems to offer the right 
combination of reality and virtuality, or nature and spirit, to host such 
a philosophy. This idea of Bildung had one of its earlier champions in 
Schiller who, in assessments like this one, offered the basic premise be-
hind Hegel’s idea that spirit needs to appear to itself: Man “does not stop 
short at what Nature herself made of him, but has the power of retracing 
by means of Reason the steps she took on his behalf, of transforming the 
work of blind compulsion into a work of free choice, and of elevating 
physical necessity into moral necessity” (Schiller 1982, 11). If Schiller in-
spired Hegel, he did so not incidentally by talking about theater.
Ethical Drama
Hegel draws upon Aristotle to develop his rather unusual—I would say 
Nietzschean—understanding of pathos. Even though he discusses pa-
thos in the context of his analysis of tragedy it is not primarily Aristotle’s 
Poetics that he consults, nor the Rhetoric, in which Aristotle discusses the 
different páthe of concern for the orator. Instead, Hegel turns to a work 
that Aristotle wrote around the same time as the Rhetoric and the Poet-
ics, namely the Magna Moralia. For Hegel, passion does not—and here 
he agrees with the author of the Magna Moralia—hinder ethical life, 
but furthers it.4 In his Lectures on the History of Philosophy, Hegel quotes 
and comments on Aristotle’s critique of Socrates’ intellectualist notion 
of virtue:5
Concerning Aristotle’s criticism of the principle of Socrates, we should 
note here that he says, Socrates placed virtue exclusively in logos, in 
knowing. . . . “He made virtue a matter of insight. So Socrates does 
away with the alogical [allogike] aspect of the soul, to which belong 
pathos and ethical custom” [Aristotle, Magna Moralia 1.1.1182a.15–
 23]. . . . This is a good clarifi cation of virtue. Although virtue consists 
in self- determination according to universal purposes rather than 
private ends, it is not only insight or consciousness but also involves 
the agent’s identifying “heart and soul” [das Herz, das Gemüt] with the 
insight, and this is what Aristotle calls the alogical aspect of being. 
(Hegel 2006, 139)
For Aristotle, in order to determine what is good, one needs not 
only knowledge, but also ethos or character, and páthos or passion. He-
gel agrees with Aristotle’s critique of Socrates when he argues that the 
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good is “not mere thought, but a defi ning and effective presence” (He-
gel 2006, 139). In Socrates’ philosophy “the good as such [with an eye 
to human actions] still remained indeterminate”; it is “only a universal 
maxim” (Hegel 2006, 138). The good as universal principle (Maxime)—
Hegel contends with obvious allusion to Kantian moral philosophy—
lacks the force that drives concrete individuals to take it to heart.
In chapter 1, I discussed Hegel’s rather severe critique of the age of 
sensibility and its overappreciation of “the law of the heart.” Against this 
background, the analogy he draws here between pathos and the heart—
“We see that what Aristotle misses in Socrates’ determination of virtue, 
the aspect of subjective reality, is what we today call ‘heart’ ”—strikes one 
as imprecise (Hegel 1986, 473, my translation).6 Given that we are deal-
ing with lecture notes here, I think that we can attribute this impreci-
sion to Hegel’s pedagogical impetus to illustrate the relevance of Aris-
totle’s position with a contemporary reference. It is certainly true that 
the ethics of sensibility presents a critique of the intellectualism of Kant-
ian moral philosophy just as Aristotle critiques here the intellectualism 
of Socratic moral philosophy. Like the sentimentalists, Hegel critiques 
Kant’s moral rationalism, but the pathos model of emotionality serves 
him better than the sensibility model, because pathos desires action and 
externalization, whereas feeling remains locked in the interiority of the 
heart.
Like Aristotle, who speaks of virtuous passion, Hegel underscores 
the ethical value of passion and defi nes pathos as passion for a cause. 
Passion, or pathos, in this specifi c sense, drives a person to put into ac-
tion what he thinks is good and right. For Hegel, then, pathos has two 
advantages over the fi gure of the heart. By “identifying heart and soul 
with insight,” it reconciles rationality with emotionality and, because it 
propels action, it escapes the critique of mere interiority.
In a world of pathos, the sphere of the good and the true is not to 
be located in the inaccessible interiority of the heart, nor in some meta-
physical heaven—situated “who knows where” (a typical Hegelian phrase 
when it comes to exposing some so-called truth as merely imagined). The 
good and the true fi nd their reality, effectiveness, and presence in the 
customs of a people and in the passions and thus actions of its heroes: 
“The individual presence of the universal good [das allgemeine Gute am 
Einzelnen als solchen] is ‘pathos,’ the universal that drives the individual” 
(Hegel 1986, 474, my translation). The various universal goods or causes 
that can drive an individual are imagined as divine forces, but not as 
metaphysical ones. The Greek gods move among the mortals and par-
ticipate in their activities. More precisely, the gods drive the mortals to 
action and the mortals actualize the values that the gods represent:
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Regarding their substance, the gods are abstractly universal—this 
universal is actualized in the act; this actualization belongs to human 
activity, the activity of subjective individuality. This subjective individu-
ality has as its substantial content the divine matter [Stoff ], the pathe. 
They are the interests of the human agents, the powers that drive them. 
 (Hegel 1998, 98, my translation)
While each Greek god presents a particular passion to the imagination, 
Hegel underscores that the gods are part of the human tissue and fi nd 
their objective realization in the acts of the mortals.
As subjective motivations and as objective gods, the páthe consti-
tute accepted reasons for the way things are done. In precisely this sense 
(of accepted reasons), they are, thus, rational. “Pathos is the power in 
general [überhaupt] insofar as it moves the human heart and soul, and it 
should be considered an aspect of the rational and free will,” Hegel con-
tends (Hegel 2005, 96, my translation). While, from a modern perspec-
tive, we might feel compelled to fi nd rational only the political pathos of 
Creon, whereas Antigone, who is driven by the “unwritten laws” of family 
allegiance, might seem irrational to some of us, Hegel insists that their 
tragedy develops precisely because they are both motivated by different 
but equally rational and ethical causes.
As the third characteristic of pathos (in addition to its external 
reality and its rationality) we need to mention its intransigence: “The 
individual is what it is; it acts out of this character, this pathos, and it is 
character because it is precisely this. This is the strength of the ancient 
characters: that they don’t choose, but are what they do. . . . The fi gures 
are this and eternally this, and that is their greatness” (Hegel 1998, 305, 
my translation). Passionate characters are heroes because pathos leaves 
no room for ambivalence or critical self- refl ection. Without wavering or 
second- guessing, the hero is absolutely fi rm in his commitment. Pathos 
thus refers to an innate character disposition, not a temporary upheaval 
of passion.
The fact that Hegel uses pathos to refer to the character or ethical 
calling of an individual who is embedded in the social customs of his 
community shows once again that Hegel draws upon the Magna Moralia, 
rather than other, perhaps more familiar, works by Aristotle. In the Rheto-
ric, for example, Aristotle discusses various character types (ethe) that the 
orator might encounter in the audience he is trying to convince; these 
character types are determined by social factors (such as age, class, and 
fortune) and thus remain relatively constant. Páthe, on the other hand, 
such as anger, pity, or jealousy, can be spontaneously created; the skilled 
orator can arouse affects in the audience (in order to infl uence their 
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judgment) by displaying the signs of the desired affect, that is, by fi rst 
arousing the affect in himself. Meanwhile Aristotle underscores the im-
portance of the orator’s credibility. To protect his credibility, his speech 
and his affect must be in line with his character or ethos. Ethos, in this case, 
means honesty and trustworthiness. Hegel’s notion of pathos, on the 
other hand, does not allow for the possibility of auto- or hetero- affection, 
that is, of the conscious and artful manipulation of pathos. For Hegel, 
pathos is unchanging. The ancient characters are “eternally this.” Their 
heroism consists in being uncompromising and steadfastly true to their 
character. Pathos is Hegel’s fi gure for the authenticity of emotion and 
for the saturation of a person with substance: “The substance appears 
with individuality [an der Individualität] as his pathos, and individuality ap-
pears as what brings substance to life. . . . Ethical individuality is imme-
diately and in itself at one with its universal; it has existence only within 
it” (§ 470, trans. modifi ed). The complete congruence of the hero with 
his cause certainly suggests honesty and trustworthiness. Hegel thus uses 
pathos as virtually synonymous with character or ethos in the sense of Aris-
totle’s Rhetoric.
The earlier- quoted passage from the Lectures on the History of Phi-
losophy (where Hegel comments on Aristotle’s critique of Socrates) con-
tinues by citing “love, ambition, thirst for glory” as examples of virtuous 
pathos.7 Here, it is thus taken for granted that even such morally ambigu-
ous passions as thirst for glory, ambition, or love inevitably (through the 
infamous “cunning of Reason,” one would assume) serve the good. But 
Hegel’s discussion of pathos in the Phenomenology of Spirit is embedded in 
an analysis of ethics played out not in a providential, but in a tragic world. 
Here, even the righteous passion brings about disaster.8
So far we have analyzed the different characteristics of pathos (vir-
tuous, reasonable, intransigent, and driving) from the meta- theoretical 
perspective of Hegel’s critique of rationalist morality in the Lectures on 
the History of Philosophy. Now we turn to Hegel’s discussion of pathos in 
the Phenomenology. In the tragic world of ethical action, two different but 
equally ethical values collide. The two heroes, each of whom ardently 
serves his own cause but offends the god who impassions the other, both 
behave ethically and unethically to equal degrees. But such ambiguity 
doesn’t fi t the heroic sense of self. From the hero’s point of view, things 
are clear. He sees his own passion as righteous pathos—he genuinely 
serves an ethical cause—whereas the other’s behavior seems to him an 
insincere and unnecessary production of pathos—at best a private end 
posing as a universal purpose. Tragedy ensues from the refusal to recog-
nize the pathos of the other.
The phenomenological approach adds an existential aspect to the 
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discussion of pathos that will promptly introduce a certain amount of 
theatricality. In general, the Phenomenology enacts the various fi gurations 
of consciousness and allows us to identify with them—the phenomeno-
logical presentation as such has, thus, something theatrical about it. In 
addition, the particular fi gure of consciousness we are analyzing now—
ethical passion—is best known from ancient Greek theater. Hegel calls 
attention to this intertwining of the theatrical and the ethical realms 
by using the word Handlung (action, act, plot) rather than Tat or Tun 
(“deed,” or “doing”) to describe the activities of the passionate individ-
ual. He thereby suggests that pathos—his trope for absolute emotional 
sincerity—has indeed something staged about it.
The theatricality of ethical action gives rise to suspicions about the 
true value of pathos. The need emerges for a line to be drawn between 
virtuous, substantial, genuine, and right passions on the one hand, and 
self- serving, insubstantial, phony, and wrong passions on the other. He-
gel begins to mark the difference by reserving the word Pathos for the 
former and Leidenschaft or Leidenschaftlichkeit for the latter. The part of 
the Phenomenology that deals with the realm of ethics from the point of 
view of religion, for example, states that merely subjective and arbitrary 
interests are “not the pathos [Pathos] of the hero; they have in the hero’s 
eyes descended to the level of being his passions [Leidenschaft]—that 
is, they have sunken to the level of accidental essenceless moments, . . . 
which are neither capable of constituting the character of heroes nor 
of being expressed and revered by them as their essence” (§ 741).9 The 
protagonist of the section on “the ethical order” in the “Spirit” chapter 
draws the line around himself. As the drama of the ethical action unfurls, 
the heroic perspective multiplies by two.10 This duplication allows each 
hero to project the theatricality that has infected pathos onto the other: 
to experience his own passion as genuine pathos and the other’s as mere 
Leidenschaftlichkeit.
In the remainder of this section, I will discuss how Hegel treats 
the collapse of the distinction (which is not only problematic but also 
rather precarious) between Leidenschaft as unethical passion, and Pathos 
as virtuous passion. It is the hero’s own action that will precipitate this 
collapse.
The ethical world knows a plurality of causes or ethical authorities 
that are personifi ed by different gods. They usually exist peacefully side 
by side and can be honored as equally valid. Under certain and indeed 
necessarily occurring conditions, two of these values come to a head in a 
tragic collision that produces severe physical suffering:11
There are different ethical authorities [sittliche Mächte]. In a state of 
calm, they form the circle of the gods and are in harmony with one 
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another. But it must also happen that they are offended and, thus, 
called to the scene to act [zur erscheinenden Tätigkeit aufgerufen]; individu-
als thus appear as the pathos, as the actualization of an ethical power. 
 (Hegel 1998, 302, my translation)
The god appears on the scene as the pathos of an individual. 
The passionate character fully identifi es with his pathos and thus lends 
reality to only one of the many ethical authorities. The other gods are of-
fended by this exclusivity that defi nes pathos. The intransigence of pa-
thos then precipitates the tragic collision: “Because . . . ethical life con-
sists essentially in this immediate decisiveness [unmittelbaren Entschieden-
heit], and for that reason only one law is the essence for consciousness, . . . 
the ethical powers . . . acquire the signifi cance of excluding each other 
and being opposed to each other” (§ 465). The many ethical authorities 
are thus reduced to two: “Because it has decided  [entschieden] for one of 
them, ethical consciousness is essentially character. . . . It sees right only 
on its own side and sees only wrong on the other” (§ 465). Pathos, by 
 Hegel’s defi nition, determines a person’s character and thus behaves 
like Ethos as defi ned by Aristotle’s Rhetoric in that it cannot be manipu-
lated and does not change easily. This resolute character of passion spurs 
tragedies.
Clearly, the passionate acts that constitute the tragic world of eth-
ics intertwine activity and passivity. The hero suffers his agency. He lives 
in the service of a higher ethical authority, god, or spirit. He receives his 
high standing from the fact that he personifi es this ethical authority, but 
he also gives his life, his full existence as an individual, to this one cause. 
In this sense, his passion for the cause spells suffering.
The existence of the pure concept . . . is an individual which spirit 
elects to be the vessel for its sorrow. Spirit exists in this individual as his 
universal and as his power, from which he suffers violence—as his pa-
thos, to which he has surrendered himself, so that his self- consciousness 
loses its freedom. (§ 704, trans. modifi ed)
The cause drives the individual to action and determines his character. It 
moves the individual at his core, and yet it enters from the outside:
[The páthe] are the agents’ interests, their driving forces. On the one 
hand, they determine the subjectivity of man; on the other, they are 
independent determinations existing in and for themselves. As far as 
they belong to the human being, and are man’s genuine character, 
and drive him, the confl ict arises that the same determinations can be 
represented as self- suffi cient individualities over and against man [for 
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example as gods], and thus collide with human freedom. (Hegel 1998, 
98– 99, my translation)
Against common assumption—including the hero’s self- image—
Hegel shows the heroic subject to be not fully autonomous, but heter-
onomous to the extent that the law that rules his character is imagined 
to have an independent existence in the form of a particular god: “Man 
in passion is in a pathos, a god has overpowered him, he is not a free 
subject anymore, he is beside himself [außer sich]” (Hegel 1998, 103, my 
translation).
In the pathos model of emotionality, inside and outside overlap to 
the extent that gods and heroes mutually penetrate and actualize one an-
other. The mortals, with their actions, turn divine ideality into concrete 
external reality. Meanwhile, the gods are the personifi cations of páthe; 
the gods are men’s emotionality in exterior form: “The outward appear-
ance must at the same time show something of man’s inwardness. . . . 
Since the gods are in the heart and soul, even if they exist to a certain 
extent outside. In Homer, this constantly moves to and fro [geht dies stets 
herüber und hinüber]” (Hegel 1998, 99– 100, my translation).
Pathos, as Hegel understands it, is always interior and exterior at 
the same time. Structurally, pathos trembles between inside and outside; 
it oscillates between the literal and the fi gurative, the staged and the 
genuine. This fl utter blurs the difference between the opposites; each 
side briefl y but repeatedly appears as the other. The inside appears as 
the outside; the genuine as staged; the fi gurative as literal. This is to say 
that pathos renders the passionate character ontologically ecstatic. In an 
almost literal sense, the passionate is beside himself with passion. With 
this account of the ek- stasy of passion, Hegel offers a critique of interior-
ity. He shows that it is more productive to understand emotion as pathos 
than as feeling locked into the interiority of the heart.12
This same ecstasy of passion—the fl utter between inside and out-
side, between activity and suffering, or between the genuine and the 
staged—suggests another interpretation of pathos—one that attends 
to its lightheartedness. Naturalizing pathos in his discussion of Greek 
ethical life as the fi rst—that is to say, the most natural—shape of spirit, 
Hegel explicitly excludes from the context of tragedy the interpretation 
of pathos as theatrical and lighthearted. Nevertheless, by superimpos-
ing aesthetic and existential concerns in this discussion, he implicitly 
draws attention to the problems of a naturalizing account of pathos. I 
think that the problem with the pathos model of emotion is that it feeds 
on a misguided desire for authenticity and drama. By drama, I mean 
not theatricality but emotional and existential weight.13 Driven by his 
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desire for real drama, the passionate character ignores that pathos itself 
 trembles—lest this fl utter introduce an air of self- irony. Instead, he re-
inforces the impression of complete inner coherence, which, as we have 
seen, leads to intransigence and thus to tragedy.14 The passionate charac-
ter insists that “there is neither arbitrary choice nor is there struggle or 
indecision. . . . Instead, in its eyes, the ethical essentiality is the immediate, 
the unwavering, what is free of contradiction” (§ 464). Dramatic pathos 
creates tragedy and tragedy generates dramatic pathos.
So far, we have established that Hegel considers the pathos model 
more useful than the sensibility model of emotion (with its trope of the 
feeling heart). At this point, we will turn to the problems—indeed the 
tragic pitfalls—that the intransigence of pathos poses.15 Hegel shows that 
the totalizing gesture of pathos is based on ignorance or, rather, on dis-
avowal:16 “Now, because . . . ethical life consists essentially in this imme-
diate decisiveness, and for that reason only one law is the essence for con-
sciousness, . . . thereby arises in consciousness the opposition between 
the known and the not known” (§ 465– 66). If he were aware of his trem-
bling, the dramatic character might be able to suspend (auf heben) his 
resolve (Entschiedenheit) and see that there are gods on the other side 
as well. Such suspension would open a space for lightheartedness in the 
midst of pathos. But Hegel presents awareness of the constitutive trem-
bling of pathos, of its movement “to and fro,” as a purely aesthetic con-
cern (Hegel 1998, 100). He discusses the phenomenon in his lectures 
on the philosophy of art as well as in the section on “Religion in the 
Form of Art” of the Phenomenology, but not in the section on the “Ethical 
Order”—as if such fl utter had no room in the practical world of ethi-
cal decisions.17 Apparently, the person passionately caught up in the ac-
tion cannot or should not be aware of his trembling between the literal 
and the fi gural. The effects are tragic, we know. The dramatic character 
doesn’t realize that the position of his antagonist is as justifi ed, as reason-
able, and as ethical as his own: “He takes his purpose from his character 
and knows it as the ethical essentiality; however, by virtue of the determi-
nateness of his character, he knows merely the one power of substance, 
and, for him, the other power is concealed” (§ 737). He doesn’t see that 
the other also acts out of passion for a good cause.
Only after the fact, after his pathos has driven him to act, will the 
dramatic character experience his agency as a suffering, and will he have 
to acknowledge that the other’s position was always as valid as his own:
The accomplished deed turns the point of view of ethical consciousness 
topsy- turvy. What the accomplishment itself articulates is that the ethical 
must be actual, for the actuality of the purpose is the purpose of acting. 
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Acting directly articulates the unity of actuality and substance. It says that 
actuality is not accidental to essence, but rather that, in league with es-
sence, actuality is not granted to anything that is not a true right. On ac-
count of this actuality and on account of its deed, ethical consciousness 
must recognize its opposite as its own. It must acknowledge its guilt:
 Because we suffer, we acknowledge that we have erred. [Weil wir leiden, 
anerkennen wir, daß wir gefehlt.] (§ 469, trans. modifi ed)18
By acting upon his beliefs, the passionate character shows that external, 
tangible reality is important to him. He is not satisfi ed with knowing what 
is right; he needs to see it realized. He feels justifi ed in altering the given 
reality in the service of his pathos, and his ability to do so only proves 
to him the truth and righteousness of his position. Yet, because his an-
tagonist was also able to alter the given and to establish the reality of his 
pathos and law through action, the other’s action must have ethical va-
lidity as well. Because the passionate character believes that “actuality is 
not accidental to essence,” and that it “is not granted to anything that is 
not a true right,” he will have to acknowledge his adversary’s act as righ-
teous. We can see more clearly now what I touched upon earlier when I 
introduced the fl utter of pathos, namely how the act alienates the pas-
sionate character to a certain extent from his position. Hegel insists that 
this shift appears only in retrospect. It fi rst requires that the passionate 
character act authentically, that is, that he fully identify with the knowl-
edge of what is to be done. And yet “action itself is this inversion [Verkeh-
rung] of what was known into its contrary, into what is (§ 738). The act that 
fully expresses the agent’s commitment also shows that the agent didn’t 
fully understand what his commitment truly was. Hegel explicitly values 
the fact that pathos calls to action and that action turns the character 
inside out. What he less explicitly thematizes in the phenomenological 
account is that such an “inversion” (or rather: “eversion”) introduces an 
incongruity into the character (between the self before the act and the 
self after the act) that renders him ek- static. We will see in section 3 of 
this chapter (“Theatrical Lightheartedness”) that this ecstasy of pathos 
importantly structures the Phenomenology’s mode of presentation. What 
emerges for our context here, in this section on the dramatic account of 
pathos, is that the tragic character, because he comes “outside of him-
self” in his passage to the act, is thus forced to “acknowledge” the rele-
vance of alterity.
The suffering of the tragic hero is his physical experience of the 
other’s reality. Since the tragic hero’s insight into the other’s relevance 
is born of suffering, his mode of understanding here is not one of mas-
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tery, but one of acknowledgment (Anerkennung): “Because we suffer we 
acknowledge [anerkennen] that we erred.”19 At fi rst, the dramatic charac-
ter considers all other positions as unjustifi ed, unethical, unreasonable, 
and emotional without substance. “Since it sees right only on its own side 
and sees only wrong on the other, . . . consciousness . . . beholds in the 
other side [either] the violence of human caprice [menschliche zu fällige 
Gewalttätigkeit] . . . [or] the obstinacy . . . of inward being- for- itself [Ei-
gensinn des innerlichen Fürsichseins]” (§ 465, trans. modifi ed). Whatever 
the other party says or does the passionate hero deems it as not driven 
by Pathos—since Pathos is inherently righteous—but as mere Leidenschaft 
or emotionality without substance. The other is seen as acting out of a 
temper (menschliche zufällige Gewalttätigkeit) or out of narcissistic oversen-
sitivity (Eigensinn des innerlichen Fürsichseins), but not out of passion for a 
just cause. After his passage to the act, the dramatic character is forced 
not only to recognize the relevance, justifi cation, and righteousness of 
the other’s passion, but also to acknowledge the subjectivity and arbitrary 
bias of his own pathos: “The right of the ethical, namely, that actuality 
is nothing in itself in opposition to the absolute law, learns [erfährt] from 
experience that its knowledge is one- sided, that its law is only a law of its 
character, and that it has grasped merely the one power of substance” 
(§ 738). What he took to be universal law turns out to be more like a per-
sonal passion: his law is only the law of his own character. What is more, 
his conviction that the given “is in itself nothing” and that reality should 
be actively transformed according to the laws of ethics doesn’t allow him 
to simply accept his character as a natural given. He has to acknowledge 
that he made a choice among a multiplicity of valid causes and that this 
choice was, in the fi nal analysis, arbitrary.
In the section on the “Ethical Order,” Hegel reduces the multi-
plicity of possible páthe (evidenced in the multiplicity of gods) to two: a 
female and a male. This reduction—which is an effect of the tragic colli-
sion—lends an air of necessity to these specifi c alignments of gender and 
pathos (woman’s pathos: the family, man’s pathos: the polis). In my view, 
Hegel’s discussion of ethical tragedy offers a critique of naturalized gen-
der and gendered pathos. He shows that the passionate character, who 
takes the genderedness of his pathos to be natural, is actually mistaken 
in treating his pathos as a given, rather than as a subjective construction 
that can be constructed otherwise.
Here we see that the distinction between merely subjective Leiden-
schaftlichkeit and substantial Pathos breaks down. The terminological dif-
ference does not index a difference in the phenomenon, but a difference 
in perspective. That is to say, the emotional phenomenon we call Leiden-
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schaft is not inherently evil or irrational and the emotional phenomenon 
we call Pathos is not inherently good or rational, but the terms we use 
betray our attitudes toward emotion:
These [universal powers], when they are in men, and are active in 
them, they are what the ancients called pathos. Our “passion” [Leiden-
schaft] isn’t exactly the right term for this; “passion” carries the con-
notation of something that should be subjugated, something base. . . . 
Pathos is the power in general, insofar as it moves the human heart and 
soul, and it should be considered an aspect of the rational and free will. 
(Hegel 2005, 96, my translation)
Pathos is used to express the rational and righteous quality of passions, 
whereas Leidenschaft is used to reject passions as immoral and irrational.20 
Love, for example, can be regarded both as a danger to virtuous life and 
would then be called a Leidenschaft, or as a force that compels one to vir-
tuous action, that is to say, a Pathos.
The hero’s passage to the act reveals that righteous pathos and ar-
bitrary temper or sensitivity always overlap. Whenever a person acts emo-
tionally, one can safely assume—without risking life and limb in a tragic 
crisis—that there is some substance behind it. But we also have good 
reason to be skeptical about any show of pathos that infl ates a personal 
issue into a “just cause.” Pathos thus loses its nimbus of righteousness, 
while temper and sensitivity can be recognized as integral to pathos. That 
is to say, temper and sensitivity no longer need to be projected to the side 
of the other, but can be acknowledged—in the self and in the other—as 
displaying the overlap of agency and suffering that constitutes passion.
Tragic Recurrence
With this lesson learned, the world of drama and of tragic pathos has 
seen its day. Hegel pronounces the death of the gods, thus fi guring the 
end of tragic pathos.21 Pathos was defi ned over and against Leidenschaft 
(passion) as rational, ethical, universal, and fi rm. Now that it has become 
obvious that the dramatic character trembles between the pretense of 
resolute greatness and the reality of unpredictable suffering, tragic pa-
thos is effectively dead. At least it has no future as a life form of spirit 
on its journey toward self- awareness, that is to say, as a subject of the 
Phenomenology.
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And yet, as usually in the Phenomenology, the subject undergoing 
the experience does not learn the lesson. The same kind of tragedy will 
therefore repeat itself in different fi gurations. Spirit will continue to pro-
duce fi gures who are completely certain that truth is on their side, and 
who are utterly assured of their own righteousness. Let me fi rst explain 
why the protagonist doesn’t embrace the theatricality of pathos, before 
I briefl y discuss how dramatic pathos repeatedly resurfaces in the Phe-
nomenology and thus can be said to structure the phenomenological text. 
In the next section, we will then discuss the importance of theatrical or 
lighthearted pathos for the structure of the Phenomenology.
Tragedy teaches the spectator and the self- refl ective agent that there 
are just and justifi ed norms other than the one he subscribes to. Rather 
than a knowledge that is power, or a knowledge in the mode of mastery, 
tragedy produces a humble kind of knowing that is best described as 
acknowledging (Anerkennen).22 The other person, whose actions seemed 
so irrational and unjustifi ed, indeed acted according to his own pathos, 
that is, to a different, but equally justifi ed, ethical commitment. This 
experience relativizes pathos. It retroactively introduces negativity—the 
question mark of self- refl ection—into the full and completely positive 
identifi cation of the passionate individual with his cause.
But—and this is an important qualifi cation—it does so not for the 
hero. Pathos cannot properly be described as a trope of transport since, 
far from effecting a transformation, it quite literally comes to a dead end. 
The tragic hero suffers without learning from his mistakes. He disavows 
his trembling and the theatricality of pathos because he defi nes himself 
as absorbed by pathos and intransigent in his complete identifi cation 
with it. Therefore his suffering takes the form of complete annihilation: 
the substance “is a pathos which is at the same time his character. Ethi-
cal individuality is immediately and in itself at one with its universal; it 
has existence only within it and is incapable of surviving the downfall 
[Untergang] that this ethical power suffers at the hands of its opposite” 
(§ 470). For the dramatic character, to acknowledge the other’s reality is 
to have his own reality destroyed. If every fi ber of my being is seized by a 
particular pathos, then there is no fi ber left to recognize the other’s pa-
thos and to integrate the insight. This is the problem with the desire for 
authenticity. Tragic heroes do not cultivate the elastic self- negativity that, 
according to Hegel, constitutes subjectivity. Their fate is that “they do 
not discern themselves [in the negative power] but rather . . . sink and 
vanish” in it (§ 742).23 What is more, the hero would rather kill himself 
than acknowledge that the temper or oversensitivity that he projected 
onto the other is actually also his own; he would rather kill himself than 
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recognize the other within him and thereby acknowledge his constitutive 
ekstasis. The heroic passage to the act takes the self- alienating or ek- static 
structure of action to the suicidal extreme.24
With his suicide the tragic hero restores the order he disturbed. 
The reconciliation of the confl ict between the two ethical authorities 
thus remains, as Pinkard points out, a quasi- natural one: Greek justice 
follows a homeostatic principle of fi ghting any disturbance by reestab-
lishing the initial calm.25 Pinkard thus agrees that the shape of spirit that 
naturalizes pathos learns no lesson—crises will naturally reoccur just as 
they will naturally be balanced out. Resolution takes place in the mode 
of forgetting rather than in the mode of acknowledging:
The reconciliation of the opposition with itself is the Lethe of the 
underworld in death—or the Lethe of the upper world in the form of 
absolution [Freisprechung]. . . . Both are forgetfulness, the disappearance 
of actuality and of the activities on the part of the powers of substance, 
of their individualities and . . . of the abstract thought of good and evil. 
(§740, trans. modifi ed)
With this vanishing act, Hegel’s text transitions to a new shape of reli-
gious worldview, one that doesn’t abstractly oppose good to evil. But the 
passionate character has learned no lesson. Out of the oblivion to his 
passage to the act will rise a new dramatic character and a new tragedy 
like Phoenix from the ashes.
Hegel conceives of the tragic confl ict as a collision between indi-
viduals, not as a rift within one subject. The interpretation of emotion as 
natural, which characterizes the pathos model, doesn’t allow for differ-
ence within; it only knows difference between (and it casts this difference 
as one between righteous Pathos and impulsive Leidenschaft). This means 
that despite all its advantages, namely its exteriority and its integration 
of emotionality and rationality, the pathos model—in its naturalizing 
or dramatizing version—lacks what Hegelian philosophy fi nds most im-
portant: the negativity of the subject. For Hegel, the foremost character-
istic of the subject is its power to negate itself and to endure or survive 
this negation. We will see in the next section that the theatrical account 
of pathos integrates negativity, but here it is important to note that the 
dramatic subject doesn’t know that power. The hero is so identifi ed with 
his pathos that he either literally dies or—if he indeed manages to ac-
knowledge the other’s passion—becomes unheroic and thus irrelevant. 
Feeding on the individual’s misguided notion of authenticity and on the 
world’s tendency to forget inconsistencies, tragic drama will therefore 
reemerge in endless repetition.
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This brings us to the question of how naturalized pathos structures 
the Phenomenology of Spirit. Hegel’s dialectic is often read as an economy 
of drama: confl icts are brought to a head in order to provoke a solution; 
to the parties involved in the confl ict, the “solution” inevitably comes 
in the form of death, perishing (Zu grundegehen), or utter oblivion; after 
that, it is a new day and a new shape of consciousness presents itself.26 As 
we have seen, this economy of drama—steeped in the Hegelian under-
standing of tragic pathos—creates suffering without learning.
The Phenomenology of Spirit sets as its goal to generate spirit’s self-
 awareness. Telling the story of a representative of spirit—so- called natural 
consciousness—and of its successive reincarnations, the book models 
the path to achieving this goal. I argue that the text superimposes three 
different literary modes: a narrative of Bildung, theatrical enactments 
of the various life forms of spirit, and the lyric poetry of the speculative 
proposition that syncopates the trembling rhythm of this text. In this 
chapter, I focus on theatrical enactment. Spirit is the subject, the object 
and the observer of the various acts and actions that the Phenomenology 
of Spirit presents; it is the author, the actor, and the spectator of its own 
drama. In its subject function, spirit is at times compared with God.27 In 
its object function, it takes the stage as “natural consciousness.” The ob-
server role is played by us, the readers of the Phenomenology, in conjunc-
tion with Hegel, the author of the Phenomenology. Through us—who are 
struggling to comprehend the text—spirit gains an awareness of itself.28 
In all three instances, spirit suffers its agency and therefore—because it 
suffers—is supposed to acknowledge that it erred. Such an acknowledg-
ment would be one step further on the path toward self- awareness. But 
to what extent does this acknowledgment really happen? To what extent 
are lessons learned and is Bildung accomplished?
Consciousness’s Bildung consists in a series of painful experiences, 
in the repeated breaking of consciousness’s certainty and existence. It 
can be more properly described as a Brechung than as a Bildung, as the 
breaking and the refraction, rather than as the formation, of an iden-
tity.29 Each chapter and each dialectic shows the same pattern, namely, 
that consciousness’s initial axiom is untenable. Consciousness is forced to 
acknowledge that it erred. It has a chance to gain this insight only by fully 
identifying with its epistemological core assumption and acting accord-
ingly. Each fi gure of consciousness in the Phenomenology is a dramatic 
character who realizes its (epistemological) pathos. Its mode of learn-
ing and knowing would be that of experience and humble acknowledg-
ment (of actively suffering each and every insight)—if only conscious-
ness were able to learn. Instead, each fi gure of consciousness—like the 
tragic hero—“dies” from its self- contradictions. A new fi gure emerges—
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another character in the drama of the Phenomenology of Spirit—who in 
turn will, after having exposed its pathos to the ironic negativity of reality, 
nevertheless cling to this pathos and thus become irrelevant. This sce-
nario of experience without benefi t is repeated with each chapter of the 
book.30
You might wonder: how does this fi t with our image of Hegel? Well, 
it doesn’t, because our image of Hegel is largely skewed by our desire for 
dramatic pathos. You will answer: it is the phenomenologist who learns 
from consciousness’s experience; the author and the reader are able to 
integrate the insights that kill the protagonists. To a certain extent, that 
is true; yet Hegel warns emphatically of the danger of staying above the 
action, of avoiding the passage to the act in order to preserve intellec-
tual superiority and control. I am happy to concede that most of Hegel’s 
lectures evince the detrimental effects of dialectical mastery, of knowing 
in advance where the dialectical three- step will lead.31 But in the Phenom-
enology, things are still fresh, and Hegel still struggles with confusion. 
Precisely because it acts out spirit’s Bildung, the Phenomenology has an air 
of unpredictability to it. It takes place here and now while I read it; we 
don’t know what is going to happen because the next step is contingent 
upon the current one. This event character of the Phenomenology depends 
on the reader’s willingness to abandon herself to the action and suspend 
disbelief, as it were. We are called to identify with the protagonist and 
to let ourselves be absorbed by the action. As readers, we are asked to 
make “the effort to give up this freedom, and, instead of being the arbi-
trary principle moving the content, . . . to immerse this freedom into the 
content [diese Freiheit in ihn zu versenken]” (§ 58, trans. modifi ed). Hegel’s 
textual practice is designed to draw the reader in.32 In order to avoid 
mere Erbaulichkeit (edifi cation, playing it safe), the Phenomenology bets on 
identifi cation and absorption. It thereby risks that the reader will get lost 
in the pathos of the protagonist. Indeed, its readers often consider the 
position of a particular fi gure of consciousness to be the author’s posi-
tion; this means that Hegel’s strategy “worked,” that these readers have 
actually submerged their freedom in the content to the point that they 
are unable to tell play from philosophy. They have identifi ed with the 
epistemological pathos of one fi gure of consciousness—only to “die” 
with it at the end of the chapter or to save themselves by repudiating 
it as “false” and to throw in their lot with another fi gure.33 Encouraged 
by Hegel’s textual practice, these are mistaken readings: passages to the 
readerly act, if you will, without guarantee that the reader will learn from 
the experience.
Hegel even forces God—or spirit as the self- revealing agent of the 
phenomenological process—into passionate earnestness:34 “The life of 
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God and divine cognition might thus be articulated as a game love plays 
with itself, this Idea will be downgraded into edifi cation [Erbaulichkeit], 
even into triteness, if it lacks the seriousness, the suffering, the patience, 
and the labor of the negative (§ 19). For Hegel, it doesn’t make sense to 
conceive of spirit as a transcendent being that is all- powerful. Instead, 
he locates spirit in the political institutions, the laws, the arts, the philo-
sophical systems, the religious and cultural practices, and the minds (to 
the extent that they are socially constructed) of the people of this world. 
In such this- worldly form spirit suffers from alienation. Yet Hegel insists 
that self- awareness, or being- in-and- for- itself—cannot be gained without 
being serious about self- abandonment:
In itself that life is indeed an unalloyed parity and unity with itself, since 
in such a life there is nothing serious in otherness and alienation nor 
in overcoming this alienation. However, this in- itself  is abstract univer-
sality, in which . . . its nature, which is to be for itself . . . [is] left out of 
view. (§ 19)
Hegel rejects the idea of a transcendent spirit that rests assured 
of itself and engages in reality only for play, secure in the knowledge of 
a positive outcome. He thus addresses the fear of “divine comedy” that 
Žižek reformulates in “The Act and Its Vicissitudes”:
When [Christ] was dying on the cross, did he know about his 
Resurrection- to-come? If yes, it was all a game, the supreme divine 
comedy, since Christ knew his suffering was just a spectacle with a 
guaranteed good outcome—in short, Christ was FAKING despair in his 
“Father, why did you forsake me?” (Žižek 2005)
In response to this anxiety, Hegel insists on earnest pathos and fulminates 
against irony.35 Yet, if we buy into his repudiation of irony, the question 
arises: how is spirit able to attain self- awareness if it identifi es completely 
with its pathos of self- revelation and is dead serious about abandoning 
itself to the alienating forces of the real? According to Hegel’s analysis 
of dramatic pathos, it simply wouldn’t be able to gain self- knowledge: 
the passion of spirit will impede rather than enable it to learn from ex-
perience.
I hope to have shown that while it is very possible—even quite at-
tractive—to read the Phenomenology of Spirit as organized by an economy 
of drama, such a reading, by itself, prevents the Phenomenology from reach-
ing its goal. It makes the protagonist/s, the reader/s, and the author/s 
suffer without offering an epistemic gain in return. We will now turn to 
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an alternative reading, which—Hegel’s rage against irony notwithstand-
ing—attends to the text’s ironic distance from its content, and to the 
theatricality of its composition.
Theatrical Lightheartedness
While pathos as a thematic life form of spirit becomes irrelevant and the 
passionate character dies, the mode of knowledge produced by the pa-
thos model of emotionality will remain central for Hegel’s philosophy. 
With his translation of Antigone’s line, weil wir leiden, anerkennen wir, daß 
wir gefehlt (because we suffer we acknowledge that we erred), Hegel offers 
an epiphonema, a summarizing pithy sentence, for the epistemological 
pathos of experience that structures the Phenomenology of Spirit. Experi-
ence is, then, a second- degree pathos (a pathos that governs the syntax 
of the Phenomenology rather than determining a particular fi gure in the 
Phenomenology). Like fi rst- degree pathos, one can understand experience 
in two different ways—dramatically or theatrically. A naturalizing version 
of the pathos of experience produces an eternal recurrence of drama, 
a continuous revival of emotionally intense, passionate fi gures, and a 
Handlung or story line of suffering without learning. Since a series of 
experiences without accumulating experience does not conform to the 
prevalent image of Hegel, this scheme is usually complemented by the 
logic of Aufhebung in such a way that this repetition of experience can be 
read as progress. I take issue with both components of traditional Hegel 
interpretations—the dramatic notion of experience and the idea that 
Aufhebung purchases progress—and will argue instead that the logic of 
Aufhebung works to dislocate emotionality from itself and to produce not 
drama, but lightheartedness.
We will now explore what exactly the theatrical account of pathos 
entails. I will argue that registering the theatricality of pathos doesn’t 
curtail but rather enables the existential feel of pathos. Only he who 
“watches himself act” (sich selbst spielen sieht) can feel genuine passion 
and understand or negate pathos without himself being annihilated by 
this procedure (§ 747, trans. modifi ed). By contrast, we have seen that 
naturalized pathos lacks the negativity that Hegel describes as constitu-
tive of subjectivity—the ability to survive its own self- negation. Read in 
the spirit of the self- refl ective version of the pathos of experience, the 
Phenomenology offers an education in acknowledging theatricality and in 
developing the lighthearted humility necessary for the mode of knowl-
edge that is “acknowledging.” Many have claimed that Hegel’s explora-
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tion of tragedy inspires his philosophy in a fundamental way. They see 
in the tragic confl ict and its resolution a model for Hegelian dialectics.36 
In the remainder of this chapter, I will argue that Hegel’s analysis of the 
theatricality of tragic pathos even more importantly than his theory of 
tragic confl ict informs his composition of the Phenomenology and his phi-
losophy in general.
The production of dramatic confl icts, the constant need to bring 
differences to a head and to sharpen them into a collision, already re-
veals the theatricality inherent in the dramatic model of dialectics. 
Drama needs to be produced; thus, it is to a certain extent staged. The 
second part of Hegel’s section on “The Ethical Order” is titled “Die sitt-
liche Hand lung” (“The Ethical Act”). The choice of the word Handlung 
is striking in that it means “deed” but also “plot” and thus explicitly refers 
the deed to the realm of fi ction.37 From the very beginning, starting with 
the title, and throughout his analysis of the ethical order, Hegel plays the 
double register of ethics and theatrics.
Hegel’s language shifts back and forth between real life and theater 
to make a fundamental argument about the theatricality of life. For ex-
ample, with a subtle reference to acting—“self- consciousness has not yet 
come on the scene [ist noch nicht aufgetreten] . . . as yet, no deed has been 
committed”—he suggests that the individual has to produce his pathos 
theatrically—that is, as a deed that is performed in front of spectators—
in order to be able to reach an awareness not only of what he has done, 
but of what his pathos (his motivation and intention) really was (§ 463, 
trans. modifi ed). The agent has no epistemic access to his pathos as a 
“given,” and self- consciousness can only be attained after the fact, that is 
to say, after having appeared on stage.
Discussing Hegel’s engagements of tragic, comic, and confessional 
literature in the Phenomenology, Speight has offered a strong and con-
vincing argument for the retrospectivity and theatricality of agency. Tak-
ing Hegel’s reading of Antigone as exemplary for an account of agency 
in general, he observes that “the desire or intention [the proper term 
for the tragic context would be “pathos”] relevant for [Antigone’s] un-
derstanding [of] her deed is not to be found in prior deliberation, but 
is rather embodied  in the deed itself and read off of it retrospectively” 
(Speight 2001, 59, ). Since such a self- understanding must be refracted 
through the eyes of the spectators, it drives home the “socially mediated 
or ‘theatrical’ character” of pathos (Speight 2001, 70). Speight’s formu-
lation “read off” bespeaks his sense that the deed doubles as a plot or 
Handlung that demands to be read like a text. After what has emerged in 
the fi rst section of this chapter, we need to add to Speight’s account of 
retrospectivity that Hegel proposes not only that we come to recognize 
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the specifi cs of our motivating pathos after the fact, but that we must 
in the same breath acknowledge the ruin of Pathos proper in its over-
lap with Leidenschaft. The hypocrisy (of infl ating a personal cause into a 
universal one) that the tragic hero had projected onto the other, whom 
he therefore accused of mere show and scene- making, in fact character-
izes the tragic hero himself. Hegel contends that passionate individuals 
are driven to show their character and to act out their beliefs. He dem-
onstrates that their deeds alienate them from their pathos when their 
activity turns into suffering. Because of its inherent link to agency and 
because of the overlap of ethical pathos and narcissistic passion (temper 
and oversensitivity), even this suffering has something of an act to it. In 
the fi nal analysis, Hegel thus argues that pathos compels the person to 
make a scene.
Uneasy with theatricality’s potential for pretense and hypocrisy, 
while nevertheless embracing the social mediation that theatricality af-
fords, Speight draws on one of Pinkard’s stipulations for free agency—
that one needs to identify with one’s action as one’s own—to argue that 
theatricality is sublated in the forgiveness plot at the end of the spirit 
chapter.38 Whether or not this argument is convincing, I see no need to 
sublate the threatening dimension of theatricality, especially because the 
theater is itself the paradigmatic scene of Aufhebung. On stage, action is 
make- belief and genuine reality at the same time: reality is sublated in 
make- belief and illusion is sublated in the physical reality of the actors’ 
bodies. Let us therefore further examine the theatricality of pathos that 
Hegel presents.
As passionately as the heroic individuals identify with their pathos, 
their cause also exceeds them (it is universal—they are individual, it is 
divine—they are mortal). It exists before and beyond them: the dramatic 
characters enact a script—be it written or unwritten.39 The hero plays 
a role in the double sense of the phrase. On the one hand, he draws 
courage from the half- avowed fact that he can rely on a safety net of 
customs and rules while acting out his role within a canonical plot: “self-
 consciousness’s action rests on a secure trust [Vertrauen] in the whole” 
(§ 467).40 On the other hand, the tragic hero differs from the epic one 
in that he “steps forth” to deliver his lines himself. He is “the artist him-
self” and exposes himself in front of an audience. This standing out and 
standing apart of the tragic hero is another sense of the ek- stasy of  pathos 
that has emerged earlier. It is time now to examine more closely the trem-
bling between inside and outside, between the literal or existential and 
the fi gural or theatrical that I have briefl y touched on earlier. Doing so, 
we will get a better sense of the lighthearted version of pathos.
When the passionate character steps forth and feels himself stand 
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out, he—if perhaps only imperceptibly—begins to tremble. He fears that 
which drives him: he fears his pathos. The sense that he, as an individual, 
exposes himself to bear the consequences of acting out his pathos while 
his god remains whole and his cause remains holy (at least in his eyes) 
positions him as slightly apart from his pathos: “That of which human be-
ings can truly be afraid is an ethical power, the power of their own bosom. 
This power is eternal and unalterable . . . ; it stands above the individual, 
and in comparison with it the individual vanishes” (Hegel 2005, 250, 
my translation). This slight but fearful distance from one’s own pathos 
might turn into self- pity or into respect—not only for one’s pathos, but 
for oneself as driven by this pathos. In any case, the self- difference that 
trembling opens calls forth an affective embrace of or a sym- pathy for 
one’s ek- stasy: “Compassion or sympathy can have two objects: sympathy 
with distress, . . . with the negative. . . . The other one is sympathy with 
the affi rmative force in the subject. This affi rmative is the brave, ethical, 
and truthful in individuals; this kind of sympathy also needs to exist, 
the fear of this ethical power” (ibid., my translation). Apart from lifting 
Aristotle’s very physical páthe phobos and eleos on the high horse of the 
moral sublime, Hegel suggests here that there exists a difference within 
the dramatic character—even an, if ever so slight, dislocation within the 
structure of pathos itself.41 As if watching himself act, man pities himself 
and fears himself as a passionate character. Such sympathy or awe for the 
self implies the doubling of the emotional subject into one who is over-
come by pathos and immersed in the action on the one hand, and one 
who has reservations about his pathos or embraces and reinforces it on 
the other. This duplicity introduces an air of pretense into the structure 
of pathos. When we foreground the theatricality of pathos, we fi nd that 
the resoluteness and intransigence that defi nes dramatic pathos becomes 
unsettled by the interference of such second- degree emotions as self- pity 
and self- respect. This interference creates emotional plasticity.
Pathos is both reinforced and ruined by the confl icting second-
 degree emotions layered on top, as it were. If we apply this insight into 
the theatricality of pathos to the textual pathos that structures the Phe-
nomenology of Spirit, we can see that the ecstasy I have earlier defi ned as 
the ontological condition of “being beside oneself” is better described as 
a hovering above oneself. It turns out, then, that the logic of Aufhebung 
has a spatial more than a temporal bent. The subject of the Phenomenology 
is moved and negated by passion, and at the same time it hovers above 
the scene of its negation. This kind of Aufhebung creates the undramatic 
and lighthearted pathos of the text. The subject perishes in its passion-
ate passage to the act and, at the same time, it persists and integrates 
the lesson of the experience, which, in turn, relativizes the passion. To 
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think Aufhebung spatially means to consider negation and preservation 
as simultaneous movements, and to not distribute them onto different 
fi gures who relieve one another in time (in the sense that one fi gure of 
consciousness disappears in order for the next more integrative fi gure 
to emerge).42
As I mentioned earlier, the subject of the Phenomenology is divided 
within: spirit is the author, the actor, and the spectator of its own drama. 
The text contains numerous moments of parabasis, where the spectator is 
explicitly involved in the scene. The endings and beginnings of chapters 
are preferred times for parabasis.43 Here, the phenomenologist comes to 
the fore and uses the fi rst- person plural to communicate something the 
protagonist does not understand. The spatial movement of parabasis dif-
ferentiates between an actor in character who participates in the action 
and an actor who steps out of character to refl ect on the situation. At 
the same time, the phenomenological “we” is also the “we” of spirit (of 
“the I that is we and the we that is I ” [§ 177]). The fi rst- person plural thus 
mediates between the divisions within spirit: a protagonist becomes phe-
nomenologist and rises above the scene (or steps onto the proscenium) 
in order not only to communicate directly with the spectators (who share 
in the phenomenological “we”) but also to indeed become one of the 
spectators and refl ect on the action. Such parabasis can be described as a 
self- refl ection of spirit that is more immediate than the self- refl ection via 
the actions of the protagonist only in the sense that the experience of the 
protagonist is precisely the material and the result of its self- refl ection: 
protagonist and phenomenologist are only different versions of the same 
subject. The divisions are far from clean- cut.
The functioning of the Phenomenology  depends on cross-
 identifi cations among its subjects, its objects, and its observers. The 
different aspects or moments (Momente) of spirit are both different from 
and identical with one another.44 Each refers to the others in an elastic 
web of differentiation yet cohesion. Spirit, who is this web, can die and 
survive at the same time, as can each one of its fi gurations or shapes 
of consciousness. Every protagonist and every phenomenologist has the 
ability to self- negate, that is to say, to die and survive at the same time. 
This is the negativity that so famously defi nes the subject in Hegel. This 
negativity is, in my view, fundamentally emotional because it is the abil-
ity to acknowledge and negotiate inner difference. Such emotionality is 
plastic and theatrical rather than linear and dramatic, because there is 
always a remainder of the subject in action that hovers above the scene 
and refl ects it. At the same time, the subject is existentially enwrapped in 
the passionate act. Malabou’s term of “plasticity” helps to bring out the 
very real exposure and physical commitment that is part of theatrical 
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embodiment, when she points out that “while certainly in opposition to 
‘rigid,’ ‘fi xed’ and ‘ossifi ed,’ [the adjective ‘plastic’] is not to be confused 
with ‘polymorphous.’ Things that are plastic preserve their shape” (Mala-
bou 2004, 8f)—that is to say, they take shape and commit to a shape 
rather than hovering eternally aloof in a noncommittal version of irony. 
The genuineness of the Phenomenology’s theatrically emotional subject 
consists in the humility of abandoning itself to the alienating force of 
the real, rather than in the arrogance of dramatic pathos.
The lightheartedness of theatrical pathos permeates the Phenom-
enology. At each instant, the text combines the gravitas of pathos with the 
levity of irony. If the thematic discussions of pathos—in the section on 
the ethical order, and in the section on religion as a work of art—both 
end with tragedy turning into comedy, the book as a whole is suspended 
at the tipping point of tragedy into comedy or—since the suspension 
ruins linearity—of comedy into tragedy. Therefore, if I make a case here 
for the lightheartedness and theatricality of the Phenomenology’s pathos, I 
do not want to simply exchange pathos for irony, or tragedy for comedy. 
The Phenomenology’s emotional syntax is characterized by the oscillation 
between the two; I will describe it as a syntax of trembling back and forth, 
and as a syntax of bouncing up and down.45
We could say that the Phenomenology’s lightheartedness imitates the 
bouncy joyousness and serenity (Heiterkeit) of the Greek gods that He-
gel—according to Hotho’s notes—described in his lecture on the phi-
losophy of art: “The gods must remain eternally serene. . . . To pursue a 
particular aim with rigor and single- mindedness and to perish going to 
the bottom of it [darin zugrundegehen], this cannot happen to the gods” 
(Hegel 1998, 98, my translation). Even though the Greeks knew many 
gods and each one had therefore a fi nite character, their life was indeed 
infi nite and divine suffering thus never took the form of natural death. 
As immortals, the gods do not take the pathos they personify all too seri-
ously—they do rage or love in earnest, but they also rise above the action 
for a break: “They interfere here and there, but just as well they abandon 
their business and amble up [wandeln empor] to the Olympus” (ibid.). I 
read this Emporwandeln as a form of Aufhebung. Breaking with and taking 
a break from natural existence is the Greek gods’ mode of negativity or 
of self- refl ection. Hegel indeed describes it as a form of irony, as “the 
irony that is spread over the Homeric gods” (ibid.). The Greek gods are 
swathed in an irony less abstract than the one Hegel in other contexts 
harshly critiques. Hegel usually attacks irony for its arrogance and lack 
of commitment, its tendency to dissolve into wit everything but the su-
periority of the self. Such self- aggrandizing is not part of divine irony. 
The Greek gods tremble. They personify the trembling of pathos when 
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they move back and forth between negating their Olympic existence to 
participate in fi nite life and withdrawing from human reality to the Olym-
pus. They even die (as we have seen at the beginning of the last section). 
As tragic pathos, the Greek gods die, but, we will see now, they return in 
comic levity. Their irony covers both ethereal and earthly existence.
While the gods of the Homeric epics assume an ironic distance from 
their actions, the noble humans of the tragedies are left to suffer and per-
ish. The tragic hero sticks to his dramatic pathos; he remains faithful to 
his god even when the god has abandoned him to take a break. Since the 
gods are fi gures for páthe, Hegel’s comment about the gods taking off in 
mid- fi ght, as it were, suggests that pathos is less unambivalently substan-
tial than originally defi ned. As Aristophanes’ comedy suggests to Hegel, 
the gods “are clouds, a disappearing vapor” (§ 746). Divine passions con-
trol the atmosphere but, in this capacity, they are anything but fi rm. To 
us who are concerned with a theory of emotionality, Hegel here offers a 
most interesting account of emotion as not without self- negating irony. 
Tragedy ensues from the hero’s not understanding this  refl exivity and 
lightheartedness of emotion and instead essentializing or naturalizing 
pathos, that is, considering his pathos an unchangeable given. The tragic 
hero is stubbornly attached to his pathos even when the feeling has dis-
sipated and the god who moved him has dissolved into thin air. With the 
substance of passion gone, the fi rmness of character becomes a selfi sh 
vanity because it is stripped of content.
The tipping point, when virtuous pathos inevitably turns into self-
 serving pretense, is relentlessly exposed, mimicked, and mocked by the 
“eternal,” that is to say, the uncontainable and immortal or divine “irony” 
of the feminine (§ 474). Under the direction of “the feminine” (I pro-
pose to include women, comedians, and Hegelian phenomenologists in 
this category), the (male) youth gives performances in which “the pos-
turing of the universal essentiality is betrayed” (§ 744).46 On the stage 
staffed by womankind and youth, the gods appear naked (“those essenti-
alities still have . . . merely the nakedness [Nacktheit] of their immediate 
existence,” § 746) and the privileged members of the polis make fools 
of themselves:
That demos, the universal social sphere, which knows itself to be master 
and regent as well as being the understanding and insight which are 
to be respected . . . exhibits the laughable contrast between its own 
opinion of itself and its immediate existence, between its necessity and 
contingency, its universality and its ordinariness [Gemeinheit]. (§ 745, 
trans. modifi ed)
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By embracing the lightheartedness of emotion, “the feminine” 
threatens the ethical order with “the consciousness of the dialectic which 
these [pathetic] maxims and laws have in themselves and . . . thereby 
[with] the consciousness of the disappearance of the absolute validity in 
which they had previously appeared” (§ 746). What the dramatic charac-
ter tried to repress, the secret that he labored to keep (from himself)—to 
the point that he would rather die than watch his claim to unconditional 
validity dissolve—is revealed.
The theater of womankind and youth features self- ironic subjects 
who come to know and divulge their secrets. The self- ironic subjects act 
and watch themselves act passionately. They experience and learn from 
their experiences (i.e., negate their experience); they can do both be-
cause they are agent, actor, and spectator at the same time, in an elastic 
identity of differences:47
The self, which comes on the scene here in its signifi cance of being 
actual, plays with the mask which it once puts on in order to be its 
“persona.”—However, it just as quickly makes itself come out from 
this illusion and once again come forward in its own nakedness and 
ordinariness, which it shows not to be distinct from the literal self 
[eigent lichen Selbst], from the actor, nor from the spectator. (§ 744, trans. 
 modifi ed)
In parabases and asides to itself, the self- ironically passionate subject 
reveals its secret lightheartedness by slipping in unsettling ways be-
tween “signifi cance” and “ordinariness.” It shifts from putting on the 
mask of the protagonist to putting on the mask of the actor to putting 
on the mask of the spectator. Meanwhile all of the identities are acting as 
genuine or “literal” selves. And so tragedy turns into comedy:
The pure thoughts of the beautiful and the good thus give a comic 
spectacle: emancipated from opinion [Meinung]—which provides their 
determinateness as content and also provides their absolute determi-
nateness in that consciousness resolutely clings to this content [i.e., the 
intransigence of pathos]—they become empty, and precisely as a result, 
turn into a game played by the opinion and the caprice of contingent 
individuality. (§ 476, trans. modifi ed)
The negation of opinion (Meinung), which always carries the over-
tone of the fi rst- person possessive pronoun mein in Hegel, allows the 
subjective to bounce back and play with the objective. This circularity of 
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self- negativity gives grief to some; others take pleasure in it. The ethical 
order used to provide security: the dramatic character could trust in the 
righteousness of his cause. But his own action has broken the promise; 
it has refracted the ethical order in the ironic lightheartedness of self-
 negating emotion, and has thrown the crestfallen hero, who used to oc-
cupy the center of the ethical world, into an uneasy eccentricity: “Since its 
trust is therefore broken, and since the substance of the people is there-
fore shattered [in sich geknickt], spirit, which was the mediating term . . . 
henceforth now stands out as the extreme [in das Extrem herausgetreten]” 
(§ 701). This is the ecstasy of “spirit . . . which mourns over the loss of 
its world” (ibid.). Others enjoy the fact that the naturalized order is not 
set in stone: “Actual self- consciousness, . . . in employing what is natural 
for its adornment [Putz] . . . , shows itself to be the fate to which the se-
cret is betrayed, namely the truth about the self- essentiality of nature” 
(§ 745, trans. modifi ed). The secret is betrayed. The gods the heroes wor-
shipped, the passions they considered natural are now taken as whimsical 
properties of the subject, rather than authorities that require subjection. 
“The subject is . . . elevated above that sort of [abstract] moment as it 
would be elevated above an individual property [the God as universal 
moment or the pathos as abstract substance], and, wearing this mask, 
the subject articulates [spricht aus] the irony of something that wants to 
be something on his own” (§ 744). With a light heart, womankind turns 
the gravity of moral pathos into frivolous ornaments and adornments 
(Putz and Schmuck): “The feminine—the polity’s eternal irony—changes 
the . . . universal purpose into a private purpose, transforms . . . universal 
activity into this determinate individual’s work, and . . . inverts . . . univer-
sal property into the family’s possession and ornament [Putz]” (§ 474).
This passage from the Spirit chapter has often been read as decry-
ing womankind’s resentment and petty egotism: because they are weak, 
women have to erode all greatness.48 Apart from the fact that Hegel attrib-
utes a similarly strong resentment to older men (they engage in fraud 
and deception because they are “preoccupied [with] and anxiety- ridden 
[by] . . . the individual details of life”), it is fundamentally unclear that 
this should be the straight sense of the uncontainable irony at work here 
(§ 746).49 I therefore want to propose a different sense: the eternal irony, 
when it “transforms” and “inverts” pathos, actually compels pathos to 
“come forward in its own nakedness” (§ 474; 744). While dramatic pa-
thos, in its naturalizing thrust, interpellates mortals into bearing the fate 
of the reversal of their acts, this irony turns the tables of fate on pathos. It 
reveals that pathos, which cloaks itself in the mantle of ethos (of a substan-
tial cause with a claim to universality), has always also an aspect of private 
passion or Leidenschaft, of self- serving individuality to it. This irony means 
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that pathos “lets the mask [of gravity] drop” and that subjectivity fl oats 
with comic levity (§ 744):
The consummation of ethical life in free self- consciousness and the 
fate of the ethical world is therefore . . . the absolute lightheartedness 
[Leichtsinn] of ethical spirit which has dissolved within itself all the fi xed 
distinctions of its stable existence and the social spheres of its organic 
structure, and, being perfectly sure of itself, has achieved a boundless 
joyfulness [schrankenlose Freudigkeit] and the freest enjoyment of itself 
[Genusse seiner selbst]. (§ 701, trans. modifi ed)
This apparent victory of subjectivity has nothing in common with 
the idea of the supremacy of any one human subject, or of a group 
of human subjects (let’s say women) or even of the human subject, in 
general. What has emerged here is what I referred to in the introduc-
tion as the non- human subjectivity or impersonal subject status of emo-
tionality. Pathos has become refl exive; it behaves like a self- relating, self-
 dividing, and self- negating entity and in that sense it acts as a subject. 
The tragicomedy of pathos might involve human beings, but, if so, then 
always in the plural, that is to say, always as inwardly divided and ontologi-
cally dependent on others. Human subjects or characters might come on 
the scene, play a part, show up for an act, but they are neither a suffi cient 
nor even a necessary requirement for emotionality.
Subjects to Syntax
Impersonal emotion, emotion as self- refl ective subject indifferent to 
the human subject, is to be found on the level of textual performance. 
With the second part of this book, we will move away from an analysis 
of the different models of emotionality that Hegel discusses (heartfelt 
feeling, dramatic pathos), which tie emotion to the human subject, and 
embark on the analysis of Hegel’s emotional textuality. It has emerged 
from our discussion of the theatricality of pathos that passionate individ-
uals are indeed texts—self- differential entities—who as such, and only 
as such, can tremble and be emotional. In the next part of the book, we 
will move beyond the compulsion to attribute emotions to humans and 
instead explore the emotionality of texts. We will be concerned with the 
syntax of Hegel’s philosophical moves and with the emotional tropes that 
shape this syntax. I will describe these tropes as “transports” because they 
divide and connect the different moments and fi gures of Hegel’s text, 
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transporting spirit from one to the other by way of an emotional mode 
of registering and negotiating incongruity.
The composition of the Phenomenology of Spirit refl ects Hegel’s 
critical analysis of dramatic pathos and it remedies the shortcomings 
of the dramatic model, namely its lack of ambivalence, irony, and refl ex-
ivity. The theory of tragedy has often been thought of as constituting the 
core of Hegel’s philosophy, because the tragic confl ict and its resolution 
are seen as a model for Hegelian dialectics. I contend that his philosophy 
in general, and his composition of the Phenomenology in particular, are 
more deeply informed by his analysis of the theatricality of tragic pathos 
than by the drama of the tragic confl ict. The theatrics of the Phenomenol-
ogy builds ambivalence, irony, and self- refl ection into the subject struc-
ture of emotionality. It does so by elastically dividing the subject of the 
Phenomenology (spirit) into a circle of protagonists and a virtual assem-
blage of phenomenologists, all of whom are singular and plural at the 
same time. Their connection is maintained and forged by the fact that 
they all serve as (emotionally and intellectually involved) spectators of 
one another: they all read one another, identify with one another, and, 
in doing so, fi gure one another.
At the end of this chapter I compared the structural pathos of the 
Phenomenology to the Greek gods moving up and down between the ether 
and the earth. Against the common reading of the Hegelian narrative 
as progressively elevating (Aufhebung) consciousness from one shape to 
the next and thus perfecting its education (Bildung), the text turns out 
to repeatedly negate (aufheben) the ethereal moment of spirit, bringing it 
back down to earth, and recurrently form (bilden), embody, and actualize 
spirit. Dramatic pathos—as we have discussed in the second section of 
this chapter—thwarts the teleology of education because its naturalizing 
mode of negation doesn’t allow for learning. But theatrical pathos—with 
its spatialized and virtualizing mode of Aufhebung—doesn’t do any better 
in serving such a presumed teleology. In this case, the development does 
not advance because linear time has been ruined, and because the trem-
bling between ether and earth takes place within each formation of con-
sciousness/ spirit. Such movement in stasis or trembling within bends the 
series of shapes (Gestalten) of consciousness, which we usually imagine 
as organized into a progressive line, not back into the circle of internal 
teleology, but into the circle of the Greek gods, that is to say, a relatively 
loose group of fi gures. Each shape has its own epistemological pathos 
and plays the part of a particular god. In the moments of transition, 
though—from one pathos to another, one shape of consciousness to an-
other, one truth paradigm to another—the relativity of pathos becomes 
particularly palpable. Here, in this in-between space, pathos is seen to be 
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as much private and fi ckle passion (Leidenschaft) as it is ethos or absolute 
fi rmness of character. Nietzsche has pointed out that this ambivalence of 
pathos can come into view only after the fact:
While we are living each phase of our lives we rarely recognize its 
true pathos, but always see it as the only state that is now possible for 
us and reasonable and—to use some words and a distinction of the 
Greeks—thoroughly an ethos and not a pathos. (Nietzsche 2001, 
§ 317)
With his theatrical composition of the Phenomenology and its elastically 
self- differentiated subject, Hegel anticipates the Nietzschean defl ation 
of exalted values through genealogy. Above all, he contests the value of 
sober and unchanging, objective, and timeless truth.
Like Nietzsche, Hegel needs both: irony and sincerity, tragedy and 
comedy. While the experience of relativity generates lightheartedness, 
it also (re-)creates the danger that the subject may collapse into the 
complete unity of self- identity, that one may be absolutely at home in 
appearance, and that Spirit may lose its restlessness and fi nd repose in 
well- being.50 Again, it is the structure of the text that safeguards against 
this collapse. The different personae of the Phenomenology’s plural subject 
trouble and undo, transport and shape one another. They serve as supple-
ments and remainders of one another, so that no one shape, character, 
or moment is ever fully one with itself or ever completely eliminated.
Most interpretations of the Phenomenology see only one side of the 
supplemental relation between “natural consciousness” and “phenom-
enologist.” When one of the heroes of the Phenomenology perishes, re-
ceived wisdom has it that Hegel meant for the trembling afterimage of 
its pathos to ascend to the memory of the phenomenologist. I fi nd it 
rather impossible to decide who resides on the Olympus in this text: the 
phenomenologist or the protagonist. Who suffers his pathos dramatically 
and who has the serenity and lightheartedness not to get too attached? 
Does the cunningly ironic world spirit ascend to the heavens dropping 
shape after shape of consciousness into the pit of memory?51 Or does the 
protagonist blissfully amble from incarnation to incarnation only to leave 
the phenomenologist ruminating on each and every crisis? Any reading 
of the Phenomenology of Spirit that wants to get a sense for the particular 
emotionality of this text needs to retain this fundamental ambivalence. 
The self- dividing and self- relating negativity of the Phenomenology’s textu-
ality creates both earnest pathos and lightheartedness.
Our analysis of the theatricality of Hegel’s composition has brought 
into view the transport model of emotion that we will explore in further 
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detail in the second part of this book. A transport can be strong or slight, 
but it lifts one out of oneself. Because transports move one beyond one-
self and render one ek- static in a rather matter- of-fact way, they cannot 
be located inside the self as parts of an inner life. Transports thus differ 
from heartfelt feelings. They unsettle the distinction between inside and 
outside as much as that between within and between. Transports gener-
ate a subject that is transient and multiply divided. In contrast to dramatic 
pathos, the transport model shows that ambivalence, refl exivity, and 
irony are constitutive of emotion itself. Following Hutcheon, who wants 
us to see the affective dimension of irony, I am foregrounding the ironic 
dimension of emotionality.52 In keeping with her argument against an 
irony that cynically evades all affective engagement, I don’t want irony to 
be confused with evasiveness and lack of commitment. Instead, I insist 
on taking seriously irony’s ambivalence, that is, the fact that despite all 
her self- negations the ironist does take a stance. And if she manages a 
“generous irony,” this stance will transport her across the region where 
sympathy and distance overlap.53
Transports produce instances of acknowledging (Anerkennen) as 
their particular kind of rationality. Acknowledgments are movements 
toward knowledge or cognition that involve a certain amount of passiv-
ity or suffering, and that are constitutively incipient or underway, never 
defi nitive or complete. Highlighting the overlap of rationality and emo-
tionality, the transport model brings into view a syntax of emotion over 







This release of itself from the form of its own self is the highest 
freedom.
—Phenomenology, § 806
I will begin with the end. This fi rst chapter on emotional syntax analyzes 
how Hegel’s Phenomenology ends, in order to clear the way for a new be-
ginning in the reading of this Hegelian text. Against the expectation 
raised by the title of the last chapter of the Phenomenology and by the 
common view that this text is a teleological narrative, the Phenomenology 
ends not in the presence and plenitude of absolute knowledge, but in 
release. With his fi nal chapter, Hegel abandons any imperialist project 
of knowledge that he or his readers might have pursued over the course 
of the text.
Rather than provide a positive result, which one might be able to 
identify as “absolute knowledge,” the fi nal chapter of the Phenomenol-
ogy of Spirit keeps circling. Rather than close the circle of spirit’s self-
 exploration once and for all, it fi nds more and more ways to indicate 
openings. On the fi fteen or so pages of the chapter entitled “Absolute 
Knowledge,” the words entäußern or Entäußerung (self- emptying) appear 
twenty- eight times. This is the highest concentration of the word in any 
chapter of the Phenomenology. As if this wasn’t enough, the signifi ers of 
release proliferate—among them, one fi nds Entlassen (release § 806), 
Ablassen (giving-up, § 796), Verzichttun (relinquishing, § 796), aufopfern/ 
Aufopferung (sacrifi ce, § 807), offenbaren/Offenbarung/Offenbarkeit (note 
the double signifi er of exposure: offen [open] and baren [to bare]), sich 
hinausstellen (put itself forth, § 792, trans. modifi ed), herauskehren (put 
on view, § 803), and aussprechen (“articulate,” nine times). The chapter 
on “absolute knowledge” not only thematizes release, but the very end 
of this last chapter also performs release. The last sentence of the Phe-
nomenology of Spirit is perhaps not exactly grammatically incorrect, but it 
is certainly grammatically incoherent and thus performs non- closure. 
84
E M O T I O N A L  S Y N T A X
In addition, the text resists coherence by breaking off with a dash, from 
which two lines of poetry dangle.
In the course of a close analysis of the ending of the Phenomenology 
of Spirit, I will introduce in this chapter the juggle of poetry and phi-
losophy, which I will further pursue in the next chapter. This opening 
to another (here, the opening of philosophical syntax to the syntax of 
poetry) allows me to address the question of whether one needs others 
in order to become emotional. Attending to the example of grief, this 
chapter examines to what extent and how mediation is constitutive of 
emotionality in general.
I will also contend in this chapter that it is an act of friendship 
when Hegel alters the verses he cites. This claim anticipates the argu-
ment, more thoroughly developed in chapter 5, that “mutual acknowl-
edging” is an interaction among self- refl exive parties, in which no one 
remains intact. But my claim about the nature of friendship also reveals 
the double bind of my own practice of reading: I derive my method of 
transformative reading—in good hermeneutic fashion—from the text’s 
own economy, so that (paradoxically) I remain true to the Hegelian text 
by transforming it. As a result, no matter how much I alter the text, my 
reading will still be Hegelian—but hopefully I will have been a good 
friend and will have introduced a shift in the meaning of “Hegelian.”
For the line of inquiry about mediation as a constitutive element of 
emotionality, I will rely on Terada’s philosophy of emotion in Feeling in 
Theory and on the work of Hélène Ci xous, who, particularly in her book 
Déluge, her play L’histoire qu’on ne connaîtra jamais, and in several of the 
essays assembled in English under the title Stigmata, explores the affi n-
ity between sorrow and theatricality. Terada argues that “people can feel 
emotions only through intermediate representations” (Terada 2001, 18).1 
Cixous holds that humans need theater (in the most extended sense) to 
be able to cry. For what seem to me clearly strategic reasons, Cixous main-
tains that “the universe of emotion” is human and not gendered.2 The 
desire for melodrama—the desire to cry in the theater, at the movies, or 
while reading a book—is nothing specifi cally feminine, she would say. Yet 
the theatrical, fi ctional, or fi gurative structure of emotionality—which 
allows, even necessitates one to have emotions by proxy or as a proxy—
makes possible a division of labor in emotional affairs. This division is 
still mostly organized along gender lines. Women still do emotional work 
for others while this work goes unrecognized and is disapproved of. For 
strategic reasons that are different from Cixous’, then, I point out that, 
with their tears, women clean the house of the self and wash men’s dirty 
underwear. Against this backdrop, a challenge arises that I am unable to 
ignore: can I make Hegel cry?
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Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit doesn’t appear to shed a tear. The 
individual fi gures of consciousness are of interest only as long as their 
self- contradictions aren’t exhausted. Once understood, they are dis-
carded and the text invests in a new fi gure of consciousness. Each shape 
of consciousness dies a death without pain, without grief, without burial, 
a death that doesn’t haunt. As Butler has it: “There is little time for grief 
in the Phenomenology because renewal is always so close at hand” (Butler 
1999, 21). Only when the text is about to end is it able to gesture toward 
the skeletons in its closet. At its limit, the Phenomenology acknowledges its 
fi nitude, conjures up a friend, and dissolves in tears.
Hegel’s Tears
The title of the Phenomenology’s last chapter seems to suggest the fi nal 
supersession of all non- knowledge (ignorance, error, opinion, madness, 
etc.) in “absolute knowledge.” The fi nal word of the chapter, seine Un-
endlichkeit (its infi nity), would then present the grandiose culminating 
point of a narrative of progressive self- awareness. Yet, upon close ex-
amination, this apparent closure of the Phenomenology of Spirit looks more 
like a release and an abortion of the project of self-knowledge. Lacoue-
 Labarthe had the inkling that “the closure [of the speculative system] 
can scarcely contain the pressure under which it has perhaps already 
succumbed without anyone’s becoming aware of it” (Lacoue- Labarthe 
1989, 224). Perhaps it is time to take notice.
The very last lines of the Phenomenology are preceded by fi fteen or so 
pages of an almost unintelligible whirl of sentences that McCumber has 
called a “stew of words” (McCumber 1993, 21). Spirit has been cooked 
and recooked for a long time now. In the last chapter more than any-
where, the Phenomenology reads itself and, to borrow a phrase from Agam-
ben, “bend[s] the prose of philosophy into a ring” turning upon itself 
and returning to itself, round and around (Agamben 1991, 78).3 The 
pressure mounts. Finally, this concoction froths over:
Out of the chalice of this realm of spirits
Foams forth to it its infi nity. 
(§ 808, trans. modifi ed)
aus dem Kelche dieses Geisterreiches
schäumt ihm seine Unendlichkeit.
This ending might be read as an ejaculation. The Phenomenology’s 
cum shot, where spirit fi nally gets to see its own sperm. Instead of losing 
the seeds of its wisdom again and again in the chalice of phenomenologi-
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cal inquiry, recognition foams back out of the abyss of experience—and 
spirit succeeds in knowing itself. Schiller’s “Ode to Joy,” a poem that is 
kindred in its acclamation for friendship to the one Hegel quotes here 
(Schiller’s poem “Friendship”), celebrates such male homosocial and 
auto erotic exuberance:
Joy in foaming beakers creams:—
Infl uenced by the golden vine,
Civilized the savage seems,
Timid hearts with valour shine.
Let the generous fl agon pass;
Brethren, in your sites rise,
To good fortune drain a glass,
Effervescing to the skies!
(“To Joy,” trans. Arnold- Forster; 
 Schiller 1902, 63– 64)
Freude sprudelt in Pokalen,
In der Traube goldnem Blut
Trinken Sanftmuth Kannibalen,
Die Verzweifl ung Heldenmuth—
Brüder, fl iegt von euren Sitzen,
Wenn der volle Römer kreist,
Laßt den Schaum zum Himmel spritzen:
Dieses Glas dem guten Geist!
(Schiller 1983, “An die Freude,” 
 stanza 7)
The brothers used to be at each other’s throats and feeding upon each 
other like cannibals. But they are assuaged now, and in this round they 
feel like heroes (they drink Heldenmut). In a carousal that has orgiastic 
overtones, they encourage each other to aim for the stars with their ejacu-
lates (Laßt den Schaum zum Himmel spritzen): even the good heavenly spirit 
might be impressed by that!
Yet this intertextual reference also reveals the despair (die Verzweif-
lung) that underlies such self- aggrandizing exuberance. One can read 
the line that features Verzweifl ung as a parallel structure to “trinken Sanft-
muth Kannibalen,” thus translating it into something like “courageous 
heroes imbibe despair.”4 In chapter 7, I will elaborate on the fractures 
and ruptures that are the physical manifestations of despair. Here, we 
must at least notice that the triumphant ending to the book- length self-
 refl ection of spirit is sapped by an uncanny word choice. Let’s look at the 
full passage of Hegel’s ending:
The goal, absolute knowledge, that is, spirit knowing itself as spirit, 
has for its path the recollection [Erinnerung] of spirits as they are in 
themselves and as they achieve the organization of their realm. Their 
preservation [Aufbewahrung] in terms of their free existence appearing 
in the form of contingency is history, but in terms of their conceptu-
ally grasped organization, it is the science of phenomenal knowledge. Both 
together are conceptually grasped history; they form the recollection 
[Erinnerung] and the skull place [Schädelstätte] of absolute spirit, the 
actuality, the truth, the certainty of its throne, without which [ohne den] 
it would be lifeless and alone; only—
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 Out of the chalice of this realm of spirits
 Foams forth to it its infi nity. (§ 808, trans. modifi ed)5
Das Ziel, das absolute Wissen, oder der sich als Geist wissende Geist hat zu 
 seinem Wege die Erinnerung der Geister, wie sie an ihnen selbst sind und die 
Organisation ihres Reiches vollbringen. Ihre Aufbewahrung nach der Seite ihres 
freien in der Form der Zufälligkeit erscheinenden Daseins ist die Geschichte, nach 
der Seite ihrer begriffenen Organisation aber die Wissenschaft des erscheinen-
den Wissens; beide zusammen, die begriffene Geschichte, bilden die Erinnerung 
und Schädelstätte des absoluten Geistes, die Wirklichkeit, Wahrheit und Gewiß-
heit seines Throns, ohne den er nur das leblose Einsame wäre; nur —
 aus dem Kelche dieses Geisterreiches
 schäumt ihm seine Unendlichkeit.
What kind of fl uid is it, after all, that foams back at spirit? The text 
doesn’t name the liquid, but circumscribes it as “infi nity.” Earlier in the 
Phenomenology, at the end of the chapter on the understanding, infi nity is 
described as the “universal blood” (das allgemeine Blut, § 162). Does abso-
lute spirit drink blood? There is certainly something vampiric about the 
constant need for Aufhebung. I can almost see spirit frothing at the mouth 
from a mad desire for the life essence of its manifestations. Infi nity, the 
last word of the Phenomenology, suddenly seems less than the triumphant 
culminating point of a narrative of progress. And the glorious chord of 
“the actuality, the truth, the certainty” that buttresses absolute spirit’s 
throne is slowly and creepingly drowned out by the ghastly overtone of 
the word Schädelstätte (literally: “skull site”).
Certainly, with a little bit of effort, Schädelstätte can be read as com-
municating a sense of sovereignty. The Latin caput combines the mean-
ing of skull with that of “head” or “chief,” and Schädel  can profi t met-
onymically from its Latin counterpart. Of course Schädelstätte can also 
easily be translated into Calvary or Golgotha, and will receive from the 
Christian context the absolution that a swift elevation to heaven affords. 
But Schädelstätte reinscribes what the Latin- derived Kalvarienberg (Cal-
vary) or the Aramaic- derived Golgatha (Golgotha) covers over: a linger-
ing sense of death.6 Schädelstätte means “skull site” or “place for skulls” 
(as do Calvary and Golgotha for those who know Latin and Aramaic). 
Some say that the hill by Jerusalem got its name from its skull- like shape.7 
Legend has it that the skull of Adam was buried there, and the belief is 
that Jesus sacrifi ced himself there to expiate Adam and reverse man’s 
death.8 These stories are attempts to soften the drastic ring of the word 
Schädelstätte by reducing the numerous skulls to one, which then can 
more easily be turned into n- one. Yet Schädelstätte has the very profane 
meaning of mass grave: a place where a large number of skulls come to 
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lie either at once (due to war) or as accumulated over time.9 Golgotha 
was Jerusalem’s place for executions; it is a site of serial killings. Jesus 
died on a heap of bones; he simply added one to the numberless skulls 
that were already amassed there. He was one among many. Similarly dies 
“absolute knowledge.”
Absolute spirit has erected its throne on a pile of bones. The mes-
sage of these last lines is very clear: without the death of many, absolute 
spirit would be lifeless. Its life is the result of the path of suffering that 
is the Phenomenology and the death of many fi gures of consciousness that 
went down in the annals of history. In a footnote to the word Schädel-
stätte, Nancy notes the obvious, namely that “history is also a vast and 
pain- ridden ossuary, a place where suffering and death are preserved” 
(Nancy 1997, 143, my translation). The Phenomenology of Spirit reads the 
bones of history and re- stashes them in an orderly fashion. The book 
preserves the various forms of spirit and organizes them according to the 
rules of “the science of phenomenal knowledge.” Yet from the depth of the 
mountain of skulls, a putrid liquid wells up and muddles things. It foams 
forth to remind absolute spirit that it is made of death and thus subject 
to death. The infi nity of knowledge is not unlimited. Its reign (Reich) 
doesn’t hold. Hegel’s last words don’t give us absolute knowledge once 
and for all. They also do not implement the neat organization (accord-
ing to the rules of “the science of phenomenal knowledge”) that they assert. 
Instead they veer into confusion. Like the fi fteen or so pages leading up 
to it, the last sentence teeters at the edge of intelligibility. It does so not 
because it ventures out into unknown zones of knowledge, but because 
it circles back and back again, refusing to come to the point. Hegel’s last 
words don’t tell us what absolute knowledge consists of. Thank God!—
one might say. We have learned not to ask. Absolute knowledge is noth-
ing but the path toward absolute knowledge (“the truth is the whole[;] 
however, the whole is only the essence completing itself through its own 
development”), and so the request to state what spirit knows when it has 
come to know itself would launch us back into the entire development 
again (§ 20). Hegel’s last sentence doesn’t give us absolute knowledge. 
Rather, as if the author was distracted at the very apex of the phenom-
enological development, it oddly shifts referents and slips into an inco-
herence so slight that it would have almost remained unperceived.
Note the relative pronoun in the phrase ohne den. Grammatically 
it is not incorrect—it can refer to the throne (both are masculine in 
German)—but it certainly interrupts the parallel structure of this con-
voluted sentence: “beide zusammen, die begriffene Geschichte, bilden die Erin-
nerung und Schädelstätte des absoluten Geistes, die Wirklichkeit, Wahrheit und 
Gewißheit seines Throns, ohne den er nur das leblose Einsame wäre” (one ex-
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pects ohne die—die Wirklichkeit, Wahrheit und Gewißheit). The fi nal sentence 
folds back on the one before it. The penultimate sentence bravely—with 
“a hero’s courage [Heldenmuth],” we could say—pronounces the goal 
(das Ziel) right away, then names it as “absolute knowledge,” then de-
fi nes it as “spirit knowing itself as spirit,” and then continues its regress 
by describing the path toward absolute knowledge rather than telling us 
what this knowledge actually consists of. The fi nal sentence repeats, with 
some additional clarifi cations, what the penultimate sentence already 
stated. “Their preservation” in the fi nal sentence repeats “the recollec-
tion of spirits” in the penultimate. Similarly, “in terms of their free exis-
tence. . .” repeats “as they are in themselves” from before. And again, 
“in terms of their conceptually grasped organization” repeats “as they 
achieve the organization of their realm.” Then comes another summary 
(“both together”) and we arrive back at the beginning: “recollection.” 
This is “the actuality, the truth, the certainty” of “spirit knowing itself as 
spirit,” without which spirit would be lifeless and alone. Without what? 
Without the actuality of the realm of spirits, or without the recollection 
of spirits? Either one would make sense, but Wirklichkeit, Erinnerung, Auf-
bewahrung—all the words that would offer up a coherent meaning—are 
feminine. Den must refer to the throne—but it is incoherent with the 
rest of Hegel’s philosophy to say that spirit be lifeless without its throne. 
Absolute knowledge does not need to prop up its power with such a dead 
symbol. The sentence makes more sense if we consider another, more 
remote, possibility: if we take den to refer to “absolute spirit.” The gender 
alignment works (Geist is also masculine). It would be more Hegelian to 
say that the throne would be lifeless without absolute spirit. Yet, apart 
from the syntactical stretch of this version (den is too far away from des ab-
soluten Geistes to sustain the reference), we are also not able to meaning-
fully relate the proposition’s remaining attributes to the throne (should 
the throne be das Einsame and the thing that drinks infi nity out of the 
chalice?).
The signifi cance of this pronoun, I’d like to propose, is something 
other than its semantic referent. Ohne den marks a qualitative shift in the 
syntax of the sentence, which both consolidates the confusion and inter-
rupts it. Mieszkowski has argued that the fi gure of anacoluthon (a change 
of grammatical structure within one sentence) shows up language’s emo-
tionality, that is to say, its incapability of creating a truly monolithic or-
ganizing schema (Mieszkowski 2009, 648– 65). While the strange, almost 
imperceptible shift that ohne den initiates can perhaps not be qualifi ed 
as an anacoluthon in the strict sense, it certainly marks the fact that this 
sentence relates to itself as to something other than what it presents itself 
to be. This sentence is not at peace with itself, but emotional. Even if ohne 
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den is nothing but a small mistake, it breaks with the endless repetition 
of recollection. With it, the structuring of spirit’s “realm” (Reich) comes 
undone, and absolute knowledge begins to dissolve. Ohne den is the tear 
in absolute knowledge. Because of it, the throne totters. In despite of it, 
the stew bubbles over. And absolute spirit breaks into tears.
Make a Scene
How to experience the moment of grief that takes spirit by surprise and 
that it loses immediately as the text breaks off? On the way toward answer-
ing a similar question, Cixous notices in the human psyche an infi nite 
desire to shed tears. Puzzled by the observation that we enjoy sad sto-
ries, she asks, “Why do we read books that make us weep?” Her response 
is, “undoubtedly because we never have, in reality, enough to lament” 
 (Cixous 1998, 42). With this statement Cixous certainly does not mean to 
deny real experiences of suffering. Instead, she points to the problematic 
relationship between reality and emotionality.
“In reality,” we never have “enough to lament,” not because the 
lamentable isn’t real or there is not enough of it in real life, but because 
we need something in addition to the real in order to be able to lament. 
Affects—in Deleuze and Guattari’s sense of the non- conscious and non-
 linguistic experience of intensity—have an immediate quality to them 
that gives us no means to lament. Physical pain might be one of the most-
 discussed examples of such intensity. Scarry notes that pain is diffi cult to 
describe because it destroys language.10 “Pain has an element of blank,” 
writes Emily Dickinson.11 Pain subjects us to its absolute presence since “it 
cannot recollect / When it began” and “It has no future but itself” (Dick-
inson 1891). For the body in pain, circumscribing, that is, re- presenting 
pain through recollecting and anticipating its limits are impossible op-
erations because they require an (if ever so slight) distance from the 
present, a slight gap or lag—precisely that which pain eliminates in its 
absolute rule. Without this interval, no lament, no language of pain is 
possible. “In reality, we never have enough [distance] to lament.”12
Against the idea of immediate affect and dumb pain, Hegel con-
tends that subjectivity requires the pain of (self-)negation. Self- refl ection 
and pain are thus intertwined for Hegel. He considers pain as a form 
of mediation: pain is mediated and refl ects itself, and self- refl ection 
or subjectivity involves pain. The subject needs to show “that there is 
nothing on hand in it itself which could not be a vanishing moment 
for it” (§ 187). Yet, it is obviously a paradoxical demand on the subject-
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 to-become that self- negation be constitutive of subject formation. One 
can enjoy self- negation only as long as one survives it. This is the lesson 
of the Phenomenology’s “struggle for life and death.” “We need to mourn 
for ourselves. And yet to stay alive,” notes Cixous (Cixous 1998, 42). She 
admires Siegfried’s swan song in the Nibelungenlied: his extraordinary ca-
pacity for transport. Siegfried is able to lament his own death because he 
anticipates it and because he identifi es with those surviving him:
In former times, the husband of Kriemhild collapsed among the 
fl owers in stanza 988, one saw the blood pouring from his wound. . . . 
Sigfrid didn’t want to die without having said everything he thought. 
Dying, he spoke by turns to his friends and to his traitors, and to 
every body he said, fatally wounded, what he had to say. In stanza 999 
the fl owers all around were drenched in blood. At the end, the dying 
 Sigfrid still bothered to suffer vicariously for [à la place de] his father, 
his mother, and his barons. When he had no more strength to speak 
he still exhaled at the end one terrible stanza. He had such a furious 
pity for those who awaited his return for long. It was the agony of those 
who waited for him in vain that he wanted to lament before he died. 
(Cixous 1992, 15, my translation)
Siegfried gives the best proof of his subjectivity when, rather than 
getting swallowed by the mute reality of sheer pain and death, he fi nds 
the intervals of negativity (anticipating his death and putting himself in 
the position of those around him) that allow his feelings to resonate. Of 
course, that was “in former times,” and we are no Siegfried. That is why 
we need books that make us weep. Because in reality we don’t have Sieg-
fried’s sublime ability to invite self- difference, we need fi ction, metaphor, 
or theater to create the interval that makes emotion resonate and allows 
us to experience it in the fi rst place. The sheer “reality” of pain is not an 
emotion; the lament is the true emotional experience. Emotion is, thus, 
a manner of speaking.13
Our ability to feel emotion is, then, a matter of understanding emo-
tionality. I mean this in the double sense. Emotionality is a mode of un-
derstanding, or, as Terada puts it, “emotions are an interpretive act that 
involves representation and mediation” (Terada 2001, 17). But we also 
need the right understanding of emotionality—we need to understand 
emotionality as self- refl ective—if we want to feel emotions. If we think 
that the authenticity of emotion lies in its immediacy, we will have a hard 
time experiencing emotion. On the other hand, the fi ction that opens a 
gap within emotion takes nothing away from the truth of emotion. On 
the contrary, the idea of affective clarity and integrity emerges as a dis-
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avowed fi ction when Terada describes it as the white mythology of emo-
tion, which wants emotions to be “affective cognitions with none of the 
disadvantages of affects” (Terada 2001, 31). In the fi rst chapter of Déluge, 
entitled “C’était l’entre deux,” Cixous stresses our disappearing ability 
to live in-between. For her, “the emotion is born at the angle of one state 
with another state” (Cixous 1998, 26). The self- identical facticity of brute 
loss, for example, doesn’t resonate emotionally. One feels numb about 
it until one makes a scene of it. “I need imagination to ‘excite’ sorrow 
even at a loss of my own” (Terada 2001, 38). I need to fi nd that distance 
to myself—to my own loss—that allows me to lament it. “Making a scene” 
thus involves refl ecting and refracting the loss across various fi gurations 
of loss, self, and presence.
This turns emotion into transport, into a traveling across states that 
fi gure one another and that by this very fi guration get condensed. For 
example, a weeping act can be understood as a chant that echoes past 
and future losses. With one’s tears one repeats the loss that one antici-
pates. At times the refl ection takes place externally; sometimes a fi gure 
of the in-between hits one from outside—as it happened to the “old 
friend” Cixous remembers, “who had just lost her husband. . . . And she 
said to me, with an utterly surprised air: you know, at the corner of boule-
vard Jourdan and rue Deutsch de la Meurthe, all of a sudden, I started to cry. 
Well, that is the point: it takes place quite exactly at the corner, at the 
angle” (Cixous 1997, 42). But it takes understanding for grief to take 
place; it takes an understanding of emotionality as transport; it takes the 
suppleness to comprehend (to penetrate and embrace) and identify with 
different fi gures and states across intervals (without eliminating the dif-
ferences) to experience grief or any other transport.
Emotional transport involves time travel (past and future losses), 
spatial constellations (tears at the corner), interpersonal identifi ca-
tions (Siegfried and his entourage), or intrapersonal identifi cations (I’ll 
come to this in a moment). Yet what I have distinguished here—time 
and space, inter- and intrapersonal relations—indeed overlaps, because 
emotionality cuts across the distinction and separation between inside 
and outside. The idea of emotion as a mental content (to be expressed) 
illustrates well how the wrong conception of emotion generates only 
numbness and leaves us feeling empty. “Emotions appear to be exem-
plary inner contents . . . because the history of thought about emotion 
has invested in theories of expression” (Terada 2001, 28). But emotions 
are never fully inside or fully outside; they travel across and in-between. 
The expressive hypothesis can be confi rmed by experience only when it 
has gone through deconstruction, and when expression is understood 
in the rather uncommon way Mark Taylor understands “secret(ion)s”: 
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“Secretions, it seems, are always entre- deux. While a secret is an outside 
that is inside, a secretion is an inside that is outside” (Taylor 1990, 190). 
There is no inner plenitude that can be perfectly put into language or 
other forms of expressions; rather, the inner is already alienated from 
itself when the uncanny fl uid wells up and the shedding of tears or other 
secretions makes one feel the tears (Zerrissenheit) within.
This brings me to the somewhat counterintuitive notion of intra-
personal identifi cation. “We feel not to the extent that experience seems 
immediate, but to the extent that it doesn’t; not to the extent that other 
people’s experiences remind us of our own, but to the extent that our 
own seem like somebody else’s” (Terada 2001, 22). Terada notes here 
something very important, namely, that the cross- identifi cation required 
for emotion does not simply aggrandize the self by appropriating the 
other, but estranges the self as well. We feel to the extent that our own ex-
periences seem like somebody else’s. Our self- feeling paradoxically turns 
us into objects for ourselves. “A situation that Wittgenstein considers too 
absurd seriously to contemplate—in which people can feel emotions only 
through intermediate representations, which he likens to ‘inanimate 
things’ or ‘dolls’—is the case even when the intermediary is oneself” 
(Terada 2001, 18). Even self- feeling turns us into things: dense and in-
animate objects—dolls, for example, or dummies or skull bones—things 
that are not entirely transparent to us. It is to Hegel’s great credit that 
he embraces this kind of self- alienation. There is no absolute knowledge 
without spirit acknowledging “that the being of the I is a thing” (§ 790).
We can lament only when we relate to ourselves as something else. 
I remarked earlier that emotion is a way of speaking; now we can specify 
that emotion is an indirect way of speaking. Only by way of indirection 
can we communicate (even to ourselves) what we truly feel. “The ven-
triloquist spills his or her guts by speaking from the belly. . . . Ventrilo-
quists, of course, do not speak directly. They speak indirectly by speaking 
through an other who cannot speak and who is, therefore, a dummy” 
(Taylor 1990, 190). Only by relating to ourselves as dummies or things 
can we fi nd that interval that allows us to cry.
Yet the assumption that the doll or the skull bone is a dummy who 
cannot speak still belongs to what Terada identifi es as the “ideology of 
emotion” (Terada 2001, 3). This ideology is based on the idea that feeling 
distinguishes humanity from inhumanity. Hegel, on the other hand, al-
lows us to register the fact that the “dummy” does speak and does experi-
ence transports at least to the same extent that human subjects do—that 
“the thing is I” and I can only echo this thing (§ 791). Emotionality, then, 
comes always in multiple voices that mix and mingle, that affi rm and ne-
gate, that interrupt one another and inaccurately echo one  another. As 
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Cixous puts it, “I live of living and dying interwoven into a sonata. I don’t 
want the world by one eye and just one dimension, no, our life is not cut 
and dry, but at least fi ve times varied, awry, contorted” (Cixous 1992, 
16, my translation). Emotionality, thus, has a sense for complexity, and 
furthers ethical relationalities where each party imitates other tongues 
without simply translating them into one unifi ed voice that it claims as 
its own.14
Joys of Grief
The interval that generates emotionality also affects individual emotions. 
Self- distance opens a gap within emotions and gives them an ironic char-
acter: emotions are experienced not as clear and simple, but as oscil-
lating between different, often opposite fl avors. There is, for example, 
an overtone of pleasure in the experience of grief. With his speculative 
logic—which elastically captures the unity of opposites and the differ-
ence within identity—Hegel offers an excellent tool for attending to this 
ambivalence of emotionality. The speculative quality of tears—the fact 
that these secretions nourish—is not lost on Cixous, either. “Pouring 
out and taking in,” we drink our tears, she notes (Cixous 1998, 47). “It 
is salted milk” that suits the taste of adults (Cixous 1997, 44).15 If spirit 
breaks into tears at the very end of the Phenomenology, Hegel’s thoughts 
on infi nity and alienation enable absolute spirit to drink its tears from 
the chalice of spirits.
The need for a metaphoric distance from pain is bound up with the 
theatricality of grief. The staging of grief proves necessary for the feeling 
of grief to be registered at all, and it also mixes grief with pleasure: the 
“happiness in tears . . . is connected to the theater, to representation, to 
the fact that there are witnesses” (Cixous 1998, 47). Only shared grief al-
lows full pleasure. This explains Hegel’s theatrical paroxysm at the end 
of the Phenomenology of Spirit. With the fi nal lines of the book he suddenly 
slips into the language of poetry and into the character of a friend. Hegel 
thematically and performatively conjures up friends who can introduce 
the self- difference necessary for the joyful experience of grief. Only the 
echo of another’s voice allows the Phenomenology to dissolve into tears. 
This other is easily identifi ed as Schiller, the end of whose poem “Die 
Freundschaft” (“Friendship”) Hegel cites here. Another other called to 
the scene is poetry, the ambivalent friend of philosophical discourse.
When Hegel mimics poetry by unfaithfully reciting Schiller’s poem 
“Friendship,” an unexperienced grief unexpectedly interrupts this osten-
sibly triumphant phase of “absolute knowledge.” In the indirect presence 
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of a friend, Hegel is able to abandon the imperialist gesture of systematic 
knowledge. He has reached his limit. If there is any content to “absolute 
knowledge,” it can only be the refl exive claim that for knowledge “to 
know its limit [i.e., to know itself] means to know that it is to sacrifi ce 
itself” (§ 807). In keeping with the unending regress of his fi nal chapter, 
Hegel at fi rst seems to circle back to the empirical material that phenom-
enology processes: “This sacrifi ce is the self- emptying within which spirit 
exhibits its coming- to-be spirit in the form of a free contingent event” (ibid). 
In its function as a chalice or container, the book holds and organizes the 
sacrifi cial manifestations of spirit. But at the end of the Phenomenology this 
containment fi nds its limit. Self- emptying takes the form of a shedding 
of tears. The spirits bubble over the rim of this chalice that is the Phenom-
enology and systematic discourse breaks into song. With his ventriloquism 
(of Schiller), Hegel spills his guts: he empties himself. He abandons con-
trol over the book. But to him—who argues that the “release of itself 
from the form of its own self is the highest freedom”—such surrender of 
control is a freedom more meaningful than the problematic notions of 
intention, agency, and free will (§ 806).
Of course, Hegel does not release his book without hoping that 
he might get a response—that in some way or another the liquid he 
spills might come back to nourish him. Ten years earlier he had mused 
about the speculative reversal of natural force. On vacation in the Alps 
in 1796, Hegel has the opportunity to observe that liquid—even a liquid 
that is not bound in an organism—does not submit to the law of linear 
progression. Even water that falls off the mountain (i.e., water that is pro-
pelled with considerable force in one direction) will change direction 
and come back up. He commits his pleasure at this speculative reversal 
to a travel log. While mountains and glaciers interest him little, Hegel de-
scribes in detail three different waterfalls (the falls of the Staubbach, the 
Reichenbach, and the Aar). He doesn’t tire of specifying again and again 
how the water dust, produced by the water foaming back, dances in the 
sun and wets his face, clothes, and body. One waterfall is accessible via a 
footbridge: “The Aar makes a few glorious waterfalls that plunge down 
with terrible force. One of these is spanned by an audacious bridge, on 
which one gets completely wet from the dust” (Hegel 1986a, 1:616, my 
translation). Another one is not so easy to reach, but as soon as Hegel 
and his friends spy it, their excitement gets them wet: “Suddenly the up-
per part of the Reichenbach fall now presented itself to us . . . and we 
approached it merrily through wet meadows. On the green hill opposite 
the fall, the water dust—that the wind caused by the fall chased toward 
us—soaked us completely” (Hegel 1986a, 1:615, my translation). Linger-
ing near the “brink of the abyss,” Hegel meticulously describes the play 
of the falling waves in their course through the air and over the rocks 
96
E M O T I O N A L  S Y N T A X
(ibid.). Here the surprising return of the river appears most poignantly. 
After the falling water is already out of sight, it miraculously comes out 
of the abyss back to life: “After the waves thus . . . plunge into the abyss 
where the gaze cannot follow them . . . one perceives smoke surging out 
of a crevasse. This smoke one recognizes as the foam that shoots up from 
the fall” (ibid.). About ten years later, Hegel conjures up a similar image 
with the fi nal lines of the Phenomenology: “out of the chalice of this realm 
of spirits / foams forth to it its infi nity.” He does so surely in part to re-
assure himself that the thoughts he just put forward and the words he 
just spilled will not be lost in dank darkness, but will freely come back to 
him with increased liveliness. But, at the same time—across the Alpine 
hikes—he is now in the position of someone who submits to the fl uid 
as something strange, of someone who runs through the meadow to be 
wetted by a liquid that comes from someplace else. The act of release 
presents a conscious gesture of exposing his work to alteration and dis-
persal. Like the waters of the Reichenbach, the Phenomenology will return 
“not unifi ed into one substance” but “ever dissolving and leaping apart” 
(Hegel 1986a, 1:614, my translation).
Readers and Friends
Quoting is an act of friendship—not only because Hegel allows Schiller 
to take the fl oor before he has fi nished his sentence to give his own book 
closure, but also because he borrows Schiller’s lines not without trans-
forming them.16 The friendship of philosophy and poetry consists in the 
fact that neither of them speaks alone here—each gains voice through 
the other and each twists the other’s words. Hegel moves what he quotes 
and changes what he reads. By that I mean not only that the lines of 
Schiller’s poem receive a new meaning in the very different context of 
the Phenomenology, but that Hegel actually modifi es almost every word in 
this “quotation.” Schiller’s original reads:
Friendless was the great master of the 
 worlds,
Felt a want—so he created spirits,
Blessed mirrors of his blessedness!—
Found the highest Being not his like,
From the chalice of the entire realm 
 of souls
Foams forth to him—infi nity.
 (my translation)
Freundlos war der grosse Weltenmeister,
Fühlte Mangel—darum schuf er Geister,
Sel’ge Spiegel seiner Seligkeit!—
Fand das höchste Wesen schon kein 
 Gleiches,
Aus dem Kelch des ganzen Seelenreiches
Schäumt ihm—die Unendlichkeit.
(Schiller, “Die Freundschaft,” 
 last stanza)
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In a careful analysis of the discrepancies between Schiller’s and 
Hegel’s versions, McCumber argues convincingly that Hegel’s alterations 
take the form of “a series of dereifi cations, in which all references to 
anything unconditioned or atemporal . . . are replaced in favor of vari-
ous kinds of situated (local and passing) phenomena” (McCumber 2000, 
49).17 While Schiller’s lyrical “I” mirrors itself in “the great master of the 
worlds” when it sings its hymn to friendship, Hegel’s “absolute spirit” 
does not lay claim to mastery.18 As I have discussed in chapter 1 (draw-
ing upon Nancy’s work), Hegel doesn’t accept the idea of a creator who 
is above and beyond the world; similarly, he doesn’t propose that spirit 
be the author or independent and masterful creator of its story. Rather, 
“manifestation surges up out of nothing, into nothing. The manifested 
is something, and every thing is manifested. But there is no ‘manifester’ 
that would be yet another thing than manifestation itself” (Nancy 2002, 
33). Similarly, just as there is no creator beyond manifestation, there 
can be no knowledge outside of manifestation. The knowledge that the 
last chapter of the Phenomenology provides is not absolute in the sense 
that it can stand on its own as a categorical, timeless truth. “Absolute 
knowledge” does not supersede all the errors that led us here, but it is 
part of the erroneous path. Or, as McCumber puts it, “the universal—
the goal of the whole process—is now, like all other stages of the book, 
nothing more than its position in the whole” (McCumber 2000, 56). Ab-
solute knowledge is self- refl ective, but it doesn’t close the system, since 
the system—because of its strict immanence—must logically be an open 
or unfi nished system. Spirit that knows itself knows that it cannot lay 
claim to totality, and so Hegel changes Schiller’s Aus dem Kelch des ganzen 
Seelenreiches / Schäumt ihm—die Unendlichkeit (From the chalice of the 
entire realm of souls / Foams forth to him—infi nity) into aus dem Kelche 
dieses Geisterreiches / schäumt ihm seine Unendlichkeit (Out of the chalice 
of this realm of spirits / Foams forth to it its infi nity)—thus effectively 
situating “absolute knowledge.”
In the circular structure of its self- referentiality, “spirit knowing it-
self as spirit” is infi nite. Yet its infi nity is local and temporal and therefore 
fi nite. Spirit can gain knowledge of itself only as this spirit. Across the 
specifi c narrative of this book, this spirit gains self- awareness—not as 
the only possible formation of spirit, but as this spirit that has gained this 
shape across this history. McCumber explains the surprisingly frequent 
use of demonstrative pronouns in the last chapter of the Phenomenology, 
arguing that “the universal . . . the truth which was to be written down . . . 
thus dies away in its separate being and becomes nothing more than 
the knowledge of this sequence of shapes of consciousness” (McCumber 
2000, 56).19 Universal truth dies away. The kind of truth that can be writ-
ten down because it will be the same tomorrow as it was today, this no-
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tion of truth as categorical and unchangeable, which was the operative 
notion of truth for the protagonist throughout the Phenomenology, fi nally 
dies here, at the very end of the book.
While we might want to rejoice over the death of the problematic 
and often repressive ideology of timeless truth, this is also, perhaps more 
than ever, the moment to ask whether the Phenomenology can mourn its 
dead. Is there fi nally time for grief here, at the end of the book, where 
we don’t have to hasten to the next step on the ladder of Aufhebung? 
Where, for once, renewal is not at hand? Can the protagonist of the Phe-
nomenology shed tears over the loss of an idea, in which it had invested 
for its whole life? Not if the book (and our interest in the protagonist) 
comes to a defi nite end. This is why this last chapter keeps circling—so 
as to protract the reader’s being done with it. Acknowledging “the neces-
sity of interval,” Hegel fi nally stages an interruption and allows for tears 
(Blanchot 1993, 75).20 He lets poetry and philosophy interrupt them-
selves and one another—but not just in order to (let) speak, but rather, 
in order also to render possible the worklessness or désoevrement of tears 
(pronounced both ways).21 Breaking into verse, the text sheds tears not 
only for the countless “skulls” that litter the path toward absolute know-
ing, but also for the idea of an unchanging and eternal truth, which has 
animated all the shapes of consciousness and formations of spirit.
The last word authored by Hegel alone is nur (only). It is a lonely 
word and a sad word—a signifi er of restriction, disappointment, and 
fi nitude. Isolated by a semicolon on its left side and a dash on its right, 
nur stands between two discourses (Hegel’s and Schiller’s, philosophy 
and poetry) and works on both.22 Nur reverses the gesture of Schiller’s 
poem. Schiller’s “great master of the worlds” has a master’s appetite (Be-
gierde) and needs the entirety of creation to provide him with a sense of 
infi nity, which means that Schiller envisions this master’s self- knowledge 
in the form of a universal and eternal truth. Meanwhile, the subject of 
Hegel’s version of Schiller’s lines drinks its infi nity “only” from a spe-
cifi c chalice and its truth is therefore circumscribed. But this “only” also 
applies to what precedes it and thus it affects our way of reading the 
Hegelian text, as well. Across the word nur Schiller’s poetry and Hegel’s 
philosophy syncopate each other. The verses bend the linear movement 
of philosophical prose while nur functions as the pivot.23 Looking back 
at the Hegelian text from the vantage point of the two verses at the end, 
we come to understand that the truth of absolute knowledge is not the 
kind of truth that can be simply written down. Rather, it is like the truth 
that we encountered at the very beginning of the book—in the chapter 
on “sense certainty”—the truth that was lost by writing it down.24 Abso-
lute knowledge is “only” the kind of truth that one cannot hold onto by 
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preserving it unchanged. Or better—and this would be reading his text 
backward from the end—absolute knowledge acknowledges that its truth 
changes with every utterance. It knows itself to be the kind of truth that 
is altered by being written down and altered by being read.
This is the point where the Phenomenology sets the reader free, and 
that is why I began my discussion of emotional syntax here, at the end. 
In the end, the spirit of this Phenomenology surrenders to the uncontrol-
lable effects of place and time and gives itself over to the future that will 
come to it from its readers.25 Readers from other places and other times 
now arrive to interrupt this way of “writing down (up) the truth.” Some 
might do so by moving and transforming the text—as is done among 
friends. Others might consider the Phenomenology to be dated and not 
worthy of being reworked, as Hegel did when he wrote in 1831: “peculiar 
early work, not to be reworked—related to the time of its composition” 
(quoted in McCumber 2000, 57). The latter attitude takes the book’s 
meaning to be like sense certainty’s truth: only a Meinen (mere opin-
ion). At any rate, with its last lines, the Phenomenology releases the grip it 
had on its reader, from whom it had demanded extraordinary supple-
ness and complete devotion. Now, the Phenomenology abandons itself to 
its own Aufhebung—to being altered and turned from the vantage point 
of another perspective.
In my proximity to Hegel—a mediated and self- referential proxim-
ity that leaves enough room for the syncopating rhythms of mutual ac-
knowledgment to resonate and that can serve as an echo chamber for the 
tears, the trembling, and the brokenness of Hegel’s text—with my supple 
yet fi rm hand on the small of his back, I have just led him into a slight 




This confl ict between the form of a proposition per se and the 
unity of the concept which destroys that form is similar to what 
occurs in the rhythm between meter and accent. Rhythm results 
from the juggle and unifi cation of both. In that way, in the 
philosophical proposition, the identity of subject and predicate 
does not abolish their difference.
—Phenomenology, § 61
For Hegel, rhythm affects logic. What is more, logical necessity is consti-
tuted by the rhythm of the concept’s movement: “It is in this nature of 
what is to be its concept in its being that logical necessity in general consists. 
This alone is the rational and the rhythm of the organic whole . . . —that 
is, it is this alone which is the speculative” (§ 56, trans. modifi ed). Yet, the 
rhythm of the concept is far from steady and predictable. It is a constant 
juggle. There is no preexisting concept of the rhythm of the concept; 
rather, its rhythm emerges contemporaneously with its fumbling steps of 
self- comprehension. Each phenomenological scenario compels the con-
cept to (re-)create its rhythm in communication with its context. Because 
the “rhythm of the organic whole” thus changes constantly, it is quite diffi -
cult, if not impossible, to identify speculative rhythm. “When you think 
you have it, it evaporates and returns as a new rhythm” (Trinh 1999, 14). 
The situatedness of knowledge—even of absolute knowledge—that we 
discussed in the previous chapter returns here as the incessantly chang-
ing rhythm of the whole.
We will discover in this chapter that speculative rhythm emerges 
from the divided method of philosophical science, which juggles con-
trary demands. This method is grounded in sympathy understood as a 
sharing of non- identity, a sharing that itself is shared. Every articulation 
of a new insight thus alters the rhythm of the whole. Like someone who 
dances to her own heartbeat. Every move she makes with her arms, her 
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legs, or her torso to accompany her heartbeat changes the rhythm of that 
beat, which in turn has an effect on her dance moves.1
Echolalia
Speculative rhythm has often been constructed as a regular three- step. In 
that case, dialectics becomes a rocking movement that feels soothing. It 
assures that individual concepts come and go, and that thought departs 
and returns, while nothing is lost and nothing imposes itself forever. 
But Hegel’s analogy between logic and rhythm suggests something more 
disturbing. Hegel’s rhythm has an element of chaos. It is reminiscent 
of the description of rhythm by Deleuze and Guattari, who specify that 
“what chaos and rhythm have in common is the in-between” (Deleuze 
and Guattari 1987, 313). Oscillating between different notions of the 
concept, between judgment and speculative proposition, and between 
philosophy and poetry, speculative rhythm introduces chaos and contin-
gency into the realm of logic—and that can be a quite troubling thought. 
The elements of the two different logics of Hegel’s divided methodology 
do not join under the rule of a common beat. Not one of these danc-
ers leads. Instead, they bring different rhythms to bear on one another, 
forming “a zone in which dissonant, differently tuned voices, discordant 
voices out of tune with themselves and with the times, may be heard 
echoing through one another” (to use a formulation of Michael Levine 
1997, 111). Yet the different logics “unexpectedly click in, come apart, 
meet halfway, and so on; in other words, . . . they do and undo one an-
other in their diversifi ed movements” (Trinh 1999, 261).
The self- actualizing activity of Hegelian concepts cuts across the 
clear- cut distinctions that traditional logic tries to enforce. For Hegel, 
language, thought, and reality overlap and are inseparable. Thoughtful 
statements are acts that alter reality. The “form of writing” must therefore 
be of great concern for Hegel when he embarks on the project of the 
Phenomenology, that is, of presenting spirit as it appears to itself (Hegel 
2002, 251). It comes as no surprise, therefore, that he devotes an impor-
tant part of the Phenomenology’s preface to his thoughts on the form of 
philosophical exposition (§ 56– 66).2
Spirit appears (phainesthai) to itself in the logic and syntax of its lan-
guage (logos). The Phenomenology of Spirit mediates spirit with itself through 
writing. Nevertheless, as we have seen in the previous chapter, Hegel is 
much attuned to the fact that a dynamic truth cannot simply be written 
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down. In response to this fact, the language of Hegel’s Phenomenology di-
vides itself between the language of traditional logic and the language 
of the speculative. Hegel describes the relation between the two forms 
of writing as a juggle, a tremulous harmony in motion, and as a rhythm 
that comes to life through the syncopated ensemble playing of two ways 
of thinking. This moving incongruence of the phenomenological text 
makes it emotional.
The always subtly changing rhythm of speculative writing resists 
quick understanding, and refuses the smooth supersession of the signi-
fi er “with a view to the concept” (Derrida 1986, 9a). The “magisterial cold-
ness” and unemotional, “imperturbable seriousness” of Hegel’s Geist is 
 “semantically infallible” solely “for those who have read him a little—but 
only a little” (Derrida 1986, 1a); that is, for those who have read him only 
in one direction.3 In the following, I will traverse Hegel’s text back and 
forth in an attempt to bring its body to life again and again as a warm body. 
Then we might notice that, rather than the motionless fl ight of the eagle 
in the very high cold regions of the sky, the Phenomenology performs an 
eagle dance—the imitation of the afterfeeling of the eagle on the ground. 
Close to the ground, “very lowly, low down, close to the earth,” the danc-
ers respond to a multitude of at times contradictory calls: they save yet 
lose themselves curling up into a tight ball or crossing the road slowly with 
hundreds of swift little steps (Derrida 1991, 234). For German ears, the 
“eagle”—this emblem of Prussian authoritarianism, and this word that is 
already the translation of another echolalia: of the French echo of He-
gel’s name (aigle)—turns into an Igel: one of poetry’s names.4 Poetry sets 
the eagle on its feet.5 There, on the ground, in an unfamiliar element, the 
eagle looks quite awkward and vulnerable.
The complex rhythm of Hegel’s philosophical language restores 
thought to its body. Poetic language brings to the fore a general charac-
teristic of texts, namely that they survive their physical vanishing in the 
uptake of information. Unable to decide where best to place the stress, 
we read over and over again and thus remain attached to the material-
ity of words. We keep the bodies of words company (or allow them to 
keep us company).6 Doing so, we begin to notice that words communi-
cate with one another, that they echo one another even where the gram-
mar of meaning prevents such associations.7 Lyric poetry, says Hegel, 
“allows particular ideas to subsist alongside one another without being 
related, whereas thinking demands and produces dependence of things 
on one another, reciprocal relations, logical judgments, syllogisms, etc.”8 
By  juggling logical judgments and syllogisms, Hegel invites some of the 
chaos of this lyric “alongside” in an effort to counteract dependence, op-
pression, and the hierarchical understanding of Aufhebung.
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This chapter interrogates logic, that is, rules of intelligibility, in order 
to show not only that emotion is a mode of thought, but also that emo-
tionality calls for and produces a different logic. The argument that emo-
tions function like judgments, because they are intentional in that they 
have an object or aim, is rather problematic in my view.9 The syntax of 
judgment demands the existence of a subject and an object, their separa-
tion, and their hierarchical organization. The established rules for logi-
cal judgments force us to think in hierarchical subject- object relations. 
And while Nussbaum, for example, is at pains to prove the intentionality 
of emotions and their status as “forms of judgment,” she misses an op-
portunity to interrogate the very rules of intelligibility that separate emo-
tionality from rationality in the fi rst place (Nussbaum 1997, 234).10 Hegel 
suggests that there is something to be gained from bringing together 
the two contradictory logics of traditional argumentation and speculative 
sympathy while allowing them to syncopate each other and to exchange 
their steps. The discord and confusion that is thereby introduced into 
the rigidly ruled discourse of conventional logic urges thought to move 
in more than one direction. A self- difference has opened up within logic 
to construct the emotional syntax of philosophical language. It creates 
resonances within that cannot close themselves off from resonating with 
other bodies or even other logics. Emotionality is lodged in the language 
of the Phenomenology, in the tremulous harmony of the “doleful cry of the 
owl at twilight” (Nancy 2001, 38).
Emotional Concepts
Hegel radically redefi nes the notions of concept and proposition used 
in traditional logic generally and, more specifi cally (and closer to He-
gel’s concerns), in Kant’s transcendental philosophy. Traditionally, the 
defi nition of concepts as abstract, self- identical, and timeless terms has 
served to shield the rules of thought from empirical and emotional in-
terference. Hegel’s phenomenological approach counteracts this aver-
sion against experiential knowledge. It undoes the traditional separa-
tion between logic and empiricism by insisting that a concept realizes 
itself and that reality comprehends itself. For Kant, concepts are general 
and abstract terms, empty containers or, as Hegel puts it, “inert recep-
tacles” that need to be fi lled with the concrete material of experience 
(gleichgültige Behälter; Hegel 1975a, §162). Kant famously refers to con-
cepts without intuitions as void, thus underlining their status as sub-
jective forms of representation that call for objective content (Kant 
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1990, B75 and B298– 99). Hegel understands the concept (Begriff ) as 
reaching through (durchgreifen) and undoing such abstract divisions as 
subject and object, form and matter, or logic and ontology.11 The con-
cept is no fi xed entity distinct from comprehension. Herein consists 
precisely the novelty of Hegel’s notion of the concept: that it is not a 
term but a movement, the movement of comprehending. But this activ-
ity doesn’t necessarily require a human agent. Concepts comprehend 
themselves.
Hegel’s phenomenology of spirit thus not only examines how a 
situated consciousness “applies” certain concepts, but traces how con-
cepts “actualize themselves”: how concepts self- differentiate and recol-
lect, embrace themselves and tear themselves to pieces—all the while 
generating realities that affect and situate consciousness. Concepts thus 
have a reality somewhat independent from those who “use” them. When 
Hegel says that it is in the “nature of what is to be its concept in its being,” 
he considers being not just as substance but also as subject (§ 56). Sub-
stance is usually understood as self- identical, timeless, and stable: “On 
account of its simplicity, that is, its parity- with- itself [Sichselbstgleichheit], 
[substance] appears to be fi xed and persisting” (§ 55). But this appear-
ance passes: “this parity- with- itself is likewise negativity” (ibid.). Tradi-
tional philosophy assumes that such negativity or moving force is exerted 
upon being by the thinking subject, that is, externally. “However, that 
[what is] has its otherness in itself and that it is self- moving are con-
tained in that simplicity . . . which is the pure concept” (§ 55). No human 
subject is required for the concept to come to differ from itself and to 
emotionally respond to, negotiate, and juggle this disparity with itself. 
Hegel’s radical contribution to the philosophy of emotionality consists 
in suggesting that, in their self- tearing and self- embracing dynamic, con-
cepts themselves are emotional (and not just the philosopher). Hegel 
reinscribes the emotionality that traditional philosophy has severed from 
conceptual life back into the concept itself.
Kant’s demand that “an abstract concept be made sensuous” must 
strike Hegel as redundant because a concept makes itself sensuous (Kant 
1990, B299). It differentiates itself and takes the form of an Ur- teil (“judg-
ment” or “predicative proposition,” literally: “original partition”).12 Of 
course, Hegel’s notion of judgment is as unusual as his notion of the 
concept. For him judgments are not formal and atemporal assertions, 
but living bodies (“the judgment of the plant,” for example, develops out 
of the unity of the germ), concrete things (“all things are a judgment”), 
or confl ict- laden propositions (Hegel 1975a, § 166 Zusatz; § 167). They 
change over time and at no time are they one with themselves.
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Hegel thus introduces self- dissonance or emotionality into his 
notion of the concept, into his notion of judgment, and even into his 
notion of truth. While, according to traditional logic, predicative propo-
sitions are either (wholly) true or (wholly) false (depending on whether 
concepts have been correctly applied), for Hegel they are both true and 
false because their concept realizes itself in them in a self- contradictory 
way.13 If nothing can be “wholly true,” as Hegel indeed maintains, the 
truth comes always mixed with untruth (ignorance, error, opinion, mad-
ness, etc.). There is no solid, self- identical, and sober truth, but only a 
dynamic, precarious, and emotional process of self- refl ection that must 
juggle self- affi rmation and self- critique.
Hegel thus defi nes truth as subjective—not in the sense that it lacks 
reality, and not only in the sense that it is a reality perceived (a reality for 
another, as Hegel would say), but in the sense that truth itself constitutes 
a subject:
In my view, . . . everything hangs on apprehending and expressing the 
truth not merely as substance, but equally as subject. . . . Furthermore, 
the living substance is the being that is in truth subject, or, what amounts 
to the same thing, it is in truth actual only in so far as it is the move-
ment of self- positing, that is the mediation of itself and its becoming-
 other- to-itself [sich anders Werdens]. (§ 17– 18)
The concept’s activity of self- positing by way of partially negat-
ing and partially affi rming itself thus can be apprehended—so Hegel 
proposes—as the self- refl ecting subjectivity of the concept. This self-
 refl ection juggles the confl icting and emotionally charged demands of 
self- othering and self- collecting; it is an activity that is not reserved for 
human agents.
All this said, the emotional and material reality of Hegel’s concept 
is easy to overlook because Hegel twists the traditional use of the word 
“concept” so radically that it is diffi cult to accept. Most interpretations 
of the Hegelian text—even the best—have in fact disregarded the con-
cept’s materiality and self- dissonance in favor of an understanding of the 
concept as metaphysical abstraction. Derrida, for example, offers a weak 
reading of the notion of the concept when he writes that for Hegel “lan-
guage accomplishes itself [and] thus becomes signifying only by relieving 
within itself the (sensible, exterior) signifi er, traversing it and denying it 
with a view to the concept” (Derrida 1986, 9a). While tradition justifi es 
the view that “the logic of the concept is the eagle’s,” Hegel certainly op-
poses this tradition (Derrida 1986, 55a).
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Emotional Judgments
In the preface of the Phenomenology, Hegel introduces the rhythm of the 
speculative judgment as actively critiquing and disarticulating the logical 
form of philosophical writing that is the predicative judgment (§ 60– 
66).14 Predicative judgments are composed of or can be logically reduced 
to three parts: the subject, the copula, and the predicate.15 Hegel de-
nounces the predicative judgment as the symptom of a rigid, overly clear-
 cut and hierarchical thinking. He shows that its claim to simplicity and 
straightness only superfi cially covers over the confl icts it actually harbors. 
In the previous section, I already noted that concepts actualize them-
selves in judgments in a self- contradictory way. It is now time to specify 
these contradictions.
According to Hegel’s analysis, every judgment presents a discord 
between what it means and what it says. The judgment means that sub-
ject and predicate are identical—a is b—but in reality it separates them 
into two different terms—a and b—and the copula physically stands in 
between the two, holding them apart. “The meaning seems to be that 
the difference is denied, although at the same time it appears directly 
in the proposition” (Hegel 1989, 90, trans. modifi ed). The letter of the 
judgment is at odds with its spirit; the judgment means to cover over a 
difference that its body exhibits. In this situation, “clever argumentation 
[Räsonnieren]”—as Hegel calls the formal thinking that produces pred-
icative judgments—solves or, rather, controls, the confl ict by establishing 
a hierarchy (§ 58).16 The body of the text is rejected once the meaning 
is retained.
But the judgment contradicts itself in more ways than one. Not 
only do its meaning and its physical appearance fail to coincide, but it 
is also of two minds about what it means. While the judgment claims to 
express the identity of subject and predicate, its own rules of intelligibil-
ity prohibit this identity.17 Good judgment demands that the predicate 
must not be the same as the subject. Whenever they are indeed iden-
tical, the proposition doesn’t make any sense; it is, as Hegel observes, 
commonly rejected as saying nothing: “If, for example, to the question 
‘What is a plant?’ the answer is given ‘A plant is—a plant,’ the truth of 
such a statement is at once admitted by the entire company on whom it 
is tested, and at the same time it is equally unanimously declared that the 
statement says nothing” (Hegel 1989, 415). “A rose is a rose” says noth-
ing. Supposedly. The predicate has to be different from the subject, and 
difference—logically—is understood as subordination. The subject in its 
particularity or individuality is supposed to be subjected to the universal-
ity of the predicate. Even if subject and predicate are different but equal, 
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the proposition does not constitute a logical judgment because it is im-
possible to decide which term should govern the “identity” of the two. 
Does “poetry is a hedgehog” say anything? Can we subsume poetry under 
hedgehog? The sentence is grammatically correct, but it is no predicative 
proposition because it contains no predicate. According to good judg-
ment, it gives no answer to the question “what is poetry?” because it joins 
two terms that are equally particular. In order for the predicate to say 
anything about (über) the subject, it has to be higher, more general, and 
more signifi cant than the subject which must be lower, more particular, 
and without the ability to speak for itself.18
Again the confl ict is managed—or attempted to be managed—by 
introducing a hierarchy. The order of the terms in the judgment must 
not be reversed: a (every) rose is a plant, but that does not mean that 
every plant is a rose. Or, to cast the same in more humanistic—albeit not 
more human—terms: Socrates is a man, but not every man is a Socrates. 
The logic of “clever argumentation” here betrays its inherent violence. 
The Enlightenment holds that all men have reason and understand-
ing. These faculties allow them to make judgments, construe arguments, 
and engage in public reasoning. If we listen to the logic of the judg-
ment, though, it turns out that only those who subject themselves to Soc-
rates can claim reason (his name functions as shorthand for the canon 
of Western philosophy). The others teeter precariously at the edge of 
having their humanity denied. Socrates agrees to sending the fl ute player 
away. Her unruly rhythm would only disturb a rational “evening in con-
versation.”19 The basic idea of the Enlightenment does allow for the con-
traposition—someone who does not have reason and understanding (or 
quite unreasonably declines to follow its rules) is not a man.
Together with Hölderlin and Schelling, the early Hegel demands 
that the style of philosophical conversation be changed. In the “Earliest 
System- Program of German Idealism” they urge that “the philosopher 
must possess just as much aesthetic power as the poet” (Hegel, Hölderlin, 
and Schelling 2002, 111). In order to counteract the discrimination in-
herent in philosophical discourse, the new philosopher must display the 
contradictions at work in any assertion, the contradictions that the formal 
rules of logic so far have worked hard to subdue. The new philosopher 
must be able to attend to the sensuous qualities of language, register the 
subtle syncopations between the letter and the spirit or the body and the 
meaning of a judgment, and develop a philosophical syntax that juggles 
or rhythmically interweaves both logical and poetic language. “Thus in 
the end enlightened and unenlightened must clasp hands” and dance, 
with not one of these dancers leading (ibid.).20
Instead of the clear- cut logic of the judgment, which separates 
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 enlightened and unenlightened, Hegel proposes the syntax of specula-
tive rhythm. Against the covering- over of confl ict through the hierarchi-
cal organization of subject and predicate, or matter and meaning, Hegel 
exposes the confl icts and affi rms that “the non- identical aspect of subject 
and predicate is also an essential moment” (Hegel 1989, 91). While “in 
the judgment this is not expressed,” speculative syntax arranges together 
the different pieces of the whole (that is the truth) in a way that they 
gesture toward each other, fi gure one another, and imitate each other’s 
steps across the vast interval of their differences. It creates a complex 
and moving interplay, a strange—partly monstrous and partly ludicrous, 
at times powerful and at times heartbreaking—confi guration: the dance 
of the Igel with the eagle.
Invitation to Dance
Hegel does not advocate a purity of expression that “rigorously excludes” 
the logic and grammar of judgment (§ 64). He makes use of predicative 
propositions even though he considers them inappropriate for specu-
lative philosophy. In the Science of Logic, Hegel warns: “We must, at the 
outset, make this general observation, namely, that the proposition in 
the form of the judgment is not suited [nicht geschickt ist] to express specula-
tive truths” (Hegel 1989, 90). According to the (general) principles of 
his systematic philosophy, judgments have no place in philosophical dis-
course. And yet he was dealt his cards and he is committed to play them. 
Tradition has sent (geschickt) him a philosophical language that is not 
suited (nicht geschickt) to express speculative truth, and he will not argue 
with tradition.21 Neither does he desist from presenting or exposing the 
speculative. But he is happy to forego the claim of expression with its 
calls for authenticity and purity.22
The Phenomenology clarifi es what it means to remain faithful to spec-
ulative truth: “The exposition [Darstellung] which stays true to its insight 
into the nature of what is speculative must retain the dialectical form 
and must import nothing into it [nichts hereinnehmen] except what is both 
comprehended and is the concept” (§ 66). Hegel breaks the vow of fi del-
ity by admitting judgments. He hosts the foreign logic in his own system. 
It is a move that will cause him, his readers, and his text a lot of trouble. 
It is a move that generates emotionality. Yet this unfaithfulness to his 
principles allows him to fl exibly respond to the historical reality of non-
 Hegelian philosophical discourse, and ultimately to remain true to his 
own thinking. Allegiance to the speculative necessitates unfaithfulness 
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to general principles. It would be quite un- Hegelian to abstractly oppose 
tradition. Instead, Hegel seduces those readers who expect conventional 
logic by speaking their language. (He knows that, as far as philosophy is 
concerned, there is no other language.)23
Hegel’s style is susceptible to its others, including traditional logic. 
The rhythm of Hegel’s moving exposition juggles two ways of philo-
sophically constructing propositions: speculatively and “argumentatively 
[räsonnierend].”24 Such “commingling” upsets both speculative and ar-
gumentative thought since “each of those modes interferes with the 
other” (§ 64). His writing thus loses in clarity and defi nition. “It is only 
the kind of philosophical exposition which rigorously excludes the ordi-
nary relations among the parts of a proposition which would be able to 
achieve the goal of plasticity” (ibid.). With “plasticity” (plastisch sein), He-
gel means here that only this kind of exposition would achieve the defi -
nition and well- rounded completeness of sculpture. But Hegel happily 
renounces the well- proportioned tangibility of Greek sculpture in favor 
of a philosophical elasticity.25 Hegel has noted that the ideal of Greek self-
 containment and repose favors an “aloofness from feeling” and turns life 
quite literally into stone.26 With the Phenomenology he is interested, rather, 
in the dynamic plasticity of something as unending and diffi cult to iden-
tify as rhythm. Troubled and torn like the “doleful cry of the owl at twi-
light,” speculative rhythm has replaced the “tranquil trait of mourning” 
that the solitary statues retain (Nancy 2001, 38; Pinkard 2008, fn. 28).
In Hegel’s rhythmic exposition, the different modes (argumenta-
tive and speculative) take part in one another while taking each other 
apart. Traditional logic does not persist untouched; it is shaken by spec-
ulative rhythm. Similarly, by embracing the very logic that rejects the 
speculative, Hegel invites trouble into the heart of his philosophy. Yet 
the emotionality generated by the fact that different grammars mingle is 
not suppressed by hierarchical sublations of one mode in the other. The 
dance of the Igel crosses the dance of the eagle without crossing it out. 
Hegel even speaks of a “harmony” between the two, but this harmony, to 
be sure, amplifi es dissonance, interference, and syncopation:
This confl ict between the form of a proposition per se and the unity 
of the concept which destroys that form is similar to what occurs in 
the rhythm between meter and accent. Rhythm results from the juggle 
[schwebende Mitte] and unifi cation of both. In that way, in the philo-
sophical proposition, the identity of subject and predicate does not 
abolish their difference [Unterschied], which is expressed in the form 
of the proposition. Instead, their unity emerges as a harmony. (§ 61, 
trans. modifi ed)
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This passage renders the friction between two possibilities of read-
ing—reading the material form and reading the meaning—as, once 
again, a confl ict between identity and difference. For Hegel, this confl ict 
does not have to be (dis)solved but can be made productive as a har-
monic disunity in oscillating motion. Pinkard translates Hegel’s complex 
expression schwebende Mitte as “oscillating midpoint,” conveying the sense 
that speculative rhythm fi nds balance through constant counterbalanc-
ing movements. I translate it as “juggle” in order to communicate that 
unifi cation, for Hegel, is a precarious juggle and not a stable synthesis 
(no matter how insistently the third step of the dialectical three- step is 
read as such).27
To construct judgments argumentatively is to follow the steady 
meter of a strict grammatical arrangement: subject, copula, predicate. 
The “subject constitutes the basis” for the succession of beats, the “solid 
ground [ feste Boden]” on which predication advances (fortlaufen, § 60). 
There are two ways of accentuating predicative judgments. The subject 
can be understood as agent, that is, as privileged over and against its vari-
ous and passing activities. Then the emphasis lies on the individual. Or 
the subject can be taken as remaining mute, demure, and (e)motionless 
while it “passively [unbewegt] support[s] the accidents” (§ 60). Without 
being an agent or having a voice it simply provides substance for judg-
ment. In this case, “the understanding downgrades [the subject] to the 
status of something lifeless, since it merely predicates it of another exis-
tence, and takes no cognizance of the immanent life of this existence” 
(§ 53, trans. modifi ed). The predicate, on the other hand, then makes 
a fuss (macht ein Aufhebens). It suppresses difference and sublates phe-
nomena into the unity of its abstractly universal concept.28 Its mode of 
aufheben is again unilateral: it puts an excessive emphasis on universality. 
Without much art, the proposition’s accent thus lies either on the fi rst 
term, the subject—one two three; a is b; god is being; poetry is x—or on 
the last term, the predicate—one two three; a is b; god is being ; poetry is x. 
Either way, it presents a simple cadence.
To construct judgments speculatively is to juggle both of these ca-
dences, to keep them both in play. Of course it is quite diffi cult to render 
both cadences at the same time. Therefore, “much has to be read over 
and over again” (§ 63). First, one might conclude that “the I is a thing,” 
i.e., that the subject as agent is predicated of a lifeless and abstract acci-
dent (§ 790). Yet this very emphasis on the subject “compels knowledge 
to come back to the proposition and now to grasp it in some other way” 
(§ 63). The correction reads the initial statement in the opposite direc-
tion and says “The thing is I ” (§ 790). The supposedly lifeless accident is 
in fact an I or a self- refl ecting agent. But then how can one categorical 
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statement change into its reverse like that? Clever argumentation feels 
impelled to reinforce the status of the copula by clarifying “that the being 
of the I is a thing,” i.e., that “is” establishes a solid and stable, thing- like 
or categorical link (§ 790). But it has already been stated that “the thing 
is I.” Thus, the thing (the copula) which is the being of the I is I. The 
copula itself acts, moves, and refl ects upon itself. The self- negating move-
ment of the copula functions as the “oscillating midpoint” that unifi es 
this quasi- syllogism (or speculative syllogism) into which the one judg-
ment has unfolded through multiple readings.
But we have jumped ahead to the fi nal chapter of the Phenomenol-
ogy; let us return to the preface and read again Hegel’s account of the 
emotional syntax of judgment. Speculative thinking raises the prosodic 
charge of philosophical language. It introduces a disruptive accent that 
syncopates the pattern of formal logic. The speculative deals a “counter-
 punch” to the normal accentuation of philosophical language:
The nature of judgment, that is of the proposition per se which in-
cludes the distinction of subject and predicate within itself, is destroyed 
by the speculative judgment [spekulativen Satz], and the identical propo-
sition which the former comes to be contains the counter- punch 
[Gegenstoß] to such relations. (§ 61, trans. modifi ed)
The proposition has doubled: there is “the proposition per se which in-
cludes the distinction of subject and predicate within itself” and “the 
identical proposition” which deals the counterpunch that confounds 
these distinctions. When the proposition “God is being” is read specu-
latively, the second term “being” trades the abstract universality of the 
predicate for the dynamic self- mediation of the subject (in Hegel’s em-
phatic sense), that is, of the self- negating concept. In the movement from 
the fi rst to the second term, the subject, thus, reappears—as in “Rose 
is a rose is a rose is a rose.” The subject is entangled in the predicate: 
“thought, instead of getting any farther with the transition from subject 
to predicate . . . fi nds the subject also to be immediately present in the 
predicate” (§ 62).29 The note of the subject lasts through the beat of what 
is usually the predicate, and the reader fi nds the attack on the third count 
lacking. What now? The reader “feels . . . inhibited [gehemmt].” The pred-
icate makes no fuss, macht kein Aufhebens, and allows for no stress. The 
proposition breaks off in the middle of an enjambment and leaves the 
reader hanging with one foot in the air (§ 62). Trying to fi gure out where 
to rest the foot, the reader “is thrown back to the thought of the subject” 
(§ 62). She pivots on one foot to move through the proposition in the 
other direction. Yet, turning around in an attempt to regain the sub-
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ject, she realizes that the accent on the fi rst count is lost, too. “God” has 
ceased to provide the stable ground on which the movement of thought 
can rest. Instead, this subject has been tossed in the air: “Here, ‘being’ 
is not supposed to be a predicate. It is supposed to be the essence, but, 
as a result, ‘God’ seems to cease to be what it was by virtue of its place in 
the proposition, namely, to be a fi xed subject” (§ 62).30 Speculative read-
ing turns an abstract subject into the self- refl ecting concept that tears 
itself to shreds and recollects itself. Instead of referring to something 
outside of language, the subject has become a reality that writes itself: 
“Since the concept is the object’s own self, that is, the self which exhibits 
itself as the object’s coming- to-be [sein Werden], it is not a motionless subject 
passively supporting the accidents; rather, it is the self- moving concept 
which takes its determinations back into itself” (§ 60). The subject makes 
its own sense. Realizing this, the reader has lost her former defi nition of 
the subject: “Within this movement the motionless subject itself breaks 
down [geht zugrunde]” (§ 60). Now that “the subject has dropped out of 
the picture [verlorengeht],” the suspended foot is thrown back to the count 
of the predicate (§ 60). Yet it does not safely land there to resume the 
course of a measured choreography. With this awkward pirouette, the 
reader—who has lost her footing on this base that “totters [schwankt]” 
(§ 60)—falls into the arms of the subject now understood as self- refl exive 
subject- matter: “Thought thus loses its fi xed objective basis [Boden] which 
it had in the subject, when, in the predicate, it is thrown back to the sub-
ject [darauf ], and when, in the predicate, it returns not into itself but into 
the subject of the content” (§ 63, trans. modifi ed).
The clear- cut separations between subject and predicate, as well 
as between the reading subject and the content or subject matter of the 
proposition, are unsettled by the fact that the concept reaches through 
these divisions. Moved by the concept, the reader is unable to dissociate 
herself from what she reads. Drawn into the dance, she fi nds that she is 
not grounded in herself but depends on the other, the one she reads, 
to hold her. But clever argumentation loathes giving up control. Hegel, 
thus, exerts a certain kind of violence when he seduces the reader to read 
the judgment speculatively. His diction betrays this violence. According 
to his description, the reading subject “suffers from a counter- punch” 
(§ 60). It “feels . . . inhibited . . . and . . . thrown back” (§ 62). The vio-
lence of Hegel’s writing style consists in not allowing the reader to trans-
late the confl icts of a proposition into the higher synthesis of a stable 
meaning. It interferes with the reader’s wish to be done with the text.
However, since that former subject [subject of the proposition] enters 
into the determinations [accidents] themselves and is their soul, the 
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second subject, which is to say, the knowing subject, fi nds that the for-
mer, which it was supposed to be over and done with, which it wants to 
go beyond in order to return into itself, is still there in the predicate. 
Instead of being able to be the agent [das Tuende] in the movement of 
predication . . . the subject is still occupied with the self of the content. 
The subject is not supposed to exist on its own, but it is supposed to ex-
ist together [zusammensein] with this content. (§ 60, trans. modifi ed)
Hegel frustrates the reader’s desire to withdraw as quickly as possible 
from the contact with the other into the aloof identity and superior au-
thority of the I. Speculative science asks us to “be with [zusammensein]” 
being (apprehended and articulated as subject) to sympathize with its self-
 disruption without losing our own beat, to join hands with it and dance.
Half- Sympathetic Speech Acts
Let us return once more to the passage quoted at the beginning of this 
chapter: “It is in this nature of what is to be its concept in its being that logi-
cal necessity in general consists. This alone is the rational and the rhythm 
of the organic whole . . .—that is, it is this alone which is the speculative” 
(§ 56). Speculative philosophy does not rely on a set of unchanging rules 
of logic that it applies equally to all cases. Rather, the speculative philoso-
pher observes—while acknowledging the impact of her own subjectiv-
ity on the phenomenological scenario—how being comprehends itself 
and how this process of self- comprehension (or of being “in its being 
its own concept”) plays itself out in particular situations. The method of 
speculative philosophy is thus divided between attending to its own rules 
and attending to the way its subject grasps itself. Speculative thought 
juggles this self- division: “This nature of scientifi c method—that partly 
[teils] it is inseparable from the content, and partly [teils] it determines its 
rhythm by way of itself—has . . . its genuine exposition in speculative phi-
losophy” (§ 57, trans. modifi ed). The divided methodology of speculative 
thought consists partly (teils) in dancing to its own beat, and partly (teils) 
in following the lead of its subject matter. Rather than simply applying 
abstract (i.e., ostensibly objective, timeless, and universal) rules of logic, 
the speculative thinker needs to attend to the way the particular concept 
at hand comprehends itself (what criteria it sets for its comprehension). 
And she needs to do so without losing her own beat. As a matter of fact, 
she needs to foreground the particularity of her own way of grasping. 
Only a dance of (at least) two different beings, trying to comprehend 
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themselves and each other by trying to respond to each other’s and their 
own movements, realizes what Hegel calls philosophical science.
Dancing thus to two different measures requires effort and atten-
tiveness. Hegel describes what he calls the “exertion of the concept [An-
strengung des Begriffs]” and the “attention to the concept [Aufmerksamkeit 
auf den Begriff ]” as emotional labor (§58). It might be intellectually diffi -
cult to fi nd the right category for a phenomenon and draw inferences 
according to the formal rules of logic, but there is no emotional diffi culty 
here. Speculative philosophy, on the other hand, requires emotional 
labor. It is frustrating for the philosopher to renounce authority over 
the matter.31 Hegel notes the emotional diffi culty of injured pride. He 
even suggests that the movement of the concept can produce a feeling 
of shame—“the kind of shame which supposedly lies in something’s hav-
ing been learned”—since learning implies an acknowledgment of pre-
vious mistakes.32 But the speculative philosopher must be able to bear 
such shame.33 Hegel, in fact, asks her to transform vanity and shame into 
sympathy with what she is trying to comprehend. He demands of the 
philosopher to “sink [her] freedom into the content [diese Freiheit in ihn 
zu versenken],” that is to say, to refrain from manipulating the content 
and instead to follow and to imitate the movement of the content’s self-
 refl ection (§ 58, trans. modifi ed).34
In its proximity to empathy, sympathy is certainly not an uncon-
tentious notion. Scholars today ardently debate whether empathy is ap-
propriate in matters of epistemology and hermeneutics, whether it is 
politically helpful, and whether it is even possible.35 Complicating my 
use of the term here is the fact that it has undergone important changes 
in meaning between Hegel’s time and ours.36 I don’t have room here to 
thoroughly engage in this debate, but I do want to clarify two aspects of 
sympathy that are important to me and that differentiate it from similar 
terms (and from different understandings of the same term). I’d like to 
understand sympathy strictly as feeling with or feeling together, as shar-
ing feeling, or, in short, as commiseration. That is to say, sympathy has 
nothing to do with the condescending notion of compassion. In addition 
to the horizontal relationality of sympathy, I would like to stress its tem-
poral character. I take sympathy to translate the German Nachempfi nden 
(“having an afterfeeling” or “imitating a feeling”), as opposed to Einfüh-
lung (“feeling into”). The latter reinscribes interiority whereas I appreci-
ate the temporal lag and supplementarity of Nachempfi nden. The Greek 
empathês simply means “in a state of passion,” as opposed to apathês, which 
means “without passion.” But this neutrality of the term is lost when, 
around 1900, Lipps uses Einfühlung to initiate an important discussion 
about the knowledge of other minds that nevertheless suffers from pre-
supposing an all- too- stable notion of the self.37
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Hegelian sympathy is a resonance between transports, rather than 
between individuals.38 Indeed, Hegel fi nds sympathy possible because 
he doesn’t have an emphatic notion of the singularity of the individual. 
Instead, he operates with a logic of fi guration. The three moments of 
the concept—individuality, universality, and particularity—fi gure one 
another in the sense that they are distinct but that “each distinction is 
confounded in the very attempt to isolate and fi x it” (Hegel 1989, 620). 
By the same token, individual concepts fi gure one another. The individ-
ual, according to Hegel, tends to isolate and fi x distinctions. It conceives 
of itself as an indivisible monad without openings toward others—as one 
who excludes and repels other individuals. As such, the individual is an 
important moment in the movement of the concept (across individual-
ity, universality, and particularity), but it necessarily passes. Unlike Kier-
kegaard and those who follow his criticism that Hegel lacks regard for 
singularity, I appreciate this passing of the individual, because it is the 
condition of the possibility of transport. The logic of fi guration makes it 
possible that one be carried out of oneself and to a different self.39 He-
gel’s rhythm of partial sympathy breaks up the integrity of the individual. 
Rather than unifying to full singularity, divided characters resonate across 
a distance in a way that might partially confound their distinction.
Nevertheless, as already noted, Hegelian sympathy has little to do 
with compassion. Rather, having an afterfeeling or imitating another’s 
feeling (Nachempfi nden) involves the (partial) negation of the other and 
the self. Juggling identity and difference includes that one speak in an-
other’s voice while twisting his words.40 Rather than compassionately af-
fi rming the fullness and sincerity of someone’s feeling, Hegelian sympa-
thy moves the other and the self: it transports. We have begun to see in 
the last chapter, and will discuss it further in this and the remaining chap-
ters, that emotion, for Hegel, is always mediated intersubjectively and 
across a temporal lag. All emotion, thus, necessarily takes the shape of 
sympathy in the sense of afterfeeling or Nachempfi nden (be it a sympathy 
with oneself). At the same time, Nachempfi nden (in the sense of “adapting 
from”) opens a future for transports because it calls for further textual 
enactments (or readings) of emotional judgments.
It becomes clear, then, that the emotional labor Hegel is concerned 
with has an ethical bent (if a somewhat perverse one). The “attention” 
and “exertion” that Hegel demands of the speculative philosopher con-
sists in renouncing vanity and instead bearing the shame of risking sym-
pathy (§ 58). The method of speculative philosophy thus shapes the re-
lations between self and other. It helps the emotionally thinking and 
reading subject to identify with what at fi rst appears as alien.41
With his opaque writing, Hegel responds to the violence he regis-
ters in conventional reading acts. Hegel specifi es that the straightforward 
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meaning that clever argumentation retains by avoiding the diffi culty of 
attending to an unstable rhythm is, in fact, a negative one, or simply 
the negation of the subject- matter: “clever argumentation conducts itself 
negatively towards the content apprehended; it knows how to refute it 
and reduce it to nothing” (§ 59). The argumentative reader has every-
thing already understood; her purely intellectual or formal knowledge, 
then, negates the otherness of the other by capturing it in a knowledge 
statement. Or she quickly makes up her mind and says: “A rose is a rose 
means nothing.” In both cases, she is able to position herself above the 
“object” of her thought:
Instead of entering into the immanent content of the subject- matter, 
the understanding always surveys [übersieht] the whole and stands above 
the individual existence of which it speaks, or, what amounts to the 
same thing, it does not see it at all. However, scientifi c cognition in 
fact requires that it give itself over to the life of the object. (§ 53, trans. 
modifi ed)42
From the scientifi c thinker, that is, the speculative reader, Hegel demands 
sympathy with the life of the subject matter.
Sympathetic reading and sympathetic knowledge partially negate 
not only the other but also the self. They spring from the acknowledg-
ment of self- difference.43 Sympathetic “identifi cation,” for Hegel, does 
not consist in the affi rmative recognition of the inner contents of other 
minds. Rather, “what is shared . . . is sharing itself, and consequently 
everyone’s nonidentity, each one’s nonidentity to himself and to others” 
(Nancy 1991, 66). The ethics of Hegelian sympathy thus destroys individ-
ual integrity. Rather than trying to preserve the unity of indivisibility, the 
subject opens to the self- difference and emotionality of the concept and 
becomes self- dissonant, unsettled, and emotional. Negativity thus plays 
an important part in Hegel’s version of sympathy. “It is death—but if one 
is permitted to say so, it is not a tragic death . . . it is death as sharing and 
exposure. It is not murder—it is not death as extermination” (Nancy 
1991, 66– 67). The loss of self on either side must only be partial if this 
movement of comprehension is not to end in nothingness. The concept 
half- exerts itself by dancing to (at least) two different measures.
Reading Hegel’s prose resembles reading a poem aloud: one hesi-
tates as to where to put the accent—is it in accordance with the meter, 
or with the syntax, or with the stress of the meaning? What if all three 
differ from one another? Where to articulate the beat? When to rest the 
foot? The reader feels herself checked halfway through the sentence, 
gets lost, and is forced to go back, to repeat the reading in order to fi nd 
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the subject. Subject and predicate exchange positions. Back and forth. 
Predicative propositions are by law irreversible, but the speculative judg-
ment breaks this law to construct its rhythm. Rhythm “changes direction,” 
as Deleuze and Guattari have it (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 313). The 
speculative philosopher reads propositions backward and forward. Such 
reading acts transform linearity into textuality and create plasticity.
The Phenomenology as a whole is one unendingly plastic—shape-
 taking—emotional judgment. I read the Phenomenology as the meticulous 
exposition of all the confl icts and contradictions Hegel could detect in 
the one infi nite judgment that is the self- refl ection of spirit. The different 
fi gures of consciousness in the Phenomenology articulate this emotional 
judgment in progress while consciousness reads itself differently in each 
of its shapes: consciousness is a consciousness is a consciousness is a 
consciousness. The Phenomenology in its entirety provides the speculative 
reading of this one judgment: the self- differentiation of spirit, across 
which spirit appears to itself by negating itself again and again. Specula-
tive reading refuses to reduce the proposition to one single and straight 
meaning. The union of subject and predicate allows for difference while 
their absolute difference accepts being articulated as identical: “Rose is 
a rose is a rose is a rose.”44 While Rose is ceaselessly signifying rose and 
multiplying particularity without aspiration to the universal, the repeti-
tion also articulates her self- differentiality.
This kind of reading undermines the logic of argumentation by 
refusing to answer the question: “What is a speculative proposition?”45 
Nancy suggests, “We shall not reply to the question: Hegelian discourse 
nowhere does so. But it is against it, along it or on its edge, that we shall 
see Hegelian discourse being laid out, used and scattered, to the very 
extent that it is forced to change its form” (Nancy 2001, 77). “Hegel has 
already subtracted his text from the logic of argumentation, from the play 
of the Gegenreden” and responses (Nancy 2001, 11). Against and alongside 
predication, speculative writing prolongs the reading. And as this read-
ing takes shape, moving back and forth in endless repetition, Hegel’s dis-
course transforms, if ever so slightly. It begins to verge on poetry.46
Hegel’s quasi- verse takes part in conventional logic while taking it 
apart. Not only does his strategy of seduction entangle the reader in the 
movement of the speculative, but it also leaves his own writing trapped 
in the logic of predication. In order to seduce the reader to give up 
her aloof position and superior authority, to renounce her vanity and to 
move with the content, Hegel himself has to write with, instead of about 
and above (über), the subject matter. “Speaking nearby or together with 
certainly differs from speaking for and about” (Trinh 1989, 101). But if 
he wants to stand a chance of being accepted when asking the reader 
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for a dance, Hegel needs to speak the language of his philosophical au-
dience, the language of judgments and of formal logic. His exposition 
therefore must be divided within.
Hegel does not invent an idiom that would unambiguously express 
speculative movements. In order to appear, spirit borrows the form of 
judgments: “It is worth remembering that the dialectical movement like-
wise has propositions for its parts or elements. Thus, the highlighted dif-
fi culty seems to recur continually” (§ 66). Spirit’s self- refl ection requires 
that spirit abandon itself to fi nite assertions. Whether it will grasp itself 
across that difference remains an open question.
What is meant as interplay between predicative judgment and 
speculative judgment can always be read simply as predication. “The 
philosophical proposition, because it is a proposition [a Satz], evokes 
the common opinion about both the usual relationship between subject 
and predicate and the customary procedure of knowledge” (§ 63). He-
gel conceives of the speculative as a movement, yet every sentence (Satz) 
is set (gesetzt) according to grammatical and logical laws (Gesetze), which 
Hegel is not ready to break. Hegel does not invent a language different 
from the one that can be read as predicative judgment. There is no new 
speculative language which escapes the spider web of predicative judg-
ments spun by blood- sucking concepts (to invoke Nietzsche). There is 
no strictly speculative idiom that avoids fi nite thought and precludes ar-
gumentative reading by corresponding only to the speculative movement 
of the concept. Herein lays the passion of the new science that gives the 
reader the power to transport the text—despite the often- repeated fact 
that Hegel’s texts feel like mousetraps.
Infi nite judgments might best perform the exertion and attentive-
ness of the concept. In them, difference does not remain locked in or 
eingeschlossen, but gets disclosed or aufgeschlossen.47 The labor of the con-
cept consists in reaching through (durchgreifen) and joining what is com-
monly regarded as incompatible. Infi nite judgments posit the incongru-
ous as identical: for example, “the I is a thing,” “spirit is a bone,” or 
“poetry is a hedgehog.” But these judgments make no sense in the con-
text of traditional logic. For traditional logic—which is bound up with 
metaphysical ontology—mind and body or body and soul are incompat-
ible.48 Against the foil of traditional logic, it becomes clear, then, that it 
is neither mysticism nor metaphoric speech when Hegel describes the 
concept as a life- giving force. We call it life when spirit gets embodied or 
when a body is moved by soul. Life—the interpenetration of body and 
spirit—becomes possible, then, because the concept juggles both.
Yet such life is always haunted by death. “Spirit is a bone” can always 
be read as a straightforward assertion. It would not even be incorrect, or 
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against speculative logic, to say that spirit is a dead thing, inert and de-
fenselessly exposed to the abstractions of clever argumentation. “Taken 
just as it stands, that judgment is devoid of spirit, or rather is itself the 
epitome of what it is to be devoid of spirit. However, in terms of its con-
cept, it is in fact the richest in spirit” (§ 790, trans. modifi ed). Specula-
tively comprehended, this infi nite judgment manifests the power of spirit 
to join the disjointed. It is a precarious power, however—because spirit 
depends on others to read itself. Precisely because the speculative links 
the incompatible, the spheres it links can always fall apart.
Traditional logic accepts infi nite judgments only in their negative 
form. Even Hegel mentions only the negatively infi nite judgment (with 
examples like “spirit is not red,” “the rose is not an elephant,” and “the 
understanding is not a table”) in his Science of Logic (Hegel 1989, 642). 
When the infi nite judgment is taken literally (which is always possible), 
we are in the realm of the negatively infi nite judgment, and that means 
the death of the life of spirit: “Similarly death [is] a negatively infi nite 
judgment . . . in death, as we ordinarily say, body and soul part, i.e., sub-
ject and predicate utterly diverge [auseinanderfallen]” ( Hegel 1975a, 
§173, Zusatz). Death passes through the speculative judgments—and 
Hegel juggles identity and difference to keep them alive.49
The precariousness of speculative unions can provoke violence. 
Hegel is almost ready to smash the face of anyone who reminds him of 
this tenuousness: “The retort here would really have to go as far as smash-
ing the skull of the person who makes a statement like that in order to 
demonstrate to him in a manner as palpable as his wisdom that for a per-
son a bone is nothing in-itself and is even less his true actuality” (§ 339). 
Speculative sympathy includes anger, fear, despair, and grief. Tropes of 
Transport traces these fi gures of emotionality in the Hegelian text. The 
source of the text’s power and fragility—its emotionality—lies, however, 
in its divided language that juggles argumentative and speculative syntax. 
Hegel’s speculative thought is infected to the core with the abstract logic 
of the understanding. Power is shared: “in fact, non- speculative thinking 
also has its rights, which are valid”; and such power- sharing requires the 
ceaseless renegotiation of the terms of their disunity, and an incessant 
mediation and exposure to negativity (§ 65). In short, there is a constant 




They acknowledge themselves as mutually acknowledging each other.
—Phenomenology, § 184
The title of this chapter translates Anerkennen—in Hegel’s trope of gegen-
seitiges Anerkennen—as “acknowledging” rather than using the standard 
translation, which is “recognition.” Let me explain this choice. “Recogni-
tion” has two meanings in English. The fi rst meaning presupposes a prior 
knowledge of what or whom one now encounters again. To recognize 
is to identify again something or somebody one has seen before. This 
would be Erkennen or Wiedererkennen in German. Secondly, “to recognize 
somebody” means to appreciate or to formally confer a status of value 
onto someone. This second use comes indeed very close to the German 
Anerkennung, but the prefi x re reinscribes the sense of retrospection and 
repetition, which is not there in the German. In order to recognize some-
body as embodying a certain value one needs to have a prior knowledge 
of this value. We need to have norms in place, against the background 
of which we can confer or receive recognition. Even in the sense of ap-
preciation or of conferring a status of value onto somebody, recogni-
tion thus requires either the prior existence of that which is recognized 
declaratively, or—if we follow the “constitutive” theory of recognition, 
which contends that the act of recognition creates the status of the recog-
nized —recognition still requires a prior knowledge of what such a status 
might entail. In any case, whether performative or constative, both senses 
of re- cognition match a currently encountered object or situation with a 
preexisting notion or memory of it.
Gegenseitiges Anerkennen, in Hegel’s Phenomenology, is not based on pre-
vious knowledge. At the beginning of the chapter on self- consciousness—
where the account of Anerkennen is located—the subject has no pre-
existing notion of who or what the other might be because it has never 
encountered another subject before. So far, it has been a consciousness 
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and, as such, has related only to a world of objects. It also has no positive 
knowledge of itself or of what might constitute self- consciousness, since 
its very young “self- certainty” has, until now, only consisted in negating 
the empirical world. It is, thus, a mistake to assume that the parties in-
volved in the movement of acknowledging identify each other as some-
thing or someone in particular. And if they did, they would have fallen 
back to the status of consciousness and would treat each other as objects, 
rather than subjects.1
Hegel shows how self- consciousness comes to life in the plural as 
the movement of mutual acknowledging (gegenseitiges Anerkennen). They 
“acknowledge themselves as mutually acknowledging each other [sie anerkennen 
sich als gegenseitig sich annerkennend]” (§ 184, trans. modifi ed). Without 
a preexisting notion of what they might be and without coming to a 
substantive conclusion about each other, subjects emerge as the move-
ment of self- refl ection without any content other than this movement 
itself. “An” signifi es a movement-toward without a certain aim, while “re” 
suggests a doubling back to a preexisting notion or object. This is why 
I choose the verb “acknowledge” to translate anerkennen. It renders the 
tentativeness as well as the togetherness of anerkennen in its prefi x “ac” 
(as in “accord”) and thus relates the emergence of a “knowledging along 
with,” as it were.
Such mutual and shared acknowledgment without any substan-
tive notion of subjectivity can obviously not arrive at a judgment, be it 
a judgment of knowledge (in the modes of Erkennen or Wiedererkennen), 
or a value judgment (in the mode of Anerkennung).2 Hegel thus clearly 
conceives of acknowledging as a movement in progress (not a completed 
act). Current political and legal discourse on recognition treats recogni-
tion as a relatively stable good that can be conferred or received, with-
held or demanded. When this discourse takes place in German, it op-
erates with the word Anerkennung. The suffi x -ung points to the stable 
and regulated character of such an evaluation as well as to its sense of 
completion. But Hegel does not use the term Anerkennung in the Phenom-
enology.3 He prefers to turn the verb anerkennen into a noun—das Anerken-
nen, preferably in the phrase: die Bewegung des Anerkennens (the movement 
of acknowledging)—because he is concerned here with an unfi nished 
movement (§ 178, trans. modifi ed). I render the continuous character of 
this movement with the gerund. The movement of mutual acknowledg-
ing is necessarily shared, but—because of its incompleteness—it does 
not produce recognition as a good to be exchanged in reciprocity.
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Mutual Penetration and Mutual Embrace
In this chapter I will explore and critique the different valences of Anerken-
nen. In order to do so, I will branch out into a discussion of two poems, 
Goethe’s “Wiederfi nden,” written about ten years after the publication of 
the Phenomenology, and Hölderlin’s “Andenken,” written just a few years 
before. Wiederfi nden relates to Anerkennen on the semantic level, whereas 
Andenken participates in a chain of signifi ers—from Andacht to Anden-
ken to Anerkennen—that challenges those readings of Hegel that see him 
making claims to completion and perfection. We will see that Goethe’s 
poem presents an image of perfection and completion while also estab-
lishing the world- spiritual three- step that is often attributed to Hegel (na-
ive identity, separation through refl ection, reunion on a higher level). 
While in Goethe’s poem truth is static and love hierarchical, Hölderlin’s 
poem (like Hegel’s philosophy) pursues the question of how to foster the 
always transient movement of mutual solicitude and participation.
Before discussing in more detail what Hegel’s Anerkennen or ac-
knowledging entails, I would like, in this fi rst section, to more fi rmly 
establish the contrast between acknowledging and recognizing. We have 
said that all recognition (appreciation, conferral of status, or identifi -
cation) involves an element of remembering. The German equivalent 
that highlights this aspect of recognition would be Wiedererkennen, which 
is also the literal translation of recognition: re (wieder) and cognition 
(Erkennen). Wiederfi nden is another entry in the same semantic fi eld. 
Translated literally as “re- fi nding,” wiederfi nden means to recover some-
thing or someone and to fi nd this thing or person identical even after a 
period of separation. Let us turn now to the poem from Goethe’s West-
 Eastern Divan:4
Wiederfi nden
Ist es möglich! Stern der Sterne,
Drück ich wieder dich ans Herz!
Ach, was ist die Nacht der Ferne
Für ein Abgrund, für ein Schmerz.
Ja, du bist es! meiner Freuden
Süßer, lieber Widerpart;
Eingedenk vergangner Leiden,
Schaudr ich vor der Gegenwart.
Als die Welt im tiefsten Grunde
Lag an Gottes ewger Brust,
Ordnet’ er die erste Stunde
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Mit erhabner Schöpfungslust,
Und er sprach das Wort: Es werde!
Da erklang ein schmerzlich Ach!
Als das All mit Machtgebärde
In die Wirklichkeiten brach.
Auf tat sich das Licht: so trennte
Scheu sich Finsternis von ihm,
Und sogleich die Elemente
Scheidend auseinanderfl iehn.
Rasch, in wilden, wüsten Träumen
Jedes nach der Weite rang,
Starr, in ungemeßnen Räumen,
Ohne Sehnsucht, ohne Klang.
Stumm war alles, still und öde,
Einsam Gott zum ersten Mal!
Da erschuf er Morgenröte,
Die erbarmte sich der Qual;
Sie entwickelte dem Trüben
Ein erklingend Farbenspiel,
Und nun konnte wieder lieben,
Was erst auseinanderfi el.
Und mit eiligem Bestreben
Sucht sich, was sich angehört,
Und zu ungemeßnem Leben
Ist Gefühl und Blick gekehrt.
Sei’s Ergreifen, sei es Raffen,
Wenn es nur sich faßt und hält!
Allah braucht nicht mehr zu schaffen,
Wir erschaffen seine Welt.
So, mit morgenroten Flügeln,
Riß es mich an deinen Mund,
Und die Nacht mit tausend Siegeln
Kräftigt sternenhell den Bund.
Beide sind wir auf der Erde
Musterhaft in Freud und Qual,
Und ein zweites Wort: Es werde!
Trennt uns nicht zum zweitenmal.
(West- Östlicher Divan, 1815)
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The fi rst stanza conjures a scene of recognition between two lov-
ers: “O can it be!” (Ist es möglich!)—“Yes, it is you” ( Ja, du bist es!). Beyond 
this specifi c encounter, the exclamation that opens the poem—“O can it 
be!”—ponders the condition of the possibility of recognition in general. 
The poem’s answer lies in the projection of a previous familiarity. The 
title of the poem is “Wiederfi nden.” By the second verse, the encounter 
of the lovers is established as a reprise: “I press you to my heart again!” 
(Drück ich wieder dich ans Herz!). And the fourth stanza postulates the 
breakup of a previous union as the condition for the possibility of love: 
“everything that fell apart / Now could fall in love again.” Even Widerpart, 
in the sixth line of the fi rst stanza (which means “opponent” or “opposite 
party,” with wider spelled without an e) phonetically joins the three wie-
der of the poem—especially since Widerpart and its rhyme and semantic 
echo Gegenwart (wider and gegen both mean “against”) together bracket 
and embrace the activity of recalling (eingedenk) in the seventh line. For 
Goethe, to love (lieben) means to love again (“wieder lieben,” fourth stanza); 
love must be grounded in a previous union just as knowledge must take 
the form of re- cognition.
The scene of recognition is repeatedly interrupted by the memory 
of separation—“chasm is the night” (Nacht der Ferne), “far apart, what 
pain!” (Abgrund, Schmerz), “bygone suffering I recall” (eingedenk vergang-
ner Leiden)—but this disturbance also intensifi es the lovers’ reunion. The 
“shudder” (schaudr ich vor der Gegenwart) that allows the lyrical “I” a trem-
bling dis- identifi cation with the “present time” (across the interfering 
past) could be a true form of emotionality or lighthearted transport in 
the sense I propose. Yet, it functions here to dramatize and consolidate 
unifi cation, rather than to emotionalize or destabilize identity.
The most substantial distraction from the present encounter, the 
drift into the mythical narrative that spans three stanzas, securely estab-
lishes in its very fi rst line the preexistence of primordial cosmic love: 
“When the world lay in the depths / Utmost on God’s eternal breast” (Als 
die Welt im tiefsten Grunde / Lag an Gottes ewger Brust, trans. modifi ed). This 
preexisting love grounds and enables the scene of recognition between 
the two lovers of the fi rst stanza. The lyrical “I” can recognize the other 
as its Widerpart, its “image, . . . rhyme,” as that which “belong[s]” to it (was 
[ihm] angehört), because they had lain in each other’s arms before. The 
same applies for the relation between God and world. God has a precon-
ceived notion of his other. Before he creates the world through a consti-
tutive act of recognition—conferring the status of independent being—
the world already exists (whether physically laying on God’s breast or 
existing as an idea that is close to his heart). There are, thus, two layers 
of recognition here: the recognition of the other’s separate being (“Es 
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werde! ”) and then the recognition of the other as the lyrical “I”’s “you” 
(“Yes, it is you”). The fi rst recognition performs the fi rst act of analysis 
and thereby initiates refl ection and explicit understanding. Yet this realm 
of analysis is here staunchly described as lacking love. The second rec-
ognition is possible only in love—that is to say, through two layers of re-
membering: remembering the painful separation and remembering the 
(even deeper) union. In sum, the poem tells a story of three stages that is 
rather typical for the early nineteenth century: initial union without free-
dom and refl ection, freedom and refl ection through separation, reunion 
and reconciliation of the two prior stages. The question that interests me 
here is whether the third stage does indeed afford both a loving refl ec-
tion that acknowledges the other’s freedom, and a self- refl ective love that 
encourages the self’s freedom. And what is its conception of freedom?
Hegel describes refl ection as an impersonal activity: as the move-
ment of the concept. The concept envelops all and indwells in every-
thing. As “an infi nite and creative form, which includes . . . the fullness of 
all content,” it is absolutely comprehensive (Hegel 1975a, § 160, Zusatz). 
And it also acts from within each individual being: “Things are what they 
are through the action of the concept, immanent in them, and reveal-
ing itself in them” (Hegel 1975a, § 163, Zusatz 2, trans. modifi ed). The 
concept’s activity consists in mutually self- penetrating and mutually self-
 embracing. (I apologize for this awkward phrasing, but the distinction 
between self and other is really not stable when it comes to the move-
ment of the concept.)
On the one hand, the concept generates and embraces totalities—
as when Hegel suggests that the concept underwrites the integrity of 
the Phenomenology’s path (“By virtue of the movement of the concept, 
this path will encompass [umfassen] the complete worldliness of con-
sciousness in its necessity,” § 34). But this embrace is only one aspect 
of the concept’s movement. The other aspect of its movement is that it 
empties itself and grants everything an independent existence: it “at the 
same time releases from itself the fullness of all content” (Hegel 1975a, 
§ 160, Zusatz). The totality that is produced by the enveloping activity of 
the concept is contained and curtailed by the ambiguity of the concept, 
which always oscillates between comprising and dispersing or appropria-
tion and externalization.
Hegel’s discussion of conscience offers a good example for the cur-
tailment of totality. It also very nicely stages what we have discussed in the 
last chapter as the juggle of the concept. Like a line of poetry that resists 
a quick reading and calls to be reread with a different intonation, the 
concept moves from one aspect of its movement to another by rereading 
itself and placing the accent differently the second time:
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Insofar as the moment of universality exists in this knowledge, it is part 
and parcel of the knowledge of conscientious action that it comprehen-
sively grasp [umfassen] the actuality before it in an unrestricted manner 
and that it thus both precisely know the circumstances of the case and 
take everything into consideration. However, since it is acquainted with 
universality as a moment, this knowledge of these circumstances is thus 
the kind of knowledge which is fully aware that it does not compre-
hensively grasp [umfassen] them, that is, it is aware that it is not therein 
conscientious. (§ 642)
The stress on universality allows for a comprehensive embrace, but once 
a different emphasis has brought into view that such totality is in fact par-
tial (that it is only a “moment”), the totality has de facto disintegrated. 
The other aspect of the concept’s movement thus consists in letting it-
self be penetrated and separated from itself. Only non- refl ective self-
 naturalizing substantiality “resists all invasion” (nichts in sich eindringen las-
sen will; Hegel 1975a, § 159). The example of “sense certainty”—a form of 
consciousness that refuses self- refl ection and preserves its truth “as a rela-
tion remaining in parity with itself [sich selbst gleichbleibende] . . . and into 
which . . . no disparity [Unterschied] at all can force its entry [eindringen]”—
shows ex negativo that the concept moves against such selfsame integ-
rity and instead invites division (§ 104). In short, the concept is (self-)
totalizing and (self-)fragmenting, infi nite and fi nite, at the same time.
At fi rst take, Goethe’s poem seems to suggest a similar dynamic. 
The third stage of its narrative is characterized by a sense of life as both 
fi nite (because individual) and infi nite or “measureless” (ungemeßnem). It 
combines the unifying feeling of love with the eye’s faculty for discrimi-
nation: “Sight and feeling hurtle them / Back to life that’s measureless” 
(Und zu ungemeßnem Leben / Ist Gefühl und Blick gekehrt). The word Ergreifen 
(grasp) in the next line echoes Hegel’s Begriff. Yet the rest of the line is 
a bit more disturbing. Raffen means something like “reap” and carries 
overtones of obsession and ruthlessness. With the lines, “Grasp or snatch, 
no matter how, / Take hold they must, if they’re to be” (Sei’s Ergreifen, sei 
es Raffen, / Wenn es nur sich faßt und hält!), Goethe seems to suggest that 
the means do not matter as long as the embrace is tight. This begs the 
question whether the third stage, which is supposed to reconcile love 
with freedom and understanding, doesn’t give freedom a raw deal, and 
whether it does so perhaps because it overcompensates for the void as-
sociated with the second phase.
The second phase is experienced as “stiffened” (starr), “void, and 
mute, and still” (stumm, . . . still und öde), and characterized by “solitude” 
(einsam), because of an absence of feeling, especially of love. The only 
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feeling mentioned in those three stanzas is “diffi dence” (Scheu). We will 
see in a later section of this chapter that Hegel considers shyness (he 
uses the word Scham) to be a speculative transport that draws lovers 
together by pulling them apart. For Hölderlin, Scheue works similarly. 
But the love of Goethe’s poem is “without longing” (ohne Sehnsucht). It 
doesn’t draw together; it only repels in search of independence. The god 
of this poem repairs the situation with a more instrumental than sublime 
second act of creation: “then he made the rose of dawn” (Da erschuf er 
Morgenröte). According to Benjamin Hederich’s Gründliches mythologisches 
Lexikon—Goethe’s preferred source on Greco- Roman mythology—Au-
rora was punished by Venus with an insatiable desire for love, and her 
role in this poem’s mythical account of genesis is to provide the neces-
sary desire (Sehnsucht) to counteract the drive for independence. Goethe 
thus divides into two different emotions the double pull that character-
izes shyness in Hegel and Hölderlin. Of course, we could read “the rose 
of dawn” as a fi gure for Scheu: the blushing of the morning after, the 
rosy glow that veils the stark contrast between “light” (Licht) and “dark” 
(Finsternis). The rose of dawn invents a game of hues and harmonies to 
distract from the abyss (Abgrund) and to mediate between the elements 
that “fell apart” (auseinanderfi el) and “clove apart” (auseinanderfl iehn). But 
as we will see, the fact that the mediation is an aesthetic one—the beauti-
ful semblance of harmony—has an important impact on the experience 
of love and freedom created by this poem.
The reconciliation through the aesthetics of beauty that the morning-
 red affords is mirrored by Goethe’s poem as a whole. Despite its insistent 
evocations of pain, separation, and death, the poem ends fi rmly on the 
positive note of unassailable unifi cation: “And a second word ‘Become!’ / 
Shall not tear us apart again” (Und ein zweites Wort: Es werde! / Trennt uns 
nicht zum zweitenmal). With its six stanzas of equal length and its consis-
tent cross rhyme (ababcdcd), the poem impresses balance and harmony 
on the ear and the eye. It is a perfectly organized, well- rounded, and 
unifi ed piece of beauty. And so are its characters: the two lovers are de-
scribed as “exemplars” (musterhaft); they represent the most beautiful of 
humanity in both joy and pain (Freud und Qual). The beloved stands out 
among the many as “star of stars” (Stern der Sterne) and the lyrical “I” re-
fl ects itself in the image of God when it tells the mythical story of God’s 
separation from the world. At no point does the evocation of primor-
dial cosmic events become seriously threatening because the two stanzas 
presenting individual human love (the fi rst and the last stanza) literally 
bracket and contain the cosmic love and breakup that is dealt with in 
the middle stanzas. There is pain here, but no excess or ecstasy. Even 
the sublime delight of God (mit erhabner Schöpfungslust) is restrained 
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by human measure, which calibrates the unifi ed into the unique (even 
though, as we have seen, unifi cation requires repetition) by putting an 
end to repetition from here on: “nicht zum zweitenmal.” At last, the savage 
and desolate dreams (wilde, wüste Träume) of primordial lust and fl ight 
are reined in by the beautiful image that shows the cosmic powers (all 
the stars in the universe) reduced to witnesses to the marriage of these 
two exemplary individuals: “Starbright with a thousand seals / Night 
the bond will ratify” (Und die Nacht mit tausend Siegeln / Kräftigt sternenhell 
den Bund).
In such play of mirrors between universality and individuality, the 
sense for plurality—that is to say, the sense for real differences—gets 
lost. Everything echoes the exemplary couple. What is more, there is no 
indication of mutual love within the couple. Just as the play of mirrors 
between the human and the divine or between individuality and univer-
sality establishes a clear hierarchy in favor of the human individual, there 
is a hierarchy within the couple so strong that we get no sense for the 
freedom of the beloved. The only time she (the poem does suggest the 
feminine gender) has an independent existence, this existence is experi-
enced as “void, and mute, and still.”
The unifi cation that is realized under the sign of taking hold (sich 
faßt und hält) establishes the singular. If this love allows for freedom, it is 
the freedom of one, and freedom means self- suffi ciency. The tight grip 
on the other of fassen and halten affords the one his Fassung (composure) 
and Haltung (poise). It realizes an aesthetics of balance and composure 
that disavows vulnerability, struggle, emotionality, and difference within 
the couple. Mutuality has no value here; instead, the lyrical “I” loves it-
self. Satisfi ed with itself, it has overcome division. Just as the lyrical “I” has 
no need for an independent lover, this poem does not need the reader. 
It is perfect in itself. The poem is the image of self- suffi ciency. Goethe 
might offer a specifi c account of love with “Wiederfi nden,” but he is not 
looking for love. He has found it already. Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, 
on the other hand, needs readers. Only through the reader, in the iden-
tifi catory journey of reading along the path of spirit, does spirit actually 
gain an awareness of itself.
Luck of Love
Hegel’s style demands a reading of love.5 It does so in both senses of the 
phrase. It demands a practice of reading that engages the reader in a—
for a philosophical work perhaps unusually sensual—love relationship 
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with the text. And it demands a reading of the trope of love—or, to be 
more precise, the trope of “mutual acknowledging”—that we fi nd in the 
text and that also structures the text.6
The fact that The Phenomenology of Spirit demands love means that 
it isn’t sure of it. In the previous section we discussed a poem where 
love (between two individuals, between world and God) is presupposed 
as a given. There, I have also begun to explain that Hegel understands 
the “concept” as a mutual physical- cum-intellectual penetration and em-
brace of subject and object, or of self and other, or of different “mo-
ments” of the concept, like individuality and universality. Nevertheless, 
Hegel never presents such interpenetration as a given. Even when he de-
scribes interpenetration—as he does in the section on mutual acknowl-
edging—his account is so obviously ideal that it cannot quite produce 
the impression of present existence. The text asks for love: it asks the 
reader to acknowledge, that is to say, to join and share the movement 
of mutual acknowledging, in order to actualize—imperfectly—what the 
author can only offer as an ideal. The text’s call for love is not a desire for 
recognition.
The Phenomenology tries to seduce the reader to join its conceptual 
movements. It doesn’t allow her to remain at a distance, safely withdrawn. 
It doesn’t offer itself to a quick opening of the optical lens. It wants the 
reader to expose herself to the phenomenological development and to 
engage with it—to enter the text and to let herself be enveloped by it, but 
also to take it in and be unsettled and altered by it. It demands a mutual 
penetration and a mutual embrace of reader and text.
Rather than stringing together thoughts (Gedanken), the Phenom-
enology proceeds by way of concepts (Begriffe). Hegel wrote in his note-
book while working on the Phenomenology: “Thoughts are not so much the 
issue anymore. We have enough of them, good and bad, beautiful and 
bold. Rather, concepts are the issue” (Hegel 2002, 251, trans. modifi ed). 
The difference that he establishes between “thoughts” and “concepts” 
is one between stasis and movement: he suggests—perhaps counterin-
tuitively, but coherently throughout his work—that “thoughts” denote 
the end of the activity of thinking, whereas concepts move and motivate 
one to think. Concepts dynamically realize thought. “Thoughts,” on the 
other hand, are fi xed and compact; they can be easily appropriated (“we 
have enough of them”). Yet, even though they come in all varieties to suit 
every taste—“good and bad, beautiful and bold”—to possess thoughts 
doesn’t yield much satisfaction for Hegel. Uninterested in ownership, he 
desires the interaction with a free subject. With the Phenomenology, Hegel 
is looking for love.
Just as they are easily appropriated, “thoughts” are easily exchanged 
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from one person to another. They are universal currency, accepted by 
everyone because their value is stamped on their face: “thoughts” are 
“through themselves immediately made valid,” Hegel’s aphorism contin-
ues (ibid.). Similar to Descartes’ “intuitions,” Hegel’s “thoughts” imme-
diately present themselves as common sense. But to have them does not 
mean to penetrate or to embrace them.
“Concepts,” on the other hand, are neither good, nor beautiful, 
nor bold; they are embarrassing: “But in that thoughts are through them-
selves immediately made valid, whereas concepts, on the contrary, must 
be made comprehensible, the form of writing thereby undergoes a 
change and acquires a form of appearance demanding a perhaps pain-
ful and embarrassing [peinlich] effort” (Hegel 2002, 251, trans. modi-
fi ed). Concepts do not immediately offer a clear picture of their value. 
They thus produce embarrassment. Concepts exhibit themselves without 
presenting a face. They don’t represent but come naked (skinless, even) 
and demand of the readers to similarly denude themselves. This is not 
a pretty picture. Unlike “representational thinking” (Vorstellungsdenken), 
the concept doesn’t provide images that are easily absorbed. Instead, the 
movement of concepts involves groping, touching, trying and tasting. It 
seduces the reader to the humiliating labor of Selbstdenken, a thinking 
that engages the embodied, desiring, experiencing subject while expos-
ing it to change: “The last royal road in studying is thinking for oneself 
[Selbstdenken]” (Hegel 2002, 251).
The text of the Phenomenology demands a more than cursory pene-
tration from the reader. Thoroughly, not just with one organ from which 
the mind has withdrawn, but completely naked, with her bare hands, 
lips, and nose, the reader is asked to open skin after skin until her body 
reaches fl uidity and drinks the slime of the written. Some reject this gift: 
“They stick their noses straight into the texts—and immediately withdraw 
them, choking and gasping for air” (McCumber 1986, 641).7 More than 
embarrassing, concepts can be repulsive, even painful. Barely having re-
ceived the gift, some spit out the slimy fl uid that isn’t easily swallowed. 
It sticks between the roof of the mouth and the root of the tongue and 
forms threads in the throat. Like Schelling, they hastily and with clatter-
ing chimes retire into their shell, and spit the stuff at Hegel’s feet. They 
refuse to digest what seems indigestible.8
Hegel must have been very offended by the fact that Schelling 
didn’t read past the preface of the Phenomenology. He could become furi-
ous when people—let alone one of his best friends—looked for quick 
answers in easily digestible bites instead of responding to the embarrass-
ing exposure of the concept by exposing themselves to its movement in 
return.9 With an ironic attack he anticipates the scene of injury in the 
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preface to the Phenomenology, expressing his indignation at readers who 
barely touch a book and yet believe they got its main ideas:
No matter how much a man asks for a royal road to science, no more 
convenient and comfortable way can be suggested to him than to put 
his trust in healthy common sense; and then for what else remains, to 
advance simply with the times and with philosophy and to read reviews 
of philosophical works, perhaps even go so far as to read the prefaces 
and the fi rst paragraphs of the works themselves. (§ 70)
One of Hegel’s strategies to foil readerly shortcuts is to produce an 
indigestible preface, one that sticks in the reader’s throat and prolongs 
the contact. For more than fi fty pages, Hegel refuses to write a preface. 
Instead, he argues against summarizing his arguments and forces the 
reader to turn around in circles without understanding a thing. Slowly, 
his preface undresses its readers and strips them of everything they know 
and everything they rightfully expect. It is the foreplay to the lovemaking 
of concepts.
Promise of Vulnerability
The lovemaking of the concept is a grasping that both penetrates and 
embraces. It involves mutual exposure and mutual solicitude. Hegel de-
scribes acknowledging as a “movement of self- consciousness in its rela-
tion to another self- consciousness,” that is, as an act of mediation that 
engenders the self as double or, rather, as plural (§ 182).10 Common 
parlance often describes the self- mediating movement of the concept as 
“self- refl ection.” Unfortunately, “refl ection” comes with the ballast of a 
visual notion of thought. Selbstvermittlung, or self- mediation—the term 
Hegel actually uses—is indeed not visual. In addition, “mediation” in-
troduces a third element into the dyad—a medium that has its own ma-
teriality and subjectivity, as it were, and that thus opens and exposes the 
closed relation of self- consciousness onto a multiplicity. If we use the 
term “self- refl ection,” we need to keep in mind the physical and even 
sometimes existential valences of penetration and embrace, exposure 
and care.11 Hegelian “refl ection” loses its critical potential if it is reduced 
to a Wiedererkennen of myself in the other or to a simple mirroring. As 
we have established in the opening section of this chapter, Anerkennen 
is not “recognition” in the sense of Wiedererkennen; it doesn’t take place 
between two already established subjects but generates subjectivity as 
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shared and exposed. This exposure takes concrete material, physical, 
sometimes even deadly forms.
The movement of self- refl ection or self- mediation- with- another 
(ac- knowledging) introduces an important ambiguity (Doppelsinnigkeit) 
into the structure of the subject/ s: “This twofold sense . . . lies in the es-
sence of self- consciousness, which is to be infi nite or immediately the op-
posite of the determinateness in which it is posited” (§ 178, trans. modi-
fi ed). This ambiguity prevents the subject/ s from ever fully coinciding 
with themselves; it is the root of the constitutive emotionality of subjec-
tivity. Hegel characterizes self- differentiality negatively as “negativity” (as 
self- conscious, I relentlessly question myself) and positively as “infi nity” 
(self- negation moves me beyond any particular identity).
The ambiguity of self- consciousness—the fact that it opposes or ne-
gates itself as much as it affi rms or identifi es itself—creates a plural sub-
ject. Subject/ s emerge in the plural. The subject/ s’ doubleness is duplici-
tous in the sense that they freely, and often imperceptibly to themselves 
and others, shift between inner dialogue and outward conversation—
that they address themselves indirectly by way of addressing one another 
and are spoken by another when they mean to speak themselves.12 All 
this is to say that, theoretically, ac- knowledging cannot be not mutual: 
“They acknowledge themselves as mutually acknowledging each other” (§ 184, 
trans. modifi ed).
Yet the experience is usually quite different. Experience tells us 
that subjects do not necessarily engage in a reciprocal exchange of rec-
ognition. The fact that I gain recognition from you in no way forces me 
to give it back. On the contrary, if we expect reciprocity, we will most 
certainly be frustrated. The Phenomenology relentlessly paints scenes of 
failing reciprocity: beginning with the fi rst fi gure of self- consciousness, 
whose fall from the ideal of mutual acknowledging ends the struggle for 
life and death in servitude, and ending with the last fi gure of spirit, who 
is provoked to the “highest rebellion” (höchste Empörung) by the fact that 
its admission of wrongdoing remains unilateral (§ 667). If reciprocity 
happened—and it is uncertain that it ever does—it would be by acci-
dent.13 It cannot be brought about by the force of necessity that we invest 
in the dialectical process.
Granted, subject/s come to life through mutual acknowledging. 
That is to say, there is no subject that isn’t being acknowledged in some 
way or another—otherwise, it wouldn’t be a subject. “Self- consciousness 
exists in and for itself because and by way of its existing in and for itself 
for an other; i.e., it exists only as an acknowledged being [als ein Aner-
kanntes]” (§ 178, trans. modifi ed). Yet the fact that subject/ s come to life 
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as inherently dialogical (and duplicitous in this dialogue) also means that 
they lose their independence or self- suffi ciency (Selbstständigkeit) at the 
very moment that they gain it. It means, to put it in a somewhat different 
register, that the autonomous subject can legislate itself only when it 
posits itself as being bound by external forces.14 Subjects are evidently 
more dejected by the loss of something they never had (self- suffi ciency) 
than they are elated by the gain of something they cannot do without 
(a mutual relation). Due to this strong frustration, self- suffi ciency be-
comes the dominant trope in the subject’s unending self- mediation; it 
will be pursued with an obsessive Begierde and ruthless hunger that is 
reminiscent of Goethe’s Raffen (“Grasp or snatch, no matter how”) in 
 “Wiederfi nden.”15
The desire for independence and self- suffi ciency (the lost promise 
of subject formation) translates into a negative relation to the entire realm 
of alterity—into a need to treat all other subjects as objects and all ob-
jects as something to be either destroyed or absorbed into the self. On the 
phenomenological path, the movement of acknowledging develops out 
of the movement of Begierde. Even though the subject enjoys the power to 
destroy, it meets the limits of its ability to negate the other in the infi nity 
of its object. No destruction is defi nitive. For every head it severs, two new 
ones grow from the wound. Its desire never reaches full and lasting satis-
faction, but feeds on its own accomplishments. The desiring conscious-
ness is therefore forced to acknowledge the object of its desire as another 
subject that is as self- suffi cient and ecstatic as itself—one that is infi nite 
in its own right and freely exercises its own negativity, but is also exposed 
and vulnerable in its relation to alterity. Out of unsatisfi ed appetite, an-
other self- consciousness is born as inassimilably different from yet funda-
mentally bound to the fi rst. Hegel’s treatment of Faust—Goethe’s glori-
ous drama of Begierde, which Hegel alludes to in the section on “Pleasure 
and Necessity” of the chapter on “Reason”—shows the same experience 
in its temporal aspect. According to Hegel, Faust realizes that he cannot 
undo what he has done (abandon Gretchen): he realizes that his current 
self cannot absorb his former self. Because his prior self retains an inas-
similable independence, Faust must ac- knowledge his prior actions.
Begierde aims at assimilating all that is external to the form of pres-
ent consciousness (fantasized as pure self- transparency). Mutual ac-
knowledging, in contrast, affects consciousness with opacity. It opens 
self- consciousness’s pure being- for- self onto an inassimilable beyond, to 
the touch of an irreducible other. In this encounter with another self-
 consciousness, “consciousness . . . does indeed get outside of itself [außer 
sich]” (§ 184). For a moment only, Hegel’s text gives us a taste of mu-
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tual acknowledging: it is a precarious movement shared with plural sub-
jects, where each is “out of itself” yet sustained by another, without any 
one being in control of itself or of the whole movement—unable, for 
that matter, to guarantee its continuation. The default response of con-
sciousness will be to deny the loss of self- suffi ciency and to guard against 
the precariousness that comes with mutuality. What the trope of mutual 
acknowledging demands of us, therefore, ethically and politically, is to 
learn to experience exposure and vulnerability.
Charles Taylor has initiated an important discussion about the 
“need for recognition.”16 But why do we experience a need for recog-
nition when, as we have seen, acknowledging cannot not be mutual?17 
In Taylor’s account, subjects are not only driven by the desire for self-
 suffi ciency, but they also want to be recognized as self- suffi cient—as who 
they really are, as self- made men, or as artists whose most accomplished 
creations are themselves. All of these options defi ne acknowledging as a 
re- cognition of preexisting independent identities. But precisely this kind 
of recognition interrupts mutuality. Taylor contends that our attempts to 
win positive (celebratory) and substantive recognition (as something) can 
fail. Hegel would say that they must fail, because we do not get to make 
our identities autonomously. But if substantive recognition is forced into 
existence—and this can be done through the power of individuals or the 
power of norms—such recognition fails the mutuality of acknowledg-
ing. Subjects emerge together, in a messy entanglement with others from 
whom they are not even clearly distinguishable. Who we are can only be 
provisionally determined in action, that is to say, in the interaction with 
(our) others.18 Hegel shatters all dreams of complete self- suffi ciency. But 
he also shows that the desire for self- suffi ciency remains, and that this de-
sire in turn ruins any utopia of a world without masters or servants.19
With the promise of self- suffi ciency lost, and the relation within/ 
between subject/ s fi rmly established as a relation of dependency between 
a master and a servant, Begierde thus makes a comeback. Perhaps luckily 
so—after all, what would a love relation be without appetite! Yet, given 
the destructive legacy of Begierde in Hegel’s Phenomenology, Begierde affects 
recognition in the form of a desire to kill the other. At the same time, 
the master’s need for recognition inevitably turns against him. The mas-
ter’s controlling attitude toward recognition would be unnecessary if he 
didn’t in fact have a need for recognition. Thus experiencing his own 
insuffi ciency—his need—he desires an other who can sovereignly grant 
recognition and who can provide him with the self- knowledge he doesn’t 
possess on his own. Yet, the other of the master is not a self- suffi cient 
subject. Rather, the other of the master embodies the fundamental con-
dition of self- consciousness to be bound to an unassimilable other: he 
135
A C K N O W L E D G I N G
is the servant. The master thus fi nds his own recognition dependent on 
another who is vulnerable and not in control. The servant’s vulnerability 
spurs the master’s desire to kill him. The master needs to get this image 
of dependency out of his sight. He needs to put an end to the precarious 
movement of acknowledging. The threat of death, on the other hand, 
binds the servant only more securely to the master, and they both fi nd 
themselves deeper and deeper mired in the catch- 22 of their mutual 
dependency.
And yet there is an ethical side to the death wish. It is part of the 
subject/ s’ freedom. Mutual acknowledging depends on the desire to kill 
the other and the desire to kill the self. To be sure, literally killing the 
other or the self is a desperate—albeit deplorably frequent—attempt 
to put an end to mutual acknowledging. But exclusive and complete 
affi rmation is not the solution to this problem. Of course, I have the 
desire to defi ne myself and to establish a stable and recognizable (wie-
dererkennbar) identity, but every such recognition also deals a blow. The 
very act that affi rms my identity and self- suffi ciency negates my status as 
a self- mediating, infi nite, and free subject. It denies “the essence of self-
 consciousness, which is to be . . . immediately the opposite of the deter-
minateness in which it is posited,” that is, it denies my condition of being-
 outside- myself- in-another (§ 178). To receive recognition, in the sense 
of respect for what or who one is, is never entirely rewarding because it 
truncates the constitutive ambiguity and duplicity (Doppelsinnigkeit) of 
subjectivity. I might be recognized in my subject position, but not in my 
ekstasis in relation to this position. Respect might give me security, but 
it probably fails to give me my vulnerability. I am free only if I can aban-
don my present self in favor of an uncertain future, an uncontrollable 
other, or an unwanted past: “It is solely by staking one’s life that free-
dom is realized and proven [bewährt]” (§ 187, trans. modifi ed). Never-
theless, it is also important to remember that such staking of one’s life 
does not require the literality and earnestness of dramatic life changes, 
but can happen in the lighthearted and unprestigious manner of every-
day life.20
As self- refl ective beings born into freedom and mutuality, we fi nd 
ourselves torn between a desire for affi rmation and a desire for negation. 
It is our responsibility to respond to both. Hegel dramatizes the strict 
ambiguity of freedom in the “life and death struggle [Kampf auf Leben 
und Tod]” (§ 187). This is not a struggle for survival or supremacy, but a 
struggle for the “and” between life and death. The struggle for life and 
death fi gures the forbiddingly diffi cult and at the same time pleasurably 
lighthearted effort to realize the mutuality of self- consciousness in all its 
duplicity.
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Struggle for Mutuality
Mutuality must be wrested from the vigorous resistance of subjects 
against the destabilizing effects of acknowledging. In order to explore 
this struggle for mutuality—or, more precisely, the struggle to acknowl-
edge the always transient mutuality of acknowledging—it is now time to 
turn to Hölderlin’s poem “Andenken.” I will read the blowing of the wind 
presented by “Andenken” as a conversation between lovers—indeed as 
the intersection of several conversations: between Friedrich Hölderlin 
and Susette Gontard, between the poet and the reader, between Hölder-
lin and Hegel, and even between the familiar and the foreign.
For Hegel, speculative thought is a form of self- mediation. It takes 
place in the mode of ac- knowledging, that is to say, as a coming- to-know-
 along- with- another the subject as in many ways doubled, ambiguous, and 
duplicitous. Speculative thought can be embarrassing, painful, and thor-
oughly troubling; it renders the subject emotional because consciousness 
has to respond to and negotiate its doubling, as well as the resulting am-
biguity and duplicity. In the last chapter, we have discussed how specula-
tive thinking takes the physical shape of a dance—of somebody danc-
ing to her own heartbeat, affecting her pulse with her dance moves and 
adjusting her movements in turn to the new beat; or of different bodies 
bringing different rhythms to bear on one another with not one of these 
dancers leading. In the current context of acknowledging, speculative 
thought manifests physically as mutual self- penetration and mutual self-
 embrace. Here as well, whom one is coming to penetrate and embrace 
changes in the process. Self- consciousness has no stable identity. It trans-
forms when it is grasped (through being grasped, indeed) and is trans-
ported when it penetrates. Hölderlin casts this shared movement as a con-
versation. But the conversation is no less physical—it takes place through 
trees, rivers, and winds. The medium of the self- mediation among lovers 
has its own materiality and subjectivity and thus opens the closed relation 
of self- consciousness onto a multiplicity of self- relating bodies. Any truth 
about the subject is negated in its affi rmation; the conversation between 
the lovers thus keeps changing the subject and consciousness indeed has 
to juggle a multiplicity of selves. Such plasticity, multivalency, and uncer-
tainty are hard to take. It is always easier to stabilize the scene of mutual 
acknowledging by establishing recognition. But such recognition, we will 
see, can also mean death.
Working with the enjambements Doch gut / Ist ein Gespräch (But 
good / Is converse) and Mancher / Trägt Scheue (Some / Bear shyness [my 
translation]) as the main coordinates of my reading, I will highlight the 
poem’s efforts to facilitate a love that is mutual while interrupting and 
opening the dyad of the couple.
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Andenken
Der Nordost wehet,
Der liebste unter den Winden
Mir, weil er feurigen Geist
Und gute Fahrt verheißet den Schiffern.
Geh aber nun und grüße
Die schöne Garonne,
Und die Gärten von Bourdeaux
Dort, wo am scharfen Ufer
Hingehet der Steg und in den Strom
Tief fällt der Bach, darüber aber
Hinschauet ein edel Paar
von Eichen und Silberpappeln;
Noch denket das mir wohl und wie
Die breiten Gipfel neiget
Der Ulmwald, über die Mühl’,
Im Hofe aber wächset ein Feigenbaum.
An Feiertagen gehn
Die braunen Frauen daselbst
Auf seidnen Boden,
Zur Märzenzeit,
Wenn gleich ist Nacht und Tag,
Und über langsamen Stegen,
Von goldenen Träumen schwer,
Einwiegende Lüfte ziehen.
Es reiche aber,
Des dunkeln Lichtes voll,
Mir einer den duftenden Becher,
Damit ich ruhen möge; denn süß
Wär’ unter Schatten der Schlummer.
Nicht ist es gut,
Seellos von sterblichen
Gedanken zu seyn. Doch gut
Ist ein Gespräch und zu sagen
Des Herzens Meinung, zu hören viel
Von Tagen der Lieb’,
Und Thaten, welche geschehen.
Wo aber sind die Freunde? Bellarmin
Mit dem Gefährten? Mancher
Trägt Scheue, an die Quelle zu gehn;
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Es beginnet nämlich der Reichtum
Im Meere. Sie,
Wie Mahler, bringen zusammen
Das Schöne der Erd’ und verschmähn
Den gefl ügelten Krieg nicht, und
Zu wohnen einsam, jahrlang, unter
Dem entlaubten Mast, wo nicht die Nacht durchglänzen
Die Feiertage der Stadt,
Und Saitenspiel und eingeborener Tanz nicht.
Nun aber sind zu Indiern
Die Männer gegangen,
Dort an der luftigen Spiz’
An Traubenbergen, wo herab 
Die Dordogne kommt,
Und zusammen mit der prächt’gen
Garonne meerbreit
Ausgehet der Strom. Es nehmet aber
Und giebt Gedächtniß die See
Und die Lieb’ auch heftet fl eißig die Augen,
Was bleibet aber, stiften die Dichter.
(Friedrich Hölderlin, 1803– 05)21
“Andenken” is a wind poem. It initiates its own movement when it 
says in the fi rst line that “the northeasterly blows” (Der Nordost wehet). Why 
the northeasterly? Why not any other wind? And precisely what direc-
tion does this northeasterly poem take? Most interpreters, among them 
most infl uentially Heidegger, take for granted that the act of “thinking-
 toward” (Andenken) follows the blowing of the wind from northeast to 
southwest.22 Yet the fi rst signifi er of the opening verse orients us toward 
northeast. Since the geographic coordinates included in the descriptor 
of a particular wind do not indicate into which direction the wind blows 
but rather from which direction it is blowing, the line “the northeasterly 
blows” locates the lyrical I (as well as the writer and the reader) in the 
southwest facing northeast and feeling the wind (of the poem) blow in 
her face. As we have seen in the previous two chapters, Hegel would con-
sider it an act of friendship to move against this wind poem and to twist 
and turn its lines. But a slight fear of headwind blows most readers away 
from the source of this wind and turns them toward southwest. “Many a 
man / Is shy of going to the source” (Mancher / Trägt Scheue, an die Quelle 
zu gehn). Hölderlin tries to be among the few, a mancher, who carries the 
burden of moving against the wind instead of being carried away by it.23 
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Hölderlin travels northeast from Bordeaux back to Frankfurt; he does 
so in real life, but also with the lines of this poem. In May 1802, Hölder-
lin sets out on his walk from Bordeaux, where he had assumed a posi-
tion as tutor, to Frankfurt, the home of Susette Gontard. Drawn toward 
the impossible reunion with the forbidden love, this journey is marked 
by several detours and delays (in Paris, Stuttgart, Nürtingen, and again 
Stuttgart) until Hölderlin is struck by the news of Gontard’s death. Writ-
ten between one and three years after this agonizing (non-)experience, 
“Andenken” forms an attempt to reenact the journey in a way that keeps 
Gontard alive for him.
Admittedly, “Go now, go and greet / The beautiful Garonne” (Geh 
aber nun und grüße / Die schöne Garonne) seems at fi rst to unequivocally 
address a greeting to the river Garonne, which fl ows through Bordeaux. 
This address would affi rm the idea that the poem’s Andenken turns from 
Germany to Bordeaux. But Baumann convincingly argues that the north-
easterly is “of winds the dearest” (der liebste unter den Winden) because it 
tells “about the days of love” (von Tagen der Lieb’) and reminds Hölderlin 
of Gontard.24 During his stay in Bordeaux, Hölderlin receives the north-
easterly with special ardor. As this wind is a rare phenomenon in the 
region of Bordeaux, Hölderlin treasures it because, coming from the 
direction in which Gontard lives, it makes him hot with its promise of 
fi ery spirit, feurigen Geist . . . verheißet.25 If one understands the wind as a 
medium of communication between the lovers, the schöne Garonne, with 
its initials S.G., is to be read as an encoded evocation of Susette Gontard. 
With the line “Go now, go and greet / The beautiful Garonne,” Hölderlin 
invites the northeasterly to move northeast, from Bordeaux to Frankfurt, 
to greet S.G., Susette Gontard.26 He asks the wind to blow backward.
Geh aber nun then means something like: “You are the dearest among 
the winds to me because you give me fever, but now go back and greet 
S.G.; make her feel what I feel. . .” And, since Susette Gontard died of 
a pulmonary infection and, thus, literally had diffi culties breathing, geh 
aber nun also suggests something like: “I love you because through you 
I get wind of the fever she suffers from, but now go and help her to get 
back her wind. . .” The movement of Andenken thus exceeds the word’s 
sense of remembrance or recollection. It combines the retrospective 
thought process with the forward- oriented and open- ended activity of 
thinking- of or of thinking- toward, that is, denken an.
The accumulation of f and s sounds in “liebste,” “feurigen,” “Geist,” 
“Fahrt,” “verheißet,” “Sch iffern,” “grüße,” and “schöne” not only imi-
tates the wind’s blowing, but also transmits the initials of the two lovers, 
Friedrich and Susette. With the wind, the lovers whisper each other’s 
names across time and space. Nevertheless, it is an overstatement when 
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Baumann writes that “the way Hölderlin takes it, the north- easterly is al-
ready conversation and exchange of ideas, that is to say, reciprocation” 
(Baumann 1997, 19). The northeasterly might be a medium for com-
munication and a promise of mutuality between the lovers, but the reali-
zation of this “converse” (Gespräch) is far from being a given. It requires 
a constant battle against death.
As we have seen in our discussion of mutual acknowledging, Ge-
spräch in its emphatic sense, as the double movement of mutual refl ec-
tion between two free subjects, follows a logic that is hard to grasp and 
almost impossible to enable. The movement is constantly jeopardized by 
its arrest, and life is incessantly threatened by death. A Weh accompanies 
the wehen of “Andenken.” Gespräch, as the realization of mutuality in the 
back- and- forth movement of thinking- of and thinking- toward, proves to 
be diffi cult and dangerous. It requires to be struggled for without respite. 
Even though it might be sweet to drowse amid shadows, it is not good as 
we can see in the fourth stanza: süß / Wär’ unter Schatten der Schlummer / 
Nicht ist es gut. One might tire of the constant labor and yearn for a rest, 
but gut / Ist ein Gespräch. With the contrast that the poem establishes in 
the middle stanza between the sweetness of Schlummer and the value of 
Gespräch, it acknowledges the diffi culty of keeping the conversation mu-
tual. The work of love includes the almost impossible task of sending the 
wind in the other direction while the danger of losing the beloved lurks 
at the turn of every line.27
One- sidedness persistently threatens the conversation with arrest. 
Naturally, everything fl ows in one direction: the wind blows, the spirit 
is fi ery, and the river Dordogne fl ows downward (wo herab/ die Dordogne 
kommt). Before long the movement is extinguished: ausgehet der Strom. 
Quickly, the poem gets effaced in its all too transparent message. When 
nothing is read between the lines, this nothing grinds the verses to sharp 
edges, scharfe Ufer, that speed up the reading and rush the water into the 
abyss where deep falls the brook, tief fällt der Bach.
But the words themselves fi ght against their death. Darüber hin-
schauet (look out above) stretches out its ambiguities allowing the “noble 
pair” (edel Paar) to overlook and look beyond the abyss, toward which the 
water races. Der Steg (footbridge) smoothes out the sharp edge when it 
nonchalantly “trails along” the bank (trans. Chadwick, am scharfen Ufer / 
Hingehet), distracting from the other, more gloomy meaning of hingehet, 
namely “to pass away.”
The reader also contributes to the task of a loving conversation. 
She joins the lovers, thereby opening their potentially destructive tête-
 à-tête. The interpretation of the line geh aber nun is therefore not merely 
a question of right or wrong. For us to invest the aber with negating power 
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is to rescue the poem’s potential for love, its ability to move back and 
forth between the lovers. For us to understand this aber as initiating a 
turn of address between S.G. and F.H. means also to reverse the blowing 
of this wind poem that comes to us from the author, and to participate 
actively in the conversation that moves back and forth between author 
and reader.28 It amounts to giving the poem some of what it means to 
offer—responding with love and friendship to the love that it gives by 
interrupting its fl ow and twisting its perspective.
Our diffi culties with receiving the poem as a love letter and Fried-
rich’s diffi culties with receiving Susette’s greetings are, in both cases, tied 
up with a frustration about the evasive character of the beloved. She is un-
reliable. I do not know what I have in her. I do not even know where she is, 
from where she sends her love, and if she will keep sending it. True, there 
is a promise. “The north- easterly promises me fi ery spirit” (Der Nordost ver-
heißet feurigen Geist Mir). Yet, how long can I wait for the promise to come 
true? Even if the promise is “now” (nun) fulfi lled, I remain in the position 
of awaiting its (continued) realization since I cannot bear the thought of 
her love ever ending. Already, empty words are creeping up on me, ha-
bitual turns, without an individual address. But who am I to force her to 
speak to me? Doesn’t the poem have the right to refuse to yield meaning if 
it needs to avoid the grasp of a reader who only pretends to be a lover?
To accept the aber’s refusal to signify might be intended as an act 
of chivalry but it hardly preserves anybody’s freedom. Instead, it infects 
the poem with the reader’s own helplessness. Abandoned by the reader 
amidst the beauty of the Garonne, Friedrich feels a sharp pain am schar-
fen Ufer and, struggling not to slide into the abyss of solitude, he tries 
to make sure that Susette will remember to greet him: geh aber nun und 
grüße. This might be an understandable desire, but the fact that he takes 
charge of the continuation of the loving discourse means that Friedrich 
stops to hear her voice in the wind. Susette disappears as an agent in the 
conversation. The imperative forms geh and grüße neglect to acknowledge 
that the wind already blows, and fail to recognize that S.G. in fact sends 
her love. The redundant imperative spreads its impotence to overshadow 
the promise of the wind. It catches up with the wind by apostrophizing 
and enclosing it in a “now” (nun) that interrupts the wind’s movement, 
breaks the promise of verheißet, and acts as a brake on its futural drift. The 
imperative transforms the love for the wind into a suffocating clasp. It 
thrusts its will into the open fl esh of the future and forecloses the advent-
ing movement of futurity. In its fi nal turn, this aber nun turns the loving 
conversation off.
Such a reading melancholically reenacts a loss of which the reader 
is barely aware: the immense and always frustrated desire to be smitten 
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and completely overcome by the other’s address. It projects onto the 
poem the reader’s own refusal to receive the poem in its precariousness 
and unreliability. The chivalrous attempt at indifference is not really mo-
tivated by the wish to preserve the beloved intact in her difference, but 
by the desire to protect the self from the beloved’s caprice. Within the 
parameters of this reading, loving and respecting the integrity of the 
other turns into a holding on to the other and anticipating her moves. 
The beloved thus loses the very qualities for which one loves her: her 
liveliness, her unforeseeability, or, in Hegelian terms, her negativity. We 
are left with no future, nothing that comes to us from the other. Nothing 
can move us. The result is stagnation, an empty repetition of nothing, 
an accumulation of a habitual aber that does not turn or move anything, 
but pitches the poem in a melancholy tone.29 The insistence of a mean-
ingless aber as a marker of indifference and distrust isolates the reader 
and encloses the poem in a circle of non- understanding and loneliness 
from which, at best, one cry emerges: “But where are the friends?” (Wo 
aber sind die Freunde?).
In a truly mutual relation, as Hegel conceives it, ac- knowledging 
(reading the other, coming to know the other) is intertwined with killing 
the other—but killing the other is not an autonomous act, its agency is 
shared with the other, since “the object of self- consciousness is equally 
self- suffi cient in this negativity of itself” (§ 176). “For that reason, [self-
 consciousness] can do nothing on its own about that object if that object 
does not do to itself what the fi rst self- consciousness does to it” (§ 182, 
trans. modifi ed). Killing the other is killing self- consciousness and ac-
 knowledging oneself while doing it. Hegel is far from imagining mutual 
love as a peaceful and stable relationship: the two subjects move in a ver-
tiginous struggle, ceaselessly negating each other and themselves. These 
negations can be blissful if they manage to realize a form of death that is 
moving without ending the encounter in defi nite destruction.
Hölderlin’s poem models an ethics of reading that acknowledges 
this affi rmative kind of negativity. “The north- easterly blows”; the poem 
speaks to us. But while Hölderlin writes this poem Susette is already dead, 
and when we read the poem the author is already dead. The wind may 
have come from the northeast, but by the time it hits Friedrich, Susette 
is somewhere else. Once we read the poem, we no longer know in what 
sense it was written. Even though Susette’s death is a historical fact, “An-
denken” demonstrates that Hölderlin did not experience her death as a 
fact, but struggled to stay in communication with Diotima Susette Gon-
tard.30 Her death fi gures as a trope for the experience of the negativity 
of the other. Because her freedom consists in being the subject of and 
subject to her own self- differentiality, the lover is always already some-
where else as soon as she presents herself for identifi cation. In the very 
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act of sending a loving message, the sender herself changes. The source 
is gone, and it does not make sense to search for it at the point of its de-
parture unless one wants to arrest the greeting.
If Friedrich wants to communicate his love to Susette, it is not 
enough to simply reverse the direction of the greeting, and to give back 
what he received. Reciprocity does not realize mutuality. The wind would 
not reach the source even if it blew in the opposite direction. Friedrich 
has to speak without knowing where exactly to direct his words. He has 
to approach someone who is gone, dead, so to speak. Likewise, we have 
to communicate with the poem without knowing from where exactly it 
addresses us. To bear the embarrassment—die Scheue zu tragen—of articu-
lating words against the wind, without any certainty as to where and how 
the other will receive the greeting, is the only way to recognize the other’s 
negativity without killing her.
The lack of orientation resulting from the inability to locate the 
position of the beloved, combined with the strain of moving against the 
wind, provokes a wish for quiet that has strong suicidal undertones:
But someone pass me
The fragrant cup
Full of dark light,
So that I may rest now; for sweet
It would be to drowse amid shadows.
Es reiche aber,
Des dunkeln Lichtes voll,
Mir einer den duftenden Becher,
Damit ich ruhen möge; denn süß
Wär’ unter Schatten der Schlummer.
The desire of the lover would be appeased—to put a different spin on 
es reiche aber (but it suffi ces)—if he could drink up her cup and rest in 
the beloved. Yet, since it is impossible to fi nd quiet in S. who is alive with 
negativity, constantly moving and moved, F. wishes to rest with Susette’s 
nonexistence. To put an end to their missed encounters, he is ready to go 
where she is clearly not, if only to secure the certainty of her full absence. 
He is ready to die. Like the reader who is tempted to give in to the lure of 
nothingness that threatens to collapse the poem into the one meaning of 
non- communication, F. is tempted to give himself over to destruction.
According to Baumann, the next line, Nicht ist es gut (It is not good), 
forms the heart of the poem (Baumann 1997, 38). Located at the exact 
midpoint of the poem, it marks its turning point—the point at which 
Hölderlin resolves to tear himself away from the temptation of actively 
or passively dying. The struggle for recognition in Hegel’s Phenomenology 
initiates a similar turn when its protagonists realize that a dead opponent 
will not provide the desired recognition. Death is not good; so much 
might safely be said. But on which side are we to locate death: here or 
there, in this world or in the hereafter? The central line of the poem is 
so insignifi cant in its simplicity that we have to consult the neighboring 
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verses to give it more substance. Like the other pivot with which we have 
been concerned—the potentially void aber—Nicht ist es gut reads like an 
empty heart until we widen our focus and attend to the blood of words 
that will have crossed in it:
It would be to drowse amid shadows. Wär’ unter Schatten der Schlummer.
It is not good Nicht ist es gut,
To be soulless with mortal Seellos von sterblichen
The preceding verse speaks of drowsing amid shadows. Shadows 
might refer to the underworld, the dominion of the dead and its shadowy 
inhabitants. Or, if we adhere to Platonic ideas, it might remind us of the 
fact that our empirical world consists of only shadows. Or the line might 
simply draw the picture of a nap in the shadows of the wooded home-
land.31 The next line reads Seellos von sterblichen. To be soulless would 
mean to be dead. More precisely—since the dead are often considered 
to be nothing but souls—it means to dwell in a death that entertains no 
relation to life. Those who have a soul are mortal; they are able to die or 
to live; they are affected by death, divided between death and life. But to 
be soulless would mean to be without death or life, to rest in an absolute 
beyond or a total immediacy. The line break between sterblichen and Ge-
danken isolates the adjective sterblichen from the term it is adjected to, so 
that it establishes its own substantiality and asks to be read as a substan-
tive. Read on its own as Seellos von Sterblichen (soulless from mortals), the 
line evokes a state of soullessness caused by mortals, or rather, caused by 
the denial of mutual acknowledging—the refusal to acknowledge that F. 
shares the status of mortals, which consists in being with soul, or in being 
alive and affected by death, subject of and subject to one’s negativity. He 
walks around on earth like a dead man amid shadows. The central line, 
Nicht ist es gut, is a light heart that fl utters between the line before and 
the line after, which themselves are ambiguous in their relation to this 
world and the hereafter. Nicht ist es gut is itself one of the mortal thoughts 
(sterblichen Gedanken) that are interrupted by the line break and divided 
in themselves between life and death. The verse exchanges blood con-
taining oxygen for blood that carries carbon dioxide and lightheartedly 
escapes identifi cation as one or the other.
Lulling Breezes and Swaying Bridges
For Hegel, we will remember, coming to know is truly an ac- knowledging, 
something that subjects do together—not in loving peace and harmony, 
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but wrangling with each other to keep the movement of thinking, grasp-
ing, penetrating, and embracing from fi zzling out in mere negation or 
being stifl ed in mere affi rmation. It is a struggle for mutuality that keeps 
changing the subject. Since subject/ s are always beyond themselves, al-
ways subject to their own objectifi cation, alienation, appropriation, and 
dissolution, they cannot be located or identifi ed for very long. There is 
no Wiederfi nden à la Goethe in Hölderlin’s poem or in Hegel’s Phenom-
enology: no recovery of the lost object, no reunion with an old lover, and 
no re- cognition even, that trennt uns nicht zum zweitenmal. Thinking one 
another (rather than thinking of one another), subject/s change.
This change has the advantage that the subjects multiply. In Hegel’s 
text, we are treated to the panoply of different shapes of self- refl ective 
life. Each shape emerges from a transformative act of ac- knowledging. 
Acknowledging entangles subjects in one another. It is an act of converse 
that exchanges and even confuses identities. Constitutively shared, the 
subjects or fi gures of spirit are thus not strictly separated from one an-
other; they are not even always clearly distinguishable. Rather, they are 
imperfectly drawn into one another—fi guring and standing in for one 
another while overlapping.
Again, Hölderlin’s poem lends itself to elucidate the logic of this 
relation. Here as well, the couples keep multiplying. In the following, I 
will discuss how the human lovers are interlaced with the poem’s several 
pairs of trees. A Gespräch emerges—not only in words, but also among 
words—a converse in the form of asymmetrical chiasms: of unfi nished, 
non- reciprocal but nevertheless mutual exchanges.
The fi rst stanza of “Andenken” names “a noble pair of oaks and 
white poplars [ein edel Paar / Von Eichen und Silberpappeln].” The lovers in 
this pair are quite different. White poplars are known to be fi ckle. They 
like to grow near the water so the liquid can fl ow in abundance through 
their supple stems. With the help of the water they grow silvery leaves that 
fl icker in the wind. Oscillating between their two faces, these leaves enrap-
ture with the music they sing in the breeze. The oak, on the other hand, 
is ancient and unfaltering. It was Jupiter’s tree and gave honey to the 
Golden Age.32 In the imagination of Hölderlin’s time, in texts of German 
Romanticism and Idealism, it fi gures as the German tree. Big and steady, 
oaks lend themselves to mediate between gods and humans, or, as Hölder-
lin phrases it in another poem, to “stand beneath God’s thunder- storms / 
To grasp the Father’s ray . . . / And . . . offer it to the people” wrapped in 
the song of falling acorns.33 Solitary, free, and wild, they attract the light-
ning, like Semele, and are likely to be burnt for their love.34
The obvious difference between these lovers could be a source of 
misunderstanding and death. But a certain shyness or shame earns the 
pair its attribute of ethical nobility (ein edel Paar).35 They do not address 
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each other directly. Their gaze is twice diverted. Overseeing together the 
gardens of Bordeaux, the river Garonne with its sharp bank, the falling 
brook, and the footbridge, they glance at each other across the entire 
world of their surroundings. But even this world is not the direct object 
of their gaze; they hinschauet darüber with a squinting look that looks at 
and looks beyond at the same time.36 Acknowledging negativity, their 
gaze is attentive without identifying its object.
Hegel understands shame among lovers, quite counterintuitively, 
as a force against separation. To him, Scham is not a feeling that leads 
lovers to restore propriety and property, but he rather takes it as the ex-
pression of an aversion against the proper. In his 1797– 98 fragment on 
love, Hegel writes: “Love is indignant over any remaining separation and 
property; this anger of love at individuality is called shame [Scham].” Re-
versing the common values of decency, he regards the messy entangle-
ment of two bodies in love as an example of purity, whereas lovers who 
resist their intimacy trying to preserve some proper independence pre-
sent to him an image of indecency: “A pure heart [Gemüt] is not ashamed 
of love; but it is ashamed of the fact that this love is not consummate 
[vollkommen]” (Hegel 1971, 306). Striving to overcome the obstacles that 
hinder love’s culmination, shame is thus an agent in the service of love.
Hölderlin rephrases the role of Scham as Scheue (shyness). In his 
poem, shyness does the work of preserving dynamic differences within 
the pair. The stimulation of difference against the idea of an unqualifi ed 
union is also part of Hegel’s account of shame. Hamacher highlights 
the ambiguity of the work of shame in Hegel.37 He shows that shame 
splits up the unity that it has produced in order to work toward a more 
inclusive unity. Shame relentlessly takes offense at the results of its own 
efforts because no union is radical enough to be absolutely pure.38 The 
work of shame is unending. Its infi nity can be frustrating when merely 
numerical, that is, when we presume separate countable entities. If we 
presuppose a clear- cut distinction between identity and difference, every 
newly achieved unity opposes the difference which it resolved and there-
fore adds to the series of terms to be reconciled. But a different logic 
gives rise to a pleasurable infi nity. Such is the case when the lovers pre-
vent their union from collapsing into an exclusive unity and make a love 
in which “the separate still exist, but not as separate, rather as united 
[Einiges]” (Hegel 1971, 305).39 Then, like Hölderlin’s noble pair, those 
who are ashamed of the fact that they are separated also take pleasure in 
letting more and more obstacles come between them. Rubbing against 
these hurdles, they actively enjoy their love: “This wealth of life love ac-
quires . . . for it seeks out differences and devises unifi cations ad infi ni-
tum; it turns to the whole manifold of nature in order to drink love out 
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of every life” (Hegel 1971, 307). The infi nite work of shame opens the 
closed relationship between two individuals, their potentially violent tête-
 a- tête, and allows for more and more interference from the manifold 
riches of the outside world or, in Hölderlin’s words, of the gardens of 
Bordeaux. As Hamacher puts it: “For shame being is given—its own not 
excepted—only in the plural” (Hamacher 1998, 89).
Indeed, the seemingly exclusive couple has always been a play of 
multiplicities in Hölderlin’s poem: the pair does not consist of one oak 
and one white poplar, but oaks and white poplars in the plural: “A noble 
pair of oaks / and white poplars” (ein edel Paar / Von Eichen und Silberpap-
peln). The couple has also always been interlaced with other pairs. Oaks 
and poplars are crossed with other trees. Indeed, the poem abounds with 
exchange, with Gespräch, with care, with confusion, with mutation, and 
with mutuality. There is care in the elm wood that protectively “bends 
its broad tops over the mill” (Chadwick; neiget die breiten Gipfel . . . über 
die Mühl’). The house takes the “fi g tree” (Feigenbaum) into its courtyard 
and shelters it from storm and weather. Der feige Baum, the cowardly tree, 
needs protection. Yet, by its involvement in another pair, the fi g gains 
a divine power to keep the house safe in return. When Hölderlin trans-
lates Euripides’ Bacchants, he confuses fi g tree (Greek: sykon) with sanc-
tum (Greek: saekon).40 The fi g now offers protection precisely because it 
is der Feigen Baum, the holy tree of the cowards. In the context of love, 
cowardice turns into a special courage. It becomes the strength of not 
being afraid to let shyness show (Scheue zu tragen).41 Hegel asserts that love 
“has no fear of its fear, but led by its fear, it relieves [hebt auf ] separations” 
(Hegel 1971, 306– 7, trans. modifi ed). The lover bears (trägt) the brave 
timorousness of the fi g tree in the same way that she wears (trägt) a fi g 
leaf. The fi g leaf “cancels separation” by denying the difference between 
lovers. Since neither of them can be sure that their love can tolerate 
their separation, they prefer to wear their shame. But the coy fi g leaf 
also highlights the difference between them, if only as something that is 
impossible to pinpoint. The excessively shy love of the noble pair keeps 
differences moving.
The second stanza presents the movement of differences across the 
multiple interlacing pairs that form a noble pair. It begins with “there . . . / 
The brown women walk / On silken ground” (Die braunen Frauen daselbst / 
Auf seidnen Boden). The adjective seidnen is here used in the plural and is 
thus grammatically aligned with Frauen rather than Boden. But it would 
not exactly make sense to exchange the adjectives and to say: Die seidnen 
Frauen daselbst auf braunem Boden (The silken women there on brown 
ground). The exchange is not reversible; there is no identifi able point of 
origin. The daselbst functions as the eccentric pivot for an asymmetrically 
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chiasmic exchange that never fully lines up and therefore never comes 
to rest.42 Both sides are imperfectly drawn into the other so that both 
can neither be separated nor unifi ed. Around the disempowered identity 
(Selbigkeit) of the daselbst, as the light heart of the chiasm, the verses keep 
insisting on the plural.
We fi nd a similar structure in: “And over slow footbridges, / Heavy 
with golden dreams, / Lulling breezes drift” (Und über langsamen Stegen, / 
Von goldenen Träumen schwer, / Einwiegende Lüfte ziehen). Here, the converse 
explicitly engages more than two terms. The Gespräch moves in a round. 
Light and heavy at the same time, it is a slow dance over the abyss where 
deep down the river rages: Über langsamen Stegen (over slow footbridges)? 
One is tempted to correct this peculiar expression into über einwiegenden 
Stegen (over footbridges that give), and this sets the dance in motion: 
von goldenen Träumen schwer, Lüfte ziehen langsam, langsam einwiegende Stege, 
Träume ziehen schwer, schwer einwiegende Lüfte ziehen langsam Stege, wiegen ein 
in goldene Träume, träumen goldene Stege . . . (heavy with golden dreams, 
breezes drift slowly, slowly giving footbridges, dreams drift heavily, heavy 
swaying breezes slowly draw bridges, lull into golden dreams, dream 
golden bridges . . .).
What Hölderlin’s poem discovers—a chiasmic exchange so eccen-
tric and incomplete that it opens onto a round of different combinations 
and confi gurations itself inviting more and more transformations—is 
obviously very different from the model presented in Goethe’s poem. 
There, we found mirror relations on several different yet neatly orga-
nized levels: between the two lovers, between the human and the cos-
mic couple, (more abstractly) between individuality and universality, and 
fi nally between the substance and the form of the poem. All of these 
mirrorings worked to substantiate the autonomy of the lyrical “I,” thus 
granting the lyrical “I” recognition. This kind of recognition disallowed 
for any disturbing difference and prohibited multiplication, dispersal, 
and confusion. The result was a perfect poem, a poem satisfi ed with it-
self, as it were.
But it is Hölderlin’s model that we encounter in the Phenomenol-
ogy, as well. In the Phenomenology, we fi nd no closed circuit of mirror im-
ages. Because of the imperfect entanglement of plural subject/ s as they 
co-emerge in mutual acknowledging, the ostensible pair of the trope of 
mutual acknowledging has always already opened onto the multitude 
of the Phenomenology’s shapes of consciousness and shapes of spirit. All 
of the fi gures that the phenomenological narrative relates—from sense 
certainty to absolute knowing—share in this one movement of mutual 
acknowledging. Each presents another fi guration of the subject/ s that 
keep changing. But even the text as a whole is not closed. It needs us, 
the readers. The Phenomenology needs our acknowledging for any of these 
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fi gures to come to life as acknowledged and thus to be transformed.43 It 
needs us to join the struggle for mutuality.
Toward
I have relied on Hegel’s signifi er of “acknowledging”—with the pre-
fi x “ac” communicating a sense of togetherness—to support my argu-
ment for mutuality. I have argued that the acknowledgement of self-
 consciousness can only take place in the plural and is constitutively and 
structurally mutual. Nevertheless, this mutuality has to be struggled for 
because self- consciousness tends to want to settle for something less than 
mutual acknowledging, namely recognition, because recognition prom-
ises self- suffi ciency and absorption. Hölderlin’s lighthearted jumbling of 
grammar and predication suggests that the best strategy in the struggle 
for mutuality is often to abandon the struggle against it.
Before I draw my discussion of “mutual acknowledging” to a con-
clusion, we must consider another valence of the prefi x ac. So far, I have 
read “ac” as the residue of “accord,” which itself assimilates the Latin ad 
to the Latin cor (heart). It is the prefi x ad (at, to, till) that will concern 
me now—especially since, while somewhat hidden in the English version 
of the signifi er, it is in plain view on the surface of the German Anerken-
nen. As the prefi x of a verb, an communicates the direction of the action 
that the verb expresses. Examples are ansehen (look at), anschreien (shout 
at), anhören (listen to), ankleben (glue on), or anlehnen (lean against). 
While most of the time the action is directed at an object, in some cases 
an marks a movement toward the action itself, as in andiskutieren (dis-
cuss briefl y), anblättern (leaf through a little), anlesen (start reading), or 
andeuten (to incompletely explain or adumbrate). It then expresses the 
movement toward the action indicated by the verb; it suggests the in-
cipience of this action and means “a little,” “briefl y,” “incompletely,” or 
“tentatively.”
Hegel exploits this meaning of an in his discussion of the “unhappy 
consciousness”:
The unhappy consciousness does not conduct itself towards its object in 
a thinking manner. Rather, since it is just in itself pure thinking indi-
viduality, and since its object is itself precisely this pure thought, and 
since pure thought is not itself the relation of each to the other, it, so to 
speak, merely launches itself in the direction of thought [geht es, so zu 
sagen, nur an das Denken hin] and on that path it becomes devotion 
 [Andacht]. (§ 217)
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The unhappy consciousness moves toward thinking, but stops short of 
actually carrying it through. Hegel calls this fi gure of consciousness 
not Denken (thinking) and not even Andenken (remembrance, literally: 
“thinking at” or “incipient thinking”) but Andacht (devotion). He does 
so because this fi gure of emerging thought skips the actual activity of 
thinking and jumps right away to a submissive devotion to ready- made 
thoughts, that is to say, to the posture of not needing to think anymore. 
Before it has even begun (An- ), the thinking has already passed (dacht is 
the past tense of denken) and thus is Andacht.
Like the common reader of philosophical books, who enjoys read-
ing the summaries of arguments in reviews or prefaces more than actually 
reading the books themselves, Andacht loves “having thought(s)” more 
than it loves to actually think. Yet Hegel’s phenomenological philosophy 
insists that thinking (denken) and coming- to-know or realizing (erkennen) 
are movements that need to be carried out, journeyed through, or expe-
rienced even though they cause embarrassment and shame.
He famously claims that the task of phenomenology is “to bring 
[philosophy] nearer to the goal where it can lay aside the title of ‘love 
of knowledge’ and be actual knowledge” (§ 5). The operative distinction in 
this claim is not one between love and knowledge, but between the mere 
inclination toward an activity and the actualization of that activity. Ac-
tual thinking (Denken or Erkennen) is mutual acknowledging: a refl exive 
movement of physical, intellectual, and emotional interchange of plural 
subjects who struggle with each other to acknowledge their freedom as 
well as their interdependence and vulnerability. When Hegel professes 
that “scientifi c cognition requires that [formal understanding] give itself 
over to the life of the object [sich dem Leben des Gegenstandes zu überge-
ben],” he clearly suggests that the philosopher must acknowledge that 
his so-called object is indeed, on a profound level, a self- refl ective, free, 
and living subject, and he must acknowledge his interdependence with 
this subject if he is to actually think scientifi cally (§ 53). As the mutual 
embrace and mutual penetration of subjects in the plural, “actual know-
ing” is a form of love.
At the same time, the actualization of knowledge in experience 
does precisely not mean that absolute knowledge can be completed. Our 
discussion of Hölderlin’s poem “Andenken” has shown the need for the 
struggle for mutuality. It is a struggle against the trap of self- suffi ciency 
and against the rush to the fi nish line expressed in the word An- dacht. In 
Hölderlin’s poem, we fi nd this rush in a series of signifi ers that fi gure An-
denken in the rapid movements of going, running, blowing, and falling. 
“To think at” or “to think toward” is one of the fi rst senses of an- denken 
that Hölderlin’s poem suggests when he places an in the company of 
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other directional prefi xes, like hin in hingehet (go toward, go away) and 
hinschauet (look at), herab in herabkommt (come down), and aus in ausge-
het (go out). Because the non- refl exive Andenken presses too fast and too 
decidedly in one direction, it overshoots the mark and kills the sense for 
the other direction. Because it rushes to the end this “thinking toward” 
remains incomplete.
While Hegel, like Hölderlin, certainly shows a predilection for slow-
ness—even for viscosity—Hegel is not one to argue for infi nite deferral. 
Instead, it is through closure (through defi nite but temporary accom-
plishments) that he opens “actual knowledge” to the advent of an un-
known future. The movement of Anerkennen might—and indeed must 
repeatedly—be actualized in the form of a judgment—be it an epistemo-
logical judgment (in the mode of Wiedererkennen) or a value judgment (in 
the mode of Anerkennung or recognition)—but any such judgment will 
be called into question by precisely the reality that it actualizes. Neither 
the self nor the other is a stable thing in itself that could be known or 
recognized without that knowledge or recognition having a transforma-
tive effect on both. Knowledge—as a reifi ed result of the movement of 
the concept—is of course possible, even required, but Hegel’s journeys 
of thinking never end there. They always begin with knowledge (or cer-
tainty) and show how it disintegrates.44 Similarly, everyone will at times 
ask to be recognized as something (or feel compelled to recognize others 
as something), but this very recognition will change the identity thus rec-
ognized.45 Any act of recognition must therefore come to be viewed as 
misrecognition and will be outdated and updated by a new recognition. 
The completion of Anerkennen is itself transient. The process of acknowl-
edging (and thus of thinking, of comprehending, of reading) is consti-
tutively incipient, provisional, and unending.
With Hölderlin, we can extend Hegel’s critique of Andacht to Aner-
kennen. Anerkennen also—and especially when it carries through the 
movement of Erkennen—remains constitutively incipient and incom-
plete. Yet, in this case, the incipience is the condition of possibility for 
mutuality. For both a deep understanding of Hegel’s thought and a pro-
found appreciation of ethical emotionality, it is of crucial importance, 
then, to keep in view the refl exive sense of incipience that is communi-
cated by the prefi x An and thus to read mutual Anerkennen as an unend-
ing process. In the ambiguous and ecstatic circulation of Anerkennen, we 
experience others across our frequent appropriations of them as not 
fully assimilable, and ourselves across our repeated insights as not com-
pletely intelligible. As the interminably repeated incipience of Erkennen, 
Anerkennen remains impossible to accomplish in a defi nitive way because 




It felt the fear of death, the absolute master. In that feeling, it had 
internally fallen into dissolution, trembled inwardly in every fi ber 
of its being, and all that was fi xed within it had been shaken loose.
—Phenomenology, § 194
Tremble becomes an explicit topic in the Phenomenology in a brief but 
memorable moment toward the end of the section on “Self- Suffi ciency 
and Non- Self- Suffi ciency of Self- Consciousness; Mastery and Servitude.” 
In one of the Phenomenology’s frequent parabases, the phenomenologist 
communicates to the reader a truth about the protagonist of which the 
protagonist is unaware: whereas the servant’s self- image is that of some-
one who is exclusively attached to and defi ned by his physical existence, 
the phenomenologist points out that the servant’s true self encompasses 
absolute negativity—and its power:
Servitude has this truth of pure negativity . . . in fact in servitude itself, for 
servitude has experienced this essence in servitude. This consciousness 
was not driven with anxiety about just this or that matter, nor did it have 
anxiety at just this or that moment; rather, it had anxiety about its entire 
essence. It felt the fear of death, the absolute master. In that feeling, it 
had internally fallen into dissolution, trembled inwardly in every fi ber 
of its being, and all that was fi xed within it had been shaken loose [Es 
ist darin innerlich aufgelöst worden hat durchaus in sich selbst erzittert, und 
alles Fixe hat in ihm gebebt]. However, this pure universal movement, this 
way in which all durable existence becomes absolutely fl uid [das absolute 
Flüssigwerden alles Bestehens], is the simple essence of self- consciousness; 
it is absolute negativity, pure being- for- itself, which thereby exists in this 
consciousness. (§ 194, trans. modifi ed)
In its fear of death, the enchained consciousness experiences its 
own essence as absolute negativity. It is not hard to imagine that chains 
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would be unable to restrain a body that is thus spiritualized: trembles 
turn loose. The moment of absolute fear must be considered as the 
most precious moment of the protagonist’s development so far. The 
shakes and trembles of absolute fear not only actualize the servant’s 
being- for- himself, negate his mere being- for- others, and allow him to 
access his own power of negativity; they also shift the operative value 
of the dialectic of mastery and servitude from abstract negativity to 
absolute negativity.1 Negation by fear exemplifi es a non- abstract mode 
of negation, one that does not result in death or nothingness. Instead, 
the trembles dissolve the protagonist’s inert being and set it in motion. 
Moved by fear, consciousness is able to apprehend and express itself 
“not merely as substance but also equally as subject” (§ 17).2
The feeling of absolute fear facilitates the shift in self- comprehension. 
Trembling is a mode of self- refl ection. Not only will the servant have un-
derstood the true structure of his relation to the master; his embrace of 
absolute fear will also have changed his situation. Mastery and servitude 
are founded on the repression of absolute fear. Only the fear of absolute 
fear is able to arrest and enchain a consciousness that is capable of abso-
lute fl uidity. The actual experience of absolute fear destroys the fantasy 
of mastery and catapults consciousness out of servitude. As speculative 
negation, absolute fear is a productive force, an “instrument of progres-
sion,” the motor for development (Cixous 1991, 255).3
Yet consciousness, the protagonist of the Phenomenology, is not able 
to experience absolute fear in the fullest sense of the word “experi-
ence.” When Hegel, in the above- quoted passage, maintains that “ser-
vitude has . . . experienced this [truth of pure negativity] in servitude” (die 
Knechtschaft . . . hat diese Wahrheit der reinen Negativität . . . an ihr erfahren), 
the structure of the parabasis belies the phenomenologist’s very obser-
vation. The fact that the phenomenologist here separates from the pro-
tagonist, who remains absorbed in the scene, and addresses the audience 
behind the servant’s back, means that the servant cannot exactly benefi t 
from the information. What is more, an ihr, of an ihr erfahren, indicates 
spatial contiguity but not conscious awareness; it means “in itself,” not 
“for itself.” The phenomenologist thus indicates that the servant under-
went a fear that was unavailable for consciousness. To be precise, the ser-
vant cannot even have unconsciously lived through absolute fear, since 
he, strictly speaking, wasn’t there (yet) to do so. The fi gure of the servant 
was only constituted as a reaction to the event of absolute fear. And this 
reaction consisted in the repression of the intense appreciation of life 
near death which is the experience of absolute fear. The servant qua 
servant did not undergo this experience and can have no recollection of 
the fear that led to his birth.
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Therefore, when the phenomenologist retroactively establishes that 
absolute fear is indeed a factor in the life of this consciousness, this di-
agnosis can be read as an attempt to empathetically re- create an “expe-
rience” that in turn is only now and by this very diagnosis made avail-
able to the protagonist who might be shaken by the phenomenologist’s 
statement. This is an example of Hegel pushing to an interesting emo-
tional extreme the demand made in the preface, that the phenomenol-
ogist must surrender control to the self- unfolding of the protagonist’s 
development. What is more—because the experience of absolute fear 
is, strictly speaking, unavailable to any one consciousness—we, as read-
ers of the Phenomenology, cannot but tremble back and forth between the 
text’s  retroactive accounts on the one hand and the textual anticipations 
of fear on the other, both of which arrange themselves around the ab-
sence of any direct account of experienced fear. The missed experience 
of absolute fear cannot be claimed by any one fi gure of consciousness 
or even by the phenomenologist, but it does instead take shape in the 
textual trembling between and across various anticipations and recollec-
tions of spirit. The Phenomenology of Spirit inwardly trembles between the 
double genitive of its title—between spirit as the agent of the phenom-
enological inquiry and spirit as its subject matter, between spirit in the 
form of the protagonist and spirit in the form of the phenomenologist. At 
the same time, all that is fi xed within these two characters—the different 
fi gures of the protagonist, the difference between author and various 
readers, which constitutes the phenomenologist—every fi ber of this text 
shakes loose.
In the following, I will fi rst explore the absence of an expression of 
fear when fear must have been felt. After an analysis of the retroactive 
and indirect account, given by the phenomenologist/ s, of the servant’s 
absolute fear, I will highlight the textual anticipations of absolute fear 
that precede the dialectic of mastery and servitude. Then, I will conclude 
the fi rst part of this chapter by analyzing the retroactive attempts of the 
protagonist/ s to realize and integrate the missed experience of absolute 
fear. Finally, in the second part of this chapter, I will explore the textual 
trembling that surrounds and traverses the chapter transitions of the 
Phenomenology.
Missed Experience
At the beginning of the chapter on mastery and servitude, at the moment 
when absolute fear must have assailed consciousness, the narrative does 
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not acknowledge fear as the motivation for the formation of fi xed sub-
ject positions. The protagonists’ quest for mutual acknowledgment has 
turned into a struggle for life and death. Misunderstanding negativity as 
abstract nothingness, the individuals involved try to kill one another and 
themselves in order to gain status and recognition. It takes a near- death 
experience for consciousness to understand the simple fact that life is of 
the essence since a dead person can neither give nor receive recognition. 
Still, there is no mention of the protagonists’ fear here at the beginning 
of the chapter. Absolute fear is identifi ed only retroactively, at the end of 
the chapter, as a feeling the servant must have had. At the beginning of 
the chapter, master and servant are logically deduced from the struggle 
for life and death. The Phenomenology accounts for their emergence in a 
neutral tone without emotion or empathy:
In this experience, self- consciousness learns that life is as essential to 
it as pure self- consciousness. . . . It is by way of that experience that a 
pure self- consciousness is posited, and a consciousness . . . is posited 
as an existing consciousness. . . . Both moments are essential. . . . One 
is self- suffi cient; for it, its essence is being- for- itself. The other is non 
self- suffi cient; for it, life, that is, being for an other, is the essence. The 
former is the master, the latter is the servant. (§ 189)
With this sober explanation, Hegel locates the necessity for the hier-
archical division of consciousness in the protagonists’ resistance to 
com plexity. Consciousness refuses to accept contradictory values. For 
consciousness, either negation or life is of the essence, but not both. 
Therefore consciousness splits into two consciousnesses with opposed 
and hierarchically organized values.
The two consciousnesses hardly experience the lesson of the es-
sentiality of life in the same way. The master never even sees the danger 
of death; he never assumes that negativity could harm him physically—
since his body is precisely what he, as master, abstracts from. The master 
knows no fear. The servant, on the other hand, will have seen the danger 
clearly. He comes into being by virtue of his brush with death, but his 
very emergence is a turning away from absolute fear. He turns to the 
master to save his life. While both avoid the feeling of absolute fear, only 
one consciousness embraces the idea of life’s value, which turns it into a 
servant; the other consciousness holds on to the idea of abstract negativ-
ity as the essence of consciousness, and becomes the master.
That the one who has developed further is subjected to the one 
who stubbornly refuses insight certainly offends the notion that the Phe-
nomenology follows a logic of progression. The retrograde motion stems 
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from the untimeliness of the servant’s development. Not only the ser-
vant was unprepared for his encounter with death and his sudden ap-
preciation of life. The spirit of his time is not ready to integrate the 
insight into the value of life either. As we have seen in the discussion 
of mutual acknowledging in our previous chapter, the “essence” or the 
main value that the entire chapter on “mastery and servitude” pursues is 
self- suffi ciency. The servant might have already moved beyond the para-
digm of self- suffi ciency, and might be on the way toward reconciliation 
of being- for- self and being- for- another. Yet he is judged based on the 
standard of self- suffi cient being- for- self and is thus enchained.4
Anticipation
The fi rst anticipation of fear in the Phenomenology—before absolute fear 
is mentioned explicitly at the end of the chapter on mastery and servi-
tude—can be found around the transition from the dialectic of percep-
tion to the dialectic of the understanding. Here, consciousness appears 
afraid of its own implication in the development of the other, its “object.” 
Its fear takes the ironic form of an anxious avoidance of trembling. Al-
ready in the dialectic of perception, the protagonist realizes that he is 
implicated in the movement of the object which he thought to merely 
observe:
For consciousness, it has thereby been determined just how its perceiv-
ing is essentially composed, namely, not as a simple, pure act of appre-
hending, but rather as in its act of apprehending at the same time taking a 
refl ective turn into itself from out of the true. This return of consciousness 
into itself, which immediately blends itself into that pure apprehend-
ing . . . alters the true. (§ 118, trans. modifi ed)
By way of acknowledging the mingling of subject and object, conscious-
ness turns into a new fi gure of itself; it becomes the understanding.5 But 
the insight does not carry through. The understanding loses access to the 
fl eeting realization that it is entangled in the object because it is afraid 
of such entanglement: “For us, this object [the object of the understand-
ing] has come to be through the movement of consciousness such that 
this consciousness is inter woven in the coming- to-be of the object. . . . 
However . . . consciousness itself is still withdrawing from what has come 
to be” (§ 132).
As a reader of the Phenomenology, one often wonders why the pro-
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tagonists are so slow to develop. Consciousness often appears dumb and 
dense. Something has become more  than obvious to us, but the protago-
nist still doesn’t see it. This is because consciousness is afraid to discover 
new truths. It fears losing the stability of its current certainty when the 
alternative might be a world where “the truth is the bacchanalian revel 
where no member is not drunk” (§ 47, trans. modifed). Consciousness 
dreads to surrender to the dance of the speculative. The apprehensive 
anticipation of, and fl ight from, absolute fear slows down consciousness’s 
development toward “absolute knowing.”
The consciousness of the understanding insists on separating its 
own movement of explaining from the object’s movement, which it 
describes here as a play of forces. The act of explaining is for the un-
derstanding a self- gratifi cation that can do without touching and being 
touched by the object.
It is precisely for that reason that there is so much self- satisfaction in ex-
planation, because the consciousness involved in it is, to put it this way, 
in an immediate conversation with itself, enjoying only itself. While it 
undeniably seems to be pursuing something else, it is really just consort-
ing with itself [sich nur mit sich selbst herumtreibt]. (§ 163)
Consciousness manages to reduce its immediate implication in the move-
ment of the other to the distant relation of voyeurism. It pretends that 
it “has no part in [the object’s] free realization but rather merely looks 
on that realization and purely apprehends it” (§ 133). Making the ob-
ject exhibit itself, the protagonist withdraws into safety and masturbates.6 
Consciousness thereby escapes the erotic danger that Hegel mentions at 
the end of the dialectic of perception. It is the danger of being captured 
by the object, attracted by its force and pushed around in its whirl. This 
danger arises because the object is a manifestation of the self- refl ecting 
concept, the concept in Hegel’s emphatic sense. As such, the object does 
not exhibit a simple identity but comprises multiple “moments.” Each 
moment of the concept is at once an abstraction of the whole and the 
whole. Thus, despite their status as abstractions, these moments can as-
sume independent existence.7 The object has multiplied, and conscious-
ness is thrown from one embrace to the other, losing itself in an orgy of 
abstractions:
Perceptual understanding, often called healthy common- sense . . . is, 
in the act of perceiving, merely the game played by these abstractions. . . . 
It is pushed around by these empty characters [Wesen] and thus thrown 
out of the arms of one abstraction into the arms of  another. . . . 
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Common- sense is the prey of these abstractions which spin it round and 
round in their whirling circle. (§ 131, trans. modifi ed)
The pleasure that perception fi nds in merely observing the other 
might be without interest, in the Kantian sense, but here, by contrast with 
Kant’s third Critique, the free play of forces (Kräfte) is located not only 
in the observer but also—and frighteningly so—in the observed. What 
consciousness here still calls “the object”—and doesn’t yet acknowledge 
as another subject—has its own pleasure and draws the observer in.8
For now, fear is not felt as such, but avoided. The protagonist pays 
for this denial of fear with the impediment of his development. Con-
sciousness, in the form of the understanding, is afraid to do what Hegel, 
in the preface to the Phenomenology, describes as the prerequisite for spec-
ulative thinking or true comprehension, that is, to “let [its] freedom de-
scend into the content [of the ‘object’]” (§ 58). Consciousness is afraid 
to lose control.
Atremble with Freedom
The experience of absolute fear would open consciousness for the ac-
tualization of mutual acknowledging. The servant understands that rec-
ognition is possible only among living individuals (an insight that the 
master refused). But is he ready to embrace the fearful experience of 
mutual acknowledging?
In the beginning of the chapter on mastery and servitude, Hegel 
offers his account of mutual acknowledging. Mutual acknowledging cre-
ates an ecstatic relation where, in a circular movement of displacements, 
each consciousness fi nds and loses itself in the other. It is important 
to note that Hegel conceives of recognition not as a securing of one’s 
position and dignity, but as an experience of mutual exposure and vul-
nerability. In the process of acknowledging, consciousness “does indeed 
get outside of itself” (kommt es wohl außer sich, § 184). What is more, the 
other cannot be expected to ground such a constitutively ecstatic self-
 consciousness. Why not? Because he is just as little in control and there-
fore cannot stabilize their relation either. The circular structure of mu-
tual acknowledging shatters any attempt on the part of the individual 
to secure an identity. Instead, the process reaches its ideal shape when 
the parties involved become aware of the bottomless movement of their 
mutual acknowledging: when “they acknowledge themselves as mutually 
acknowledging each other” (§ 184, trans. modifi ed). The experience thus 
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draws the protagonist into the whirl of forces that the understanding 
consciousness had managed to avoid: “In this movement we see the pro-
cess repeat itself which had been exhibited as the play of forces in con-
sciousness” (ibid.). The fear that the understanding was able to repress 
now returns. It is the fear of losing control, of all too easily being carried 
away by an orgy of abstractions because one’s own existence is not very 
substantive.
As in the dialectic of the understanding, the fear induced by the 
ecstatic movement of acknowledging is at fi rst avoided. Instead of aban-
doning themselves to the bottomless process of “acknowledging themselves 
as mutually acknowledging each other,” the two parties settle down in a stable 
relation where a fi rm hierarchy gives each one a solid identity: one is the 
master, the other the servant. These subject positions develop as strategic 
formations in the defense against the absolute fear that the bottomless 
movement of mutual acknowledging gives rise to. As such they prove ef-
fective: the master is indeed never afraid, and the servant gets away with 
merely being brushed by fear. The servant has the potential to turn fear 
into a resource, as Audre Lorde implies when she rearticulates Descartes’ 
dictum as: “I feel therefore I can be free.”9 Instead of impeding the ser-
vant’s development, “the fear of the master [could be] the beginning of 
wisdom” (§ 195, trans. modifi ed). But the servant’s fear of revisiting ab-
solute fear enchains him now. Hegel’s account reveals that the avoidance 
of absolute fear importantly motivates the constitution of repressive so-
cial and political structures.
The most important question—even beyond the specifi cs of the 
dialectic of master and servant—is then whether one is indeed capable 
of experiencing absolute fear. In the following, I will trace how this and 
subsequent fi gures of consciousness will try to recover the missed ex-
perience. It is crucial that fear be experienced as a physical affection (a 
tremble) rather than merely intellectually thematized. It is crucial that it 
be “absolute” fear rather than a particular, circumscribed fear. And it is 
important that consciousness fi nd (its) pleasure in absolute fear. For, if 
consciousness “could not stand [ausgestanden] absolute fear but only a 
few anxieties, then the negative essence will have remained an external-
ity in his eyes, and his substance will not have been infected all the way 
through by it. Because not each and every one of the ways in which his 
natural consciousness was brought to fruition has come to totter [wan-
kend geworden], he is still attached in himself to determinate being” (§ 196, 
trans. modifi ed).10
Only an unrestrained fear, an absolute fear, or a fear for fear’s sake, 
so to speak, can emancipate the servant from the master because the 
master’s power is lodged in the servant’s investment in subsistence. Any 
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circumscribed fear of something specifi c at a particular moment and 
for a certain aspect of consciousness’s being, only reinforces conscious-
ness’s attachment to its particular reality. Only a fear that doesn’t trigger 
a protective mechanism, but is experienced for its own sake—that is, for 
the sake of thoroughly melting away one’s entire being—can set con-
sciousness free. While Hegel positions freedom here clearly in opposi-
tion to determinism, he also avoids confl ating freedom with autonomy. 
Rather, he points to the self- deluding character of autonomy when he 
underscores that, in self- determination, freedom and unfreedom are en-
tangled: “having a mind of his own is merely stubbornness [der eigne Sinn 
ist Eigensinn], a freedom that remains bogged down within the bounds 
of servility” (§ 196).11 It is true that the master can take advantage of the 
servant’s belief in determinism in order to instrumentalize him. But if 
the servant seeks self- determination instead, he instrumentalizes himself. 
For Hegel, therefore, freedom speculatively integrates self- determination 
and self- abandon, self- investiture and self- dispossession.12
But how can consciousness not pursue its own will? Even if the ser-
vant selfl essly labors to realize the desire of the master, he still does so 
in order to preserve himself. Naturally, with every fi ber of its being, with 
every line of thought, consciousness tries to resist its own dissolution, 
tries to fl ee from absolute fear. How, under these circumstances, can con-
sciousness experience absolute fear? The beginning of the answer to this 
question lies in the ambivalent pull of fear. On the one hand, conscious-
ness is afraid of fear; on the other hand, it yearns to experience absolute 
fear in order to gain freedom as a subject.13 Absolute fear pushes and 
pulls, repels and attracts consciousness. In repeatedly moving toward and 
away from fear, the subject enacts the experience of trembling.
To actualize fear—not in order to do away with it but to learn to 
cherish a living fear—will be the aim of consciousness’s Bildung from 
now on. In his work, which he develops beyond the mere satisfaction of 
his master into an artful fashioning of things (Bilden des Dinges), the ser-
vant tries to acknowledge his trembling, tries to live it again or, rather, for 
the fi rst time really (§ 196). In fashioning the thing, the servant actively 
uses the same power of negation that he passively succumbs to in fear: 
“this objective negative is precisely the alien essence before which he trem-
bled” (§ 196). So far fear had been a traumatic event that could not be 
integrated into conscious experience: “without culturally formative activ-
ity [ohne das Bilden], fear remains inward and mute” (ibid., trans. modi-
fi ed). Now “in forming the thing, his own negativity, that is, his being- 
for- itself, . . . becomes an object in his own eyes” (ibid.).
In his work, the servant objectifi es fear, turns it outward. Rather 
than fl eeing fear, consciousness now expresses its fear. The servant’s la-
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bor takes on a therapeutic aspect. He fashions objects in order to come 
to terms with the traumatic experience of the trembles of absolute life. 
Hegel is not uncritical of the therapeutic paradigm. On the one hand, 
trembles fi nally become real and objective through the labor of expres-
sion and the occupational therapy that the servant engages in. On the 
other hand, the therapeutic impetus of “coming to terms” with fear only 
allows for a domesticated version of fear. It does not enable the experi-
ence of the trembling life of absolute fear.
The activity of confronting fear by way of producing objects that 
bear the trace of one’s fear holds a therapeutic promise. This promise 
relies on the power of the understanding, as it is described in the preface 
to the Phenomenology: “The act of parting [die Tätigkeit des Scheidens] is the 
force and labor of the understanding, the most astonishing and greatest 
of all the powers . . . spirit is this power only when it looks the negative in 
the face and lingers with it” (§ 32, my emphasis). To “face one’s fear,” to 
imagine standing before one (vorstellen), actually allows one to keep one’s 
distance from the tremble and the infectious rhythm of fear’s negativ-
ity. When it “keep[s] and hold[s] fast to [festzuhalten]” the negative, the 
understanding turns that negative into “thoughts which are themselves 
familiar and fi xed . . . [and] motionless determinations” (§ 32). The un-
derstanding “start(s) with A as in ANT and give(s) to every terror a sooth-
ing name.”14 Abstract intelligence tames the negative and calms the fear 
by turning fl uid, uncontrollable negativity into something that is known 
and can be labeled. “This lingering [with the negative] is the magical 
power that converts it into being” (§ 32). The fashioned object functions 
as a mirror for consciousness and as a tool for its self- fashioning. It re-
fl ects back to consciousness an image of itself as a stable being that has 
overcome negation and now remains “within the element of continu-
ance” (§ 32).15 Having thus liberated his work from the desires of the 
master and having developed it instead into a means for self- refl ection, 
the working consciousness exceeds servitude proper. It has not, however, 
experienced the absolute transience epitomized in absolute fear.
Yet Hegel clarifi es that work cannot overcome transience altogether; 
it is merely “vanishing staved off ” (aufgehaltenes Verschwinden, § 195). The 
servant has enough time to see himself in his products, but these works 
nevertheless eventually disappear, and therefore refl ect the servant’s 
own mortality.16 Similarly, Hegel pushes further his account of the un-
derstanding. For him the movement has not come to an end when ratio-
nal “analysis arrives at thoughts which are themselves . . . fi xed . . . deter-
minations” (§ 32, trans. modifi ed). The movement has only just begun, 
“for the concrete is self- moving only because it divides itself and turns 
itself into the non- actual” (ibid.). The understanding’s power to make 
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something out of nothing by separating what is inseparable sets things 
in motion. Fixity and fl uidity overlap; and the rationality of the under-
standing is not as neatly opposed to the emotionality of absolute fear as 
one might assume.17
Consciousness, the protagonist of the Phenomenology, is certainly still 
afraid of absolute movement. At this stage of its Bildung—the therapeu-
tic labor of expression—it is only willing to cope with one shift: from 
consciousness to the fashioned object. Consciousness is not (yet) able to 
negotiate the contradictions of speculative negation. Instead, the servant 
fashions the thing while clinging to a logic of non- contradiction where 
fi xity excludes fl uidity, self- will excludes another’s will, and affi rmation 
excludes negation. He envisions his Bilden as pure production, affi rma-
tion and self- immortalizing, while he views the master as purely negating 
and consuming. The servant and the master see themselves in a life- or-
 death struggle and not, as Hegel puts it, in a struggle for “life and death” 
(§ 187, my emphasis).
If absolute fear were felt, it would offer an experience of the over-
lap of negation and affi rmation, of absolute rather than abstract nega-
tivity. Absolute fear dissolves the inert matter of consciousness, but this 
dissolution is itself material. It manifests itself as a trembling and shak-
ing. Trembles and shakes are bodily modes of unsettling the body. Since 
the body is at the same time the object and the subject of the negation, 
it preserves itself in its supersession. Fear is not an abstract negation 
like death but a speculative negation, a dying within life that, instead of 
simply destroying the body, sets it in motion.
As a bodily negation of the body, absolute fear not only preserves 
the body in negation but actually produces the body. Throughout the 
fi rst three chapters of the Phenomenology, consciousness occupies a naively 
disembodied position. Consciousness does not refl ect on its own physical 
condition since the object is its only focus. Only when its object develops 
for it into another consciousness or an alter ego, is it confronted with its 
bodily condition. It immediately engages in the struggle for life and death 
to show that its body is inessential for its self- image. As a result of this 
struggle, it nevertheless becomes apparent that a living body is indispens-
able for consciousness. But even this insight remains at fi rst disembodied. 
As I have shown here, the insight is not experienced by an embodied con-
sciousness but is logically deduced. Only in the trembling of fear can the 
lesson of the body be experienced. As Cixous puts it, “one must almost 
die in order to take pleasure in being made of fl esh.”18 The trembling of 
fear awakens a body for consciousness and, for the fi rst time in the Phe-
nomenology, it presents consciousness’s insight as a bodily experience.
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When the Phenomenology thus suggests that physical existence is not 
a simple given for consciousness, it actually—contrary to what one might 
assume at fi rst—undoes, or speculatively reconciles, the traditional di-
chotomy of spirit and body. Hegel shows that the body is not to be pre-
sumed as a solid container for the movements of the soul (the interiority 
model of emotion) or as a stable matrix for feelings (the impression/ 
expression model of emotion), but that absolute fear retroactively pro-
duces the body as trembling, precarious, and ecstatic matter. The servant 
has a body because he is afraid.
The trembling body is the actualization of absolute fear. As a trem-
bling body, absolute fear is therefore not confi ned to interiority—it does 
not “remain inward and mute”—but is an experience in the full sense, 
in and for itself (§ 196). Trembling combines externalizing and inward-
izing (erinnern), affi rming and negating in a movement of self- refl ection. 
This self- refl ection does not need consciousness to take place. In fact, the 
fi gures of consciousness in the Phenomenology cannot quite claim absolute 
fear because they are still new to the speculative thinking of bodily expe-
rience. The structure of experience is paradoxical and highly precarious 
because it requires bodily involvement in order to produce the body by 
negating it. All this happens in the fl ash of an instant: the body needs 
to be engaged in order to be produced, and only in its negation will the 
body have been affi rmed. The body is at the same time the subject and 
the object of its production. What is to come requires for its advent that 
it be already there. So how can it ever arrive? It is impossible—at least 
within a logic of non- contradiction. And so we might begin to under-
stand why, for a consciousness that works with a relatively simple logic, 
absolute fear is so diffi cult to experience. Consciousness is utterly unpre-
pared for the bodily thinking of speculative transports.
We have observed the rejection of embodiment in the fi gure of the 
master, who projects his bodily being onto the servant. The servant tim-
idly misunderstands the lessons of the struggle for life and death, and of 
the fashioning of things. While he grasps the importance of saving his 
life, he misunderstands what life is, namely movement and interdepen-
dence. While he is attached to natural existence, he fails to understand 
that his body is not a simple given, but a speculative, self- refl ecting sub-
ject. We have witnessed the anticipatory refusal of fear bound up with 
the rejection of the body in the fi rst three chapters of the Phenomenology, 
where materiality was exclusively assigned to the realm of objectivity. We 
will now continue to see the protagonists’ dismissal of bodily life when 
we discuss some of the confi gurations of consciousness after the dialectic 
of mastery and servitude.
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Retroaction
In the further development of the Phenomenology, consciousness stub-
bornly clings to an idea of the self as constant and autonomous, or Stoic.19 
But consciousness cannot escape from its precarious body or from the 
trembling movement of fear. Even fear in its negative form, as the fearful 
fl ight from fear, produces the body as the focus of consciousness’s, albeit 
negative, attention.20 The unhappy consciousness—the protagonist of 
the next chapter after mastery and servitude—tries to detach from the 
body and to rise to the metaphysical sphere of “the unchangeable.” But 
its fl ight from the body brings the body all the more into focus. The un-
happy consciousness’s obsession with its body, when it is “brooding” over 
its “animal functions,” is rooted in its inability to experience absolute fear 
and to understand the logic of fear (§ 225). Because consciousness still 
thinks in abstract terms, because it still values the unchangeable instead 
of the absolute movement of speculative negation, it remains unhappily 
bound to its physical existence rather than taking pleasure in absolute 
fear. Inadvertently, the unhappy consciousness performs one speculative 
negation, that is to say, one bodily negation of the body, after the other. 
Yet, according to its timorously abstract logic, these negations don’t count 
precisely because they preserve the body in its negation.21
The link between freedom and fear, which we have seen in our 
analysis of the dialectic of mastery and servitude, resurfaces when He-
gel discusses the kind of spirit that drove the French Revolution.22 It is a 
spirit that acknowledges negativity and absolute fl uidity as the essence of 
freedom, but excludes any positive stance from its highly abstract notion 
of freedom. That is why this freedom spreads terror rather than enabling 
the experience of absolute fear. In a continuous revolutionary upheaval, 
which is an attack on fi xed differences among subjects and on the value 
of unchangeability in general, the spirit of absolute freedom abolishes 
anything that tries to establish lasting existence. It cuts off the breath 
of any self- will. Misconceiving still the meaning of absolute negativity, 
it performs abstract negations or killings en masse. In this purely nega-
tive action, this “fury of disappearing” (Furie des Verschwindens) which it 
calls “absolute freedom,” it remains cold and dry (§ 589). As a “simple, 
unbending cold universality,” it performs an “arid destruction” (trocknen 
Vertilgen, § 590/ § 591). And as the “discrete, absolute and hard, unac-
commodating and obstinate isolation [eigensinnige Punktualität] of actual 
self- consciousness,” it refuses fear (§ 590). The attempt to actualize abso-
lute freedom is, thus, in the last analysis, still directed against the body. 
The body is here still understood as inert matter, or “abstract existence as 
such,” and not as a self- negating, moving, or trembling body (ibid.).
165
T R E M B L E
The consciousness of this revolutionary world has fi nally affi rmed 
and realized what the consciousness of perception was so afraid of: the 
entanglement of subject and object. Yet the revolutionary conscious-
ness both overshoots and undershoots the goal of acknowledging en-
tanglement when it wants to see absolutely no difference between sub-
ject and object. As “pure insightfulness” (reines Einsehen, § 583), this shape 
of consciousness fi gures a penetrating gaze that knows neither interfer-
ence nor limit. “This movement is thereby the interplay of conscious-
ness with itself in which it lets nothing break loose so that it would come 
to be a free- standing object confronting it” (§ 588). Far from implying 
sympathy across difference, “insight” here means the direct “gazing of 
the self into the self” without the interference of any positive, meaning-
ful, or objective difference (§ 583). The entanglement of “subject” and 
“object” has thus been reduced to a doubling of the same. In the mania 
of its “absolutely seeing- itself- as-doubled” (das absolute sich selbst doppelt 
Sehen, ibid.), the self gazes into the self and death stares back at it.
This sudden encounter with death is the terror of absolute free-
dom, its Schrecken, or fright. But I would not consider this sudden fright 
as an experience of absolute fear. All trembling is excluded from the 
terror of massive, uniform death: it is “the coldest, emptiest death of all” 
(§ 590). “The individuality of the universal will,” by negating all inner dif-
ference, is reduced to the “banality of one syllable [Plattheit dieser Silbe]”: 
death (Tod) (§ 591, trans. modifi ed). The monosyllable remains mute 
because the fl atness of its self- identity provides no volume—no interval 
for the song of death to resonate, and no leeway for the spiritualized 
body to tremble.23 Instead of lingering with the negative, and trembling 
in fear, consciousness starts up in terror, turns around, and runs back to 
an earlier form of its life—or leaps “into another land” (§ 595).
The protagonist is still running when it becomes the Phenomenology’s 
fi nal fi gure of consciousness, the beautiful soul, who despite or, rather, 
because of its “completely transparent” knowledge of itself, continues to 
live on the run, in suspicion, and in fear of absolute fear (§ 658):
It lives with the anxiety that it will stain the glory of its inwardness by 
means of action and existence. Thus, to preserve the purity of its heart, 
it fl ees from contact with actuality, and it steadfastly perseveres in its 
obstinate powerlessness to renounce its own self, . . . to transform its 
thought into being and to entrust itself [sich anzuvertrauen] to absolute 
difference. (§ 658, trans. modifi ed, my emphasis)
The beautiful soul—the last fi gure of consciousness and the pin-
nacle of self- knowledge and sensibility before “absolute knowledge”—
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still exhibits the characteristic reluctance of the individual to abandon 
itself and to acknowledge the entanglement of thought and being, sub-
ject and object, and life and death, which the experience of absolute 
fear affords.24
There is thus no evidence in the Phenomenology that consciousness 
ever experiences absolute fear, or that the experience of absolute fear 
is even possible. Because consciousness is an abstraction, absolute fear 
simply destroys it.25 As mere consciousnesses, the protagonists of the Phe-
nomenology don’t enjoy the elasticity to stand absolute fear.
So far, we have established that the fear of absolute fear at the same 
time impedes and facilitates consciousness’s movement toward absolute 
knowing. By repeatedly averting the realization of absolute change, con-
sciousness draws its path. In the next section of this chapter, I will discuss 
how this path—which twists and turns—performs precisely the move-
ment of change and interdependence that consciousness is afraid of. In 
its turning back and forth—away from and toward fear—the text actual-
izes the oscillating movement, the absolute trembling of absolute fear. 
No single fi gure of consciousness experiences absolute fear, but in their 
arrangement or in their syntax the various fi gures of consciousness in the 
Phenomenology together realize fear’s trembling motion.
I have argued that the development of the Phenomenology is driven 
by absolute fear, without that fear ever being experienced by any single 
consciousness. I will argue in the next part of this chapter that absolute 
fear occurs in between fi gures of consciousness, in the blanks between 
the chapters. If the experience of absolute fear is not possible for con-
sciousness, it might be possible before consciousness, or after. It might 
be possible during the syncopes of consciousness, between consciousness 
and consciousness, during the impossible transition from one shape of 
consciousness to another.
In the following, I want to read the silences between the chapters 
of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit without fi lling them in and thereby los-
ing them. Resisting the desire to explain how these chapters form a co-
herent line, I will interpret the leaps from one fi gure of consciousness 
to the next. The leap opens a space of negativity between the positive 
shapes of consciousness. This is the space of “absolute fear,” an interval 
of trembling. The Phenomenology asks us to allow for the trembles of fear, 
to explore it, to fi nd its joy, and its promise of freedom. In keeping with 
this demand, I propose a reading of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit in dia-
logue with Cixous’ L’ange au secret. Cixous writes:
And a child remembers the fear before being born, being born losing, 
before gaining in losing.
 But nobody there to tell the passion of birth, the expulsion and the 
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joy, at the same time, the sudden fall and then the slow resurrection. 
Nobody there to tell the fairy tale. Not me either: the instant is too 
fragile to take into my hand. Yet behind my memory from before I knew 
how to speak I feel a very fi rst instant glimmering, a trembling of fear. 
(Cixous 1991, 15)
My reading between Hegel and Cixous will attend to the birth of any 
new consciousness as a transport that trembles back and forth between 
where I am and where I am not, or between where I am and where I am 
dif ferently.
Blank in Transition
In an essay on the chapter “Absolute Freedom and Terror,” a frustrated 
reader of the Phenomenology notes that “transitions are not the Phenom-
enology’s strong point.”26 This statement strikes me as a very accurate re-
enactment (not description) of the Phenomenology’s mode of operation. 
The critic implies that the transitions from one chapter to the next, or 
from one dialectic to the next, are not worth looking at because they 
don’t make any sense. Exasperated, he turns away, and thereby imitates 
the attitude he accuses Hegel of, that is, of not being “strong,” not being 
in control, not being present to clarify what happens.
The fact that Hegel’s text does not satisfy the reader’s desire for 
logical and narrative continuity is precisely its strength. Despite expecta-
tions to the contrary, the Phenomenology does not offer a continuous ex-
position and does not provide coherent logical derivations of each shape 
of consciousness out of the preceding one. As a result of these gaps or 
leaps in progression, it appears that the Phenomenology does not have one 
protagonist who develops to ever greater self- awareness, but many pro-
tagonists. This does not mean that the many fi gures of consciousness and 
spirit are unrelated, but (a) that their sequential relation is tenuous, and 
(b) that they form connections other than linear.
The movement between chapters differs from the movement within 
chapters. Every particular fi gure of consciousness—from sense certainty 
to the beautiful soul—follows its path according to a particular logic. 
Within this logic, one moment engenders the next. Just like the critic—
whose statement “transitions are not the Phenomenology’s strong point” 
speaks of a wish for an unambiguous logic, for a continuous line as a 
railing to hold onto—consciousness needs to have a sense of where it 
is going: forward, of course; and the reader is happy to accompany the 
protagonist as long as she feels that she is taking a step up on the ladder 
168
E M O T I O N A L  S Y N T A X
toward absolute knowledge. Consciousness sets out with certainty and 
goes straight ahead to interpret the world or to create reality according 
to what it holds to be true. Yet, on its path of allegedly straightforward 
progress, consciousness has to twist and turn in order to keep hold of its 
certainty.27 It does so eagerly, because it is absolutely defi ned by the par-
ticular “essence” or value or truth criterion of its certainty. To let go of 
what it holds to be true would mean to abandon its raison d’être.28
Over the course of many chapters it becomes clear that pure af-
fi rmation is impossible, that every affi rmation is riddled with negation, 
that every actualizing of something held to be true also means abandon-
ing that truth. Yet, for consciousness, because it is an abstraction lacking 
the elasticity of the full concept, such self- dispossession is impossible. 
What seemed to be a ladder to climb the heights of reason comes to lie 
crosswise in front of consciousness barring its way. No matter how often 
it turns, consciousness will always come up against the bars of its limited 
logic. They make up all sides of the cage in which each fi gure of con-
sciousness circles while convincing itself of its own progress. To actually 
realize what it holds to be true would mean to put itself out there, would 
mean to cross the bar. Consciousness would have to go beyond the realm 
of its control. Suddenly it will be unclear what the next step could be. 
The future cannot be deduced; it can only be leaped or fallen into. As 
Lispector puts it in Stream of Life (1989)—a text Cixous is in dialogue 
with when she writes L’ange au secret: “I’m still afraid to depart from logic 
because I fall . . . into the future.”29
Is consciousness alive? Does it feel absolute fear? “By the stiffness 
of my neck and of my members, and at the shock of my heart against 
the bars [barreaux], I can tell that it is fear” (Cixous 1991, 28). The pro-
tagonist hardens. If it paid attention, it could infer from the tension in 
its body and the paralysis of its mind that it must be afraid. But does it 
tremble? Is consciousness present during the transition? Does it experi-
ence absolute fear?
The interval of trembling, the moment when consciousness oscil-
lates between two shapes or fi gures of itself, is a space of freedom. When 
the body is permeable to and the consciousness is open for the other, 
when the other shudders through the “I,” speculative thought becomes 
reality. But consciousness doesn’t quite understand speculative logic. The 
wind of fear “rattles until it falls” (secoue jusqu’à tomber, Cixous 1991, 9)—
until the bar falls, until consciousness falls, until the wind falls.
Consciousness falls and faints. It loses consciousness so as not to 
witness its own dissolution. “ ‘I fall’ we say. Watch out! says Clarice breath-
lessly, I will die. It’s the truth. We die. Sometimes a day, it can go up 
to four. Then she comes back. ‘I’m back’ she says to us. Without quite 
knowing yet who this I is” (Cixous 1991, 73). Consciousness turns and 
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goes blank, the text with it, until it comes round on the other side of the 
transition as a new shape of consciousness. The new shape of conscious-
ness opens its eyes not knowing what happened to it. “Ah if I only knew 
the score by heart, I would sing of fear” (Cixous 1991, 30). It doesn’t 
know fear, not by heart. Its heart doesn’t know it. It hasn’t experienced 
it. It doesn’t remember feeling its joy. Consciousness is always already the 
result of a transition; the transition has passed through it and has forgot-
ten the liberating negativity of fear.
Transitions are moments of absolute fear. They are moments of 
death and of birth. They are frightful because there is no rule to go by. 
The railing, the ladder, the bars, everything that gives stability and secu-
rity begins to tremble. “All that was fi xed within it had been shaken loose” 
(§ 194). Absolute fear jeopardizes consciousness’s entire being: “every 
fi ber” of its body trembles; every certainty, every rung of the ladder con-
sciousness sets its foot on, every sash bar that organizes its vision is seized 
by the wind of freedom (ibid.). “The free wind, the young one is getting 
to the bars [barreaux] and rattles” (Cixous 1991, 9).
As “this way in which all durable existence becomes absolutely 
fl uid,” absolute fear disappears as soon as it is thematized (§ 194). “The 
instant is too fragile to take into my hand” (Cixous 1991, 15).30 Absolute 
fear is a moment of absolute negativity that can only be accounted for 
performatively. Spirit cannot grasp the transition from one fi gure of con-
sciousness to the next; it goes through it. The wind blows through spirit, 
and consciousness goes blank. “Nobody there to tell the fairy tale.” “No-
body there to tell the passion of birth” (Cixous 1991, 15). Fear escapes 
the narration of the Phenomenology.
Out of politeness, one might try to attenuate the rupture: “I think 
that now I’ll have to ask for permission to die a little. Excuse me, will you? 
I won’t be long. Thanks” (Lispector 1989, 53). But then one will have 
lost not only the experience of absolute fear, but also its negative pres-
ence as an unexpected break in expository coherence: “No. I couldn’t 
die” (ibid.). It requires some strength to simply break with the demand 
for coherence:
 I’m going now.
 I’m back. Now I’ll try to catch up again with what happens to me in 
the moment—and that way I’ll create myself. (Lispector 1989, 69)
Transitions are in fact the Phenomenology’s strong point because they 
are the points where spirit shows that its movement is not a continuous 
progression. Consciousness dies and is reborn in a different incarnation, 
a different “Gestalt.” The chapter transitions of the Phenomenology—albeit 
much wordier than Lispector’s economic and elegant meditations on 
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transport—enact the same break, the same death within life that she pre-
sents us with. The last few lines of the chapter on “absolute freedom and 
terror” offer an exemplary illustration of this (non-)transition: “Absolute 
freedom passes over [geht über] from its self- destroying actuality into an-
other land of self- conscious spirit. . . . What has emerged is a new shape, 
that of the moral spirit” (§ 595). The so-called transition is effected as a 
leap across the border from revolutionary France to German moral phi-
losophy à la Kant. Having led one shape of consciousness to the reali-
zation of its own destructiveness and destruction, the narrative turns away 
from it, leaves it to its own (ineffective, we know) devices, and turns to a 
new fi gure of consciousness. Rather than leading us, step by step, through 
a transition, Hegel presents us with a past event: “What has emerged is a 
new shape, that of the moral spirit.” The old shape of consciousness has 
passed on, the exact moment of the emergence of the new one has passed 
us by, and the protagonists are certainly not more actively engaged than 
we are in their death and birth. After a typographical blank space between 
the chapters, a newborn consciousness begins to slowly create itself. The 
next chapter (on morality) will meticulously describe this new fi gure’s 
development; consciousness will catch up with what happens to it in the 
moment.
Again somewhat heavier than Lispector’s lithe narration in the fi rst 
person, Hegel regularly (at times explicitly, at others implicitly) interpo-
lates a “we,” the fi rst- person plural of the phenomenologist, around the 
moments of transport. It might be Hegel’s (somewhat awkward) way of 
being polite when he makes a bit of a fuss inserting explanations and 
excuses, anticipation and retrospection from the perspective of the phe-
nomenologist/ s right before and right after the break between chapters. 
Here is the end of the chapter on the understanding:
In the inner division [innern Unterschiede], infi nity indeed becomes itself 
the object of the understanding, but once again the understanding fails 
to notice it as such. . . . What is an object in sensuous covering for the 
understanding is now there for us in its essential shape as the pure 
concept. This apprehending of division [Unterschied] as it is in truth, that 
is, the apprehending of infi nity as such, exists for us, that is, in itself. . . . 
However, consciousness as it immediately possesses this concept once 
again comes on the scene as its own form or as a new shape of con-
sciousness that does not take cognizance of its essence in what has gone 
before but instead regards it as something completely other [etwas ganz 
anderes]. (§ 164, trans. modifi ed)
The phenomenologist steps in to explain not so much how we get from 
one fi gure of consciousness to the next, but why there is no apparent 
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connection between the two: each consciousness has a strong sense of 
its own individuality and considers its previous shape to be “something 
completely other.”
After the transition from the fi gure of the unhappy consciousness 
to that of reason, the phenomenologist observes the same more or less 
active forgetting in consciousness: “Since self- consciousness is reason, 
what had so far been its negative relation to otherness is now converted 
[schlägt um] into a positive relation” (§ 232). It took one fi nal twist and 
suddenly all the pain of the previous fi gure’s attempts to negate and es-
cape worldly existence is forgotten and reason is happy to embrace the 
world.
The phenomenologist lends support to each consciousness’s sense 
of substance and separate individuality when he indicates that the old 
shape of consciousness does not transform into the new one, but con-
tinues to exist the same way it had before, even after the exposition has 
turned its attention away from this fi gure. Here the end of the dialectic 
of the unhappy consciousness:
For on the one hand, surrendering one’s own will is merely negative 
in terms of its concept, that is, in itself¸ but at the same time it is positive, 
specifi cally, it is the positing of the will . . . as universal, not as the will 
of an individual. . . . Hence, for consciousness, its will becomes universal 
will, a will existing in itself, although in its own eyes, it itself is not this 
will in- itself. . . . However, for the consciousness itself, activity continues, and 
its actual activity remains impoverished. Its enjoyment in consumption 
remains sorrowful, and the sublation of these in any positive sense con-
tinues to be postponed to an otherworldly beyond. (§ 230)
The unhappy consciousness remains unhappy. But that does not concern 
“us” anymore, since “within this object, the representational thought [Vor -
stellung] of reason has . . . come to be,” and this is what interests “us” now 
(§ 230). Hegel’s Phenomenology does not tell the story of one protagonist 
who consistently grows and continuously progresses toward absolute 
knowledge. It follows many protagonists observing each one faithfully 
until a new fi gure has “emerged,” one knows not exactly how (§ 595).
Our Own Epoch
In addition to the performed transitions, that is, in addition to the blanks 
or the positive nothings between the chapters, Hegel offers two paradig-
matic descriptions of transports. One of them can be found in the preface 
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to the Phenomenology. On one hand, the preface is a methodological piece, 
which allows us to assume that what Hegel says there about the logic of 
transport is valid also for the transports in the text itself. On the other 
hand, Hegel explicitly refuses the notion of method; he refuses to offer 
us the railing that allows us to look down at the text without falling into 
it. Therefore, he gives no general theory of transport in the preface but 
simply an example. Or rather, the example: the transport we ideally expe-
rience as readers: “it is not diffi cult to see that our own epoch is a time of 
birth and a transition to a new period” (§ 11). What Hegel calls here “our 
own epoch” is not the historical time in which he lived. It should have be-
come clear by now that transports do not take place within historical time; 
they are—or make up—the interstices in and between historical times.31 
“Our own epoch” is the textual time of the Phenomenology—that is, accord-
ing to Hegel’s system, the time of transition from historical time to the 
infi nite (and, as we will see, itself interstitial) time of Hegel’s philosophical 
science: the time it takes to transport the reader from one into the other:
Besides, it is not diffi cult to see that our own epoch is a time of birth 
and a transition to a new period. Spirit has broken with the previous 
world of its existence and its ways of thinking; it is in the process of 
submerging them in the past [in die Vergangenheit hinab zu versenken] and 
working on its own transformation. To be sure, spirit is never at rest but 
rather always moving forward [immer in fortschreitender Bewegung]. How-
ever, just as with a child, who after a long silent period of nourishment 
draws his fi rst breath and breaks with the gradualness of merely quan-
titative growth [nur vermehrenden Fortgang]—a qualitative leap—and as 
now the child is born so too, in bringing itself to cultural maturity, spirit 
ripens slowly and quietly into its new shape, dissolving bit by bit the 
structure of its previous world . . . This gradual crumbling [Zerbröckeln], 
which left unaltered the physiognomy of the whole, is interrupted by 
the ascent [Aufgang], which, a fl ash [ein Blitz], puts forth all at once the 
structure of the new world.
 Yet this newness is no more completely actual than is the new-
born child, . . . so little is the reached concept of the whole the whole 
itself. . . . The actuality of this simple whole consists in those shapes 
which, having become moments of the whole, once again develop 
themselves anew and give themselves a shape, but this time within their 
new element, within the new meaning which itself has come to be. 
(§ 11– 12, trans. modifi ed)
Spirit is “never at rest,” always growing and crumbling at the same time. 
Its transformations nevertheless leave “unaltered the physiognomy of the 
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whole.” Spirit moves without realizing it—or it realizes that it moves with-
out showing it. It is moved but remains motionless, like a king in a sedan 
chair or a statue on a dolly. Spirit saves face and denies change until it 
breaks down. In this breakdown, a new world immediately replaces the 
old one. We leap from one world to the next. The interval of negativity 
or of trembling fails to become part of our experience; the time of in-
fi nity is reduced to virtually nothing. Transport appears as a fl ash or as 
lightning (Blitz).
The lightning destroys the old world and illuminates the new one. 
In the fl ash of an insight, we have been transported from a long and pain-
ful history of misrecognitions into the new reality of speculative science. 
The birth of speculative science should mean the end of history. Yet, sur-
prisingly, Hegel insists here on a continuity between historical time and 
the non- linear time of speculative science. Just like the many fi gures of 
consciousness within the book, “we,” the readers of the Phenomenology—
even after we have grasped the logic of the infi nite and leapt into the 
realm of the speculative—need to labor at giving spirit actuality and to 
“once again develop [its moments] anew and give them . . . a shape.” 
Hegel insists that the labor of the concept is continuous and progressive, 
that “spirit is never at rest but rather always moving forward.” Just like 
spirit, we can be “never at rest.” And with this admonishment, Hegel has 
covered over the space of the blank, the lighthearted time of the leap, 
the rupture of the fl ash.
Hegel, who, as phenomenologist, shows the strength to frustrate 
the desire for continuity and to present transitions as leaps, succumbs to 
this desire in the moment when he thematizes the transition he himself 
undergoes when writing the Phenomenology: the transition from historical 
time to the non- historical time of speculative science. The dismissive “be-
sides” and the boastful “it is not diffi cult to see” that introduce the pas-
sage are symptoms of his denial of fear. Refusing to show the strength to 
lose control together with his subject, Hegel remains a distant observer 
who claims to know better than to tremble with “our own epoch.”
The Phenomenology keeps a record of what happens “behind the back 
of consciousness” (§ 87). It records the unconscious or unregistered ex-
periences of the protagonists, and it archives the fi gures that the progres-
sive development of the exposition leaves behind. The Phenomenology, as 
a text, functions as the archive or the “memory [that] still preserves the 
dead mode of spirit’s previous shape as a passed history” (§ 545). As such, 
it is fundamentally torn within. On the one hand, this archive satisfi es 
Hegel’s anxious demand for continuous labor; on the other hand and 
by the same token it spoils his desire for the leap to the end of history 
and into a new, speculative world.32 Despite Hegel’s timorous reserve, the 
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text syntactically (not thematically) cultivates the trembling movement of 
absolute fear that neither its authors nor its protagonists endure.33 The 
Phenomenology as a text thus offers neither the (impossible) linear, contin-
uous, and causal development from history to the end of history, nor the 
leap into the speculative via the erasure of the non- speculative. Rather, 
the text gives us to read a trembling- back- and- forth between the fi nite 
and the infi nite, between the speculative and the non- speculative.
By insisting in the preface on his authority and superior knowl-
edge, Hegel lends weight to a linear reading of the text. By describing 
the movement as a progression, he favors the next “higher” form of con-
sciousness over the previous one. And by stressing that spirit’s movement 
is continuous, he encourages the sense that the Phenomenology has only 
one protagonist and that the differences between the Gestalten indicate 
a development or growth of consciousness rather than an interaction 
between different consciousnesses. But in order to register the trembling 
of absolute fear, the different fi gures of consciousness in the Phenomenol-
ogy need to be read neither as one consciousness in a linear develop-
ment, nor as many strictly separate consciousnesses, but as a multiplicity 
of consciousnesses that are neither completely different nor strictly the 
same, that move through each other without collapsing into one, and 
that send each other into ecstasies.34
Hegel’s weakness is to pretend that there is nothing to fear because 
Spirit always progresses. Thus, we need to modify the critic’s remark: 
meta- discourse about transitions is not the Phenomenology’s strong point. 
Evidently, the phenomenologist (a narrative persona that includes the 
reader function) shows more strength than the author. Despite his strong 
overall argument for self- abandon and exposure, the preface to the Phe-
nomenology shows that Hegel is afraid to abandon authority. We can take 
a breath: Hegel is no Übermensch, no absolute master of the speculative. 
Just like his protagonists, he avoids absolute fear.
Of course, Hegel’s reserve in the preface will not prevent absolute 
fear from rising. According to his own account, saving face is an integral 
part of “the work [of self- ] transformation” (§ 11). Avoiding the transition 
“to the other side of life,” from where “the other side of me is calling,” 
I “try to distract myself from [the] fear” that seizes us with a “pervading 
infection” (Lispector 1989, 12, 13; Hegel, § 545). Eventually, you cannot 
resist the onslaught any longer.35 Suddenly your body jerks: you almost 
fall asleep; you almost fall into the future of speculative thought, but at 
the last moment you fl inch and yank yourself back: “in the nightmare I fi -
nally in a sudden convulsion fall prostrate back onto this side” (Lispector 
1989, 13). You wake up “some fi ne morning”: “safe” (Hegel, § 545; Lispec-
tor 1989, 13). The lightning didn’t strike, the scene is “bloodless,” yet 
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spirit crossed a line (§ 545). In a “sudden fall,” he slipped through the 
bars, and the “kadump!” with which he hits the ground again jerks him 
out of his reverie (Cixous 1991, 15; Hegel, § 545). He will have been “on 
the other side of life,” but any consciousness—and here Hegel is not dif-
ferent from his protagonists—considers where it is to be “this side,” the 
Diesseits, or “this life” (Lispector 1989, 12). “Consciousness as such has 
never slept”; it has always been engaged in a continuous movement and 
does not conceive of its side as the other side (Nancy 1993, 16). While 
the nightmare of speculative thinking thus remains a well- kept secret, 
consciousness starts anew to set itself out as if nothing happened. It “has 
in this way painlessly shed merely its withered skin”:
Rather, now that it is an invisible and undetected spirit, [pure in-
sight] thoroughly infi ltrates [durchschleicht] all the nobler parts, and 
it has soon taken complete hold over all the fi bers and members of 
the  unaware idol. At that point, “some fi ne morning it gives its comrade 
a shove with the elbow, and thump! kadump! the idol is lying on the 
fl oor.” —Some fi ne morning, the noon of which is bloodless if the infec-
tion has permeated every organ of spiritual life. Memory alone then 
still preserves the dead mode of spirit’s previous shape as a passed 
 history (passed one knows not how exactly), and the new serpent of 
 wisdom,  elevated for adoration, has in this way painlessly shed merely 
its withered skin. (§ 545, trans. modifi ed)
This is the second exemplary description of a transition that I want 
to consider. It is located in the body of the text, not between chapters, 
but within the chapter on the enlightenment. While specifi cally describ-
ing consciousness’s transformation from believer to enlightened subject, 
it also functions as an exemplary description of transitions in general and 
refl ects on the Phenomenology as transition.
The account is torn between the perspective of the consciousness 
after the transition and that of the consciousness before the transition. 
From the perspective of the enlightened consciousness, the transition 
is painless. It didn’t feel a thing. Consciousness wakes up to its new life 
without knowing what happened and, what is more, without knowing 
that it was indeed asleep or blacked- out. Emerging as a so-called enlight-
ened and, thus, supposedly free consciousness, it did not experience 
absolute fear. Spirit’s “work on its own transformation” (§ 11)—that is, 
the spreading of “pure insight” in the mind of the naively faithful con-
sciousness—is identifi ed as an unconscious work, a “pervading infection 
[that] is not noticeable beforehand” but “thoroughly infi ltrates all the 
nobler parts” (§ 545).
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Already in the dialectic of master and servant, the labor of fear was 
described as an infection. There we read that if consciousness “could 
not stand absolute fear . . . his substance will not have been infected [an-
gesteckt] all the way through” by negativity (§ 196). Absolute fear produces 
self- consciousness by infecting substance with negativity. It performs its 
work quietly; we read in the above- quoted passage that insight “fl ows 
into” the believer and hollows out the idol.36 This “way in which all du-
rable existence becomes absolutely fl uid” leaves “unaltered the physiog-
nomy” of consciousness (§ 194; § 11). The change goes unnoticed until 
pure insight pushes the king from his sedan chair, and with a bang, it 
becomes apparent that the old shape of consciousness is already dead, 
and that the new one has already taken its place. The transition again 
happens in a trice; while in the passage from the preface it appears as a 
fl ash or lightning, here it is a sudden noise, a bang or thunder.
Again, the protagonist does not experience absolute fear. But some-
where the secret is kept. A trace of fear, a memory from before remains 
in the body after the leap: “And a child remembers the fear before being 
born” (Cixous 1991, 15). The young consciousness, “the newborn child” 
begins to tremble after the fact (§ 12). “It is only when the infection has 
become widespread that it is for consciousness” (§ 545). Then it fl inches 
and yanks itself around, defends itself and struggles against its dissolu-
tion. Retroactively, consciousness fi ghts against a fear it has never quite 
felt. In this struggle, which in our last example takes the form of a dis-
pute between enlightenment and faith, the consciousness after the tran-
sition reenacts the consciousness before the transition. For itself, the 
enlightened consciousness is pure insight and pure intention, and its 
struggle “is directed against the impure intentions and perverse insights” 
of priests and believers (§ 537, trans. modifi ed). But, in its fi ght against 
absolute fear, “pure insight . . . becomes the negative of pure insight; it 
becomes untruth and unreason, and as intention it becomes the negative 
of pure intention and grows into lies and dishonesty about its purpose” 
(§ 547).37 The old idol, victim of an infection, comes back to haunt the 
new enlightened consciousness. Pure insight is infected with belief: it 
has faith in reason. So it indeed “fall[s] prostrate back onto this side,” 
the side of the believer (Lispector 1989, 13). And the “noisy ruckus” of 
both fi gures’ “violent struggle” echoes the wild roars of an even earlier 
fi gure of consciousness: the spiritual kingdom of animals and its decep-
tion (§ 546).38
Led by fear of absolute fear, we like to construe a fi rm separation 
between one life and another. That is why we tend to read the chapters 
of the Phenomenology separately. We pretend that each of these fi gures is 
stable and self- contained, and forget that they fi gure one another. One 
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shape of spirit inadvertently replicates previous shapes of spirit and so 
the textual life of spirit retroactively makes up the experience of trem-
bling it didn’t have before.39 The text keeps the secret. And that is why 
the newborn child, the new period of spirit can—if it is not too afraid 
of fear—rejoice in the replication of shapes across the lightning of the 
qualitative leap, and delight in hearing the echo through the thunder. 
The child might take pleasure in fright. Without a warning, the winds 
of fear and the shivers of birth rise again in its body. It does not avoid 
contact with the bars. Sitting on a climbing frame at the playground—
with one leg in front of birth and one leg behind it—the child rocks back 
and forth. “On the spot we rode them, secretly, and we enjoyed ourselves 
on their backs. . . . On bars we traveled before all travel” (Cixous 1991, 
9). Thus consciousness might remember the fear it has felt when it was 
someone other than it is now. The enlightened consciousness trembles, 
permeated by its previous shapes. “I’m still afraid. But my heart is beat-
ing. . . . You are a way of my being me, and I a way of you being you” 
(Lispector 1989, 54).
The memory and anticipation of one fi gure of consciousness in the 
other—as one fi gure shudders through the other—is the experience of 
absolute fear. The consciousness before the turn and the consciousness 
after the turn exchange shapes. The moments of impossible absolute 
fear function as turning points around which the movement of the Phe-
nomenology pivots, oscillating between before and after. Fear keeps the 
different shapes of consciousness apart, and mediates between them at 
the same time. The moment of synthesis in Hegel’s dialectic does not 
consist in the next higher form of consciousness, but precisely in this 
turning point, this blank, this fl ash of an instant that cannot be grasped 
because it is the concept itself that trembles and turns at this instant.40
If we linger a bit with the passing moment of reconciliation, we 
might, from this perspective, be able to register the trembles of the text 
that take place despite the author’s call for steady work. Even the pas-
sage from the preface is several times torn and trembles across its mul-
tiple tears. Chiefl y remarkable is the parenthesis “a fl ash” that completely 
interrupts the syntax of an otherwise well- organized sentence and thus 
performs the interruption that Hegel here thematizes: “This gradual 
crumbling, which left unaltered the physiognomy of the whole, is in-
terrupted by the ascent, which, a fl ash, puts forth all at once the struc-
ture of the new world” (§ 11). Then one notices that the description 
cuts across spirit in transition and the authorial perspective that keeps 
a distance from such transport. It oscillates between modeling a mo-
ment within the Phenomenology and describing the moment of the Phenom-
enology. It moves back and forth between identifying gradual growth and 
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gradual crumbling, or progress and dissolution. And fi nally one would be 
hard- pressed to precisely locate in time this account as it seems to shift 
with the transport it is describing. On the one hand, “spirit has broken 
with the previous world of its existence and its ways of thinking,” which 
implies that the transition took place already (ibid.). On the other hand, 
the transition is about to occur, and spirit “is about to submerge them in 
the past” (ibid.). Moving between before and after, trembling across the 
limit line, the passage lingers in transition. It turns out that this descrip-
tion of transport is divided between calling it a leap and describing it as 
a continuous development.
Let’s also look again at another one of the performative (not de-
scriptive) accounts of transport. So far, we said that the blanks between 
the chapters mark the interruption of continuity and negatively present 
the experience of absolute fear. In the following, I will argue that the 
text  trembles around these blanks. I want to consider again the transition 
from “Absolute Freedom and Terror” to “Spirit Certain of Itself: Moral-
ity.” I have already mentioned that “absolute freedom passes over from its 
self- destroying actuality” and jumps the border “into another land of self-
 conscious spirit, . . . that of the moral spirit” (§ 595). For a moment, the 
phenomenologist follows not the line of progression but that of regress; 
he notes that the jump might as well take the shape of a similarly abrupt 
movement in the other direction—a being hurled back:
In the way that it emerged from out of this tumult [of the revolution], 
spirit might have been hurled back to its starting- point, the ethical 
world and the real world of cultural maturation, which had only been 
refreshed and rejuvenated by the fear of the master, a fear which had 
once again entered into people’s hearts. (§ 594)
We know that history could not benefi t from the subjunctive Hegel em-
ploys here. A period of restoration did in fact follow the French Revo-
lution. Hegel alludes to that historical fact:
These individuals, who have felt the fear of their absolute master—
death—now once again acquiesce in negation and divisions, put them-
selves into the various orderings of the social spheres and return to a 
divided and limited work. However, as a result, they return back to their 
substantial actuality. (§ 593, trans. modifi ed)
In order to escape the terror of a meaningless death, society re-
turns to stratifi cation, discrimination, and servitude. As I have discussed 
in the fi rst part of this chapter, terror does not afford an experience of 
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absolute fear. It doesn’t teach consciousness the pleasures of a living fear, 
but merely reminds it of its fear of death. The result repeats the outcome 
of the struggle for life and death: consciousness accepts a limited but se-
cure position within a hierarchy.
But not only historically, also logically, spirit is bound to be thrown 
back to its starting point and to “run through this cycle of necessity all 
over again” (§ 594). The dialectic of absolute freedom and terror teaches 
a lesson in logic, namely that pure self- identity is impossible. When the 
universal will aspires to total self- identity and sets out to negate all dif-
ference within, it inadvertently negates itself. What is more, even death 
cheats the universal will out of the desired integrity: self- negation of-
fers no relief from self- difference since self- negation only evinces self-
 difference: “As the pure parity- with- itself of the universal will, absolute 
freedom thus has the negation in it, and in turn it thereby has the division 
as such in it, and it develops this once again as actual division” (§ 593). 
The “actual division” here takes the shape of spheres or classes and ap-
portioned tasks. Hegel makes it quite clear that the historical fact of a 
period of restoration following the revolution is only consistent with logi-
cal necessity.
In any case, the narrative development of Hegel’s Phenomenology 
does not take its orders from history but from speculative necessity. In-
deed, Hegel not only alludes here to historical events, but also refers to 
earlier chapters of the Phenomenology. “The ethical world and the real 
world of cultural maturation” to which “spirit might have been hurled 
back” (§ 594) refers to the preceding parts of the section on spirit: “True 
Spirit, Ethical Life” and “Spirit Alienated from Itself: Cultural Matura-
tion.” We are also, as I already indicated, thrown back even further, to the 
chapter on mastery and servitude with its preference for hierarchical yet 
stable relations over the uncertainty of mutual acknowledging. For the 
narrative of the Phenomenology, the only possibility to escape this eternal 
return is the leap into the next chapter.
The narrative trembles and turns on the meaninglessness of death. 
On one hand, the mass terror of senseless death throws the late con-
sciousness of absolute freedom back to the beginning and into an end-
less cycle of repetitions. On the other hand, this same acknowledging of 
the absolute meaninglessness of death projects consciousness into the 
next dialectic. The massive negation is so abstract that it offers no rec-
ompense: “the universal will can give nothing in return for the sacrifi ce” 
(§ 594).41 This means that no positive actuality can distract conscious-
ness from acknowledging that its own essence is absolute negativity: “this 
negation in its actuality is not alien,” but “is unmediated oneness with 
self- consciousness” (ibid.). With this acknowledgment, “the meaningless 
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death, the unfi lled negativity of the self, changes over suddenly into ab-
solute positivity” (ibid.). We have reached here the point where the ex-
tremes of pure negativity and pure positivity touch one another across 
infi nity and where we tremble back and forth from one to the other.
For a brief moment, the exposition reveals the pleasure in trembles 
that even the stern moral philosopher from Königsberg takes: “Spirit 
feasts [sich labt] on the thought of this truth” (§ 595, trans. modifi ed). 
The truth here is that freedom consists in the sudden “changing- over” 
(Umschlagen) of pure positivity (universal will) into pure negativity (ter-
ror) and back into pure positivity (forms of experience that are transpar-
ent to knowledge) (§ 594). Morality, the next fi gure of consciousness, 
will quickly forget the pleasure of the “pure universal movement, this 
way in which all durable existence becomes absolutely fl uid” (§ 194). 
But “we,” as readers of the Phenomenology, can stand (ausstehen) or linger 
with death by trembling back to earlier parts of the text and forth to the 
following exposition.
If we read the Phenomenology forward and backward starting from its 
moments of transition, our reading could perform the trembles of fear. 
It will be no easy task; it takes a long time to unfold one instant. “We’ll 
labor for months to copy the fl ash” (Cixous 1991, 70). Every fi gure of 
consciousness has to be read as permeated by many others. Every propo-
sition of this book has to be read backward and forward. The entire de-
velopment of the Phenomenology presents a meticulous actualization, and 
thereby multiplication, of one transport or instant of transition. The Phe-
nomenology not only cuts across time periods and fi gures of conscious-
ness, but, situated between history and philosophical science, it moves 
between time and non- time, or between linear time and the trembling of 
an infi nite present. The linearity of its development as a whole is there-
fore broken up by a to and fro of different times echoing in each other. 
In the Phenomenology, time shudders with interlacing rhythms. Different 
times strike against one another, oppose each other, rub against one an-
other, take each other’s place in a trembling rhythm with the text’s “heart 




It . . . has . . . the most painful feeling and the truest insight 
about itself—namely, the feeling of the dissolution of all of 
its self- assurances, the feeling that it has been rolled upon the 
wheel through all the stages of its existence and that every bone 
in its body has been broken.
—Phenomenology, § 538
The twentieth century has read the Phenomenology of Spirit as a coherent 
narrative of progress. It has commonly accepted that “the Phenomenology 
raises empirical consciousness to absolute knowledge” while understand-
ing this “raising” as an improvement and “absolute knowledge” as the 
fi nal mastery of truth (Hyppolite 1974, 39). Fink, for example, describes 
the itinerary of the Phenomenology as a straightforward movement with “a 
defi nite point of departure and a defi nite end. The point of departure is 
the ordinary conception of being, in which we lodge, as it were, in a blind 
and ignorant fashion. . . . The end of the path is for Hegel the insight 
that is attained into what being is, that is, the truth of being or absolute 
knowledge” (Fink 1977, 42, my translation). Solomon spells out the com-
mon assumption that this passage is a progression from darkness to light 
when he suggests that “the ‘root- metaphor’ of the entire Phenomenology [is 
development understood as] growth and education. Hegel several times 
uses the image of a growing tree or a growing child to illustrate his model 
of philosophy, but perhaps the dominant philosophical image is Plato’s 
metaphor of education, in which the philosopher leads the uneducated 
out of the shadows and into the light of truth” (Solomon 1983, 277).
The introduction to the Phenomenology, however, describes con-
sciousness’s path toward absolute knowledge as a “path of despair” (Weg 
der Verzweifl ung, § 78). Quite contrary to the optimistic interpretations of 
many of its readers, “this path has a negative meaning” for the protago-
nist of this narrative of Bildung (ibid.).1 The Phenomenology emphasizes 
repeatedly that the formation or Bildung of its protagonist means for 
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this model subject “the loss of itself” (ibid.). Entwined with such self- loss 
is the loss of truth: “for it is on this path that it loses its truth” (ibid.). 
Consciousness starts its journey of formation as a righteous subject with a 
clear idea of the world. Then, not once, but many times, again and again, 
it loses itself and is forced to abandon the certainty of its knowledge 
until consciousness, “through a complete experience of itself, achieve[s] 
a cognitive acquaintance of what it is in itself”: a consumed and shattered 
subject (§ 77).
The Phenomenology presents Bildung as a “path of despair,” that is, as 
a path of spiritual and physical ruin. I will discuss over the course of this 
chapter how the subject in despair consumes and dismembers itself; how 
it loses its head, how its heart breaks, how its spirit is crushed but restless, 
how it loses a leg, and how its every bone is broken so that it feels like rub-
ber. When we reach the part of the Phenomenology where consciousness 
begins to understand that it is not simply a natural given, but that it is the 
result of a long and ongoing path of formation—when we reach the self-
 alienated spirit of cultural maturation (Bildung)—the protagonist rather 
poignantly registers the despair of this journey: it has the “feeling that 
it has been rolled upon the wheel through all the stages of its existence 
and that every bone in its body has been broken” (durch alle Momente ihres 
Daseins hindurch gerädert und an allen Knochen zerschlagen zu sein, § 538, 
trans. modifi ed). At that moment, it must dawn on the reader as well as 
the protagonist that Bildung is torture.
Yet the despair of the Phenomenology remains strangely impalpable. 
After the brief but powerful mention of it in the introduction, despair 
barely ever becomes a topic again. The feeling of despair is largely cov-
ered over by the teleological thrust of the narrative. Žižek points out that 
while subjectivity, in Hegel’s sense of negativity, essentially creates self-
 disturbance, the stories we tell about the self have a stabilizing function. 
“The organization of the narrative history of ‘what I am,’ ” (or of what 
spirit is) designates “the formation of a new, culturally created homeo-
stasis which imposes itself as our ‘second nature’ ” (Žižek 2006, 210). It 
is thus not surprising that spirit’s autobiography—the bildungsroman of 
consciousness—creates a feeling of confi dence and trust in automatic 
growth rather than communicating a sense of despair. Consciousness 
does not have the face of despair: every time it is crushed, it picks itself 
up and cheerfully starts anew. The introduction to the Phenomenology an-
nounces that what follows will be a text of despair but, once the story 
begins, this proclamation seems forgotten.
Nevertheless, despair affects the entire organization of the Phenom-
enology. It plays a syncopating and performative, rather than a thematic 
role. This is why it is important to read the Phenomenology not only for its 
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narrative, but also for its theatrics and its rhythm. Attending to the sig-
nifi cance of despair for the textual structure of the Phenomenology, I will 
follow a threefold approach. First, I will examine two of Hegel’s rather 
curious and, in the traditional sense, non- philosophical mentions of de-
spair: despair (Verzweifl ung) as an etymological relative of doubt (Zweifel) 
and despair as an emotion of animals. Then I will discuss two examples 
of the breaking of a shape of consciousness: the judgment of phrenol-
ogy and the hard heart of the beautiful soul. These last two sections will 
be bracketed by two explorations of textual performances of despair: the 
(dis)organization of rational thought, and the (dis)organization of the 
Phenomenology’s narrative. Throughout, I will move beyond an exegesis of 
Hegel toward an account of despair that I hope will be useful for emo-
tion studies today. For this purpose, I will draw upon The Passion According 
to G.H. (1994), a novel by the Brazilian writer Clarice Lispector that de-
scribes an unexpected crisis in the life of an upper middle- class Brazilian 
woman: the encounter with a cockroach. An insignifi cant incident that is 
usually aborted by the quick killing of the cockroach takes greater, spiri-
tually transformative dimensions for this woman who, for no particular 
reason, opens herself to the experience of the encounter. Without call-
ing this experience by the name of despair, Lispector’s text offers a poetic 
phenomenology of despair’s (self-)shattering and  (self-) consuming 
 qualities. While called on the scene here to interrupt Hegel’s narrative, 
The Passion According to G.H. thus resonates across a productive distance 
with the Phenomenology of Spirit—not least because they both offer de-
Christianized, perhaps even parodistic, versions of the  Passion.2
Wordplay
In the introduction to the Phenomenology, Hegel links the two concep-
tually rather disparate terms Verzweifl ung (despair) and Zweifel  (doubt, 
skepticism). As is often the case with Hegel, his attention to the linguistic 
material determines the thrust of his conceptual operation here. Added 
to the root zweifel are the prefi x ver- (which can indicate the thorough ac-
complishment, but also the negation, of the action expressed in the verb 
it modifi es) and the suffi x -ung (English: “- ing,” which is regularly used 
to turn verbs into nouns, and which emphasizes the continuous aspect 
of the action expressed). Hegel uses the resulting word (ver- zweifl - ung) to 
pre sent despair as a thoroughgoing self- doubt or a “self- consummating 
skepticism” (sich vollbringende Skeptizismus, § 78). He thereby draws at-
tention to three characteristics that make him validate despair over 
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 skepticism. First, with the use of the refl exive pronoun “self,” Hegel af-
fi rms the self- refl exivity of despair. By contrast, he critiques the skeptic 
for directing his negativity solely toward the outside—that is, for being 
skeptical about everything except his own power to negate.3 Second, 
Hegel considers despair to be more genuine and more effective than 
doubt. When skepticism pretends to negate accepted opinions and prej-
udices, it ends up reinforcing them.4 Despair actually carries through 
what skepticism only claims to do. Finally, Hegel underscores the nature 
of despair as process: despite despair’s effectiveness, the gerund “self-
 consummating” (vollbringend) presents despair as an ongoing movement 
that does not come to completion. Despair forms the self as constitutively 
incomplete, as torn between self- affi rmation and self- negation without 
either one ever reaching its end.
As self- refl exive doubt or self- doubt, despair reveals that, while the 
essence of consciousness is negativity, this essence is only improperly 
called its nature. The self tends to want to claim a substantive essence 
for itself by protecting itself from its own negativity and employing its 
negativity solely against what is foreign to it. But consciousness cannot 
avoid becoming self- conscious. “To think does not mean to think as an 
abstract I, but as an I which at the same time signifi es being- in- itself [An-
sichsein], that is, it has the meaning of being as an object in its own eyes, 
or of conducting itself vis- à-vis the objective essence in such a way that its 
meaning is that of the being- for- itself of that consciousness for which it is” 
(§ 197). Thus, when consciousness negates the object, it cancels its own 
being- for- self as well. As soon as consciousness begins to genuinely think, 
it must realize that it truly is a self in despair.
In contrast to the genuine actuality and effectiveness of despair, 
Hegel describes doubt (Zweifel) as an incomplete despair (Verzweifl ung). 
Descartes’ skeptic philosophy asks consciousness to “advance but very 
little” because it is concerned about security, safety, and certainty (Des-
cartes 1979, II.5). Hegel’s Verzweifl ung, on the other hand, leaps without 
falling back onto the originally presumed truth. According to Hegel’s 
analysis, the skeptic’s ineffective frenzy to denounce the vanity of all exis-
tence is driven by a “fear of truth.” The skeptic masks this fear with a “fi ery 
enthusiasm for the truth [heiße Eifer für die Wahrheit]” and a general scorn 
for all appearance (§ 80).5 But in fact he even “hide(s) . . . behind the 
appearance” (sich . . . hinter dem Scheine verbergen, § 80, trans. modifi ed). 
He needs illusions in order to demonstrate his scorn for them. Once he 
has abolished all untruth, he fi nds himself deprived of shelter. The skep-
tic then is on the verge of the abyss, exposed to the emptiness all around 
him. He freezes in terror until he manages to forget his situation and can 
begin anew: “Skepticism which ends with the abstraction of nothingness 
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or emptiness cannot progress any further from this point but must in-
stead wait to see whether something new will come along and wait to see 
what it will be if indeed it is then to toss it too into the same empty abyss” 
(§ 79). Oblivious to his predicament, the skeptic performs an uncon-
scious version of self- negation: a self- negation that does not consummate 
genuine self- doubt, but takes the form of naive self- contradiction.6
Despair is an unending process. The subject in despair effectively 
negates itself and disarticulates the certainty of its own (positive or nega-
tive) opinions. Yet despair ruins the self without ever completely annihi-
lating it. The self in despair will always contradict even its own negation; 
it will multiply, fl y ahead of itself, and spoil the peace of its own death.7 
Mere negations are too simple for a hyperactive consciousness in despair. 
Despair does not lead into an abyss of nothingness because the desper-
ate is too obsessively attentive not to fi nd the trace of affi rmation within 
negation that turns the entire operation around:
This nothingness is determinately the nothingness of that from which it 
has resulted. . . . That nothingness is itself thereby determinate and thereby 
has a content. . . . When the result is grasped as determinate negation, that 
is, when it is grasped as it is in truth, then at that point a new form has 
immediately arisen. (§ 79, trans. modifi ed)
Consciousness “can fi nd no peace” (keine Ruhe fi nden, § 80). Be-
cause it refl ects upon itself, it is always beyond itself: “Consciousness . . . 
is . . . its concept, and as a result it immediately goes beyond the restric-
tion, and, since this restriction belongs to itself, it goes beyond itself too” 
(§ 80). Precisely because it grasps itself, the self will never grasp itself 
completely. Precisely because it negates itself, the self will never negate 
itself completely. It is always one step ahead of itself, and thereby one 
step behind. The subject can never catch up with itself. It doubles and 
therefore it doubts itself. It drives itself to despair. Torn within, it will 
never fall apart. There is a tension between its different sides that will 
always keep them from coinciding while always holding them together. 
“But as the self . . . [the ‘I’] is the absolute elasticity” (die absolute Elastizi-
tät, § 517): a rubber subject.8
Consciousness moves by the elasticity of its rubber nature. Despair-
ing, consciousness ruins its current existence, but this self- loss never 
keeps it down for long. It always bounces back. It neither stands nor falls: 
it does both at the same time. Like a Weeble, consciousness wobbles, but 
it doesn’t fall down.9 Even though it feels heavy with despair, it always 
fl ips up again. This is not its own freely exercised decision. Conscious-
ness simply does not have the choice to fi nd peace on the ground. While 
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it keeps its head up high, it is ruled by its butt. And even though its butt 
is heavy, it touches the ground only ever so slightly, causing the head to 
always fl ip up again, without a purpose. Consciousness keeps staggering 
and bouncing back until, almost by accident, it realizes that it cannot 
stop. This does not mean that it has reached its goal. Despair is unending 
in the active sense; it undoes the internal teleology that some readers em-
phasize in the Phenomenology. When the protagonist realizes that it cannot 
stand still, all it has understood is that self- negation and being beside it-
self (Außersichsein) are part of what it is; they belong to its denaturalizing 
nature. On the path of despair, the protagonist “achieve[s] a cognitive 
acquaintance of what it is in itself”—a self in despair (§ 77).
Self- refl ection leads into despair. But that is only the beginning. 
Doubtful, consciousness hesitates even to make one step—it is called to 
“advance but very little” (Descartes 1979, II.5). Desperate, the subject of 
the Phenomenology rolls on the wheel of determinate negations through 
its various shapes, on and on. At the end of the “path of despair” that is 
the Phenomenology, we fall even more thoroughly into a now utterly light-
hearted despair. The movement of despair does not lead to the restora-
tion of knowledge and self; it continues in the affi rmation of restlessness 
and brokenness. The protagonist is crushed by the wheel, but it never 
falls apart completely. The self- refl exive energy of despair’s determinate 
negations holds together the various shreds or shapes of the Phenomenol-
ogy’s subject. The protagonist is both singular and plural, for it is “an ‘I’ 
that is genuinely self- dividing [sich wahrhaft unterscheidendes] in its simplic-
ity, that is, an I remaining- in-parity with itself [sich gleichbleibendes] within 
this absolute division” (§ 197, trans. modifi ed). There is one protago-
nist throughout, and yet there are different “shapes” or “fi gures” of this 
protagonist—different shreds of the broken subject. While despair ruins 
the original and fi nal unity, it also prevents the shreds from settling into a 
shape completely of their own. Each fi gure speculatively relates to other 
broken fi gures and to the ruined whole. The subject of the Phenomenology 
is a subject in despair that keeps changing its form and does so to no end 
(no purpose, no limit).10 Despair is unending (the self).
The desparate loses the legs that provide stability and begins to fl oat 
slightly above ground; he self- divides and begins to hover lightly above 
himself.11 Despair lets consciousness lo(o)se: it unleashes consciousness’s 
(self-)destructive forces. This has its own pleasure: “a very diffi cult plea-
sure; but it is called pleasure” (Lispector 1994, i). When the path of de-
spair opens onto the pleasure of despair, this pleasure consists in the 
diffi cult bliss of living the elastic tension between two irreconcilable yet 
unending pulls: to unify (without ever reaching complete unifi cation) 
and to dismember (without ever reaching complete dissolution).
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The word “despair” might carry too much pathos for the light-
hearted despair that the Phenomenology produces. The term tends to leave 
us with our false imaginations of the worst. As an elastic transport—a 
“plastic” transport in Malabou’s sense or a “speculative” transport in He-
gel’s sense—despair keeps its subject tumbling back and forth between 
its torturous and its pleasurable poles. The German word is perhaps 
more felicitous in that it draws us playfully into the double twist of Ver-
 zwei (two)- fl - ung. In the Phenomenology, despair doesn’t take itself too se-
riously. It rather has an air of irony, with its simultaneously affi rmative 
and negative gestures. Consciousness remains quite unpossessed by de-
spair; it never experiences an absolute depth of nothingness, but always 
different degrees of a despair that is aufgehoben from the onset.
Animal Despair
Now that we have touched on the pleasurable aspect of despair, it might 
not be surprising that Hegel describes as despair something that we 
usually consider to be an enjoyment, namely eating. His fi rst explicit 
example of a despairing act is the literal consumption—the eating up—
of that which has no stable being. Sense certainty—the fi rst and most 
immediate fi gure of consciousness—must, based on its own notion of 
truth, conclude that sensuous objects are unreal. For consciousness, true 
reality means unchangeable, everlasting being. Therefore, the fi gure of 
consciousness that has staked all its certainty on the reality of sensuous 
things will have to despair:
What one can say to those who make assertions about the truth and 
reality of sensuous objects is that they should be sent back to the most 
elementary school of wisdom, namely, to the old Eleusinian myster-
ies of Ceres and Bacchus and that they have yet to learn the mystery 
of the eating of bread and the drinking of wine. This is so because the 
person who has been initiated into these secrets not merely comes to 
doubt the being of sensuous things. Rather, he is brought to despair of 
them. (§ 109)
Hegel in no way claims here that sensuous things are indeed un-
real. Rather, he contends that a consciousness that views reality as ever-
lasting being must come to the conclusion that sensuous things are not 
real.12 This does not preclude the protagonist/s of the Phenomenology 
from changing their understanding of what counts as truth. In fact, over 
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the course of a long process of self- education, consciousness will begin 
to appreciate the notion of a dynamic and transient truth. And then the 
status of sensuous things will be reevaluated.
This said, we can turn our attention to the puzzling fact that Hegel 
describes the consumption of sensuous objects—“the eating of bread 
and the drinking of wine,” for example—as a way of despair. As discussed 
in the previous section, Hegel maintains in the introduction that de-
spair genuinely negates what skepticism merely “resolves” to annihilate. 
In the fi rst chapter of the Phenomenology, despair’s actual negation takes 
the form of a physical destruction: the gobbling-up of the object. Such 
unmediated violence poses a problem for human taste. Therefore, those 
animals that are presumed to have no taste or culture or conscience are 
better at it:
Nor are the animals excluded from this wisdom [of the Eleusinian Mys-
teries]. To an even greater degree, they prove themselves to be the most 
deeply initiated in such wisdom for they do not stand still in the face of 
sensuous things, as if those things existed in themselves. Despairing of 
the reality of those things in the total certainty of the nullity of those 
things, they, without any further ado, simply help themselves to them 
and consume them [zehren sie auf ]. Just like the animals, all of nature 
celebrates these revealed mysteries which teach the truth about sensu-
ous things. (§ 109)
Hegel considers animals to be able to despair but unable to doubt. In 
speculative circularity, a step forward is a step backward. And the abstract 
or merely “natural” negation that death is turns into a life- giving force. 
The reason animals don’t doubt is that doubt requires a distancing from 
the object of doubt, a separation that creates the other as an object or 
Gegenstand—as something that stands stationary opposite to (gegen) the 
subject. But animals don’t freeze the frame and “do not just stand idly in 
front of sensuous things.” Instead, by eating the other, they affi rm tran-
sience and interrelatedness. To eat the other means to abolish the separa-
tion between subject and object. Feuerbach will later coin the aphorism 
Der Mensch ist, was er isst—for Hegel, man is not the focus of this thought 
and the verb sein must be taken in the double (intransitive and transi-
tive) sense: one is or becomes what one eats and one exists or brings to 
life what one eats.
Eating the other alive draws both parties into a mutual death- and-
 life- giving relation. Non- human animals can openly engage in a behav-
ior that humans must keep a secret. They grasp the truth that remains a 
mystery to humans. Lispector suggests that the moral categories of victim 
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and perpetrator do not exist in the animal realm because they presup-
pose a distance between subject and object: “The most profound of mur-
ders: one that is a mode of relating, a way of one being existing the other 
being, a way of our seeing each other and being each other and having 
each other, a murder where there is neither victim nor perpetrator but 
instead a link of mutual ferocity” (Lispector 1994, 74). Partaking in the 
cycle of eating and being eaten, animals consume in despair. “Without 
any further ado,” they expose themselves to the whirl of consumption, 
and thus show that they not only grasp the truth of sensuous things, 
namely that sensuous beings (including animals) are transient, but that 
they also accept the higher, speculative notion of truth, namely that truth 
itself is dynamic. For these animals, transience does not mean unreality, 
and negation does not end in nothingness.
The element of self- refl exivity that distinguishes despair from doubt 
might not be immediately obvious in the context of the Phenomenology’s 
fi rst chapter, on sense- certainty, but it becomes clearer against the back-
ground of Hegel’s discussion of life at the beginning of the Phenome-
nology’s second part, on self- consciousness.13 Here, Hegel describes the 
“cycle” (Kreislauf ) of life as a “circulation” of (self-)consumption, where 
eating the other means eating oneself, and devouring means giving life 
(§ 171).14
Hegel fi rst distinguishes between life in general and individual life. 
Organisms are individual forms of life, while life in general is unindi-
viduated or de- individualized life matter (somewhat misleadingly, Hegel 
calls it “inorganic” to emphasize its opposition to the organism). Living 
organisms eat life matter. Here, consumption functions as separation: 
the organism “affi rms itself . . . as preserving itself . . . by virtue both of 
its separation from its inorganic nature and by its consuming this inor-
ganic nature” (§ 171). The organism defi nes and sustains itself as indi-
vidual living being over and against life in general. But when the living 
being eats life, “what is consumed is the essence” (was aufgezehrt wird, ist 
das Wesen, § 171). The organism isst, was es ist. It negates its own essence. 
It incorporates that against which it means to stand out, and thereby 
undoes the separation. Es ist, was es isst. In other words, it is now life in 
general or unorganized life matter that consumes the living individual. 
The negation is mutual in the rigorous sense that the act of eating unor-
ganized life matter makes it impossible for the organism to maintain its 
own separate and self- suffi cient individuality. Consumption means both 
the destruction of the other, and the ruin of the self.
But consumption also restores the self and gives life to mere sub-
stance: “The sublating of individual durable existence is, conversely, 
equally its own engendering. . . . Since it posits the other as being within 
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itself [das Andre in sich setzt], it in that way sublates its simplicity . . . , 
i.e., it estranges that simplicity. This estrangement of the undifferen-
tiated fl uidity is the very positing of individuality” (§ 171). When life 
eats up the living—that is, when undivided and unorganized matter 
literally swallows (in sich setzt) the individual—it introduces difference 
into the general fl uidity, which in turn individuates life. The mutual 
(self-)negation is a mutual (self- re-)production. Each part of the cycle 
of life has its essence in the other. In the end, it becomes clear that the 
distinction between life in general and individual life doesn’t hold: “The 
fl uid element . . . is only actual as shape; and that it organizes itself [sich 
gliedert] is . . . once again a dissolution (§ 171, trans. modifi ed). To say 
that the living eats life matter and that, in the same act, life consumes 
the living is, therefore, just another way of saying that the living eats it-
self. Animals eat themselves and each other alive. “Alive,” then, has to be 
taken in both the attributive and the predicative sense. Animals eat living 
animals, and they make what they eat come alive.
Lispector offers a variation on this thought. The fi rst- person narra-
tor of The Passion According to G.H. has caught a cockroach between the 
two doors of a wardrobe. For G.H., the cockroach exemplifi es eternal 
life, impersonal, unindividuated life matter that has survived millions 
of years on earth unchanged. Her description of the cockroach departs 
from the organicist, expressionist, and individualist paradigm: “A cock-
roach is an ugly, shiny being. The cockroach is inside out. No, no, I don’t 
mean that it has an inside and an outside; I mean that [it] is what it is. 
What it has on the outside is what I hide inside myself” (Lispector 1994, 
69). The cockroach is what it is: undivided, divine being. Its absolute 
nakedness reveals without revelation since it knows not even the trace 
of a secret. G.H. keeps many secrets; she is capable of lying.15 In other 
words, G.H. has a heart. She is the proud proprietor of an interiority 
that allows her to “hide . . . behind the appearance” (§ 80).16 And yet she 
begins to see herself—inverted—in the cockroach: “What it has on the 
outside is what I hide inside myself.” Then G.H. watches how white pus 
slowly oozes out of the cockroach’s cracked body: “The cockroach’s pulp, 
which was its insides, raw matter that was whitish and thick and slow, 
was piling up on it” (Lispector 1994, 54). What was about to die is com-
ing alive.
Mother, I only pretend to want to kill, but just see what I have cracked: 
I have cracked a shell! Killing is also forbidden because you crack the 
hard husk and you are left with viscous life. From the inside of the husk, 
a heart that is thick and white and living, like pus, comes out, Mother, 
blessed be you among cockroaches, now and in the hour of this, my 
death of yours, cockroach and jewel. (Lispector 1994, 86, my emphasis)
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The whitish pulp—life in general—slowly dissolves the boundaries 
of the individual—that is, of G.H. G.H. sees herself in the cockroach. 
She has projected her heart onto the cockroach that has no heart but 
wears its insides out. “A heart that is thick and white and living, like 
pus, comes out” of the fi rst- person narrator G.H.—Georg Hegel, per-
haps—who abandons the attachment to interiority: “As if saying the 
word ‘Mother’ had released a thick, white part in me, . . . like after a vio-
lent attack of vomiting, my forehead was relieved” (Lispector 1994, 86). 
Cockroach and G.H. are each other. They eat each other and they vomit 
each other into existence—each one the mother of the other. G.H. has 
been swallowed by the neutral, non- individual eyes of the cockroach, 
and she tastes the white pus, the thick matter of life. G.H. despairs of the 
cockroach’s reality and, without any further ado, consumes it. Despair 
lets her lo(o)se. She abandons the defi ning traits of her persona, the 
adornments of her ego, the initials that mark her property.17 “My death 
of yours” is a resurrection to “a life that at last is not eluding me” (Lispec-
tor 1994, 57). The “suitcases with the engraved initials” of the narrator 
and the “hard husk” of the cockroach are but different pieces of dried 
surface from the same continuous fl uidity of life (Lispector 1994, 107, 
86). G.H.: two pieces from the alphabet, nothing behind it. And the cock-
roach has become an “I.” Like G and H, I is a letter to be exchanged. “I, 
neutral cockroach body, I with a life that at last is not eluding me because 
I fi nally see it outside myself—I am the cockroach” (Lispector 1994, 57). 
I am the external interior; I “remains the same,” I has survived millions of 
years on earth unchanged because it is empty—“the proper empty core 
of subjectivity” (Žižek 2006, 227).
Desperate Analysis
By eating each other and themselves alive, animals grasp and share (in) 
some truth of sensuous beings. For Hegel, eating is a way of thinking.18 
“All of nature, like the animals, celebrates these open Mysteries” (He-
gel), this “link of mutual ferocity” (Lispector). But man likes to part from 
the feast. While animals “prove themselves to be the most deeply initiated 
in [the] wisdom” of the mysteries of despair, man emerges from the revel 
of mutually consuming refl ection by way of a peculiar kind of stupidity 
(§ 109). He fi xes his gaze, wherever he looks, on the dull but stable opac-
ity of self- identity.
Identifi cation is a unilateral refl ection that interrupts the circle 
of mutual refl ection. It relies on the rational work of the understand-
ing: “The act of parting [Scheiden] is the force and labor of the under-
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standing, the most astonishing and the greatest of all the powers, rather, 
which is the absolute power” (§ 32, trans. modifi ed). Men—including 
Hegel—take great pride in this rational faculty, which nevertheless stops 
short of the speculative movement of refl ection that animals are capable 
of. By cultivating the power of distance and analysis, man protects him-
self against the destabilizing effect of despair’s “being- of-itself- outside-
 itself- in-the- other” (Nancy 2002, 35). He refuses to join the round, go in 
 circles, and lose his head in despair.
The rational withdrawal from and dissection of the whirl of life has 
a deadly ring to it (Scheiden also means “to depart this life,” “to die”): “It 
is the tremendous power of the negative; it is the energy . . . of the pure 
I. Death, if that is what we wish to call that non- actuality, is the most fear-
ful thing of all, and to keep and hold fast to what is dead requires only 
the greatest force” (§ 32). The source of man’s power is his ability to 
analyze, that is, to detach elements from the fl uidity of life and to assign 
object status to these elements that as such really don’t exist. “That . . . 
what is bound to other actualities and only exists in their context should 
attain an isolated freedom and its own proper existence is the effect of 
the tremendous power of the negative, of the energy . . . of the pure I” 
(§ 32, trans. modifi ed). By virtue of hypnotic fi xation—facing death or 
“look[ing] the negative in the face”—man gives this non- actuality a face 
in the fi rst place (ibid.). By fi xing his gaze on abstractions, he confers 
upon them an objective identity: “This lingering is the magical power 
that converts it into being” (ibid.). The same prosopopoeial operation 
is also applied to the one who uses it: the “pure I” is itself an abstrac-
tion with no actuality. It comes into being by way of a concentrated self-
 contemplation, a form of autosuggestion. Through the magic of the 
understanding, the rational “I” generates itself. That is to say, this epige-
netic operation of man takes the shape not so much of a self- birth as of 
a suicide. By giving itself its own, authentic, Heideggerian death—and 
thus by actively resisting “my death of yours”—the “I” posits itself. Facing 
death, man gives himself a face.
With the declaration, “to keep and hold fast to what is dead re-
quires only the greatest force,” Hegel contributes to the human con-
ceits of grandeur. Man likes to see himself as the superior animal and 
Hegel locates this superiority in the ability to keep a cool head. For the 
sake of maintaining his self- conceit, man abhors nothing more than to 
“roam about as a throng of madly rapturous women, the untamed revel 
[ungebändigte Taumel ] of nature in self- conscious shape” (§ 723, trans. 
modifi ed). Hegel here combines women, animals (via the adjective “un-
tamed”), and gods (Dionysus, Demeter) in one dizzying semantic fi eld 
of bodies in ecstasy that threaten the authority of the rational “I.” Lispec-
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tor helps us to reclaim this potentially misogynous combination for a 
phenomenology of the intensity of neutral life that is declined in the 
feminine: “Living life instead of living one’s own life is forbidden. It is a 
sin to go into divine matter. And that sin has an inexorable punishment: 
the person who dares go into that secret, in losing her individual life, 
disorganizes the human world” (Lispector 1994, 136). Neutral life or life 
in general, which is indifferent to the individual’s life and death, cannot 
be owned; its ecstasy is improper and unpossessed. Lispector calls this 
impropriety of living neutral life “immund” (immundo in Brazilian Portu-
guese).19 With this word she retrieves connotations of “unclean” (in the 
sense that some religions place a ban on eating certain animals), but also 
of “unadorned” (the Latin adjective mundus can refer to a woman’s el-
egant dress and jewelry), and of “chaotic” (the Latin noun mundus means 
“world”; it translates the Greek cosmos, which represents the world as an 
orderly arrangement; the antithesis of cosmos is chaos). To “go into” the 
unclean nakedness of chaotic life is a sin that can neither be attributed 
to nor borne by an individual, because the individual life gets lost in the 
process. The punishment for this sin therefore strikes not the individual, 
but human society as a whole: it “disorganizes the human world.” Living 
neutral life instead of living one’s own life ruins the intelligibility of the 
anthropocentric world. The cosmos becomes unpredictable. We begin to 
stagger and fall into despair.
In order to prevent such stagger and remain in control as best as 
possible, man parts and analyzes. And yet, it is precisely this rational anal-
ysis that produces the fragmentation and despair of the whole. Lingering 
with the negative, the understanding gives separate existence to what in 
itself exists only as a passing moment in a fl uid movement. The analysis 
was meant as an intellectual exercise, a rational self- discipline, and a 
kind of self- cultivation (Bildung). But here, epigenesis does not enable a 
claim to absoluteness; rather, it ruins the absolute.20 Here, the stabilizing 
effect of rationality speculatively joins the shattering effect of rationality. 
Against its intention, the understanding creates despair by scattering the 
dynamic whole. And this is precisely the reason why Hegel praises the 
work of the understanding. Rational analysis brings about the disrup-
tion and dismemberment that keep moving speculative, despairing self-
 refl ection. The locus of agency in man’s “act of parting” thus turns out 
to be rather uncertain (§ 32). As doer, man is done. Avoiding despair, 
he falls into despair. Pentheus, who keeps his distance from Dionysian 
revelry, will have his head torn off by his mother. Like him, every king 
will lose his head on the Phenomenology’s path of despair: Hegel will break 
anyone who “asks for a royal road to science” (§ 70).
Of course, the reader rejects such violence. Similarly, the protago-
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nists of the Phenomenology resist despair’s unending movement. They do 
not lightheartedly give themselves over to be transported by despair. In-
stead, each fi gure of consciousness develops a “tremendous power” (un-
geheure Macht, § 32) to hold fast to the abstraction that it is (compared to 
the whole). In the face of these resistances and since, according to his 
own diagnosis, “it is much more diffi cult to set fi xed thoughts into fl uid 
motion than it is to bring sensuous existence into such fl uidity,” Hegel 
has developed complex strategies to break shapes of consciousness and 
shatter readers’ expectations (§ 33). In the following, I will discuss two 
of them—the breaking of the phrenologist’s judgment and the breaking 
of the hard heart.
Lacerating Judgment
Phrenology, which is the attempt to scientifi cally determine a person’s 
character based on the shape of her skull, emerges within the sphere of 
reason—more specifi cally, of “observing reason.” The sphere of reason is 
animated by the assumption that the objective, material world is not for-
eign to the world of the mind: “It is the concept of this entire sphere . . . 
that thinghood is the being- for- itself of spirit itself” (§ 359). This not only 
means that the mind has access to the external world and that it fi nds 
its own rules of intelligibility confi rmed in nature. It also means that it is 
perfectly rational to regard spirit—and by consequence any individual 
consciousness—as a thing, for example, a bone.
How does the phrenologist model of observing and classifying 
human subjects emerge? Despite the fact that “observing reason” is hap-
pily reconciled with external reality, reason develops a strong introver-
sion.21 For its own epistemic purposes, it creates a stable opposition and 
law- governed relation between an inner world and an outer world. That 
is to say, it “creates the law that says the outer is the expression of the in-
ner” (§ 262). The law of expression arrests the self- moving concept and 
relegates it to interiority. Reason here clings to an inwardness that it 
has inherited from the dialectic of the understanding. When the under-
standing noticed the transience of the empirical world, it developed the 
image (Vorstellung) of a supersensible “inner of things” (§ 142). At that 
time, self- consciousness identifi ed with this interiority, and now reason, 
still beholden to the understanding, cannot quite live up to its own idea 
that the (external) real is rational and the rational is (externally) real. 
Instead, it takes external reality as an expression of internal reality. The 
demand for expression perpetuates, within the anti- metaphysical per-
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spective of  reason, the metaphysical stance of the understanding—the 
“image [Vorstellung] of appearance and appearance’s inner” (§ 165, trans. 
modifi ed).
The theory of rational existence—that the rational exists in objec-
tive form—governs all of reason’s assumptions, including its assumption 
of an inner life. The law of expression dictates that there can be no 
inwardness that is not linked to outwardness. So reason ends up with a 
rather problematic, even at times downright silly, and yet extremely infl u-
ential image of interiority. Rational consciousness imagines the internal 
as coming in a solid and fi xed, that is to say, essentially external shape: 
“the inner as such must have an outer being and a shape just like the 
outer as such, for the inner . . . is itself posited as existing and as available 
for observation” (§ 264). This reifi cation of inner life makes reason less 
spiritual than spirit because the “inner being of spirit” remains “spirit-
less” when it is “interpreted as a fi xed . . . being” (§ 340). In the sphere 
of reason, the truth criterion of unchangeability or timelessness, which 
has governed all previous shapes of consciousness from sense certainty 
to the unhappy consciousness, is once again used as the measure to test 
certainty, and once again it will fail this protagonist.
The proper response when one fi nds oneself evaluated based on 
phrenology would be to bash in the critic’s head: “the retort here would 
really have to go as far as smashing the skull of the person who makes a 
statement like that” (§ 339). This would be appropriate in the sense that 
it would respond to the allegations on the phrenologist’s terms. Some-
body who has reduced the dynamic life of spirit to something as rigid and 
random as a boss of the skull might not be able to understand otherwise 
than through hard evidence that his skull is not as solid as he thought. 
One would have to break his skull “in order to demonstrate to him in 
a manner as palpable as his wisdom that for a person a bone is nothing 
in-itself and is even less his true actuality” (§ 339).
And yet this mimetic identifi cation—responding to the phrenolo-
gist on his own terms—is not sophisticated enough to set the phrenolo-
gist on the path of despair. Doing violence to his body will not move his 
thoughts. As mentioned earlier, “it is much more diffi cult to set fi xed 
thoughts into fl uid motion than it is to bring sensuous existence into 
such fl uidity” (§ 33). I have suggested that Hegel beat in many a head 
and broke many a bone with his Phenomenology of Spirit. The text certainly 
registers that spirit’s self- knowledge comes at the expense of the bone 
health of its protagonist, who, in a moment of “truest insight about it-
self,” has the “feeling that it has been rolled upon the wheel through 
all the stages of its existence and that every bone in its body has been 
broken” (§ 538, trans. modifi ed). At this point, it is time to attend again 
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to the self- refl exivity of despair, that is to say, to the fact that there is no 
transitive sense of despair. In the case of the phrenologist, while smash-
ing his head might be warranted by his own logic, he would still experi-
ence this negation as coming from the outside and therefore it would 
not bring about the self- doubt that is despair. And indeed, Hegel doesn’t 
quite break the phrenologist’s skull.
Instead, Hegel sympathizes with the phrenologist and takes his 
judgments seriously. There is of course a certain irony in Hegel’s sympa-
thy, but that is nothing new.22 A mix of sincere identifi cation and ironic 
distance characterizes all the discussions of the various shapes of con-
sciousness/ spirit. As I have suggested in the introduction, the Phenomenol-
ogy presents the philosophems of its protagonist/ s in free indirect dis-
course—oscillating often imperceptibly between the protagonist’s voice 
and the phenomenologist’s voice. Hegel uses the freedom afforded by 
this style of thought representation in order to gain and communicate an 
intimate knowledge of perspectives. Such intimacy would be precluded 
by a more straightforward approach. Hegel points out that “the raw in-
stinct of self- conscious reason will reject out of hand [unbesehen verwerfen] 
such a science” as phrenology (§ 340; trans. modifi ed). But the Hegelian 
phenomenologist refrains from crude reasoning and outright rejection 
and, instead, approaches the phrenologist in a more cultivated manner: 
he takes the perspective of phrenology, he speaks its language, he ventril-
oquizes its thoughts.23 And after he has done so in detail, he introduces 
a referential shift when he declares that, even though this is not what 
observing reason in the shape of phrenology means to say, “what in truth 
[it] has been saying is expressed in the statement that the being of spirit is 
a bone” (§ 343, trans. modifi ed). Here Hegel doesn’t speak directly with 
the voice of phrenology anymore, but takes the liberty to refl ect on the 
phrenologist position and to distill it down to one tangible verdict. He-
gel won’t be trapped by the intentional fallacy. It doesn’t matter what the 
phrenologist means to say; his pedestrian ideas have already disqualifi ed 
him. What matters is what his position actually comes down to, namely 
“that the being of spirit is a bone.” In keeping with his rejection of expres-
sionism, Hegel detaches the judgment from the person who pronounced 
it. He separates thought and mind. As soon as the thought is no longer 
taken as an expression of a mind, he can treat both—the judgment and 
the phrenologist—as things, to be broken.24 Rather than literally bash-
ing in his head, Hegel demonstrates that the phrenologist doesn’t know 
what he is saying, that he is indeed the bonehead he idiotically claims he 
is, that he is indeed an abstract thing without self- awareness.
Then again, Hegel’s use of free indirect discourse gives him the 
liberty to swing all the way back to a sympathizing identifi cation with 
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the phrenologist. Hegel gives him credit, suggesting that the future of 
spirit harkens back to the phrenologist when he feels some embarrass-
ment about his position. The thing that is the phrenologist’s mind knows 
embarrassment—a promising fact, one would think: “Out of a kind of 
natural honesty which lies at a deeper level of self- conscious spirit,” the 
phrenologist “conceals from [him]self the shamefulness of the naked, 
conceptless thought [begriffl osen, nackten Gedankens]” that underlies his 
position (§ 345, trans. modifi ed). And yet, the phrenologist’s sheepish-
ness only drives his mind further into the traps of un- self- refl ection. Ton-
ing down “the crudeness [das Grelle] of the proposition,” that the being 
of spirit is a bone, he inadvertently obscures the signifi cance of his stance 
(§ 345, trans. modifi ed).
Since the phrenologist either doesn’t know what he is saying or is 
too embarrassed to state the naked truth, the phenomenologist has to 
carve out the actual shape of the phrenologist position: “what in truth the 
foregoing has been saying is expressed in the statement that the being of 
spirit is a bone.” Now Hegel can begin to break this thing. First its referent: 
what, a bone?!—In order to tear the statement to shreds, the phenom-
enologist simply needs to point out “that for a person a bone is nothing 
in-itself.” A bone is nothing essential and certainly not the true expres-
sion of a mind—“even less his true actuality” (§ 339). That was easy.
But let’s not get carried away by the “raw instinct of self- conscious 
reason”! Let’s linger a while longer with the most dazzling verdict, “that 
the being of spirit is a bone.” The sphere of reason is animated by two 
contradicting premises, that of rational existence and that of interior-
ity. Hegel’s attack on phrenology is leveled not so much against the idea 
that spirit could be a thing as against reason’s investment in interiority. 
The discussion of phrenology serves to show that reason remains utterly 
spiritless when it seeks to satisfy its desire for unchanging and solid reality 
by looking inward. To project interiority as the abstract opposite of ex-
teriority means to reify it, to turn it into a dead thing and thus—against 
the intention of the discourse of interiority—to turn it into something 
external. The idea of an “inner being of spirit” renders spirit “as a fi xed 
spiritless being”—and that is why thinkers belonging to the sphere of 
reason are faced with the conundrum that, to put it bluntly, there seems 
to be no such thing as inner life: whenever we can put our fi nger on it, 
it is already dead.25
But this is not the end of Hegel’s discussion of phrenology. Given 
the paradoxical, or rather, the speculative workings of Hegel’s Aufhebung, 
his attack on the (inner) thing is not a destruction, but a spiritualization 
of the (outer) thing. The speculative reading of the proposition “that 
the being of spirit is a bone” reveals that even “externality . . . in the sense 
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of a dead thing” is indeed spiritually animated and presents “the outer 
immediate actuality of spirit” (§ 343). Not just the organism, not just 
language—where one might expect a certain impersonal capacity for 
self- refl ection and self- negation—but any simple object, even a bone, 
has a kind of mind of its own. Rational self- consciousness’s declared 
“certainty of being all reality” may seem egocentric (§ 230), but the fl ip 
side of this worldview is the contention that all reality is self- conscious, 
including such utterly objectifi able and seemingly inert matter as the 
boss of a bone: “The concept of this image [Vorstellung] is that reason is 
to itself all thinghood, even purely objective thinghood” (§ 346, trans. modi-
fi ed). In the distilled verdict of phrenology, we have thus found the most 
concrete and spiritual actualization of reason’s governing premise of ra-
tional  existence.
The spiritualization of things completely depends on the read-
ing of the judgment “that the being of spirit is a bone.” If read at face 
value, it turns the reader into a spiritless bonehead who pisses away his 
capacities for self- refl ection.26 But read speculatively, the judgment ne-
gates and spiritualizes itself. When, in her discussion of defenses against 
hate speech, Riley quotes Hegel saying that the aim is to “have done with 
the thing altogether,” she knows that treating the thing as a thing or the 
other as an object does not present an effective strategy, especially if the 
goal is destruction (Riley 2005, 25). The Phenomenology famously demon-
strates that the object must negate itself in order for the subject to be 
able to have done with it: “on account of the self- suffi ciency of the object 
[I] can only achieve satisfaction if the object itself effects the negation 
in it” (§ 175).
The proper response when one fi nds oneself evaluated by phrenol-
ogy is, then, to make room for and respect the freedom of the judgment 
to negate itself. This can be accomplished by a not- quite- straightforward 
reading of the judgment. It is therefore absolutely no accident that Hegel 
renders the phrenologist judgment about spirit in indirect speech. From 
the slightly removed and oblique vantage point of indirect discourse, 
the phenomenologist allows the thought of phrenology to develop its 
peculiar form so that it can appear as “the infi nite judgment that the self 
is a thing—a judgment which sublates itself” (§ 344). Read categorically 
or crudely as positive judgments, the propositions “the self is a thing” or 
“spirit is a bone” are easily rejected. But read as infi nite judgments, they 
are actually true.27 It is true that underdeveloped forms of reason (like 
phrenology) have an ossifying notion of interiority. At the same time, 
this very insight sublates the factual truth—the infi nite judgment negates 
itself—and transports us to a more sophisticated conception of spirit.
The larger truth of this infi nite judgment is that spirit is indeed 
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a thing in space and time, but a speaking and self- refl ecting thing—or 
rather, an infi nite number of things that communicate (with) and re-
fl ect each other and themselves. This truth can barely be conveyed in 
the propositional form of a judgment. The infi nite judgment presents a 
borderline judgment. It hovers precariously and emotionally at the edge 
of its own self- negation by adjoining two terms that cannot be logically 
related. Spirit and Bone are like apples and oranges. There is no expres-
sive continuity between them but simply a gap of negativity. They are 
so unrelated that the identity posited by the copula cannot be achieved 
via subordination (which is the usual procedure by which the judgment 
identifi es what appears different).28 Instead, the infi nite judgment says 
that the abstract is the abstract: spirit, understood abstractly as substance, 
is a bone, understood abstractly as a solid being. In this very judgment—
“the abstract is the abstract”—each abstract thing or term refl ects itself 
in the other abstract thing or term. Through this self- refl ection, they 
become “concrete.” We are witnessing the process of mutual acknowl-
edging between bone and spirit. Passing through the infi nite judgment, 
one term becomes affected by the other: Spirit emerges as ossifi ed and 
Bone as spiritualized. It is hard to tell them apart at this point. One 
is entangled in the other. Neither being nor self- consciousness can be 
taken as a fi xed term anymore; instead one must juggle both as dynamic 
subjects constantly in the process of self- dissolution and self- generation. 
The entanglement of spirit and bone, ideality and materiality, inward-
ness and outwardness forms an emotional thought—the self- refl ective 
emotionality of the Bacchanalian revel “where no member is not drunk” 
(§ 47, trans. modifi ed).
Come Break My Heart
While on the one hand the protagonist breaks bone after bone in the 
course of the Phenomenology, on the other hand it hardens more and more. 
Consciousness is scarred and scared. Its scars are traces of a loss that it is 
afraid to endure again, traces of a fear that it hasn’t really felt (because it 
was unbearable) but of which it becomes more and more afraid. Its fear 
grows with every new scar pulling it together tighter and tighter until the 
rubbery pulsating mass petrifi es, and consciousness takes the shape of a 
“hard heart.” The “hard heart” is the last fi gure of consciousness in the 
Phenomenology. It dialectically emerged from the fi gure of the “beautiful 
soul,” which had no substance to speak of.
The very impossibility of experiencing despair is one of the main 
200
E M O T I O N A L  S Y N T A X
characteristics of despair. Despair quite literally breaks the subject by 
dividing it from its own experience: “unendurable is the measureless in-
terval separating me from suffering. Suffering such that I cannot bear it is 
this interval, this gaping void dividing me from suffering” (Smock 2003, 
8). The inability to despair drives one to despair. “I whom pain has liq-
uidated before I even begin to undergo it, have always yet to endure 
it” (ibid.). What Smock formulates here so poignantly in dialogue with 
Blanchot, helps us to understand the paradox that the despairing pro-
tagonist of the Phenomenology faces. As a result of its missed encounter 
with despair, consciousness learns to fear despair. It fi ghts despair toward 
the end of its journey even more than in the beginning. The fi nal fi gure 
of consciousness in the Phenomenology displays the toughest resistance to 
the self- negation of despair.
With the glue of an extreme self- will, the hard heart keeps itself 
together. Unwilling to open, it “rejects any continuity with the other” 
(§ 667). As if it were casting pearls before swine, it “refus[es] to throw 
itself away against another” (sich gegen einen andern wegzuwerfen) and, 
“mutely keeping itself within itself,” it throws but stinging predicates (not 
even full judgments) at the other (§ 667, trans. modifi ed). “In crying out 
‘base,’ ‘vile,’ and so on against the hypocrisy” of the other, it keeps the 
other at a distance, and “repels this community” (§ 663, trans. modifi ed; 
§ 667). The verbal projectiles allow the hard heart to remain fi rm in its 
position. While the arrows are fl ying, it doesn’t budge an inch. “Stiff-
 necked,” it insists on its judgment about the other and resists any turn the 
judgment might take when the other receives and interprets it (§ 667). 
“This was not what was meant by the judgment—Quite the contrary!” is 
the response implied by the hard heart’s posture when the other allows 
the judgment to enter its own fl esh and then returns it, expecting the 
hard heart to touch the blood- smeared dart again (§ 667). The fact that 
the other accepts the accusation instead of fending it off cannot move 
the hard heart: “Following on the admission of the one who is evil—I 
am so—there is no reciprocation of the same confession” (§ 667, trans. 
modifi ed). Stubbornly and self- righteously, the beautiful soul turned 
hard heart holds its head high where the air is thin but pure, and where 
it doesn’t have to smell the baseness of the other.
Opposite the hard heart Hegel positions a consciousness that, in 
full knowledge of the contingency of all standards, nevertheless fi nds 
it important to answer a call to action. This fi gure of consciousness is 
clearly the wisest, freest (in both senses of freedom, as self- determination 
and as self- abandon), and most plastic single manifestation of spirit in 
the entire Phenomenology.
The acting consciousness acknowledges the judging consciousness 
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by pronouncing the other half of its judgment; it fi nishes the other’s 
speech act. While the beautiful soul only throws predicates around, the 
other completes its sentences by saying, “I am so” (Ich bins, § 667, trans. 
modifi ed). Together, they form statements such as “ ‘bad!’ . . . ‘I am so’ ” 
or “ ‘vile!’ . . . ‘I am so.’ ” Hegel presents us here with a dance of shared 
speech. The judgment (Urteil) is literally divided (geteilt) between the two 
fi gures. The bits of judgment and their corresponding confi gurations 
of consciousness enjoy a certain kind of independence, but each also 
reaches out to the other and complements the other. Ich bins—which can 
also be translated as “it’s me”—can be heard then as a sign of familiarity. 
One answers the question “who is it?” with “it’s me” only within the hori-
zon of a trusted intimacy. These two know each other so well that one can 
complete the other’s sentences. One can mirror the other’s steps as they 
move across the dance fl oor. One is the protagonist of the Phenomenology 
and the other the phenomenologist. They have moved together through 
so many life stages of spirit at this point that they know each other inside 
out. Along the path, the phenomenologist has again and again furnished 
the predicates for the protagonist’s naive propositions of being, and the 
protagonist has ever anew realized in action what the phenomenologist 
could only abstractly posit.
Now it is as if the judging consciousness does not hear the pro-
nouncements of intimacy. It does not react. It never receives the love let-
ters that the acting consciousness sends. It is too set on denying (itself) 
pleasure, too judgmental.29 When the other says “it’s me; I am so,” the 
judging consciousness hears a self- deprecating admission of guilt. It sees 
a slobbering dog that gets so excited at the slightest attention that it is 
unable to differentiate between love and maltreatment. “This was not 
what was meant by the judgment”; it’s not love, “quite the contrary!”—
it’s hatred and disgust, says the hard- hearted judge (§ 667). Meanwhile 
the drooling puppy eagerly acknowledges, “I am base” and “I am vile,” 
because any interpellation—no matter how degrading—offers at least a 
minimal amount of recognition.
Of course, the acting consciousness doesn’t mean its admission of 
guilt as a defi nitive and fi nal account of its character. It means it as a con-
textual response.—“Yes, I can see why you think that I am vile and, yes, I 
think it is true that I am vile, but that is not all that I am, plus, we all have 
vile aspects or moments.” Here, the beautiful soul refuses to follow. But 
the other has just outed himself as a Romantic ironist.30 When he says, “I 
am base” and “I am vile,” he means what he says and does not mean it at 
the same time. He states a passing truth. He simultaneously affi rms and 
negates that he is base or vile. That is to say, he puts the emphasis on the 
subject when he says Ich bins (I am so). Within the coercive parameters 
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of interpellation, the “I” insists on its right to bind or unbind the pieces 
that make these sentences. In no way does it submit to an essentializing 
character statement.
But whether we see ourselves as drooling puppies or, more fl atter-
ingly, as Romantic ironists—how can we get the hard heart to admit a 
mistake and to ask for forgiveness? How do we facilitate another’s de-
spair? Perhaps the one who resists despair is precisely not the other. 
“We”—that is probably the phenomenologist/s. But if these last two fi g-
ures of consciousness in the Phenomenology fi gure the relation between 
phenomenologist and protagonist, the acting consciousness (the wisest 
and freest fi gure) would be the protagonist—it is the one involved in the 
action. And the phenomenologist is revealed here to be the judgmental 
hard heart who since the beginning of the story has done nothing but 
“cry out ‘base,’ ‘vile,’ and so on against” each and every incarnation of 
natural consciousness. Such phenomenologists, it turns out, do not learn 
much because they resist transport; they miss the love letters because 
they refuse to ac- knowledge (to think- along- with).
A pure heart can hardly love. In order to reach out to another, it 
must “let go of its own simplicity and rigid unchangeableness” (§ 786). If 
nothing else helps, it will need to be broken: “its one- sided unacknowl-
edged [nicht anerkanntes] judgment must be broken in a way that for the 
former, its one- sided, unacknowledged [nicht anerkanntes] existence of 
particular being- for- itself had to be broken” (§ 669, trans. modifi ed).31 
Mutual acknowledging means the death of the solitary, unmoved being-
 for- self: “The former dies back from its being- for- itself and empties itself 
[entäußert sich] and confesses; the latter disavows the rigidity of its abstract 
universality and thereby dies back from its lifeless self and its unmoved 
universality” (§ 796). But—just as with the phrenologist—force won’t 
produce lovers. Since its hard- heartedness is an effect of its denial of its 
broken- heartedness, all one can do is to show that the beautiful soul is 
not as “lifeless” as it appears, that there is a crack that runs through the 
hard heart and that this crack makes transport possible, and fi nally that 
the judgment is in fact already doubled and broken in half and thus 
shared and moving, and that this is where the beauty lies.
At this late point in the phenomenological game, consciousness 
knows itself as continuously changing. This knowledge is its power: “con-
science is this power because it knows the moments of consciousness to 
be moments, and as their negative essence, it rules over them” (§ 641). 
Through self- knowledge, consciousness rises above its ever- changing 
manifestations to fi nd a lasting self- identity in the ethereal essence of 
its ever- changing forms. Whatever material reality consciousness gives 
itself, either in acting or in speaking, has no importance for it. For itself, 
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it has its essence in spirit—but it understands spirit in a non- speculative, 
un- Hegelian way as the distilled negativity of the “I” that is devoid of any 
material impurities. The beautiful soul grounds itself in its conscience. 
Conscience defi nes itself as the “assurance [that] assures that conscious-
ness is convinced that its conviction is the essence” (§ 653, trans. modi-
fi ed). “This absolute certainty into which substance has been dissolved” is 
consciousness’s last bastion against despair (§ 657).
And yet the bastion is obviously on the verge of falling apart. The 
self- refl exivity that guarantees the absoluteness of the certainty of con-
science on the one hand, disintegrates it on the other hand. The ver-
bal doublings of an “assurance [Versicherung] [that] assures [versichert]” 
and a being “convinced [überzeugt] [of] its conviction [Überzeugung]” 
can sidetrack the tight- knit circle of conscience. Each doubling forms 
two lips ready to open and to eat conscience alive. Absolute certainty is 
self- consuming: the “absolute self- consciousness within which consciousness 
drowns [versinkt]” because “substance has been dissolved,” this absolute self- 
consciousness will not be able to remain pure (§ 657, trans.  modifi ed).
Holding on to its clear conscience, the beautiful soul inhabits the 
zone in between fi gurations. It refuses to take shape and thus becomes a 
fi gure for the phenomenologist who, of course, doesn’t take shape in the 
text, either, but emerges in the form of the fi rst- person plural around the 
transitions from one fi gure of the protagonist to another, that is, around 
the zones in between fi gurations. As if it knew that it is the last fi gure 
of consciousness in the Phenomenology, and therefore has no new life to 
escape to but can only fall apart, the beautiful soul refuses to “commit 
itself to the absolute division [Unterschied]” and to expose itself to the 
alienating forces of reality (§ 658, trans. modifi ed). And yet its spirituality 
overlaps with materiality. The utterly beautiful transparency of this soul 
takes shape as the absolute impenetrability of a heart of glass. Not only is 
the hard heart a thing, but it is a broken thing—glued together with its 
last reserves of clotted, rubbery blood. The crack is still noticeable and 
threatens to open any time. Only the softness of a d holds the pieces of 
the hard heart together. A d so hard to pronounce, so easily rendered as 
a t (at least for me), that it betrays the latent doubletalk. It doubles the 
heart and makes it fall apart. One who heard the crack at the heart of the 
hard could give it a start. Unexpectedly, the beautiful soul turned hard 
heart might “let go of its own simplicity and rigid unchangeableness,” 
forgive evil, and begin to move out of its cardiac arrest (§ 786). It’s in the 
cards that, sooner or later, the heart won’t be able to ward off its break-
ing. Yet how this break comes about will be decided only by accident.
Unexpectedly, “acknowledgment [Erkennen] bursts forth as the Yes 
between these extreme terms” (§ 786, trans. modifi ed). Acknowledgment 
204
E M O T I O N A L  S Y N T A X
is not foreseeable.32 There is no guarantee that it will be reciprocated. 
When the other “repels this community,” the rejection certainly arouses 
“the utmost outrage [höchste Empörung] of the self- certain spirit” (§ 667, 
trans. modifi ed). Even so, acknowledgment responds to no demand. Ac-
knowledging is structurally mutual but, from the perspective of one, it 
can happen only accidentally. Using violence to break the hard heart 
won’t turn glass into fl esh, and the blood that might fl ow will only be 
spent. Instead, in an instant of lightheartedness, a moment off guard, the 
hard heart falls apart and a Yes escapes the shell. Consciousness affi rms 
the other, ac- knowledges the other, and feels an unexpected pleasure. It 
falls in love. And the scar opens.
Narrative (Dis)organization
We encounter the shattering force of despair also on the narrative level 
of the Phenomenology of Spirit. The narrative of the Phenomenology can be 
described as a path of despair because despair—in this case the text’s de-
spair—breaks the dynamic “whole” that is “the true” into separate chap-
ters, shapes of consciousness, or “stations” (Stationen).33
None of the Phenomenology’s chapters or fi gures of consciousness 
alone speaks the truth in an absolute sense that transcends all condi-
tions. Their truth and reality are relative and, in the end, none of them 
can stand on their own. And yet each shape of consciousness does pre-
sent an iteration or instantiation of spirit and as such can claim a certain 
station and level of independence.34 This relative self- suffi ciency of the 
different shapes produces a range of different activities undertaken in 
the interest of self- preservation. Not one shape of consciousness wants 
to change. Rather, each shape reacts to any potentially life- changing ex-
perience with an effort to integrate this experience into its existing set of 
ontological insights.35 The result is a narrative extension of each shape 
and of each chapter that makes it extremely hard for the reader to keep 
in view the whole of spirit’s story of formation.
From the perspective of the protagonist, survival would be guaran-
teed if it were the consciousness of a transcendent and stable truth. That 
is to say, consciousness resists not only its own despair but also spirit’s 
despair: it fears the truth that is self- negating: “The fear of truth may 
lead consciousness to hide both from itself and from others behind the 
appearance” (§ 80, trans. modifi ed). Or, as the narrator of The Passion Ac-
cording to G.H. puts it, “I’m terrifi ed of that profound disorganization. . . . 
I know that I can walk only when I have two legs. But I sense the irrele-
vant loss of the third one, and it horrifi es me, it was that leg that made 
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me able to fi nd myself, and without even having to look” (Lispector 1994, 
3– 4). As we have seen in our discussion of fear in the previous chapter, 
whenever a fi gure of consciousness has reached a point where it cannot 
integrate its experiences any further, it loses consciousness and slips into 
oblivion. On the other side of this death, a new fi gure emerges. The re-
sulting gaps in the narrative tear the body of the text apart. We might 
want to call it the cunning of spirit (as opposed to the cunning of reason) 
that the protagonist/ s’ efforts to resist despair and to preserve them-
selves intact—through post- traumatic amnesia if necessary—effectuate 
despair on the larger level of spirit’s self- lacerations.
From the perspective of spirit, none of the fi gures of conscious-
ness can lay claim to absolute knowledge, since “the truth is the whole. 
However, the whole is only the essence completing itself through its own 
development” (§ 20). Truth is, thus, achieved only in the narrative expo-
sition of spirit, which exposes spirit:
This exposition [Darstellung] . . . can be taken to be the path of natural 
consciousness which presses forward towards true knowledge, or it can 
be taken to be the path of the soul as it wanders through the series of 
the ways it takes shape, as if those shapes were stations laid out for it by 
its own nature so that it . . . might purify itself into spirit. (§ 77, trans. 
modifi ed)
The word “stations” certainly echoes the Stations of the Cross. The quote, 
then, fi gures the Phenomenology as the passion of the Christ: the suffering 
of the phenomenal aspect of God as he goes through the drawn- out and 
torturous process of purifying physical existence into the Holy Spirit. 
This is the Passion according to G. W. F. Hegel—according to most of 
his readers. But the description of the Phenomenology’s path as purifying 
the soul into the life of the spirit also resonates with Hegel’s descrip-
tion of the rites of the Eleusinian mysteries: “This cultus . . . is based on 
cheerfulness or serenity. The path of purifi cation is one that is traveled 
physically [durchwandert]. . . . The physical traveling [Durchwanderung] of 
the road [counts] as an actually accomplished purifi cation of the soul, 
an absolution” (Hegel 1987, 180). The cult of Demeter and Dionysus 
taught its followers the secrets of death, resurrection, and life.36 Travel-
ing through a series of stations on the road to Eleusis, the Mystai were 
effectively absolved from the terror or panic (Pan is a companion of, and 
at times another name for, Dionysus) that death induces.
The myths of Dionysus’s double birth and repeated dismember-
ment, and of Persephone’s rape- rapture- capture by the underworld and 
periodic reemergence from it remind Hegel of spirit’s despairing media-
tion with itself: 37
206
E M O T I O N A L  S Y N T A X
The chief basis of the representations of Ceres and Proserpine, Bacchus 
and his train, was the universal principle of Nature; representations 
mainly bearing on the vital force and its metamorphoses. An analogous 
process to that of Nature, Spirit has also to undergo; for it must be 
twice- born, i.e. abnegate itself [sich in sich selbst negieren]; and thus the 
representations given in the mysteries called attention . . . to the nature 
of Spirit. (Hegel 1956, 248)
In the Phenomenology, spirit is not just born twice, but with each tran-
sition to a new chapter and a new fi gure of consciousness, spirit is born 
anew. This parceling out of spirit’s truth “may readily induce the trav-
eler to lose sight of the road altogether in the course of . . . its bends 
and distracting stations [zerstreuende Stationen]” (Hegel 1971, 79, trans. 
 modifi ed).
Since Hegel superimposes the path of the Phenomenology of Spirit, 
the passion of Christ, and the initiation rites of the Eleusinian myster-
ies, I take the liberty to add The Passion According to G.H. In all four cases, 
some body will have been dismembered and consumed. Christ breaks 
the bread that is his body and gives it to his disciples to eat. Dionysus 
is torn to shreds by the Titans and Zeus asks Semele to drink his heart. 
G.H. cracks and tastes the cockroach. The readers of the Phenomenology 
are supposed to digest and re- collect the stations of this book. It’s always 
us, the mortals who are to swallow the pieces. But can we make them 
whole?
According to one topos of our cultural imaginary, true love can 
heal fragmentation: “To reconstruct ‘this shipwreck of fragments, these 
echoes, these shards . . .’ needs a special love. . . . ‘Break a vase,’ says Wal-
cott, ‘and the love that reassembles the fragments is stronger than the 
love that took its symmetry for granted when it was whole’ ” (Hartman 
1996, 111– 12).38 This statement modulates the deep- seated idea that 
desire is fed by lack, that love grows with labor, and that we therefore 
love the imperfect more than the perfect. But it also presupposes the 
idea of a proper shape (genuine and symmetrical) and bespeaks a strong 
investment in its restoration. Because the commitments to lack and to 
integrity are equally strong, this topos presents love as the desire to heal 
(in both the transitive and the intransitive sense) that never ends because 
it constantly reproduces the wound as the condition of its own contin-
ued possibility. Such love puts the burden again on us, asking us to unify 
emotional energies and to focus them exclusively on the one god, the 
one person, or the one work of philosophy.
While Hegel’s earlier theological writings call upon love—in par-
ticular the love of Jesus—to unify and reconcile what is disrupted, the 
Phenomenology invites us to disperse emotional energy in the negativity-
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 sharing movement of a lighthearted despair. With a laconic note in his 
wastebook of the time when he writes the Phenomenology, Hegel clarifi es 
that repair can be counterproductive: “a mended sock is better than a 
torn one; not so with self- consciousness” (Hegel 2002, 251). The narra-
tive of the Phenomenology, thus, draws more on the pleasure of Dionysian 
dismemberment than on the healing power of Christian love. Here is the 
beginning of the entry on Dionysus in Hederich’s Gründliches Lexikon der 
Mythologie, the authoritative source on Greek mythology during Hegel’s 
time:
DIONYSUS. . . . A common epithet of Bacchus, which according to 
some accounts is supposed to mean dionyzos, the one who opens and re-
veals [der Eröffnende], according to others, dianysos, the one who sweetly 
penetrates us [der lieblich in uns hinein geht], and according to yet other 
accounts, dialysos, the one who dissolves us [der uns aufl öset]. (my trans-
lation)
Bacchus’s epithet speaks of mutual penetration. Like Dionysus, the Phe-
nomenology’s narrative spreads open for its readers and penetrates them. 
The mutuality of this double movement dissolves the boundaries between 
remembering (or “inwardizing”) and dismembering. Or, to put it in 
slightly different terms, it has the effect that thesis and antithesis don’t 
complement one another in a synthesis, but share the same negativity.39 
Hegelian- Dionysian negativity propels other confi gurations of conscious-
ness to enter the scene and to play their part. It is the negativity of emo-
tionality, or the power of transport, that doesn’t congeal into a fi xed 
lack or a terrifying nothingness, but gives pleasure: “Thrice happy they 
of men that have looked upon these rites ere they go to  Hades’ house” 
(Sophocles).40 Like the myths of Demeter and Dionysus, the Phenomenol-
ogy explores the overlap of fi nitude and infi nity, and thereby initiates the 
reader into an affi rmation of despair.41
Spirit—the subject of the Phenomenology—is broken and scattered; 
truth is offered up in morsels. This has its sex appeal, as Butler points out:
We begin the Phenomenology with a sense that the main character has 
not yet arrived. . . . Our immediate impulse is to look more closely to 
discern this absent subject in the wings; we are poised for his arrival. As 
the narrative progresses beyond . . . the various deceptions of immedi-
ate truth, we realize slowly that this subject will not arrive all at once, 
but will offer choice morsels of himself, gestures, shadows, garments 
strewn along the way, and that this “waiting for the subject,” much like 
attending Godot, is the comic, even burlesque, dimension of Hegel’s 
Phenomenology. (Butler 1999, 20)
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Butler sketches the sexiness of the Phenomenology’s textual despair. We can 
linger on each part of the textual body. While reading, we disjoint the 
body of this truth that is often fi gured as an “organic unity” (§ 2). The 
sex act has a dismembering effect.42 Some might be disappointed in 
the end. Those who were not distracted enough by the activity of taking 
the narrative apart and tasting its bits might actually realize that Godot 
never came, that the grand subject never arrived, that their love for ab-
solute knowledge was never consummated. Or was it? The sexiness and 
pleasure of this text, if it exists, lies not in deferred gratifi cation, but in 
the orgiastic transport of every bit at any bend of the road: “The truth is 
the bacchanalian revel where no member is not drunk” (§ 47).
There is no reason for us to feel obliged to indulge the desire 
to heal when we read Hegel. Rather than labor to restore a presumed 
(w)holiness, we can join his text’s lighthearted despair. And yet, like the 
protagonist, most readers of the Phenomenology have their own resistance 
to despair. The Phenomenology has never been read as what it claims to 
be—a path of despair. There are two ways of resisting the Phenomenology’s 
despair, or rather, two despairs to be resisted: the protagonist’s despair 
and the text’s despair. The reader can escape the protagonist’s despair 
by distancing herself from the protagonist and instead identifying with 
the narrator—the phenomenologist. She can avoid the text’s despair by 
reading the text as a triumphant narrative of progress.
Rather than attending to the existential quality of the protagonist/ s’ 
suffering, some readers sense the comedy in these desperate attempts and 
foreground the protagonist/ s’ less- than- concrete existence, describing it 
as cartoonish. These readers notice that, while consciousness repeatedly 
gets knocked down, it always gets up again. As soon as it is back on its feet 
(however many) or its four wheels (for those who grew up in the U.S. of 
the 1950s and ’60s), the protagonist seems happier than ever:
For Hegel, tragic events are never decisive. . . . What seems like tragic 
blindness turns out to be more like the comic myopia of Mr. Magoo 
whose automobile careening through the neighbor’s chicken coop 
always seems to land on all four wheels. Like such miraculously resilient 
characters of the Saturday morning cartoon, Hegel’s protagonists always 
reassemble themselves, prepare a new scene, enter the stage armed with 
a new set of ontological insights—and fail again. (Butler 1999, 21)
This non- identifi catory absence of sympathy makes sense: after all, “con-
sciousness” is not a real person, and it is rather delightful to follow the 
display of such magic resilience. Of course the resilience is purchased 
with oblivion. After each crisis, a new shape of consciousness sets out 
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with the confi dence that it has found the truth that will last forever. This 
confi dence is possible only because it has forgotten its history of many 
painful failures to fi nd such truth. Consciousness’s resilience stems from 
its myopia, from the fact that it doesn’t see the whole, but simply uni-
versalizes its own particular moment. And yet it is precisely its blindness 
that will be each consciousness’s downfall. Amnesia produces resilience, 
but it also consumes the self; it is a way of despair. Similarly, the pro-
tagonist/ s’ lack of awareness about their historical determinateness frag-
ments the whole; it breaks the text apart into a series of positive shapes 
without much coherence. Because consciousness does not remember its 
previous life and does not recollect the many torturous self- negations 
that have led to where it is, the protagonist of the Phenomenology falls 
apart into many protagonists. And just as the protagonists’ turning away 
from despair generates despair—their own as well as the text’s—so the 
reader who dis- identifi es with the protagonist/ s and remains oblivious 
to their suffering produces a cartoonishness and lightheartedness that 
in fact overlaps with Hegelian despair.
The more common strategy to avoid the textual despair of the Phe-
nomenology is to read for the happy ending. Such a reading assumes that 
spirit’s self- formation (Bildung) concludes in absolute knowledge. In-
stead of on oblivion, this strategy stakes its bets on recollection. Rather 
than giving in to the distraction of the various stations, this reader keeps 
in view the whole, relates all the shreds of experience, and thus uni-
fi es the many protagonists into the one: spirit. And yet—as Hegelian as 
it sounds—this kind of reading actually doesn’t take seriously Hegel’s 
speculative notion of Erinnerung. Inwardizing never produces a whole. It 
expropriates the one who appropriates. We have seen earlier in this chap-
ter that consumption consumes the self. “Spirit only wins its truth when 
it fi nds its feet within its absolute disruption”—when it has lost the third 
foot, the foot of synthesis, and fi nds its feet within absolute disruption, 
not after the disruption has been repaired (§ 32). Relying on remem-
brance to produce a coherent story of progress leaves the reader with 
empty hands. In chapter 3 (“Release”), I have discussed how the fi nal 
chapter of the Phenomenology (on “Absolute Knowledge”) yields nothing 
in the sense of stable and positive knowledge. It rather leaves us with a 
feeling of disappointment: remembering dismembers.
There is yet another way of neutralizing the threat of this path of 
despair; it consists in containing despair. Many have read Hegel’s dialec-
tic as an economy of drama, where each confl ict is brought to a head in 
order to provoke a solution. This solution inevitably takes the form of 
destruction and new beginning.43 Despair, then, appears not as an avoid-
able breakdown—along the lines of “don’t despair now, we are almost 
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there”—but as a necessary stage, because, without despairing, we would 
never get there. Each section of the road springs from the protagonist’s 
despair. This story has two problems. First, it integrates suffering into an 
economy of sacrifi ce in the service of absolute knowledge. But the solu-
tion does not follow in any necessary way from the sacrifi ce. It is only by 
accident that the heart opens.44 Second, this scheme is complemented 
by the logic of Aufhebung understood in such a way that the repetition 
of the dialectic process can be read as progress. Obviously, this under-
standing of Aufhebung relies on a notion of recollection that again does 
not do justice to the speculative character of Hegel’s Erinnerung. I agree 
with Rajan who sees in the repetitions and returns of the phenomeno-
logical narrative a suspension and even an undoing of teleology—what 
she calls “Hegel’s self- consuming narrative” (Rajan 1995, 164). If we take 
seriously the double vector of the movement of inwardizing, it becomes 
very hard to construct a teleology, and we ultimately have to accept that 
there is no use for and no redemption of despair other than the pleasure 
of despair itself.
The pathbreaking sentence of the Phenomenology’s preface—“spirit . . . 
wins its truth only when it fi nds itself in absolute disruption [in der abso-
luten Zerrissenheit sich selbst fi ndet]”—does not mean that tears (teardrops) 
heal the tears (cracks) (§ 32, trans. modifi ed). It does not mean that 
fi nding oneself in disruption or registering inner confl ict undoes such 
incoherence. It means that self- remembrance is self- dismembering. I 
thus take issue with the dramatic reading of the Phenomenology that re-
lies on a simple notion of memory in its interpretation of Aufhebung, 
and argue instead that Aufhebung works to slightly dissociate emotion-
ality from itself and to produce not drama, but lightheartedness. The 
logic of lighthearted despair relies on the overlap of remembering and 
dismembering. To remember (to incorporate—to consume—to join 
and hold together—to learn by heart—to keep secret) and to dismem-
ber (to break—to shatter—to scatter and become scattered—to distract 
and get distracted—to forget—to open—to reveal) play each other and 
echo one another. “Dismembering” literalizes “remembering,” and “re-
membering” spiritualizes “dismembering.” Despair is fragmentation and 
stickiness.45 For the rubber subject of the Phenomenology, falling and get-
ting up are one and the same movement. The elastic self stretches until 
it tears; and when it tears, its pieces still stick together, without pathos or 
ambition. The cracks of the cockroach heal without leaving scars. This 
healing is just as little triumphant as the cracking is dramatic. And yet 





Appadurai locates the reasons for the increase in global violence in the 
spread of specifi c emotional conditions. In Fear of Small Numbers: An Es-
say on the Geography of Anger, he argues that the ethnic cleansings of the 
early 1990s in eastern Europe, Rwanda, and India, as well as the terror 
that has come to dominate the beginning of the new millennium, are the 
effects of a “geography of anger.” By this he means that global, regional, 
national, and local spaces are interwoven to replicate hatreds that are 
fueled by “social uncertainties” and ideological fears, such as the “anxiety 
of incompleteness” (Appadurai 2006, 8– 10). Understandably, Appadu-
rai doesn’t make it his job to thoroughly theorize the emotional condi-
tions that he features so prominently in the title of his illuminating book, 
namely fear and anger. But the recent wealth of political analysis, such as 
his, that takes emotion, affect, or feeling into account while investigating 
specifi c political issues, makes a thorough theory of emotional phenom-
ena all the more necessary.
Reemtsma argues as part of his wide- ranging critique of why mo-
dernity’s excesses of violence have not destroyed modern faith in mod-
ern institutions that the civilized taboo on violence makes us more sensi-
tive and more susceptible to trauma (Reemtsma 2008, 136). In response 
to Reemtsma’s diagnosis, one might want to propose homeopathic doses 
of violence to raise the threshold for trauma again. It was perhaps in this 
spirit of remedying easy bourgeois traumatization that Fisher has made 
his case for what he calls the “vehement passions.” And it seems to me 
that much of modernity’s characteristic cultivation of sexual passion has 
been serving exactly this function of a homeopathic cure against epi-
demic trauma. But Reemtsma has a more mediated form of homeopa-
thy in mind when he argues that the social and personal fragmentations 
so typical of modernity are the kind of violence that also provides the 
mechanisms to cope with trauma. Modern rationality—in the form of 
social and mental operations that distinguish, separate, and even split 
off parts of the self—can protect the person from being seized com-
pletely and broken irremediably by violence (Reemtsma 2008, 137). I 
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have shown throughout this book, and in particular in the last chap-
ter (“Broken”), that such anti- totalizing gestures and self- differentiating 
mechanisms do not exclusively, and not even primarily, belong to ratio-
nality but are, rather, the domain of emotionality.
I subsume rationality under emotionality—in counter- distinction 
to cognitivist accounts of emotion, where emotions are shown to serve ra-
tional processes. I do so in the hope that a better awareness of the work-
ings of emotionality will change what we accept as rationality, or, to put it 
more concisely, that emotionality will affect logic. I thus pursue a strategy 
slightly different from those accounts of affect that demand a radical 
separation of affect and cognition (because they want to foreground the 
values of emotion as irreducible to those of reason). In this conclusion, 
I will address two representatives of the separatist anti- cognitivist camp 
in emotion theory: one I disagree with—that is Fisher’s The Vehement Pas-
sions—and one I have a lot of affi nities with, Altieri’s The Particulars of 
Rapture. Their book titles already indicate that they both favor emotional 
fi gures of complete seizure (passion for Fisher and rapture for Altieri). 
But one reinforces the bluntness of such seizure by insisting on vehe-
mence while the other implies internal differentiation by promising the 
particulars.
My argument for the self- differentiating force of emotionality 
brings me into almost complete disagreement with Fisher’s case for pre-
modern passion. Fisher wants to rehabilitate the passions that have been 
ostracized, as it were, by a long history of civilization. Beginning with Sto-
icism and continuing with the Enlightenment and the establishment of 
modern bourgeois society, Western culture has spent enormous disciplin-
ing energy to moderate and privatize passionate experiences. Fisher is in-
terested in the passions over and against modern “emotions” or “moods,” 
not because the term “passion” vacillates fruitfully between passivity and 
activity (or because the term is tied to a rhetorical culture of affectation 
and self- affectation), but—quite to the contrary—because passion, in his 
view, propels to “immediate action” (Fisher 2002, 14).
He identifi es two strands in the history of the discourse on the pas-
sions: one that models all passions on fear (the strand inaugurated by 
Stoicism) and one that describes their characteristics using the template 
of anger. Fisher himself praises the advantages of focusing on anger. 
“The inner material of anger is . . . the will,” he maintains, while “where 
fear is used as a template, as it was in Stoicism, the passions are taken as 
disturbances of the self, rather than internal material of the self” (Fisher 
2002, 14). “No one,” he contends, “thinking of the passions by means 
of the template of anger could ever think of the passions as passive or 
opposed to actions” (ibid.). This is a rash claim, and I have shown in my 
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chapter on pathos that impassioned action must, from the perspective of 
even only a slight remove, indeed be deemed at least somewhat compul-
sive and unfree. The fact that Fisher brushes away any concerns about 
unfreedom within action leaves me wondering whether he equates an-
ger with activity and fear with passivity simply because the object of fear 
might attack us while we might attack others in anger. He thus confuses 
emotion with behavior. By insisting that passion is “internal material” 
rather than a disturbance from the outside, Fisher assumes a substantive 
inner core (the will) and doesn’t get into view that the self disturbs itself. 
Not to mention that fear and anger are much closer connected than 
Fisher’s forced separation of two strands of passion theory wants to make 
us believe. The entanglement of anger and fear is evident everywhere in 
the work of Appadurai, who sees anger and hatred grow out of fear and 
anxiety as well as spur fear in return. But most importantly, Fisher’s cele-
bration of sheer activism seems rather dangerous in light of Appadurai’s 
diagnosis of a global geography of anger.
What, then, are the values that drive Fisher’s account? Why does he 
want this truth about the passions and not another one? Fisher provides 
a bold answer to such questions when he suggests that “the template of 
anger . . . sponsors a fundamental claim for a model of human worth and 
dignity, inseparable from the passions and nearly equal to the worth and 
dignity of reason” (Fisher 2002, 15). This statement has two parts. He 
wants equal respect for passion and for reason. In addition, he claims to 
be invested in “human worth and dignity.” Let’s turn again to his descrip-
tions of anger to see what such apparent humanism might entail: “In 
anger an outward- streaming energy, active, fully engaging the will and 
demonstrating the most explosive self- centered claims on the world and 
on others, makes clear the relation of the passions to spiritedness or to 
high- spiritedness, to motion, to confi dence, and to self- expression in the 
world” (Fisher 2002, 13). When he speaks of “human worth and dignity,” 
Fisher, thus, clearly means that of the self—over and against the worth 
and dignity of the other. Indeed, he endorses “the most explosive self-
 centered claims . . . on others.” “The passions,” he argues, “assert a world 
in which there is only a single person over against all others” (Fisher 
2002, 64). The vehement passions he wants to rehabilitate are impervi-
ous to arguments. They have a “fi xed and immobile quality, a stubborn 
indiscussable intensity” (Fisher 2002, 67). And the passionate person is 
asocial and tyrannical; he creates in one swoop “a kinglike or godlike 
world where only the reality of his anger . . . has any importance”—that 
is to say, “a world in which there is only one center and all others exist as 
circumference” (Fisher 2002, 69).
But there are indeed also values to the passions. According to 
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Fisher, passions center the self and show who we truly are. “In a mo-
ment of extreme [passion], the self is completely given” (Fisher 2002, 
54). Such centering is achieved by the “absorbing concentration on one 
present- time object.” Fisher observes that “instead of diversifi ed invest-
ment,” passion “solidifi es attention in the direction of one monopolizing 
fact” (Fisher 2002, 62). He underscores that such focus creates a sense 
of unity and intensity: “In the moment of extreme [passion] . . . full mo-
mentary unity of the self is achieved, and it is a unity in which each part 
is pitched at a peak of activity” (Fisher 2002, 54). Typically modern frus-
trations, such as the mind- body split or the hierarchy among the per-
sonal faculties, are overcome in the state of passion: “All the parts of the 
self . . . —the body . . . , the mind . . . , the soul or spirit . . . —can . . . be 
demonstrated in an impassioned state not merely to be connected but 
to pervade one another so as to be capable of being fully and simulta-
neously present” (Fisher 2002, 55). From this sense of “living life to the 
fullest” stems the tremendous attraction of passionate states: “within the 
passions lies the most potent experience of our own individual reality of 
which we are capable” (Fisher 2002, 60).
The separate values of the passions, in Fisher’s account, are authen-
ticity and absorption, unity of self and full presence. These are values 
that are not commonly associated with the antisocial and anti- democratic 
ethos that Fisher exhibits. But the brashness of Fisher’s argument has 
the advantage that it clearly and unmistakably reveals the indeed inher-
ent link between the desire for authenticity and the need for violence.1 
Fisher’s account privileges passion over less vehement emotional states 
such as mood, emotion, or feeling because his appreciation of authentic-
ity and fullness of life creates a strong need for vehement states. But such 
fullness is short- lived and doesn’t happen very frequently. The transient 
experience of passion creates a longing desire for passionate states. Simi-
larly, once we are in a state of heightened passion, Fisher admits, “we are 
protecting [its vehemence] from interruption by other moods or other 
claims” (Fisher 2002, 67). Here we get a hint of the actual fragility of 
vehemence. It requires a lot of energy to boost and protect the suppos-
edly “natural” states of high passion. And sometimes, it simply requires 
violence.
The feeling of absorption that the passions afford comes at the 
expense of the reality of others: “With extreme fear, we seem to enter a 
world where no other person any longer exists” (Fisher 2002, 60). The 
intensity of high passion is also bought at the expense of other realities 
of the self. Vehemence lies in “the most uncompromising experience of 
the present moment of time. That moment of pure present time stands 
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uninfl ected and uncompromised by any secondary feeling for claims 
of other times past or future in which, under other circumstances, we 
might imagine our identity invested” (ibid.). Intersubjective and intra-
 subjective differences suffer equally in moments of great passion. Pas-
sionate states deny inner difference, that is to say, the fact that we are 
both more and less than one person and that we are invested in various 
different versions of ourselves. They also deny outer difference, that is to 
say, the friction that the various claims of others provide. The monopoliz-
ing attention of vehement passion does not care about the destruction 
of any of the things and values—and in extremis even people—which at 
that moment do not fall within its focus. Fisher’s example of Achilles—
who, in his extreme anger, “withdraws into a solitude from which he 
can watch the destruction of his own social world”—supports what we 
have seen in chapter 2, namely that the self- destructive stubbornness of 
the tragic hero provides evidence for the peculiar indifference of single-
 minded passion to the complexities of life and the subtleties of transport 
(Fisher 2002, 64). That the passionate hero doesn’t have the energy and 
mind to rescue his world makes sense because his passion has already (if 
subjectively and temporarily) annihilated that world: signifi cant others, 
as well as all previous and future realities of the self, have become utterly 
irrelevant.
Transport
I have cast emotionality not as passion, but as transport. While passion 
singularizes, transport pluralizes—it pluralizes both the subject who 
“has” the emotion and the subject that the emotion is. My account there-
fore does not explain all emotionality through one paradigmatic trans-
port (it belongs neither to Fisher’s anger strand nor to the fear strand he 
identifi es as governing the discourse on emotion). Instead, it brings out 
the internal differences of transports. For example, I have shown how the 
orgasmic quality of release that indeed seems to bring the Phenomenology 
to a passionately heroic end is offset by its sorrowful quality: the grief 
about the many fi gures of consciousness that were former selves and 
that have been negated along the way. Through this grief, the subject of 
the Phenomenology (spirit) connects with its former selves. It might seem 
contradictory, but release relates. Transports are modes of self- relation 
that both project future selves and remember past selves. The ejacula-
tory valence of release projects the Phenomenology into the future, while 
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the sustained process of relinquishing, that is part of release, involves 
remembrance.
The transports that are thus divided also divide or pluralize the sub-
ject. The characteristic ambivalence of transports unsettles those who try 
their best to experience them. They constantly need to renegotiate the 
specifi c valences and internal distributions of that ambivalence. I thus 
describe transports as driven by Hegelian dialectic, which is precisely not 
a regulated process of calm resolution through mediation of in them-
selves stable terms, but a messy dynamic where each pole is folded into its 
opposite so that both continually and internally modify one another, and 
where recognition (Erkennen) doesn’t follow with necessity but “bursts 
forth” as if by accident (§ 786).
Transports transform and they create a multiplicity of selves along 
the way. Altieri has argued that feelings can activate and advance pro-
cesses of transformation, especially if we adopt the right attitude toward 
them. In a wonderful reading of “The Dead,” the last story in Joyce’s 
Dubliners, Altieri shows that expanding one’s capacities to both express 
and read feelings (that is to say, cultivating an aesthetic approach to affec-
tive states) enables change (Altieri 2003, 220– 30). Using Hegel against 
Butler here, Altieri appreciates that such change of self be achieved not 
through a re- signifi cation of the codes that interpellate the subject but 
through “recontextualization.” He attributes more agency to the sub-
ject than Butler does. At the same time, his seemingly introspective ap-
proach (self- transformation via thorough explorations of feelings) is in-
deed aesthetic and outward- oriented. It transforms the world. The self 
must change by creating a new world, a new context for itself. The af-
fi nities with the procedure of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit are evident. 
Here, the protagonist/ s are transported with refl ective emotion to make 
existential shifts in perspective: with the transition to a new worldview, a 
whole new world emerges.
The emotional subject is never an individual. It is divided or multi-
plied within by the history of its previous fi gurations that are aufgehoben 
or folded into the story of its future unfoldings. The boundaries of the 
emotional subject are troubled; it is not a self- centered but an ek- static 
subject, or better, a subject in transport. Altieri foregrounds this inter-
stitial character of emotional transport when he observes that Gabriel, 
the main character of Joyce’s “The Dead,” “does not so much create 
new meaning as learn to dwell more attentively at the edges of meaning, 
where he can begin to see why his sense of self- importance cannot suf-
fi ce” (Altieri 2003, 228). Transports take place at the edges of meaning, 
at the margins of worlds, or, as Cixous puts it, “at the corner, at the angle” 
between states (Cixous 1997, 42).
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Plasticity
Emotional subjectivity is plastic. In the last chapter, I have used the term 
“rubber subject” to describe the plasticity of emotionality. My discussion 
of the rubber subject of despair has shown the positive aspects of ambiva-
lence and dividedness, namely that emotionality conceived as transport 
never seizes the person as a whole. Altieri also underscores the satisfaction 
that plasticity affords. He describes plasticity as “the capacity of a psyche 
or a work of art to establish satisfaction in holding together without col-
lapsing diverse aspects of experience which all have substantial claims 
upon us” (Altieri 2003, 205). For him, plasticity thus means the fl exible 
negotiation of ambivalence and complexity. Even though he appreci-
ates the capacity to “hold together without collapsing,” Altieri, rather 
haphazardly, rejects dialectical mediation (ibid.).2 In contrast, I consider 
Hegelian dialectic as a great tool not for reconciling what is torn, but 
for reconciling oneself to tears. Speculative plasticity thus strengthens 
us precisely for, as Altieri puts it, “dwelling emotionally within what the 
oppositions help unfold” (Altieri 2003, 206).
But wherein exactly lies the satisfaction that complexity, ambiva-
lence, and plasticity afford? Transports set us free despite, or precisely 
because of, the intensity of their call. They “eat us alive” (they consume 
us and make us come alive). Their intensity and vitality stems not from 
force or weight but from the diversity of their address. With Hegel—who 
of course famously sponsors “the whole”—we can say that transports fos-
ter a version of the whole that is not unifi ed, solid, and consistent but in-
ternally differentiated, articulated, and unfolding.3 Even though it might 
be diffi cult to respond to contradictory claims, the interstices between 
the different aspects of the experience of transport always leave us space 
to breathe. The transported self never goes all out, so to speak. Trans-
ports are differentiated forms of emotionality that self- augment and self-
 attenuate through refl ection and that mobilize the self’s resources to re-
fl ect and save itself. Put differently, the emotional subject or the subject 
in transport doesn’t have to die for its passion.
As we have seen when analyzing Fisher’s account of vehement pas-
sion, the topic of emotion is often used to buttress an unelastic fi rst-
 person perspective and a blunt narcissism. Yet, the plasticity of emotional 
subjectivity includes the capacity to switch from my fi rst- person to other 
fi rst- person perspectives and to appreciate other singularities without 
losing my own (see chapter 4, “Juggle”). One of the greatest values of 
plasticity lies in its encompassing both intra- and intersubjective relations 
while intertwining them. Altieri distinguishes between plasticity and “in-
volvedness,” another major advantage of affective life. By “involvedness” 
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he means the appreciation for the affective lives of others. To me, such 
involvedness is part of plasticity precisely because the plastic subject of 
emotionality relates to itself as another, and feels the other as itself. It can 
sympathize with others because it has learned to sympathize with itself. 
Interpersonal emotional relations are formed by way of a complex inter-
play of “sympathy and distance . . . fully conjoined” (Altieri 2003, 223). 
And not only does “using self- awareness [in affective matters] as a means 
of appreciating what creates signifi cance and shapes dispositions in other 
lives” show the identifi catory aspect of sympathy, but it also reveals that 
without such appreciation self- transformation would not be possible (Al-
tieri 2003, 195). Every seemingly independent individual that forms emo-
tional relations to others is itself already mediated, that is to say, it is the 
result of a history of emotional self- transformations that, each time, in-
volve the mediation through or identifi cation with others and that also, 
each time, deposit a remainder of otherness within the self. 
Alternately, one can view the different selves that develop along the 
way of emotional self- transformation not so much as different articula-
tions of one and the same subject, but indeed as different subjects with 
independent existences that then can relate to one another as if through 
sympathy across distance. Emotional plasticity is able to hold both per-
spectives together.
The discourse on emotion often serves the self- congratulatory cele-
bration of humanity, but the most stunning and rewarding achievement 
of plasticity lies in its impersonal sympathy. To offer an example, I would 
like to turn briefl y to Altieri’s reading of the concluding stanza of Wal-
lace Stevens’s “Sunday Morning.” Altieri shows a fi ne sense for the other-
 than- human quality of emotionality when he observes that “the poem’s 
fi nal refl ections try to expand the affective fi eld into an elastic space” 
(Altieri 2003, 206):
And in the isolation of the sky,
At evening, casual fl ocks of pigeons make
Ambiguous undulations as they sink
Downward to darkness, on extended wings. (quoted in Altieri 2003, 
 206)
Even though Altieri locates the agency of this plasticity at fi rst 
in an actant that can be readily identifi ed as the expression of human 
agency, namely the poem (“the poem’s fi nal refl ections try to expand”), 
he quickly shifts to the non- human agency of pigeons: “The pigeons 
stretch out this isolated sky . . . and their ‘ambiguous undulations’ also 
slow down the time framed by that sky” (Altieri 2003, 207). The plastic 
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capacities of pigeons stretch human worries about mortality into the elas-
tic space of a sky. As if contagioned with the undulating ambiguity of the 
pigeons’ motions, the vital materiality of the literary language follows 
suit: “Sound and syntax also work to slow down the sentence by suspend-
ing clauses and by playing long vowels and lush n and d sounds against 
the temporal fl ow of the sentence” (ibid.). And here the specifi c reward 
of this plasticity comes to the fore: “At fi rst, the poem could not recon-
cile in one space the idea of religious value and the fact of mortality. But 
now we can see that . . . resolution may be possible if we can simply ap-
proach consciousness as if it could treat its own embodiment as closely 
allied to the force of these extended wings” (ibid.). A subtle and calm—
perhaps “casual”—satisfaction lies in the practice of consciousness—be 
it that of the poet, the speaker, or the reader—to treat itself as “closely 
allied” with the elastic movements of other bodies and to get a plastic 
afterfeeling (nachempfi nden) for the ambiguity of the pigeons’ casual fall 
(see chapter 4).
Syntax
Such plasticity that extends into the impersonal calls into question—and 
here I differ from Altieri’s account—the “experience” character of emo-
tional transports. Rather than somehow merely providing the raw stuff 
for human experience and representation, emotionality articulates itself. 
It has a syntax of its own.
Using the example of trembling, I have elaborated that conscious-
ness can never fully experience a transport (i.e., it is not capable of the 
experience of absolute fear) but gets eclipsed in the transition from one 
version of self to another and can therefore relate to the actual transport 
only indirectly. Nancy submits that “the subject is—or makes up—the 
experience of its being affected” (Nancy 2002, 42). “To make up” means 
“to form” but also “to fabricate.”4 As experience, transport always has a 
fabricated quality to it. The human subject “has” the experience of abso-
lute fear (for example) only in the future perfect, that is to say, it has to 
make up the experience retrospectively and in anticipation.
Nevertheless, subject and emotionality are synonymous in Nancy’s 
statement (“the subject is—or makes up—the experience of its being 
affected”). Transports are self- relations. But by this I mean that emo-
tionality relates to itself. Highlighting the impersonality of transport 
must overlap with the inverse strategy, namely, to personify emotion-
ality itself. Emotionality is fundamentally performative. That is to say, 
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emotionality constitutes herself as a subject in transport in response to 
her dividedness, a dividedness which always also has the character of 
an interpellation—before other (witnessing) subjects who are thereby 
equally transported (compare the contagion of “Moi” with the emotion-
ality of Rameau’s nephew that I have discussed in the introduction). No 
human subject is necessary for this emotional self- relation or performa-
tive interpellation to take place. Human subjects can be involved, but 
the whole dynamic is never quite a personal “experience.” If transports 
can be called “experiences” at all, this term would refer to emotionality’s 
experience of itself; but in any case it would be a mediated, articulated, 
and indirect experience—the experience of a plural, syntactic, and am-
biguous subjectivity.
As made-up experiences, transports do not take place in time, but 
they shape—and even constitute—time. I thus agree with Fisher when he 
argues, building on Hume’s account of relative measure, that “by means 
of the passions, time undergoes granulation and is given units other than 
the mechanical and identical units of seconds, minutes, hours, days, and 
years” (Fisher 2002, 76). His focus on the vehement passions frames Fish-
er’s consideration of temporality and makes him describe the passionate 
subject as exclusively concerned with the pressing quality of nearby time 
(the immediate past and the imminent future). Such urgency does not 
at all belong to the temporal features of transports. In chapter 5, I have 
explored how the transport of mutual acknowledging (which crosses mu-
tual embrace with mutual penetration) makes time fl ow or blow in re-
verse. The winds and rivers of Hölderlin’s poem “Andenken” there gave 
evidence to the ambivalent pulls of such cross- vectored time. The mutual 
refl ections among and between the moments of transport add a spatial 
character to time—rendering it extremely slow and thick.5 Hegel shows 
not only that knowledge (Erkennen) is inherent in emotionality but also 
that this part of the transport of acknowledging is unending—mutual 
acknowledging is the trope of the repeated incipience of knowledge (An-
erkennen). We have encountered another example of the decelerating, 
cross- vectored time of emotionality in the “ambiguous undulations” of 
Stevens’s pigeons. An image of mutual embrace and penetration, the 
casual fl ocks of pigeons both embrace and stretch the sky with their ex-
tended wings while being held by the sky and pierced with its darkness 
so that they sink down. Chapter 7 has shown that transports break and 
multiply the subject, and in chapter 6 I discussed how the breaks within/ 
between the subject/ s reorient time. Time trembles back and forth across 
these cracks and, as a result, those subjects who would be distant from 
one another on a linear time continuum come to overlap here, in the 
broken temporality of transport.
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Throughout this book, I have pursued different genre consider-
ations, describing Hegel’s Phenomenology as a narrative, as a theatrical 
piece, and as a poem, as well as making an argument about emotionality 
as constitutively theatrical (it needs a scene in order to transport one; see 
chapter 3, “Release”) and about the experience of transport as essentially 
narrative (it becomes available only via anticipation or retrospection; see 
chapter 6, “Tremble”). At this point, I want to underscore again that the 
mediated structure and specifi c temporality of emotionality resonates 
most thoroughly with poetry. This is so not so much because of the char-
acteristic subjectivity of lyric poetry but because of its rhythm. Poetic 
rhythm generates a different kind of syntax than that of logical sequence 
and rule- bound subordination.
Lyric poetry, says Hegel, “allows particular ideas to subsist alongside 
one another . . . whereas thinking demands and produces dependence 
of things on one another, reciprocal relations, logical judgments, syllo-
gisms, etc.”6 Things and ideas (and voices and sounds and fonts, among 
other things) subsist alongside one another in the poem, without a clear 
hierarchy. Different versions of the same poem (one that foregrounds a 
sound structure, one that highlights a certain meaning, one that focuses 
on the visual line breaks, for example) are layered one upon the other. 
These versions are certainly not unrelated. Their distinction and con-
nection, their affi nities and frictions, their refl ections across their incon-
gruences build an emotional syntax.
Lightheartedness
The more the emotional subject wants to experience sincere and sub-
stantive emotion, the more it becomes palpable (fi rst of all to the emo-
tional subject itself) that such emotional substance must be produced 
(that experience must be made) by a rather tenuous operation of intensi-
fi cation through refl ection and cross- identifi cation—the concentration 
of emotional energy through a play of mirrors. The (non-)experience 
of the sublime, Pfau has shown convincingly, means the death of natural 
feeling (see the end of chapter 1). From hence on feeling has something 
fi ctional about it.
On the other hand, even a cynic would not be able to deny her im-
potence to fabricate transports completely at will. That we need to make 
up the experience of transport does not give us a fully constructionist 
version of emotion. Malabou’s “voir venir”—which she devised to “repre-
sent that interplay, within Hegelian philosophy, of teleological necessity 
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and surprise”—also brilliantly captures the (un)anticipatory structure of 
transport: we are sure of what is coming and yet we don’t know what is 
coming (Malabou 2005, 13). Feelings surface when we least suspect them 
and fail to come about when we think we should feel something. In their 
fl eetingness they escape our control even though we participate in their 
production. Even if it is very slight, a transport always bursts. Transports 
form a language that evades us in a way that is similar to ironic language. 
Indeed, the awareness of the intrinsically ironic character of language 
in general (the fact that we cannot with fi nal certainty prevent our utter-
ances from turning against us, or others from twisting our words) facili-
tates the acceptance of the ambiguity of transports, of the fact that we 
are both subjects of emotion and subject to emotion. Instead of suffering 
from this condition, one might playfully embrace it.
In the fi rst two chapters, I have discussed Hegel’s critique of natu-
ralizing accounts of emotion. The second part of the book (on emo-
tional syntax) has therefore explored Hegelian emotionality as largely 
synonymous with negativity. It has emphasized the tears (in both pronun-
ciations), the blanks, the syncopes, and the brokenness of subjectivity, as 
well as the unending quality of the labor of the negative. As a result, my 
discussion has featured quite a few primarily negative emotions (grief, 
shame, fear, despair). But Hegel also offers the element of levity, impro-
visation, and playfulness that lifts the weight and earnestness from the 
Hegelian “labor of the negative.” Loosely quoting Goethe’s translation of 
Diderot’s Rameau’s Nephew, Hegel notes with regard to the performative 
quality of transports that “a strain of the ridiculous will be blended in . . . , 
which denatures [feelings] [ihnen ihre Natur benimmt]” (§ 521). Rameau’s 
nephew exemplifi es the emotional subjectivity operative throughout the 
Phenomenology, and this emotional subjectivity is not characterized by con-
sistency and integrity but instead slides through a whole scale of tones 
and feelings. The range and speed of the nephew’s performances turns 
up the ludicrous and silly aspect of emotionality. It undoes the idea that 
feelings are natural and therefore can and must be frankly expressed 
and respected.
Brushing aside the usual scholarly insistence on Hegel’s supposed 
scorn for irony, Trilling contends that “Hegel in his Phenomenology goes 
far towards explaining the intellectual value that irony may be supposed 
to have” (Trilling 1972, 12). Clearly, there is also an emotional value to 
irony that we can read off the Phenomenology. Rather than suffering from 
its inability to achieve a fundamental unity of self and to safeguard the 
sincerity of natural feeling, spirit takes its tears lightly. It mocks itself. The 
very articulation of disruption that Rameau’s nephew accomplishes “is” 
in turn “the derisive laughter about the disorientation of the whole and 
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about itself” (§ 524). The phrase “disorientation of the whole” must re-
mind us of Hegel’s description of truth in the preface: “The truth is the 
whole. However, the whole is only the essence completing itself through 
its own unfolding [Entwicklung]” (§ 20, trans. modifi ed). Through the 
fi gure of the nephew, spirit explicitly acknowledges that its journey of 
formation—this whole, which is the truth—is indeed confusing and con-
fused. Trilling concludes that “if ‘the whole’ is seen as ‘confused’ rather 
than as orderly and rational . . . the human relation to it need not be 
fi xed and categorical; it can be mercurial and improvisational” (Trill-
ing 1972, 121). Spirit’s laughter about itself liberates its readers and its 
various conscious manifestations (or fi gures of consciousness) from the 
weight of the “labor of the negative.”
I share Trilling’s appreciation for contingency, improvisation, and 
levity in Hegel. But I am not exclusively concerned with “the human rela-
tion” to spirit. I consider irony to be not just a rhetorical device, but also a 
constitutive factor of emotionality itself. Trilling’s wonderfully simple de-
scription of irony as an instrument to establish a disconnection, detach-
ment, or refl ective distance “between the speaker and his interlocutor, 
or between the speaker and that which is being spoken about, or even 
between the speaker and himself,” nevertheless does not get into view the 
non- instrumental and non- anthropogenic forms of irony (Trilling 1972, 
120). While Ngai has argued that a particular group of emotions—she 
calls them “ugly feelings”—have a special relationship to irony, it seems 
to me that it is rather a certain understanding of emotion that brings 
the ironic quality of emotionality to the fore.7 The account that I have 
offered here—of emotionality as a relation to alterity that is internally 
mediated—clearly relies on the slight and volatile distance that irony 
provides. Irony is part of emotionality. The tremendous energy that natu-
ralizing accounts of emotion have to spend in the attempt to keep irony 
out of the emotional picture (by locking feeling into the heart or by dra-
matizing the weight of passion) only proves this point.
Irony ruins pathos and breaks hearts. Yet there is no need to get 
overly invested in the pathos of distance, either. The “generous irony” 
that Altieri envisions overlays, in my view, self- differing with the inverse 
operation, namely excessive presencing (Altieri 2003, 228). The heart 
breaks but one doesn’t suffer in earnest because what “bursts forth” is 
the “Yes” of affi rmation (§ 786). The heart bursts into laughter. If all goes 
well, the ironic account of emotion proposed in this book encourages 
hearts to stop laboring at dramatizing passion and to embrace lightheart-
edness instead. Such lightheartedness may well take the form of exces-
sive sentimentality.
If the experience of transport is that “I is an other,” then “I” cannot 
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fully live up to my feelings. The dishonesty lies not only in the linguistic 
expression. To be certain, I cannot mean what I say when I say “I love 
you.” In the fi nal analysis, I will be unable to prove or even justify this 
declaration (see Smock 2003). But the hypocrisy of declarative language 
comes from the fact that transport itself is performative; it cannot pro-
vide a substantive referent for linguistic description. My discussion of 
fear in chapter 6 has shown that one can never fully experience fear be-
cause the experience divides the self. In love and in fear, to remain with 
these examples, we are unable to be serious. A certain kind of lightheart-
edness always slips into the experience of emotionality. We are incapable 
of owning up to our self- descriptions when we say that we fear or that we 
love, because transports keep changing the subject. Emotions are a joke, 
and we are laughable when emotional.
But in its very impotence lies also the innocence of emotionality. 
Most accounts of feeling since the eighteenth century construct inno-
cence as naive and natural feeling as uncontaminated by refl ection, while 
knowledge is seen as bringing about the fall from natural grace and thus 
as guilty. Yet, in a speculative account of emotionality innocence and 
guilt, refl ection and feeling are maintained one within the other. Inno-
cence might then be described as the practice of bearing “the unbear-
able remoteness of incessant pain,” or love, or shame, or fear, or any 
other unjustifi able feeling that is irretrievable yet inescapable in its re-
moteness from itself (Smock 1984, 61). Bearing the lightheartedness of 
emotionality then coincides with protecting emotionality from our urge 
to mean it. Such practice could reduce the need for violence that stems 
from our terror of being nothing but a joke.
Of course, sooner or later we will fail this innocence, the trope 
of transport will add one more spin and innocence will turn into guilt, 
love into hate, and the remoteness of pain into the immediacy of a blow 
(see Smock’s discussion of Melville’s “Billy Budd” in Smock 2003). But, 
despite such turns for the worse, we have now caught a glimpse of the 
turn from pretense to innocence. We might want to linger for a while and 
join this revel of valences in which no member is not drunk. The turn 
from pretense to innocence can also be described as a return from mod-
ern emotionality to an eighteenth- century sentimentality now conceived 
differently. If emotionality turns back into sentimentality, this return dis-
places the trope of the heart: sentimentality now can be understood not 
as an investment in sincerity but as a hyperpresence, a playful relation to 
lack. To the self- refl exive staging of emotionality this sentimentality re-
sponds with an excess of sincerity, the very excessive character of which, 
Sokolsky argues, mocks any sincere investment in sincerity.8
The heart breaks and breaks and breaks and each breaking heals 
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without leaving scars, mocking the impossible verdict of self- expression 
with lightheartedness. “Unabashed sentimentality would be understood 
not as a search for an encompassing substantial unity, but instead as an 
attempt to render unintelligible both this search and the counterargu-
ment that one must fail to be adequate to oneself” (Sokolsky 1987, 83). 
Instead of naively denying alienation or forcefully prohibiting unity, sen-
timentality in this sense takes the heterogeneity of the self so excessively 
and unreasonably seriously that, together with the allegedly natural unity 
of the “I,” it loses also the “conceptual means to describe this loss as loss” 
(ibid.). Among her excessive tears such a sentimentalist suffers no sense 
of loss. If emotionality all too often turns either into the violent negation 
of the vulnerability that runs through the condition of self- differentiality 
(as in the turn from impossible love to a very possible hate) or else into 
the self- punishing prohibition of unity, excessive sentimentality offers 
over- presence or being “too much oneself” as a playful yet critical alter-
native. This ludic relation to lack challenges the self- tormenting obses-
sion with lack as both too serious and not serious enough. Compared 
with unabashed sentimentality, the melodrama of self- denial still sub-
scribes, despite its own declarations to the contrary, to a logic of non-
 contradiction that is unable to conceive of negativity, alienation, and 
refl ection as embroiled with presence, innocence, and naïveté.9 It is the 
distinction of Hegel’s speculative philosophy that it affi rms the overlap 
between the mediated and the immediate, between irony and sincerity, 





1. Among them most importantly are Judith Butler, Rebecca Comay, Eva 
Geulen, Frederic Jameson, Catherine Malabou, John McCumber, Jean- Luc Nancy, 
Terry Pinkard, Tilottama Rajan, and Slavoj Žižek. Rebecca Comay’s Mourning 
Sickness: Hegel and the French Revolution was published after this book had been 
submitted to Northwestern Press. Comay puts behind us the topos of Hegel as 
grand unifi er focusing on “nonrecognition, nonproductivity, noncommemora-
tion, nonredemption” (80) and analyzing “absolute knowledge” as the exposi-
tion of the constitutive yet traumatic untimeliness of consciousness (5– 6). The 
book is a brilliant reading of the “Spirit” section of the Phenomenology that fore-
grounds the role of emotion in Hegel and thoroughly thickens our understand-
ing of this text by applying the tools of literary criticism (in addition to explor-
ing the historical context of the French Revolution and situating Hegel in the 
history of ideas as close to Nietzsche and Freud). Comay offers an example for 
the constitutive self- refl ection of emotion that I explore in this book, when she 
describes how “the bad infi nite of suspicion makes terror both refl exive . . . and 
in turn self- refl ective” (82).
2. I quote from Pinkard’s new translation of the Phenomenology of Spirit, 
available online at http:// web.mac .com/ titpaul/ Site/ Phenomenology_of_Spirit
_page .html. From here on this translation of the Phenomenology of Spirit is re-
ferred to by paragraph numbers only (using the section sign). When referring 
to a specifi c fi gure of the protagonist/ s I use the neuter pronoun, unless Hegel 
gives this fi gure a masculine designation. In this case, I follow Hegel in the use 
of masculine pronouns. In doing so, I don’t mean to suggest that the positions 
of master and servant, for example, or of any other fi gure of consciousness he 
renders masculine, cannot be occupied by female subjects.
3. For an argument for the use of “emotionality” as the term of art for emo-
tion studies, see Pahl, “Emotionality: A Brief Introduction.”
4. Compare Pinkard, “Symbolic, Classical, and Romantic Art,” 19: “In mod-
ern . . . art, the characters . . . not only worry about what they in fact feel, but also 
worry if what they feel is real, worry about how they should feel, and constantly 
offer explanations to each other about all these things in an effort to determine 
what it is that is going on ‘within’ themselves.”
5. Compare Illouz, who argues in Cold Intimacies that we currently partici-
pate to an unprecedented degree in the staging of personal authenticity, a highly 
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paradoxical and embattled practice that extends into the spheres of corporate 
business and politics.
6. The term “transport” safeguards against conceiving of emotions as 
“states.” Compare Pippin, Hegel’s Practical Philosophy, 53: “Feelings thus in Hegel’s 
language are also said to be ‘modes of negativity’—or non- identity, where this 
means a mode of self- relation within an experience, not merely . . . just being 
in . . . a state.”
7. Speight accurately describes the Phenomenology as “quasi- literary” in his 
cogent analysis of the essentially literary shape of Hegel’s philosophy of agency.
8. On the Phenomenology as bildungsroman, see Royce, Lectures on Modern 
Idealism, 147– 56; and Abrams, Natural Supernaturalism, 225– 37. Even though 
Speight addresses how the different literary genres of tragedy, comedy, and the 
novel inform Hegel’s philosophy of agency (by modeling the practices of retro-
spectivity, theatricality, and forgiveness), he reduces the differences between 
these genres to the one overarching notion of “narrative” and describes the Phe-
nomenology as “Hegel’s novel.”
9. I agree with Altieri’s preference for adverbial over adjectival treatments 
of the emotions (The Particulars of Rapture, 9– 16). See also Pfau, Romantic Moods, 
31: “Emotions thus are not ‘owned’ by an individual as some discrete representa-
tion but, instead, are experienced as a dynamic or mood by which the quotidian 
practice of representation and cognition is suffused.”
10. I use “sympathy” as the translation of the German Nachempfi ndung 
rather than of Einfühlung, because the latter (literally: “feeling oneself into”) 
reinscribes interiority and because I appreciate the temporal lag and supplemen-
tarity of Nachempfi ndung (“having an afterfeeling” or “imitating a feeling”). For 
more on sympathy, see chapter 4.
11. Nussbaum seems to appreciate disruption when she describes emotions 
as “acknowledgements of neediness and lack of self- suffi ciency” (Nussbaum, Up-
heavals, 22). Unfortunately, this aspect of emotional ethics gets lost in her overall 
normative treatment that differentiates between ethical and unethical, good and 
bad, or healthy and sick emotions. See also Altieri’s critique of Nussbaum in The 
Particulars of Rapture, 153– 80.
12. The quotation marks are in Hegel’s text and indicate quotations from 
Goethe’s translation of Le neveu de Rameau. Hegel at times condenses vastly dispa-
rate parts of the dialogue and he does not always quote correctly.
13. Hegel combines here a quote from “Moi” reacting to “Lui” with a quote 
from another performance of the nephew.
14. Taylor has addressed some of the asocial and apolitical effects of being 
absorbed in the quest for individual authenticity in The Ethics of Authenticity. Trill-
ing ends his discussion of sincerity and authenticity in a strong critique of the 
intellectual tendency to see the ultimate promise of authenticity in madness. 
He fi nds the “belief that human existence is made authentic by the possession 
of a power, or the persuasion of its possession, which is not to be qualifi ed or 
restricted by the co-ordinate existence of any fellow man” “appalling” precisely 
because it exalts “ultimate isolatedness” at the expense of social relations (Trill-
ing, Sincerity and Authenticity, 171).
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15. Discourse ethics could help to de- dramatize and to externalize emo-
tion, but its proceduralism paints a rather fragile picture of democracy. Proce-
duralists see democracy “founder” if rational agents do not adhere to the sincer-
ity principle. See Anderson’s paraphrase of Rawls: “If citizens do not undertake 
to present their views sincerely, and if those in power do not sincerely believe 
in the reasons they themselves offer for their actions, then the entire project of 
political liberalism founders” (Anderson, The Way We Argue Now, 168). Given the 
highly paradoxical character of sincerity (not to mention the tricks that language 
plays on us) and the various possible ways to conceive of truthfulness, the sincer-
ity principle seems a rather tall order. In light of these diffi culties, proceduralism 
must defi ne the rules of communicative action with such exaggerated strictness 
that making everybody adhere to its rules verges itself on the unethical.
16. Compare Hamacher on philology as affection for language as affection 
(Hamacher, Für—Die Philologie).
17. Trilling, Sincerity and Authenticity, 16.
18. Compare Altieri on plasticity (The Particulars of Rapture, 205– 7). Altieri 
identifi es three aspects of affective states that bring satisfaction as ends in them-
selves: intensity, involvedness, and plasticity. He insists that these are “conative,” 
not ethical, values, but qualifi es this statement, announcing that he is “most in-
terested in the possibility of demonstrating how an emphasis on conative states 
is compatible with immediate and sustained attention to the situations of other 
human beings” (182).
19. To take Hegel’s disparagements at face value is often misleading and 
only gets one trapped in resentful stupidity. Geulen’s brilliant reading of the 
Hegelian verdict of the end of art is an excellent case in point. She shows that 
when Hegel draws the line around ancient Greek art as the consummation of the 
aesthetic ideal, he does, in fact, not ring the death knell for art in general, but 
both points to the dubious and ambivalent ending of the prehistory of classical 
art and opens the fl oor for the specifi c vitality of modern art. See Geulen, “Hegel 
ohne Ende.”
Chapter 1
1. Compare Redding, Logic of Affect, 130: “Hegel was rather concerned that 
a wedge not be driven between feeling and concept in mental life such that 
feeling would thereby become sequestered in an inaccessibly private subjective 
realm.”
2. Schleiermacher, Über die Religion: Reden an die Gebildeten unter ihren Veräch-
tern, 22– 74 (my translation).
3. See § 9: “Whoever seeks mere edifi cation, who wants to surround the 
diversity of his existence and thought in a kind of fog, and who then demands 
an indeterminate enjoyment of this indeterminate divinity, may look wherever 
he pleases to fi nd it. . . . However, philosophy must keep up its guard against the 
desire to be edifying.”
4. See Nietzsche, “Ecce Homo,” 777: “In the history of the quest for knowl-
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edge the Germans are inscribed with nothing but ambiguous names; they have 
always brought forth only ‘unconscious’ counterfeiters (Fichte, Schelling, Scho-
penhauer, Hegel, and Schleiermacher deserve the epithet as well as Kant and 
Leibniz: they are all mere veil makers [alles blosse Schleiermacher]).”
5. Hegel mocks the rejection of rationality as a misplaced frugality that 
results in spiritual impoverishment rather than philosophical superiority: “Even 
to a lesser extent must this kind of science- renouncing self- satisfaction [Genüg-
samkeit] claim that such enthusiasm and obscurantism is itself a bit higher than 
science” (§ 10).
6. For example, by the politically infl uential Rosenkreuz Orden.
7. Compare Pfau, Romantic Moods, 12: “Kant had shown . . . the essentially 
nonpropositional status of feeling.”
8. See, for example, Rousseau, “Origins of Inequality,” 202: “The imagina-
tion which causes such ravages among us, never speaks to the heart of savages, 
who quietly await the impulses of nature, yield to them involuntarily, with more 
pleasure than ardor, and, their wants once satisfi ed, lose the desire.” Rousseau’s 
valorization of natural needs and feelings hinges upon their involuntary char-
acter; they are unaffected by the will and the imagination, and thus escape the 
perils of refl ection.
9. Among the wealth of cognitive philosophy on emotion that emphasize 
the world- structuring and salience- giving faculty of the emotions, the most sig-
nifi cant are perhaps De Sousa’s The Rationality of Emotions and Nussbaum’s Up-
heavals of Thought.
10. Another worry with Enlightenment rationality stems from a more 
jaded reaction to the rule of reason as generating not so much a crisis of values 
and beliefs but a cold objectivity that levels fi rst- person experiences and invest-
ments. This position also seeks recourse in emotion but usually requires more 
heat for emotion than those who battle disorientation and undecidability with 
“the intelligence of emotions” (subtitle to Nussbaum’s Upheavals of Thought). 
Compare Fisher, The Vehement Passions, 248– 49: “The passions, as I have tried to 
defi ne them . . . insist on . . . the differential reality of life in time. Time’s distinct 
parts . . . are details not to be surrendered or blended somehow into any objec-
tive, larger abstraction of time. . . . The passions are evidence in us for the prior 
importance of my own world over the world.” Even though Fisher mentions “the 
guiding Kantian ideals of reciprocity and universality” in his conclusion as one 
of several important victories of objectifi cation, he spends the bulk of his book 
dismantling these Kantian ideals (246).
11. Chapter 7 circles back to the question of how to respond to skepti-
cism. There, I discuss despair as a transport that, rather than protecting against 
skepticism, radicalizes it, exposing the self to its negativity from which it emerges 
lightheartedly.
12. Compare Hegel, Encyclopedia, § 438: “The essential and actual truth 
which reason is, lies in the simple identity of the subjectivity of the concept with 
its objectivity. . . . The universality of reason, therefore, whilst it signifi es that the 
object . . . is now itself universal, permeating and encompassing [das Ich durch-
dringend und befassend] the ‘I,’ also signifi es that the pure ‘I’ is the pure form 
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which overlaps the object and encompasses [über das Objekt übergreifend und es in 
sich befassend] it” (trans. modifi ed).
13. Compare Hegel, Philosophy of Right, 14.
14. They deplore the fact that “humanity . . . does not live in the gratifying 
unity of the law and the heart. Rather, it either lives in dreadful separation and 
suffering, or it at least lives as being deprived in taking pleasure in itself when it 
obeys the law” (Phenomenology, § 371).
15. Russo discusses how the French philosophes of the late Enlighten-
ment, despite their taste for the serious and the sublime, inadvertently fall into 
the frivolity and irony of the goût moderne they so despise. Hegel certainly makes 
a similar argument when he claims that the proponents of the “law of the heart” 
are simply unaware to what extent they reproduce the pleasure principle that 
ruled the previous dialectic. I agree with Russo when she points to the political 
suspiciousness of conceiving of feeling as a unifying force: “Emotion became a 
weapon in the philosophical struggle, applied in order to control and unify an 
audience that until then had been insubordinate, scattered and unresponsive to 
truth” (Russo, Styles of Enlightenment, 12).
16. Compare Žižek, Parallax, 206: “Hegel’s thesis that ‘subject is not sub-
stance’ has thus to be taken quite literally: subject . . . is something that exists only 
insofar as it appears to itself. This is why it is wrong to search behind the appearance 
for the ‘true core’ of subjectivity: behind it there is, precisely, nothing. . . . A Self 
is precisely an entity without any substantial density, without any hard kernel that 
would guarantee its consistency.”
17. See the next section for a more detailed discussion of the alienating 
experience of self- realization.
18. Against this organicism of self- expression, Žižek argues that the self 
emerges as “a violent rupture of organic homeostasis” (Žižek, Parallax, 210).
19. “Instead of attaining its own being, it therefore attains within being the 
alienation [Entfremdung] of itself from itself ” (§ 374, trans. modifi ed).
20. We might be more familiar today with the more recent critiques of 
sentimentality offered by Berlant (in The Female Complaint), by Baldwin (who con-
tends that “sentimentality . . . is always . . . the signal of secret and violent inhu-
manity” [“Everybody’s Protest Novel,” quoted in Berlant, 33]), and by Trilling 
(who traces the convoluted itinerary from Rousseau’s sentimental idealization of 
the savage to Conrad’s story of civilization’s paradoxical embrace and contempt 
for the “heart of darkness” [Trilling, Sincerity and Authenticity]). But Hegel was 
one of the fi rst to articulate this critique, and despite the differences between 
eighteenth- century and twentieth- century forms of sentimentalism, the gist of 
his critique still holds.
21. Speight follows Royce and Hyppolite in exploring this allusion (Hegel, 
Literature and the Problem of Agency, 27– 31).
22. The fi gure of the “heartless rebel” is rather common in late eighteenth-
 century German literature. In addition to Schiller’s The Robbers, see, for example, 
Hölderlin’s Hyperion, second vol., book 1. Hyperion participates in the Greek 
war of liberation against Turkey in hopes of establishing the reign of the law of 
the heart: “wo einst in unser Gesetzbuch eingeschrieben werden die Gesetze der 
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Natur, und wo das Leben selbst, wo sie, die göttliche Natur, die in kein Buch ge-
schrieben werden kann, im Herz der Gemeinde seyn wird” (Hölderlin, Sämtliche 
Werke, 3:116). But he soon realizes that his companions in battle are less than 
excellent: “Es ist aus, Diotima! Unsere Leute haben geplündert, gemordet, ohne 
Unterschied . . . es war ein außerordentliches Project, durch eine Räuberbande 
mein Elysium zu pfl anzen” (ibid., 3:117).
23. Berlant, The Female Complaint.
24. In the Encyclopedia, Hegel describes madness (Verrücktheit) as a situation 
where the subject “remains fast in a particularity of its self- feeling [in einer Beson-
derheit seines Selbstgefühls beharren bleibt]” (§ 408).
25. As is necessarily the case, according to Hegel, since “individuality, 
which entrusts itself to the objective element, makes itself vulnerable (gibt preis) 
to being altered and turned topsy- turvy” (§ 322).
26. Schiller, “Sprache,” published in Musenalmanach 1797 under the title 
“Tabulae Votivae.” The full text is: “Warum kann der lebendige Geist dem Geist 
nicht erscheinen? / Spricht die Seele, so spricht ach! schon die Seele nicht mehr” 
(Why does the living spirit fail to appear to the spirit? / When the soul speaks, 
alas, it is no longer the soul that speaks). My translation.
27. Schiller’s distich is of course set in verse, but he mangles the rhythm; 
instead of maintaining the trochaic meter he opts for the cursive. The trochaic 
version—“Spricht die Seele, so spricht ach! die Seele schon nicht mehr”—would 
have kept the phrase “spricht die Seele” intact, with the exception of the then 
even more dramatic interjection “ach!” while the rules of meter would have put 
the stress on Seele.
28. Indeed, the expressionist premise shows a lack of spirit. See § 340: “it 
has spiritlessly [auf diese geistlose Weise] grasped cognition as ‘The outer is sup-
posed to be an expression of the inner.’ ”
29. Taylor ties back to Herder the idea of (holistic) expression that he 
fi nds in Hegel (see Hegel and Modern Society). Taylor describes German Roman-
ticism as driven by attempts to reconcile the expressive unity emphasized by 
Herder with the philosophy of radical autonomy developed by Kant. In his view, 
it is Hegel who eventually solved the problem. Pippin draws on Kant to make 
an argument for spirit’s self- legislation. He calls this model of self- actualization 
an “expressive” one, in distinction to the “causal” model of natural self- making 
that is derived from Aristotelian teleology. See Pippin, Hegel’s Practical Philosophy, 
17: “The key and very controversial point to be defended is: Hegel’s self- making 
model is not derived from Aristotelian notions of natural growth and maturation 
into some fl ourishing state, but from a claim about the self- legislated character 
of all normativity.” Menke pursues a very interesting program. He argues for a 
rejuvenation of the tragic (in the strictly Hegelian sense of two irreconcilable 
but equal values) where self- expression and justice are recognized as equal yet 
confl icting values.
30. The foremost example of spirit’s textual relation to itself is of course 
the Phenomenology of Spirit itself. Within the Phenomenology, it is the chapter on 
spirit, in particular, that both thematizes and performs the text model of self-
 realization. Speight has convincingly made the important argument that the Phe-
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nomenology takes a “literary turn” in the transition from the chapter on “Reason” 
to that on “Spirit” and that the three sections of the “Spirit” chapter together 
offer a complex account of the textual character of action and agency that is in-
trinsically tied to this chapter’s engagement with literary works (Hegel, Literature 
and the Problem of Agency, 18).
31. Compare Taylor, “The Expressivist Turn,” 368– 90.
32. Compare Müller- Sievers, Self- Generation, 4: “ ‘Organic’ indeed became 
the ultimate praise in philosophical and aesthetic judgment in the period of the 
epigenetic turn [around 1800], a status the word has not lost since.”
33. Moyar argues the same in his article on “Self- Completing Alienation.” 
While Moyar establishes (self-)transparency as a necessary condition for non-
 alienated life, he concludes with the strong claim that “alienation is not simply 
an enemy to be stamped out, but rather the very background tension that main-
tains modern societies in their imperfect freedom” (172).
34. Pinkard proposes “emptying oneself” as a translation of Entäußerung. 
He points out that Hegel quotes with this term Luther’s German translation of 
the Greek kenosis—“God’s becoming fl esh by virtue of renouncing large parts of 
his own divinity” (Pinkard, “Shape of Spirit,” 120).
35. Pippin comes close to understanding actualization as utterance when 
he compares agency with being a speaker of a natural language. But he doesn’t 
have a textual notion of language. For him, the comparison with natural lan-
guage serves to evince the collective social construction of rational agency, that 
is to say, he relies on the idea of a transparency of language. His argument is 
that one can function as a rational agent only if one adds another thread to 
the safety net of mutual recognition, just as “vocalizations count as speaking the 
language only within a language community” (Pippin, Hegel’s Practical Philosophy, 
197). Hegel’s conception of action as exposure, on the other hand, emphasizes 
the Verkehrung, Verfremdung, and transformation of any deed by others, rather 
than a collective construction of mutual transparency.
36. In fact, Äußerung is not the privilege of the human subject. Any force—
including those of the natural world—is bound to exert itself (sich äußern). See 
the chapter in the Phenomenology on “Force and the Understanding.”
37. With The Inoperative Community Nancy had not yet embarked on his ex-
traordinarily interesting and novel reading of Hegel that he offered in Hegel: The 
Restlessness of the Negative. In the earlier work, Nancy still treats Hegel as a thinker 
of the state—and even equates Hegelian philosophy somewhat fl ippantly with 
the state (see Nancy, Inoperative Community, 32: “it is no longer Hegel. It is no 
longer the State”). Because of the consistency of his thought of the community’s 
unworking with his reading of the restlessness of the negative, I fi nd it neverthe-
less useful to also draw on Nancy’s earlier work to illuminate Hegel’s model of 
textual utterance.
38. See § 62: “thought, instead of getting any farther with the transition 
from subject to predicate . . . fi nds the subject also to be immediately present in 
the predicate.” For a more detailed discussion of the speculative proposition, see 
chapter 4 (“Juggle”).
39. I agree with Terada’s conclusion of the impersonal textuality of emo-
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tion and fully endorse her project to dislocate emotion from the human subject. 
But, with Hegel, I describe textual (self-)reference as (non- human) subjectivity. 
Thus foregrounding impersonal subjectivity in Hegel, I agree with Nancy’s no-
tion of the subject: “the self is what does not posses itself” (Nancy, Hegel, 36).
40. “What will later come to be for consciousness will be the experience 
of what spirit is, that is, this absolute substance which constitutes the unity of its 
oppositions in their complete freedom and self- suffi ciency, namely, in the oppo-
sitions of the various self- consciousnesses existing for themselves: The I that is we 
and the we that is I” (§ 177).
41. Following Žižek, Egginton correctly identifi es the operative fi ction of 
absolute knowledge as one of Hegel’s most important lessons. See Egginton, The 
Philosopher’s Desire, 103.
42. The passage I just analyzed is a good example of “the complicated 
footwork” of the Phenomenology that Jameson appreciates because it allows the 
Phenomenology “to avoid taking positions at the same time that it expounds them” 
( Jameson, Hegel Variations, 7). Not only the “heterogeneity of the book” has pre-
vented its various themes and textual passages from being transformed “into 
pure or coherent philosophical positions, into identifi able ideas or concepts, . . . 
about which we can say that they represent Hegel’s offi cial thoughts,” as Jameson 
has recently observed, but also, and more specifi cally, Hegel’s use of free indirect 
discourse has done so (ibid.). 
43. Pfau identifi es this kind of epistemological paranoia as one of the three 
moods constitutive of Romanticism.
44. See again Hegel’s discussion of the power of the understanding in the 
preface to the Phenomenology, § 32: “Spirit only wins its truth when it fi nds its feet 
[sich selbst fi ndet] within its absolute disruption [Zerrissenheit].” For further dis-
cussion of the understanding as the self- lacerating mode of spirit, see chapter 7 
(“Broken”).
45. See § 32: “to keep and hold fast to what is dead requires only the great-
est force”—it requires the strength and the labor of the understanding.
46. Arguing against my reading, one might propose that when Hegel writes 
“it turns out that behind the so-called curtain, which is supposed to hide what 
is inner, there is nothing to be seen unless we ourselves go behind it,” the “we” 
refers to the phenomenologist/ s who can fi ll the empty space with their supe-
rior knowledge. The phenomenologist/ s—such objection would suggest—play 
the role of Goethe’s Turmgesellschaft in Wilhelm Meisters Lehrjahre, who providently 
guides the protagonist on its path of Bildung. It is true that the “we” is ambiguous 
here; it can refer to both the phenomenologist/ s over and against the protago-
nist/ s, as well as to a narrative identifi cation with the protagonist. In the follow-
ing, I will make the case for the latter.
47. See § 303: “Observational psychology . . . discovers all sorts of faculties, 
inclinations, and passions, and since in its recounting of this collection, the rec-
ollection of the unity of self- consciousness does not allow itself to be suppressed, 
it follows that observational psychology must at least get to the point of being 
astonished that in spirit so many sorts of things and such heterogeneous things 
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without connection can exist alongside one another in the way they would in a 
sack [wie in einem Sacke].”
48. Around 1800, the pit is widely used as a metaphor for interiority. One par-
ticularly interesting example is to be found in Schiller’s Wallensteins Tod (Werke II, 
3): “Des Menschen Thaten und Gedanken, wiszt! / Sind nicht wie Meeres blind be-
wegte Wellen. / Die innre Welt, sein Microcosmus, ist / der tiefe Schacht, aus dem 
sie ewig quellen.” Quoted after Deutsches Wörterbuch von Jacob und Wilhelm Grimm, 
s.v. “Schacht.” Schiller’s use of the metaphor shows particularly well what its func-
tion was and wherein its appeal lay, namely to stabilize emotional and mental life 
against the unpredictable fl uidity of “blindly stirred waves” (blind bewegte Wellen).
49. See Hegel, Encyclopedia, § 453: the “inability to grasp a universal [as] in-
trinsically concrete [yet] simple, is what has led people to talk about special fi bres 
and areas as receptacles of particular ideas.”
50. Of course any perceptual image can serve as a sign, and perhaps even 
a kind of writing. But this is not Hegel’s concern here.
51. Derrida shows that Hegel cannot maintain this distinction. See “The 
Pit and the Pyramid: Introduction to the Semiology of Hegel.”
52. “Acquired habit subsequently effaces the peculiarity by which alpha-
betic writing appears . . . , it makes them a sort of hieroglyphic to us” (Encyclope-
dia, § 459, Zusatz). The note suggests that Hegel considers reciting by heart as 
writing in Derrida’s sense. Derrida doesn’t use this passage for his argument.
53. Compare Nancy, Hegel, 34– 35: “To penetrate negativity demands ‘an-
other language’ than the language of representation. The latter is the language 
of separation: the language of concepts in their fi xity, of propositions and their 
copulas; it is the language of signifi cation. . . . The language of philosophy is 
language itself spoken in its infi nity; which is to say, at each instant, at each word, 
at each signifi cation, language is put outside itself, insignifi cant or more- than-
 signifi cant, interrupted and strained toward its own negativity—toward the ‘vital-
ity’ of ‘the self.’”
54. About the “an sich” as an ingredient in experience, see McCumber, 
“The Temporal Turn,” 44– 59.
55. In the context of agency, this double movement takes the form of in-
ternalized habits that form a second nature. For a brilliant discussion of “second 
nature” in Hegel, see Malabou, The Future of Hegel, part 1.
56. The beautiful soul appears in literary texts usually as feminine (see 
“Bekenntnisse einer schönen Seele” in Goethe’s Wilhelm Meister and Henriette 
in Jacobi’s Woldemar). On the other hand and quite predictably, this female fi g-
ure is used to treat questions of male friendship (in particular the friendship 
between Jacobi and Goethe themselves). Hegel, as usual, uses the neuter or a 
strictly grammatical gender (in this case: die Seele is feminine).
57. “This created world is its speech, which it has likewise immediately heard 
and whose echo returns only to it [deren Echo nur zu ihm zurückkommt]” (§ 658; 
trans. modifi ed).
58. See chapter 3 (“Release”) for a discussion of speculative friendship, i.e., 
of the idea that friendship includes aggression, enmity, difference, and negativity.
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59. One of the principal literary examples of the beautiful soul, Jacobi’s 
Woldemar, has drawn criticism by others than Hegel for its generalization of per-
sonal experiences and its lack of awareness for differences. Schopenhauer, for 
example, in his preface to Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, mockingly describes 
Jacobi as a great philosopher “welcher wahrhaft rührende Bücher geschrieben 
und nur die kleine Schwachheit hat, Alles, was er vor seinem fünfzehnten Jahre 
gelernt und approbiert hat, für angeborene Grundgedanken des menschlichen 
Geistes zu halten.”
60. “The content that language has acquired here is no longer the inverted 
and inverting, disrupted self of the world of cultural maturation [Welt der Bil-
dung]. Rather, it is spirit which has returned into itself, is certain of itself, certain 
within itself of its truth, that is, certain of its recognition and certain as the spirit 
which is recognized as this knowledge” (§ 653). This certainty (Gewissheit) that 
constitutes conscience (Gewissen)—the certain knowledge of recognition accom-
plished or guaranteed, rather than incipient (An- erkennen) as a process requiring 
struggle—is the last unbroken bone, as it were, in the Phenomenology’s otherwise 
completely broken protagonist. It is the most solid bastion against alienation and 
tears (Zerrissenheit). But the hard heart will break without violence (more on that 
in chapter 7, “Broken”).
61. “The articulation of this assurance sublates the form of its particularity, 
and it therein recognizes the necessary universality of the self. In that it calls itself 
‘conscience,’ it calls itself pure self- knowledge and pure abstract will, i.e., it calls 
itself the universal knowledge and willing” (§ 654).
62. Kant seems to evoke a kind of conatus of aesthetic pleasure when he 
insists that “this pleasure is in no way practical. . . . But yet it involves causality, viz. 
of maintaining without further design the state of the representation itself and 
the occupation of the cognitive powers. We linger over the contemplation of the 
beautiful because this contemplation strengthens and reproduces itself” (Critique 
of Judgment, § 12).
63. Sokolsky has argued that sentimentalism might subscribe less (and 
more) than usually assumed to the values of honesty, purity, naïveté, natural feel-
ing, and (self-)transparency. In her reading, the sentimental mocks the declara-
tion of sincerity by being more than sincere. She thus uncovers an irony through 
excess in sentimentalism. See also epilogue.
64. Despite using “virtual” and “notional” here, Pfau more precisely argues 
that, after Kant’s account of the sublime, feelings become essentially literary. 
That is to say, from then on we need literature—especially its most complex 
confi gurations (Pfau’s examples are Novalis’s Bildungsroman and Hölderlin’s tri-
adic hymns)—to produce feelings and to communicate them to ourselves and 
to others.
Chapter 2
1. See Nietzsche, Gay Science, section 317: “Retrospection.—While we are 
living each phase of our lives we rarely recognize its true pathos, but always see 
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it as the only state that is now possible for us and reasonable and—to use some 
words and a distinction of the Greeks—thoroughly an ethos and not a pathos.”
2. Wahl, Le Malheur de la conscience.
3. I draw on Malabou’s notion of “plasticity” to bring out the layered qual-
ity of theatrical pathos and to spatialize Aufhebung.
4. Large and infl uential traditions of moral philosophy have thought of 
the passions as by defi nition immoral. For the Stoa, for example, páthe are not 
only “alogical,” but against nature and by the same token unethical.
5. Hegel does not explicitly reference Aristotle in the Phenomenology, but 
he studied Aristotle intensely for his fi rst course on the history of philosophy in 
1805. Ferrarin has demonstrated the infl uence of Aristotle on Hegel’s substantial 
changes in his systematic conceptions around 1805, especially on the changes in 
his concepts of subjectivity and self- realization (Ferrarin, Hegel and Aristotle, esp. 
408– 11). I think that it is safe to assume that Aristotle’s critique of Socratic intel-
lectualist moral philosophy had already informed Hegel’s notion of ethics by the 
time he was writing the Phenomenology (around 1806). It allowed him to project 
his own critique of Kant’s intellectualist moral philosophy on a different screen.
6. Here I quote from the 1817 version of the lectures on the history of 
philosophy (Heidelberger Niederschrift). An English translation of the 1825– 26 ver-
sion has been published. Where the two versions overlap, I quote the published 
translation; otherwise the translations are my own and the page numbers in pa-
rentheses refer to the German original.
7. “Passion (love, ambition, thirst for glory) is the universal not in the 
realm of insight, but in the realm of agency and . . . as self- actualizing” (Hegel, 
Geschichte der Philosophie, 474, my translation).
8. These two views are only different sides of the same coin: the acknowl-
edgment that personal intentions are subjected to ironic reversal.
9. Hegel often uses both terms interchangeably. Yet, in contexts where he 
wants to draw a distinction between self- serving passions and passions for a cause 
of ethical substance, he uses Leidenschaft for the former and reserves Pathos for 
the latter.
10. With the emergence of tragedy in the history of Athenian theater, the 
number of characters a play featured was extended from one to two.
11. With this link that Hegel draws between ethics and tragedy, we are 
reminded of Aristotle’s Poetics. In the Poetics, Aristotle uses the word páthos to re-
fer to the grave suffering that the tragic heroes experience. Aristotle mentions 
“death on stage, severe pain, and injuries” (chapter 11). The qualifi cation “on-
 stage” páthos here refers to physical suffering in the presence of spectators.
12. See chapter 1 (“Heart”).
13. The heroes of Greek tragedies often insist on the existential weight of 
their pathos and resist the attempts of the chorus or of other characters to dif-
fuse the crisis. See Butler on Antigone’s refusal to dissociate the deed from her 
person (Butler, Antigone’s Claim, 8); and Menke on the excessive self- judgment of 
Oedipus in Menke, Gegenwart der Tragödie, 13– 101, in particular 40– 46.
14. In line with Hegel’s own merging of the ethical and the theatrical 
realms, Speight draws attention to the fact that the actors of Athenian tragedy 
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wear masks (Hegel, Literature and the Problem of Agency, 64). The character of their 
persona is thus fi xed in advance.
15. We have recently witnessed a renaissance of arguments in favor of a 
tragic worldview. For the best among them, see Connolly and Menke. I appreci-
ate the humbling effect of the tragic worldview on notions of human agency and 
autonomy (Connolly) as much as I appreciate the argument in favor of sustain-
ing the fundamental confl ict between different normative perspectives (Menke). 
My contribution to this discussion on the tragic lies in drawing attention to the 
fact that tragedy creates pathos as much as pathos creates tragedy. This cannot 
be good news since pathos in the dramatic sense, as Hegel defi nes it, does not do 
much to humble human agents or to make them appreciate the equal relevance 
of irreconcilable normative values.
16. Hegel clarifi es that the genre of tragedy requires that the law that is 
violated must be apparent to the one who violates it. The fault of the tragic hero 
lies in not taking seriously what, in principle, is known to him.
17. Hegel discusses tragic pathos twice in the Phenomenology; fi rst in the 
context of issues regarding communal life and ethical conduct (“Spirit” section), 
and then again as part of his discussion of the religious worldview of the Greeks 
(“Religion” section). His later Lectures on the Philosophy of Art expand on the sec-
ond perspective. Hegel never published his lectures on art and aesthetics. At this 
point, there are three editions of the lecture notes: (1) Hotho’s 1835 compila-
tion of notes taken by various students from the four different times Hegel gave 
the lecture in Berlin—this text is widely used and has been translated into En-
glish (and is referred to as “Hegel 1975” in this study), (2) the critical edition of 
Hotho’s notes from the 1823 lecture (referred to as “Hegel 1998” in this study), 
and (3) the critical edition of Pfordten’s notes from the 1826 lecture (referred 
to as “Hegel 2005” in this study). Because of the dubious authorship of Hotho’s 
compilation, I have, whenever possible, avoided using this text.
18. Hegel quotes Sophocles, Antigone, verse 926, probably in his own trans-
lation (see the editor’s notes to the Meiner edition of the Phenomenology). Willige 
and Bayer translate: So muß ich duldend wohl gestehn: ich frevelte (München: Arte-
mis, 1995). Kuchenmüller translates: Dann seh ich ein: ich leide, weil ich fehlte (Stutt-
gart: Reclam, 1955). Wyckoff’s translation into English reads, “In suffering I’ll 
see my error clear” (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954). Franklin and 
Harrison translate “When I have suffered, I will understand that I have sinned” 
(Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge University Press, 2003)
19. I translate Anerkennen as “acknowledging,” rather than “recognition.” 
For the reasons, see chapter 5 (“Acknowledging”).
20. The auxiliary verb sollen (“should”) makes all the difference. Hegel 
does not say that Leidenschaft is base, but that “ ‘passion’ carries the connotation 
of something that should be . . . base.”
21. He speaks of the “depopulation of heaven” (Entvölkerung des Himmels, 
§ 741).
22. Compare Menke, “Learning from Suffering,” in Tragic Play.
23. Speight describes Antigone’s acknowledgment of error as an expres-
sion of amor fati (Hegel, Literature and the Problem of Agency, 64– 67). In his view, she 
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accepts the partitiveness of ethical action as necessary, rather than relativizing 
her pathos.
24. In Antigone’s and Oedipus’s insistence on their guilt we can see the 
auto- aggressive and suicidal streak bound up with the self- important streak of 
Pathos. See note 13.
25. See Pinkard, Sociality of Reason, 146: “Because the Greeks (or at the least 
the adulated, idealized Greeks) conceived of their ethical life as quasi- natural, 
as something that naturally restored itself to a happy and just equilibrium, they 
could not understand that their success depended not so much on a naturally 
self- restoring form of life as on their own actions.”
26. Nobody since Jean Wahl has analyzed this structure of Hegel’s dialectic 
as an emotional economy.
27. It is important to note that Hegel doesn’t fi nd this comparison very 
productive. See § 66: “It would . . . be expedient to avoid the name, ‘God,’ be-
cause this word is not immediately the concept but is rather . . . the fi xed point 
of rest of the underlying subject. . . . Even when speculative truths are stated 
about that subject, their content lacks the immanent concept because that con-
tent is only present as a motionless subject, and in these circumstances, specula-
tive truths easily take on the form of mere edifi cation.”
28. Without us, the readers, spirit would have comprehended itself only 
once: in Hegel’s mind, one would assume. But an unacknowledged singularity 
doesn’t count in Hegel’s world.
29. For a more extensive discussion of Bildung as torture, see chapter 7 
(“Broken”).
30. I have already discussed that the world of “ethical order” doesn’t learn 
from the tragic crisis, but considers justice done when the initial calm is restored. 
Another example is the “unhappy consciousness” who, even though it hears from 
the “mediator” the true meaning of action and agency, insists that “for itself, ac-
tion and its actual activity remain impoverished, its enjoyment in consumption 
remains sorrowful, and the sublation of these in any positive sense continues to 
be postponed to an other- worldly beyond” (§ 230, trans. modifi ed).
31. The Phenomenology has its moments of authorial boasting as well. I dis-
cuss one of them in chapter 6 (“Tremble”).
32. I discuss Hegel’s strategies to draw the reader into the textual process 
in chapter 4 (“Juggle”). They are rather complicated and sometimes counter-
productive.
33. Hegel would chastise such repudiation as spiritless: “Spirit is not this 
power which . . . avoids looking at the negative, as is the case when we say of 
something that it is nothing or that it is false, and then, being done with it, go off 
on our own way on to something else” (§ 32).
34. While Žižek (On Belief, chapter 4) and Malabou (The Future of Hegel, 
91– 94 and chapter 7) have shown the importance of kenosis in Hegel’s thought, 
they have not discussed God’s suffering as an instance of Pathos.
35. Hegel’s critique of Schlegel’s notion of irony is certainly motivated by 
Hegel’s strong position in favor of actual self- abandonment. For his critique of 
irony, see Philosophy of Right, 147– 49, and Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art, 64– 68. The 
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passage on irony is part of Hotho’s compilation of the lecture notes of various 
students of Hegel’s various lectures on aesthetics; it is not part of his own notes 
taken during Hegel’s 1823 lecture on fi ne art. Due to Hotho’s compilation, we 
might thus have a skewed sense of the actual importance for Hegel of the cri-
tique of Romantic irony. The same holds for the Philosophy of Right, where some 
of the more derogatory discussion of irony is to be found in the “additions” 
(lecture notes of questionable origin). It is important to note that Hegel did not 
dismiss all forms of irony. As part of the lectures on aesthetics, he speaks posi-
tively of the irony of the Greek gods. He also appreciates Solger’s notion of irony 
(see his “Review of Solger’s Posthumous Writings and Correspondence”). In fact, I will 
use the remainder of this chapter to argue that Hegel’s speculative philosophy 
embraces irony.
36. De Boer offers a very interesting version of the argument that “Hegel’s 
conception of tragic confl icts is not bound to his analysis of Greek culture, but 
constitutes the very heart of his philosophical method,” because she foregrounds 
and appreciates the “entanglement” of the terms in confl ict, rather than the con-
fl ict’s resolution (De Boer, On Hegel: The Sway of the Negative, 180).
37. I want to thank Rüdiger Campe for the opportunity to co-teach two 
sessions on Hegel’s theory of tragedy at Johns Hopkins University. During these 
sessions, he drew my attention to the word Handlung.
38. For Speight’s worry about theatricality, see, for example, 70: “If desire 
and motivation . . . have instead a socially mediated or ‘theatrical’ character, is 
there a notion of self that can escape the alternation between hypocritical imita-
tion or role playing on the one hand and refl ection about it on the other?” For 
his discussion of forgiveness, see his chapter 4 (“Forgiveness and the Roman-
tic Novel: Contesting the Beautiful Soul”). For Pinkard’s stipulations for free 
agency, see Sociality of Reason, 188.
39. Antigone refers to her pathos as the gods’ “unwritten and unchanging 
laws” (v. 554). Creon has the positive laws of the polis to draw on.
40. See § 467 (trans. modifi ed): “In universal ethical life . . . it is not this in-
dividual who acts and is guilty, for as this self . . . he exists merely as the universal 
self. Individuality is purely the formal moment of doing anything at all, and the 
content of action are the laws and mores, and those are determined for the indi-
vidual by his station in life. . . . As part of a people, self- consciousness descends 
from the universal only down to the point of particularity; it does not get as far 
as the point of individuality.”
41. See Aristotle, Poetics, chapter 19.
42. Derrida offers relever as the equivalent in French (not the French trans-
lation) of aufheben. He thereby displaces aufheben and introduces a shift within 
the logic of Aufhebung to the logic of différance. Expanding on one of the mean-
ings of relever (to lift again), Nancy presents Aufhebung as a repetitive plasticity 
(in the sense that the product of Aufhebung precedes its own production) rather 
than a linear progression. According to Nancy’s analysis, Aufhebung, thus, both 
has already passed and is still to be performed (through the work of reading). 
The reader fi nds herself in the midst of an ongoing procedure without know-
ing its rules: “we must—à la commedia dell’arte—improvise, and without know-
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ing our lines we must make progress through the plot” (Nancy 2001, 18). Coming 
from a different theoretical perspective but also with a sense for the paradoxes 
of Hegelian logic, Redding offers an evolutionary account of Aufhebung and pro-
poses “bootstrapping” as a synonym (Logic of Affect, 150– 58). Even though they 
dispute the reductionism of linear time, all of these accounts still envisage Auf-
hebung as temporal.
43. See my discussion of the chapter transitions in chapter 6.
44. For the logic of this identity of identity and difference, see Hegel on di-
vision (Unterschied) at the end of the chapter on the understanding in the Phenom-
enology, the section on “Contradiction” in “Book Two: The Doctrine of Essence” 
in the Science of Logic, and sections 115– 22 of the Encyclopedia.
45. In chapter 7 (“Broken”) and chapter 6 (“Tremble”), respectively.
46. Female irony takes the form of intrigue because women are not sup-
posed to act. “The feminine has its pleasure” in the “brave youth” (tapfre Jüngling) 
because he is ready for action (§ 474). This gendered distribution of action and 
inaction is rather heteronormative. Hegel queers Spirit when he calls for dissolv-
ing (aufheben) the pathos of natural gender in transgender performances: “ethi-
cal action has the moment of crime in itself because it does not sublate [aufhebt] 
the natural allocation of the two laws to the two sexes[, but] rather [persists] 
within natural immediacy” (§ 467). I don’t agree with Jagentowicz Mills’s reading 
that Hegel “confi n[es] women to the family” (“Hegel’s Antigone,” 84) or with 
Lydia Rainford’s statement that “Hegel’s portraits of the position of ‘woman’ 
place her fi rmly within the lower strata of being and consciousness” (Rainford, 
She Changes by Intrigue, 87).
47. See § 730: “the invincible elasticity of its unity extinguishes the point-
 like singleness of the actor and his fi gurations.”
48. See Benhabib, “On Hegel, Women, and Irony,” 40– 41.
49. See § 746: “The force of dialectical knowledge . . . puts weapons of 
deception into the hands of preoccupied and anxiety- ridden old age.” Creon 
belongs to the category of “old age”; he positions himself in opposition to Hae-
mon’s youth (see Sophocles, Antigone, v. 725ff.).
50. See § 747: “Rather, the genuine self of the actor coincides with the 
persona he plays, just as the spectator is perfectly at home in what is represented 
to him and sees himself playing a role therein . . . It is the return of everything 
universal into the certainty of itself, which . . . is, on the part of consciousness, 
well- being and letting- oneself- be- well [Sich- wohlsein- lassen], which is no longer to 
be found outside of this comedy.”
51. I am referring here to the pit (Schacht) of the intellect in which mem-
ory deposits its images. See the previous chapter.
52. Among the several descriptions of irony Hutcheon offers, the follow-
ing is particularly useful for the context of my concern with an emotional ethics: 
“[Irony] undermines stated meaning by removing the semantic security of ‘one 
signifi er: one signifi ed’ and by revealing the complex and inclusive, relational 
and differential nature of ironic meaning- making” (Hutcheon, Irony’s Edge, 13). 
I’d like to rephrase this description for my context as: the plasticity of emotion in 
Hegel undermines the substance of pathos and the security of “one individual: 
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one god/ law” by revealing the complex and inclusive, relational and differential 
theatricality of emotional meaning- making.
53. See Altieri’s “A Plea for ‘Generous Irony’ in Interpreting Affective Ex-
perience” (Particulars of Rapture, 228– 30), in particular, p. 229: “We do not have 
to repudiate all . . . intimacies . . . in order to approximate the forms of freedom 
provided by more bitter ironic stances.”
Chapter 3
1. Pfau argues the same. He locates the historical emergence of this con-
ception of feeling with Kant’s third Critique (in particular, with Kant’s analysis of 
the sublime). See my discussion at the end of chapter 1 (“Heart”). Terada en-
counters the idea that emotions require theatricality already in Rousseau (read 
through Derrida). In fact, one can move back further in time. Medievalists sub-
mit that feelings were commonly authenticated theatrically in the Middle Ages 
(see, for example, Eming, “On Stage: Ritualized Emotions and Theatricality in 
Isolde’s Trial,” 555– 71). And scholars of rhetoric argue that the practice of affec-
tion and auto- affection common in Greek and Roman rhetoric relied on a no-
tion of theatrically produced affect (see Campe, Affekt und Ausdruck).
2. Cixous, Rootprints, 31.
3. See also Agamben, Language and Death, 78: “The metrical- musical ele-
ment demonstrates fi rst of all the verse as a place of memory and a repetition. 
The verse (versus, from verto, the act of turning, to return, as opposed to prorsus, 
to proceed directly, as in prose) signals for a reader that these words have always 
already come to be, that they will return again, and that the instance of the word 
that takes place in a poem is, for this reason, ungraspable” (ibid.).
4. Even after correcting the reading from a parallel to a chiasmic syntax, 
the very chiasm of the stanza’s third and fourth line gives Verzweifl ung a promi-
nence that counteracts the explicit mood of the poem.
5. Both Miller and Pinkard shift to the masculine pronoun in the last two 
lines (Miller even capitalizes “Him”), after referring to spirit by the neuter per-
sonal pronoun throughout their translation of the Phenomenology. This decision 
unnecessarily forces the entire passage into a Christian horizon of meaning.
6. To my knowledge, Hegel uses the word Schädelstätte in only two other 
passages; both are to be found in his lectures on aesthetics. In the fi rst instance, 
Schädelstätte refers to the passion of Christ; in the second, it signifi es lifeless, non-
 self- refl ective matter. See Hegel, Werke in zwanzig Bänden, 14:152: “Der eigent liche 
Wendepunkt in diesem Leben Gottes ist das Abtun seiner einzelnen Existenz als 
dieses Menschen . . . , die Schädelstätte des Geistes, die Pein des Todes”; Hegel, 
Werke in zwanzig Bänden, 14:370 (on the beautiful form of sculpture): “Freilich 
darf dabei nicht in der Weise Galls verfahren werden, der den Geist zu einer blo-
ßen Schädelstätte macht.” Note the questionable authorship of the compilation 
of lecture notes published as Hegel’s aesthetics.
7. See Meyers, s.v. “Golgatha” (“schädelförmiger Hügel bei Jerusalem”).
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8. See Brockhaus, s.v. “Golgatha” (“Der Name Golgatha wurde später mit 
dem Schädel Adams in Verbindung gebracht, der nach der Legende hier begra-
ben sein soll. Dahinter steht wohl der Gedanke, daß Christus als zweiter Adam 
die Schuld Adams sühne”).
9. Grimms Wörterbuch defi nes “Schädelstätte” as “stätte, wo schädel liegen” 
and cites Jean Paul’s Dämmerungen with an example of this general and non-
 religious use of the word: “Wir hätten von Glück im Unglück zu sagen, . . . hätte 
man für die gefüllte Schädelstätte eines Schlachtfeldes stets einen groszen Kopf 
erkauft.”
10. Scarry, The Body in Pain, introduction.
11. Emily Dickinson, “The Mystery of Pain.”
12. Note the challengers of Scarry’s understanding of pain. Ahmed, for ex-
ample, explores the mediatedness and the sociality of pain in The Cultural Politics 
of Emotion, 23– 31. Lethen identifi es an inability to even feel pain in the face of 
the absolute lack of an (ideological, cultural, or religious) superstructure (Über-
wölbung) serving as a sound board (“Die Evidenz des Schmerzes”).
13. See Terada, Feeling in Theory, 47.
14. One can also describe this emotionality as an aesthetic relationality 
where the parties and/or states inaccurately replicate one another. Such a de-
scription would draw on Bersani’s work with Dutoit in Forms of Being and with 
Phillips in Intimacies.
15. See Cixous, Déluge, 14: “As soon as the dark song starts, nobody can 
resist drinking. . . . We are all ancient children dying of thirst / Ah! I was thirsty! 
Let’s cry / For dozens of years, I so felt like crying!” (my translation).
16. This is not the only instance where the Phenomenology breaks into verse. 
Hegel quotes four lines from Goethe’s Faust at the beginning of “Pleasure and 
Necessity” (§ 360), and two lines, in Hegel’s own translation, from Sophocles’ 
Antigone in the section on “Ethical Life” (§ 436). In both cases Hegel does not 
quote verbatim, and these two other insertions of verse can also be read as per-
formances of personal friendship. His reference to Faust easily gives away He-
gel’s regard for Goethe, while the lines from Antigone hide the interlocutor more 
thoroughly. It is in dialogue with Hölderlin—beginning when they were both 
students at the Tübinger Stift—that Hegel reads, translates, and even attempts a 
metrical rendering of Antigone.
17. McCumber observes that “the lonely Master of Worlds, independent of 
his creation, is gone: absolute Spirit, Spirit which knows itself, is result only. And 
what it results from, the series of shapes of consciousness which ‘foams forth’ 
to it, is not the set of all possible shapes—the ganze realm of shapes of con-
sciousness. It is merely this realm . . . Its self- determining unity is not infi nitude 
itself, die Unendlichkeit, but the infi nitude immanently determined by that specifi c 
whole: seine Unendlichkeit” (McCumber 2000, 56– 57).
18. See Schiller, “Die Freundschaft,” line 27: “Nur in dir bestaun’ ich mich.”
19. See, for example, § 795: “the knowing of pure knowledge not as ab-
stract essence . . . , but the knowing of this pure knowledge as an essence which is 
this knowing, this individual pure self- consciousness.”
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20. See Blanchot, The Infi nite Conversation, 75: “The fact that speech needs 
to pass from one interlocutor to the other in order to be confi rmed, contra-
dicted, or developed shows the necessity of interval.”
21. Blanchot distinguishes three overlapping modes of interruption: “to 
interrupt oneself for the sake of understanding,” “to understand in order to 
speak,” and “speaking . . . only to interrupt oneself and to render possible the 
impossible interruption” (Blanchot, The Infi nite Conversation, 79).
22. Nur is anticipated and echoed by the ohne (without) in the previous 
phrase.
23. In chapter 4, I will analyze in more detail what it means that Hegel con-
siders his philosophical prose to be affected by verse. Specifi cally, I argue there 
that he wants the philosophical proposition to be read not only in one direction, 
but forward and backward, as it were.
24. See § 95: “In order to put the truth of sense- certainty to the test, a 
simple experiment will suffi ce. We write down this truth; a truth cannot be lost by 
being written down no more than it can be lost by our preserving it, and if now, 
this midday, we look at this truth which has been written down, we will have to say 
that it has become rather stale.”
25. Chase notes that “it is as material occurrences not amenable to con-
ceptualization that history may have to be conceived once the concept of pro-
gression or regression has been dissolved” (Chase, “Getting Versed,” 136). When 
spirit gets versed, the concept of progression or regression does indeed dissolve, 
and what Chase claims here for history counts also for Hegel’s future.
Chapter 4
1. As in Mikhail Baryshnikov’s performance HeartBeat: mb.
2. For literature on Hegel’s thought on language, see Surber (ed.), Hegel 
and Language; McCumber, The Company of Words: Hegel, Language, and Systematic 
Philosophy; and Simon, Der Begriff der Sprache bei Hegel.
3. Derrida, Glas, 1a: “Those who still pronounce his name like the French 
(there are some) are ludicrous only up to a certain point: the restitution (se-
mantically infallible for those who have read him a little—but only a little) of 
magisterial coldness and imperturbable seriousness, the eagle caught in ice and 
frost, glass and gel.”
4. Derrida offers hérisson or istrice as answers to the question of an Italian 
poetry journal: “Che cos’è la poesia?”—“What kind of thing is poetry?” He found 
this answer in the work of Friedrich Schlegel, who uses the hedgehog as simile 
for his favorite incarnation of Romantic poetry: the fragment. Athenäum Frag-
ment 206: “Ein Fragment muß gleich einem kleinen Kunstwerke von der umge-
benden Welt ganz abgesondert und in sich selbst vollendet sein wie ein Igel.”
5. I wish to clarify that I don’t defend an idealistic notion of poetry that 
sees in poetry a particularly personal and emotional mode of expression. I rather 
agree with Chase when she shows the disconcerting and decomposing effects of 
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Hegel’s notion of language, especially his understanding of the sign. I also agree 
with Riley, who introduces us to impersonal passions, as well as with Terada, who 
argues that “we would have no emotions if we were subjects” (Terada, Feeling in 
Theory, 4).
6. This as a nod to John McCumber, who writes in the introduction to his 
superb book on Hegel’s philosophy of language: “The most forgotten need, the 
one that cuts us open and makes us human, cries at us unspoken from the pages 
of . . . Hegel. It is the need for a company of words” (McCumber, Company of 
Words, xv).
7. Through exemplary readings, Nägele has shown how attention to 
echoes and echolalia (over and against the syntax of logical meaning) produc-
tively “breaks up the integrity of the individual text” (Nägele, Echoes of Transla-
tion, 16).
8. Hegel’s Aesthetics, 1035, quoted in Mieszkowski, “Derrida, Hegel, and the 
Language of Finitude,” § 22.
9. Versions of this argument can be found in such different accounts of 
emotion as Nussbaum, “Emotions as Judgments of Value and Importance”; De 
Sousa, The Rationality of Emotion; and Sartre, Esquisse d’une théorie des emotions.
10. See also Nussbaum, “Emotions as Judgments,” 237: “What, then, makes 
the emotions in my example unlike the thoughtless natural energies I have de-
scribed? First of all, they are about something; they have an object.”
11. This is why Hegel usually uses “concept” in the singular. Since the logic 
of the concept turns fi xed separations into permeable differences, it creates an 
ontological immanence where all differences can be viewed as differences within 
the concept and not between distinct concepts. While this singular doesn’t ex-
clude the plural (the singular actually pluralizes), the use of the phrase “the 
concept” certainly lends itself to (mis)understandings of the concept as a meta-
physical entity.
12. “This disruption of the concept into the difference of its constituent 
functions [Momente]—a disruption imposed by the concept’s own activity—is 
the judgment” (Encyclopedia, §166 Zusatz, trans. modifi ed).
13. Compare McCumber on bivalence and degrees of truth in Reshaping 
Reason, 40– 49.
14. The predicative judgment belongs to what Hegel calls “the old science 
[die alte Wissenschaft]” (Hegel’s Science of Logic, 92, trans. modifi ed). Hegel does 
not offer a full- fl edged theory of the speculative proposition. As Nancy notes, 
“the yet necessary speculative theory of syntax is dispersed and is disarticulated 
from text to text; it goes absent where one was expecting it, and it is brought out 
in unpredictable contexts—never in the pure style of theory” (Nancy, Speculative 
Remark, 75– 76). Further explanations of the relation between speculative syntax 
and predicative judgment are to be found in Hegel’s Science of Logic, 90– 92.
15. For a more detailed explanation of the logic of the predicative judg-
ment, see Hegel’s Science of Logic, 622– 30.
16. The pejorative word Räsonnieren connotes superfi ciality in combina-
tion with a know- all attitude.
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17. See Hegel’s Science of Logic, 630: “What the judgment enunciates to start 
with is that the subject is the predicate; but since the predicate is supposed not to be 
what the subject is, we are faced with a contradiction.”
18. The German language makes it clear that in order to speak about (über) 
something, one has to be above (über) it. The fact that the predicate, as the more 
general term, gives meaning to the particular or individual and thus undefi ned 
subject distinguishes the logical judgment from any other grammatical sentence. 
See Hegel’s Science of Logic, 625: “We may take this opportunity of remarking, too, 
that though a proposition has a subject and predicate in the grammatical sense, 
this does not make it a judgment. The latter requires that the predicate be related 
to the subject . . . as a universal to a particular or individual.”
19. See Plato, Symposium, 176e (Eryximachus): “I would like now to make 
a further motion: let us dispense with the fl ute- girl . . . ; let her play for herself 
or, if she prefers, for the women in the house. Let us instead spend our evening 
in conversation.”
20. The manifesto continues: “mythology must become philosophical in 
order to make the people rational, and philosophy must become mythological in 
order to make the philosophers sensible [sinnlich zu machen].” Note that the text 
uses the same phrase with respect to the philosophers that we fi nd in Kant’s Cri-
tique of Pure Reason with respect to the abstract concept, the object of Hegel’s cri-
tique: einen abgesonderten Begriff sinnlich zu machen (Critique of Pure Reason, B299).
21. Nancy perceptively observes a sort of tai chi move in Hegel when Hegel 
takes his leave from “clever argumentation” by yielding to rather than opposing 
attacks that come in the form of complaints about the unintelligibility of philo-
sophical writing: “Through the singular logic of a reply that does not answer, He-
gel has already subtracted his text from the logic of argumentation, from the play 
of the Gegenreden, of discourses of opposition” (Nancy, Speculative Remark, 11).
22. For further explanation of why the speculative doesn’t agree with the 
demand for expression, see chapter 1.
23. Marking and remarking (on) the language that is available to him in 
order to let resonate the speculative through juggle and syncopation, Hegel thus 
pursues something akin to what Derrida has explored in Monolingualism of the 
Other.
24. Pinkard aptly translates spekulativer Satz as “speculative judgment,” thus 
underlining that Hegel does not invent a new syntax but rhythmizes the existent 
syntax of the judgment by accentuating its internal contradictions.
25. Malabou elaborates the double meaning and thus speculative charac-
ter of the word “plastic” (Future of Hegel, 5– 12). When something is said to be 
plastic, this can mean that it easily receives form or that it gives form. Plasticity 
moves between the complete fi xity of form (in sculpture) and malleability to the 
point of formlessness.
26. Lecturing on art, Hegel observes in Greek sculpture an “air of lifeless-
ness, an aloofness from feeling, and that tranquil trait of mourning.” Quoted 
from Pinkard, “Symbolic, Classical, and Romantic Art,” fn. 28.
27. Jameson has recently argued with similar exasperation against the 
three- step scheme. See Hegel Variations, 18: “We need to . . . forestall one of the 
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most notorious and inveterate stereotypes of Hegel discussion, namely the thesis-
 antithesis- synthesis formula. . . . For even if the tripartite rhythm happens to do 
justice to this or that local Hegelian insight, it still reifi es that insight in advance 
and translates its language into purely systemic terms.”
28. Nancy notes that the word aufheben appears in the Science of Logic fi rst 
as part of the expression ein Aufhebens machen, “to make a fuss” (Nancy, Specula-
tive Remark, 34).
29. “Since the predicate itself has been articulated as a subject . . . as the 
essence which exhausts the nature of the subject, [thought] fi nds the subject also 
to be immediately present in the predicate. Now, instead of having returned 
into itself in the predicate [im Prädikate in sich gegangen], and instead of having 
preserved the free status of clever argumentation [des Räsonnierens], it is still ab-
sorbed in the content, or at least the demand to be so absorbed is present” (§ 62, 
trans. modifi ed).
30. The same shift happens in the other example Hegel offers: “In that 
way when it is said, ‘The actual is the universal,’ the actual, as subject, vanishes 
into its predicate. The universal is not supposed to [soll nicht] have merely the 
meaning of a predicate such that the proposition would state that the actual is 
universal; rather, the universal ought to express the essence of the actual” (§ 62, 
trans. modifi ed). Note the use of the modal auxiliary soll (“is supposed to”) in 
both examples. It implies that the speculative reading of these propositions is 
not the only reading possible. The proposition can always be read as an abstract 
judgment.
31. Compare § 58: “To deny oneself the right to insert one’s own views into 
the immanent rhythm of the concept [sich des eignen Einfallens entschlagen] and 
not to interfere arbitrarily with that rhythm by means of wisdom acquired else-
where, this abstinence is an essential moment of attentiveness to the concept” 
(trans. modifi ed).
32. Compare § 57: “[An assertion to the contrary] is usually the fi rst re-
action on the part of knowledge when something unfamiliar appears to it. It 
usually resists it in order to save both its freedom and its own insight and its own 
authority against alien authority, since that is the shape in which what is now 
apprehended for the fi rst time appears: as alien—knowledge also stages its re-
sistance in order to rid itself . . . of the kind of shame which supposedly lies in 
something’s having been learned” (trans. modifi ed).
33. In the next chapter, I will more closely discuss Hegel’s (and Hölderlin’s) 
thoughts on “bearing shame” as part of the process of “acknowledging,” which is 
the mode of knowing that is characteristic of the phenomenological approach.
34. Compare § 58: “It is supposed to let . . . [it] move itself by its own 
nature, which is to say, to let it move itself by means of the self as its own self and 
to observe this movement” (trans. modifi ed).
35. The current discussion about empathy is carried on within and some-
times across many disciplines, including psychology (simulation theory), neuro-
science (mirror neurons), psychotherapy, moral philosophy, feminist philosophy, 
political theory, philosophy of law, and literary studies. For a helpful critique of 
empathy from the perspective of rhetoric, see Rüdiger Campe, “An Outline for 
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a Critical History of Fürsprache: Synegoria and Advocacy.” An example for the 
modernist literary tradition’s strong resentment toward calls for empathy pro-
vides Rainer Nägele’s somewhat undertheorized comment: “Neither writing nor 
political analysis can emerge from empathy and public concern. The latter are 
the sites of a misplaced moralization that blocks analysis on every level and pro-
vides the fertile ground for any rhetorical seduction that appeals to resentment” 
(Echoes of Translation, 4). Wendy Brown (States of Injury) and Lauren Berlant (“The 
Subject of True Feeling”) have provided much more thorough and informed 
critiques of the politics of compassion. Another scholar of literary modernism, 
Charles Altieri, advocates a version of “feeling one’s way in” that relies on refl ec-
tive judgment (Particulars of Rapture). Stanley Cavell emphasizes the reality and 
everyday experience of our “mutual attunement” (The Claim of Reason).
36. David Depew’s “Empathy, Psychology, and Aesthetics” helpfully distin-
guishes the different historical valences of the concept of empathy.
37. In fact, as Campe points out, Theodor Lipps was the pivotal fi gure 
not only in that he gave rise to the discourse on empathy as we know it today, 
but also in that his own work pivoted from “the broader—and older—notion 
of perceptual Einfühlung in the world and, with it, the aesthetics of empathy” 
to “the narrower—and new—concept of empathy with the human body and 
the other” (Campe, “An Outline for a Critical History of Fürsprache,” 356). De-
pew focuses on Lipps’s early work in aesthetics when he strengthens the critical 
(anti- idealist and anti- Romanticist) gist of Lipps’s theory of Einfühlung. Depew 
clarifi es that Lipps was then not concerned with the possibility to feel somebody 
else’s feeling, but rather understood Einfühlung as akin to animation: as a pro-
jection of one’s own feelings into external objects. In this context, Einfühlung is 
very closely related to expression (if I fi nd that the weeping willow expresses my 
sadness, this is an example of Einfühlung). This notion of Einfühlung maintains 
a radical difference in experience between subject and object (the willow does 
not feel sad). In that way, it is very different from the kind of sympathy Hegel 
propagates. Hegel’s epistemological sympathy can be traced back to Herder, who 
makes the—then novel—argument that peoples of different historical periods 
and cultures have radically different concepts, beliefs, perceptions, and so forth. 
He uses the phrase sich einfühlen (feeling one’s way in) in an unsystematic way 
to elaborate his hermeneutics that consist in an arduous process of historical-
 philological inquiry.
38. Literary scholars tend to be suspicious of empathy because it psy-
chologizes textual relations. My aim here is to propose a textual (and non-
 psychological) notion of sympathy.
39. Only a retrospective assessment, an afterfeeling, or a refl ective judg-
ment can establish—but also only in a transitory way—a sense of the self in 
transport. Here Altieri’s use of Kant’s refl ective judgment meets with Pippin’s 
notion of agency as retroactive credit. See Altieri, The Particulars of Rapture, 14: 
“For example, where determinative judgment would conclude that Othello is 
jealous because his behavior is governed by particular traits, refl exive judgment 
can attend to Othello as bringing together a set of traits that in the future would 
have to be considered part of our model for what jealousy might be.”
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40. Throughout this book, I discuss examples of such word twists—from 
Schiller’s verses that end the Phenomenology to Hegel’s ventriloquizing of phre-
nology.
41. § 57: “That is the shape in which what is now apprehended for the fi rst 
time appears: as alien” (see note 31).
42. The verb übersieht means “overlooks” in the double sense of “surveys” 
and “ignores.”
43. Compare Ahmed, The Cultural Politics of Emotion, 31: “The ungraspabil-
ity of my own pain is brought to the surface by the ungraspability of the pain of 
others.”
44. Gertrude Stein, “Sacred Emily,” 395.
45. Consider Hegel’s aphorism, “The questions which philosophy does not 
answer are answered in that they should not be so posed” (“Aphorisms from the 
Wastebook,” 248).
46. I agree with Hirt when he suggests that Hegel “fut avec Platon, du point 
de vue de la visée de la constitution d’un discours proprement philosophique, 
à la fois le plus grand ennemi de la poésie et le plus grand poète de la philoso-
phie” (Hirt, Versus: Hegel et la philosophie à l’épreuve de la poésie, 15). Chase offers a 
similar argument when she insists that for Hegel the philosophical idea appears 
only in a language “susceptible of memorization and inscription,” that is, in verse 
(Chase, “Getting Versed,” 135).
47. See § 61: “The nature of judgment . . . which includes within itself [in 
sich schließt] the distinction of subject and predicate.”
48. For clarifi cation about how logic is bound up with ontology, and for 
an argument in favor of transforming logic by accommodating the fl exible and 
contextual use of different ontologies, see McCumber, Reshaping Reason.
49. Mieszkowski argues that Hegel views language as “a dynamic whose 
transgressive potential paradoxically depends precisely on its essentially fi nite 
character” (Mieszkowski, “Derrida, Hegel, and the Language of Finitude,” § 2).
Chapter 5
1. After the somewhat extradiegetic description of the ideal movement of 
mutual acknowledging, the protagonist/ s of the Phenomenology do fall back to 
treating each other and themselves as objects. In the dialectic of lordship and 
bondage, the bondsman does not acknowledge and is not acknowledged but 
“retrieves” (wiederfi nden) himself in the objects of his labor (§ 196). Anerkennen 
has here regressed into Wiederfi nden. See my discussion of Wiederfi nden in the 
next section.
2. Compare Butler, Account of Oneself, 44: “Recognition cannot be reduced 
to making and delivering judgments about others.”
3. There is only one mention of Anerkennung in the Phenomenology: in the 
spirit chapter when Hegel discusses Antigone’s relation to her brother (§ 456).
4. Hegel apparently liked this poem. Hotho’s compilation of different stu-
dents’ lecture notes, published under the title Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik, in cludes 
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the following assessment: “Besonders unterscheiden sich Goethes Gedichte im 
Divan wesentlich von seinen früheren. In ‘Willkommen und Abschied’ z. B. ist 
die Sprache, die Schilderung zwar schön, die Empfi ndung innig, aber sonst die 
Situation ganz gewöhnlich, der Ausgang trivial, und die Phantasie und ihre Frei-
heit hat nichts weiter hinzugetan. Ganz anders ist das Gedicht im West- östlichen 
Divan, ‘Wiederfi nden’ überschrieben. Hier ist die Liebe ganz in die Phantasie, 
deren Bewegung, Glück, Seligkeit herübergestellt. Überhaupt haben wir in den 
ähnlichen Produktionen dieser Art keine subjektive Sehnsucht, kein Verliebt-
sein, keine Begierde vor uns, sondern ein reines Gefallen an den Gegenstän-
den, ein unerschöpfl iches Sich- Ergehen der Phantasie, ein harmloses Spielen, 
eine Freiheit in den Tändeleien auch der Reime und künstlichen Versmaße, 
und dabei eine Innigkeit und Froheit des sich in sich selber bewegenden Gemü-
tes,  welche durch die Heiterkeit des Gestaltens die Seele hoch über alle pein-
liche Verfl echtung in die Beschränkung der Wirklichkeit hinausheben” (He-
gel, Werke in zwanzig Bänden, 14:241). Since this is not one of Hegel’s published 
texts, I don’t want to make too much of the wording—but the use of “peinlich” 
here (“pein liche Verfl echtung in die . . . Wirklichkeit”), in contrast to Goethe’s 
“Freiheit” and “Heiterkeit des Gestaltens,” is certainly an interesting echo to He-
gel’s description of his own writing style and of the labor of the concept (see my 
discussion in the next section).
5. The phrase “a reading of love” is borrowed from Hamacher, Pleroma, 89. 
Hamacher uses the phrase to describe a mode of reading that seeks to maintain 
a movement of multiple differences within the unity of the text.
6. Ormiston argues that the knowledge of love (even though at fi rst dim 
and subconscious) drives the development of the Phenomenology. She intends 
only the genitive of the object in the phrase “knowledge of love.” Throughout 
her study, she perpetuates the dichotomy between a supposedly unifying love 
and what she calls refl ective consciousness. See, especially, Ormiston, Love and 
Politics, 36.
7. In his review of Clark Butler’s and Christiane Seiler’s English edition of 
Hegel’s letters, John McCumber calls to our attention that we have, to this day, 
avoided penetrating the depths of Hegel’s text: “We have not yet learned how to 
read Hegel closely; doing so will require, not merely logic and common sense, 
but appropriating the still foreign techniques of deconstruction and hermeneu-
tics. It will take time” (McCumber, “Hegel: Life, Letters and System,” 641).
8. Clark Butler points out in his commentary to Hegel’s letters that “by the 
time he replied on November 2, Schelling had read only the Preface. This reply 
was the last recorded correspondence between the two philosophers. In his let-
ter, Schelling exposes his refusal to grasp Hegel’s basic concern when he writes: 
‘Thus I confess I do not yet understand your sense in opposing “concept” to in-
tuition’” (Hegel: The Letters, 80).
9. For evidence of rage, see Hegel’s wastebook: “Der Effekt am Publikum 
ist ein absoluter Maßstab, über den das Subjekt wohl rasend werden kann. Es 
hat alles getan; aber seiner Einsicht steht eben der bewußtlose Instinkt entgegen” 
(Hegel, Werke in zwanzig Bänden, 2:558).
10. Hegel’s mention of a “multi- sided and multi- meaning intertwining” 
(vielseitige und vieldeutige Verschränkung) shows that what he reduced here, for ana-
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lytic purposes, to a double relation really expands into a multitude (Phenomenol-
ogy, § 178).
11. In chapter 2 (“Pathos”), we have discussed that knowledge in the mode of 
acknowledging can come at the expense of great physical suffering, even death.
12. Hegel dramatizes duplicity throughout the Phenomenology by using free 
indirect discourse and by having different sections of the narrative fi gure other 
sections while slipping in and out of explicit distinctions. One section might 
render as inner difference what another section has described as a difference 
between subjects (the internalized lordship and bondage of the unhappy con-
sciousness, for example), or one section makes a difference explicit that was 
implicit in the previous one (conscience splits into various confi gurations of the 
beautiful soul, for example).
13. I am not as convinced as most commentators on the hard heart seem 
to be that a fi nal reconciliation of the two fi nal fi gures of spirit does indeed take 
place.
14. This is Pinkard’s argument in “Reason, Recognition, and Historicity,” 
47– 66.
15. Goethe surely knows a thing or two about Begierde (appetite, animal 
desire, or hunger). His Faust immortalizes the image of man who can get no sat-
isfaction. In the Phenomenology’s section on “Pleasure and Necessity,” Hegel offers 
his own version of a Faust- like fi gure bent on proving that he is bound to noth-
ing in his pursuit of pleasure. He comes to realize that he is bound to his own 
actions.
16. See Taylor, “The Need for Recognition” and “The Politics of Recog-
nition.”
17. Taylor insists that recognition has become a problem in modernity. 
While in premodern cultures recognition was built into the socially derived iden-
tity by virtue of the very fact that it was based on social categories that everyone 
took for granted, moderns value authenticity in the sense of an inwardly derived, 
personal, and original identity. The authentic qua original identity does not en-
joy recognition a priori but has to win it, and the attempt to win recognition for 
one’s authentic self can fail (Taylor, “The Politics of Recognition,” 34– 35).
18. See Pippin on agency, in Hegel’s Practical Philosophy.
19. Pinkard argues as much in “Symbolic, Classical, and Romantic Art,” 
8. I am sympathetic to the solution he identifi es in Hegel, which, abstractly put, 
consists in everyone being both master and slave to one another. This would be 
one version of the mutuality of acknowledging.
20. Kojève comes too close for my taste to glorifying death.
21. Here and in the following, I quote Hamburger’s translation in Hölder-
lin, Selected Poems and Fragments, 251– 53. Other translation consulted: Vernon 
Chadwick in Haverkamp, Leaves of Mourning: Hölderlin’s Later Work, 58– 59.
22. See my article on “Andenken” for a brief synopsis of the perspectives 
taken and the directions identifi ed in the most infl uential readings of this poem 
(“A Reading of Love in Hölderlin’s ‘Andenken,’ ” 194).
23. Mancher can mean both “many” and “some.” Chadwick translates: 
Some / are reluctant to go to the source.
24. See Baumann, Das Geheimnis wird Licht, 17.
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25. About the rarity of the northeasterly in the region of Bordeaux, see 
Baumann, Das Geheimnis wird Licht, 17– 18.
26. Baumann extends the cryptonym to D.S.G. (Die schöne Garonne).
27. Compare Butler, Account of Oneself, 43– 44. Butler also warns of the po-
tentially deadly violence of recognition: “As we ask to know the other, or ask that 
the other say, fi nally or defi nitely, who he or she is, it will be important not to 
expect an answer that will ever satisfy. By not pursuing satisfaction and by letting 
the question remain open, even enduring, we let the other live, since life might 
be understood as precisely that which exceeds any account we may try to give of 
it.” I don’t see the problem in the satisfaction of desire. On the contrary, satisfac-
tion keeps desire alive because, as Hegel shows, it can never be fi nal. Rather, I 
see the problem in the aim of this desire. The desire for self- suffi ciency and the 
correlating desire to be completely captured by the other’s address destroy the 
fragile life of mutuality.
28. In “Sober Recollections: Hölderlin’s De- Idealizations of Memory in 
‘Andenken,’ ” Santner affi rms the additive rather than adversative use of the con-
junction aber as liberating and as a sign of Hölderlin’s new, more relaxed style. 
See esp. 19.
29. Heidegger reads a sense of melancholy into the series of aber. See Hei-
degger, “Remembrance.”
30. In his letter from June 30, 1802, informing Hölderlin of Gontard’s 
death, Sinclair tries to remind Hölderlin that she survives her death: “Du glaub-
test an Unsterblichkeit, da sie noch lebte, Du wirst gewiß itzt mehr denn vorher 
glauben . . . Und was ist größer und edler, als ein Herz, das seine Welt überlebt” 
(Hölderlin, Sämtliche Werke, 7:170).
31. See Heidegger, “Remembrance.”
32. See Ovid, Metamorphoses, v. 9– 11: “And men, content with food which 
came from no one’s seeking, gathered . . . acorns fallen from the spreading tree 
of Jove. . . . and yellow honey was distilled from the verdant oak.”
33. Hölderlin, “As on a holiday. . .”/ “Wie wenn am Feiertage. . . ,” v. 56– 60 
(trans. Hamburger).
34. In “The Oak Trees” (“Die Eichbäume”), Hölderlin, mobilizing anti-
 French sentiments, describes oak trees as Titans who refuse to subject themselves 
to the cultivated garden of society (gesellige Leben). Hölderlin uses the Semele 
myth in the sixth stanza of “As on a holiday. . . .” Semele, the mortal mother of 
Dionysus, asked her lover Zeus to show his true shape. When he appeared to her 
as the god of thunder, she was struck by lightning and died.
35. Hölderlin uses the word Scheue while Hegel opts for Scham. Hegel 
often prefers the more carnal term to the more refi ned connotation Hölderlin 
chooses.
36. Darüber hinschauen extravagantly extends the basic phrase überschauen, 
which by itself already carries a similar ambiguity as “to overlook” in English, 
meaning both to survey and to fail to notice. The hin- of hinschauen accentuates 
the focusing aspect of looking, while darüber emphasizes the movement beyond 
such focus.
37. I am not as confi dent as Hamacher is that we can neatly distinguish 
between Hegel’s intention (which is supposedly to give shame the task of work-
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ing in the service of unity) and the way he presents his ideas (which Hamacher 
sees as undermining Hegel’s intention). In any case, it is the presentation that 
counts, also and especially for Hegel.
38. See Hamacher, Pleroma, 89.
39. In the same fragment, Hegel calls this identity of love that preserves 
its difference within, a “vollendete Einigkeit” as opposed to the “unentwickelte 
Einigkeit” which is only the seed of life but not life itself. The unity of love is ma-
ture precisely because it preserves difference between the lovers while eliminat-
ing “allen Charakter eines Fremden.” That love does not kill otherness in favor 
of an abstract identity is of foremost importance to Hegel already in the early 
writings.
40. Beissner notes: “In der Übersetzung aus den Bacchantinnen des Eu-
ripides steht er (der Feigenbaum) für saekon (Heiligtum), verwechselt mit sykon 
(Feige)” (Hölderlin, Sämtliche Werke, 2:803).
41. In “Secluded Laurel—Andenken,” Haverkamp traces a rhetorical tra-
dition from the New Testament through Augustine and Petrarch to Hölderlin 
that uses the fi g tree as a fi gure for conversion. As the fi gure of conversion, the 
fi g tree also fi gures the vacillation and anxiety involved in such a turning, as well 
as the brave cowardice that is open to and endures such fear.
42. While in the prose form of the phrase the word daselbst stands in the 
middle between the two terms die braunen Frauen and auf seidnen Boden, the lay-




with daselbst standing off center at the upper right corner of this imaginary X.
43. See Butler, Subjects of Desire, 20: “We do not merely witness the journey 
of some other philosophical agent, but we ourselves are invited on stage to per-
form the crucial scene changes.”
44. Compare Butler et al., Contingency, 19– 20: “Hegel’s own persistent refer-
ences to ‘losing oneself’ and ‘giving oneself over’ only confi rm the point that the 
knowing subject cannot be understood as one who imposes ready- made categories 
on a pregiven world. . . . We do not remain the same, and neither do our cognitive 
categories, as we enter into a knowing encounter with the world. Both the know-
ing subject and the world are undone and redone by the act of knowledge.”
45. Appiah argues for the importance of continuous transformation (i.e., 
determinate negation) of identity over the protection of identities in the interest 
of their survival in “Identity, Authenticity, Survival: Multicultural Societies and 
Social Reproduction.”
Chapter 6
1. In Hegelian terminology, “abstract” means exclusive of the opposite, 
while “absolute” means encompassing the opposite. “Abstract negation” thus 
merely negates whereas “absolute negation” negates and affi rms.
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2. “Everything hangs on apprehending and expressing the truth not merely 
as substance but also equally as subject” (§ 17).
3. This and all the following quotations from Cixous’ L’ange au secret are 
my translations.
4. The servant is subordinated to the master because, in his rapid develop-
ment, he has learned the lessons of the value of life and of the essentiality of the 
body much quicker than the master has. The step that he seems to have skipped 
is the realization of the pure negativity of the “I.” This negativity will have been 
realized in absolute fear. The judgment on the servant is passed from the per-
spective of the master, that is, from the perspective of the consciousness that 
went through the life- and- death struggle untouched and unshaken by any expe-
rience. The master does not learn the lesson of life’s essential value, and that is 
why he considers the insight of the servant to be a failure. Only at the very end of 
the chapter does the phenomenological account turn to an examination of the 
servant according to the logic of the servant’s own experience: “We only saw what 
servitude is in relation to mastery. However, servitude is self- consciousness, and 
thus what it is in and for itself is now up for examination” (§ 194).
5. See Gadamer, Hegel’s Dialectic: Five Hermeneutical Studies, 35– 53.
6. I am not making an argument against masturbation or for coital inter-
course here. Nor do I think that this part of Hegel’s text can be used to make a 
sexual argument along normative lines. We will see in a moment that the valo-
rized term in this dialectic—the practice that is being avoided through mastur-
bation—is the orgy.
7. For further clarifi cation about Hegel’s notion of the concept, see chap-
ter 4 ( “Juggle”).
8. The perceptual consciousness’s fear of the other’s pleasure prefi gures 
the hunger (Begierde) for objects that arises when consciousness develops into 
self- consciousness (in the dialectic of master and slave). This hunger, which He-
gel describes as the desire to incorporate all objects and to thereby destroy ob-
jecthood in general, is symptomatic of a categorical paranoia vis- à-vis the object, 
the fi rst traces of which we have caught here.
9. Lorde, “Poetry Is Not a Luxury,” 38. See also Žižek, Parallax, 210: “A free 
Self not only integrates disturbances, it creates them, it explodes any given form 
or stasis. This is . . . the ultimate traumatic Thing the Self encounters in the Self 
itself.”
10. I draw here on the ambiguity of ausstehen, meaning both “to withstand” 
and “to like.”
11. See chapter 2 for a discussion of the proximity of stubbornness and 
pathos and its role in Hegel’s examination of tragedy.
12. Here I disagree with Nancy who, in “Identity and Trembling,” an es-
say that continues to importantly inform my work, writes: “The freedom that 
speculative spirit grasps is self- determined, and so sublates all determination. . . . 
Speculative spirit prefers not to think [that freedom could be given by another]. 
It designates heteronomy as pathology” (21).
13. Cixous explores the ambivalent pull of fear with L’ange au secret: “The 
wind that never abates in this book, the spirit that whispers without interruption, 
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it’s her: My fear, who is my mystery, the force that pushes me to take to my heels, 
in what direction? In her direction” (73). I will discuss Cixous’ exploration of 
fear in more detail in the next part of this chapter.
14. Erica Hunt; quoted in Trinh and Kirby, Nothing But Ways, installation at 
the Yerba Buena Center for the Arts, San Francisco, June 5– August 15, 1999.
15. Butler has shown that the servant’s attachment to the stability of the 
fashioned thing is based on an illusion. What she calls the “bondage contract” 
supports the illusions and denials of both parties. It allows the master to deny his 
bodily existence; and it allows the servant to forget that what he reads as his own 
signature on his works is always only the proxy of the master’s signature. See But-
ler, “Stubborn Attachment, Bodily Subjection: Rereading Hegel on the Unhappy 
Consciousness,” 31– 62.
16. Later in the course of the Phenomenology, when Bildung has become a 
self- alienating rather than self- immortalizing process, we encounter a notion of 
work as work of art (Werk), which operates with a greater awareness of the over-
lap of negation and affi rmation: “The work is, i.e. it exists for other individuali-
ties, . . . their interest in the work . . . is something different from this work’s own 
peculiar interest, and the work is thereby transformed into something different. 
The work is thus something utterly transitory which is effaced by the counter- play 
 [Widerspiel] of other forces and interests and which exhibits the reality of individ-
uality itself to an even greater degree to be something transitory rather than some-
thing achieved” (§ 404, trans. modifi ed). Rather than immortalizing the artist, the 
work of art gives rise to the artist’s experience of fi nitude, non- mastery, and inter-
dependence with others. The author’s signature is perverted by those who receive 
the work and make it their own. Their affi rmation of the artwork is the negation 
of the artist’s intention. While pursuing its own will, the authorial consciousness is 
co-opted by the will of others. The self- alienated spirit of the world of culture or 
Bildung knows that self- will is negated precisely in its realization.
17. For a more extended discussion of how rational analysis furthers emo-
tionality, see chapter 7, the section on “Desperate Analysis.”
18. Cixous, Stigmata, 62.
19. Stoic consciousness is the fi gure immediately following the dialectic of 
master and servant.
20. For an excellent discussion of the unhappy consciousness’s self-
 subjection as a defense against absolute fear, see Butler, “Stubborn Attachment, 
Bodily Subjection,” 31– 62.
21. I am referring here to the self- negation of consciousness by way of work-
ing, giving thanks, sacrifi cing, fasting, and castigating (§ 222– 28). In all these 
forms of self- negation, the unhappy consciousness continues to cultivate the plea-
sures of the body.
22. The Phenomenology has six major parts (“Consciousness,” “Self-
 Consciousness,” “Reason,” “Spirit,” “Religion,” and “Absolute Knowledge”). They 
vary in length, with “Reason” and “Spirit” being the longest and “Absolute Knowl-
edge” the shortest. In our discussion of absolute fear, we have skipped the entire 
section on “Reason” and are now analyzing the dialectic of “Absolute Freedom 
and Terror” at the end of the second third of the part on “Spirit.”
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23. In the fi rst chapter of Déluge, entitled “Cétait l’entre deux,” Cixous 
stresses our disappearing ability to live the moments of the entre- deux. For her, as I 
will show in the next part of this chapter, transitions are intervals of fear and grief 
whose claim on us for voice and volume is fading: “Bientôt on pourra naître sans 
crier, ensuite ce sera sans crier faire l’amour, perdre un enfant, mourir. Non, je 
ne suis pas folle. On va vers le silence. . . . Nous allons vers le Monde sans Transi-
tion. Autrefois à la strophe 988 l’époux de Kriemhild s’éffondrait parmi les fl eurs, 
on voyait le sang s’écouler à fl ots de sa blessure. . . . Sigfrid ne voulait pas mourir 
sans avoir dit tout ce qu’il pensait. Le mourant parlait tour à tour aux amis at aux 
traîtres et à chacun, mortellement blessé, le mourant dit ce qu’il avait à dire. A 
la strophe 999 les fl eurs à la ronde étaient mouillées de sang. A la fi n le mourant 
prenait encore la peine de souffrir à la place de son père, de sa mère et de ses ba-
rons. N’ayant plus la force de parler il repoussait à la fi n une terrible strophe en-
core. Il avait une si furieuse pitié de ceux qui attendaient longtemps son retour. 
C’était l’agonie de ceux qui l’attendraient en vain qu’il voulait pleurer avant de 
mourir. Maintenant dès que Sigfrid s’effondrera, ils vont couper, paraît- il. On ne 
va plus laisser aux gens le temps de crier, l’heure du violoncelle, c’est terminé. / 
Je ne veut pas qu’il arrive, ce meurt- petit, - moi dont la moitié de vivre est mou-
rir, je vis de vivre et mourir enchevêtrés en sonate. / Je ne veux pas le monde à 
un oeil et une seule dimension, non, notre vie n’est pas sèche et plane, mais au 
moins cinq fois accidentée, torte, convulsée.” Cixous, Déluge, 15– 16.
24. Throughout the sections on “Consciousness,” “Self- Consciousness,” 
“Reason,” and “Spirit,” the Phenomenology traces various fi gures of fi nite con-
sciousness. Hegel treats the same subject matter, but from the perspective of the 
divine substance, in the chapter on “Religion,” and he addresses the synthesis of 
both perspectives (fi nite consciousness and divine substance) in the chapter on 
“Absolute Knowledge.”
25. See § 439: “Spirit is . . . the self- supporting, absolute, real essence. All 
the previous shapes of consciousness are abstractions from it; they are just this, 
that spirit analyses itself, distinguishes its moments, and lingers at each individ-
ual moment. . . . As so isolated, these moments seem as if they were to exist as iso-
lated. However, their advance and retreat into their ground and essence points 
to the way in which they are merely moments or vanishing magnitudes, and this 
essence is this very movement and dissolution of those moments.”
26. Schmidt, “Cabbage Heads and Gulps of Water: Hegel on Terror,” 23. 
Even though instrumental for his subsidiary argument that the Hegel of the Phe-
nomenology found no solution to the problem that drove the French Revolution 
into terror, the quoted statement does not play a central role in Schmidt’s essay 
as a whole. Schmidt offers an illuminating analysis of the historical changes in 
Hegel’s thought on the Terror from his earliest notes on the subject to his lec-
tures on the philosophy of history.
27. Hegel’s use of the term “certainty” is counterintuitive to a modern 
scientifi c understanding. In Hegel’s text, certainty is not what consciousness ar-
rives at after a process of verifying a hypothesis, but it is what consciousness starts 
out with and loses in the process of verifying or actualizing what it holds to be 
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true. The loss of one certainty immediately produces a new one, which will have 
to be verifi ed again. Certainty, thus, corresponds to a subjective need, rather 
than an objective reality.
28. As I discussed in chapter 2 (“Pathos”), the pathos of each fi gure in the 
Phenomenology is to live and die for its certainty.
29. Lispector, The Stream of Life, 11.
30. Compare Nancy, Hegel, 42: “Self- knowing in negativity and as negativ-
ity is therefore no more a knowing than it is a victory that would subdue or 
domesticate pain, death, the other, or joy. It is not knowing of an object; it is 
self- knowing—but only to the extent that, in this knowing, self does not become 
its own object. . . . The subject is—or makes up—the experience of its being-
 affected as the ordeal of what dissolves its subsistence.”
31. See Nancy, Hegel, 44: “It is always the trembling of the fi nite seized by 
the infi nite: it is the sensibility of the infi nite in the fi nite.”
32. This explains the melancholy tone of the Phenomenology’s last chapter. 
See chapter 3 (“Release”).
33. I use “authors” in the plural because of the ambivalence within the 
authorial position between insisting on continuity and marking the transitions 
as leaps.
34. Compare Nancy, Hegel, 42: “The subject does not reappropriate its 
other and its contradiction: that it knows this contradiction to be its own, and 
that this knowing is exactly what constitutes it as subject, does not make its own 
contradiction become its subsistence. It remains its contradiction, just as my 
pain, my death, and my other, or my joy, remain outside of me: outside of me—
what, being mine, makes me go out of myself.”
35. By switching pronouns in this paragraph I mimic and thus foreground 
how Hegel’s text moves fl uidly and often ambiguously between its different sub-
jects (consciousness, spirit, author, readers).
36. See § 545: “the communication between them [the enlightener and 
the naive believer] is immediate, and their giving and receiving is an undisturbed 
fl ow [ungestörtes Ineinanderfl ießen] of the one into the other.”
37. “It is thereby entangled in this contradiction as a result of having both 
let itself get into this quarrel and thinking of itself as doing battle with some-
thing other” (§ 548).
38. “This world [of the enlightenment] still contains in it the aspect of the 
spiritual kingdom of animals [geistiges Tierreich], where in mutual violence and 
disarray, they fi ght and deceive each other over the essence of the real world” 
(§ 536, trans. modifi ed).
39. Nancy plays on the French phrase faire une experience, which also exists 
in German (eine Erfahrung machen) and which means “to have an experience” but 
also, literally, to create an experience (Nancy, Hegel, 42).
40. See Nancy, Hegel, 41: “Reconciliation is in the point, or in passage.”
41. Note that it was the problem of the unhappy consciousness that it 
gained from each mortifi cation.
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Chapter 7
1. Chase foregrounds the “disarticulation of the fi gure of progression” in 
her rapprochement of Hegel with Baudelaire in “Getting Versed,” 113– 38.
2. Ngai suggests that Lispector’s Passion According to G.H. could be read as a 
religious parody (Ngai, Ugly Feelings, 346). If parody consists in an act of mimetic 
repetition that draws on the need for iteration of a power confi guration (in this 
case Christian dogma) to introduce a shift in meaning, then I don’t see why we 
couldn’t extend her suggestion to Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit.
3. “Throughout the changing fl ux of everything which would be secure 
for it, skeptical self- consciousness thus experiences its own freedom . . . the un-
changeable and genuine certainty of its own self ” (§ 205).
4. Skepticism engages only in a “shaking of this or that alleged truth which 
is then followed by the disappearance of the doubt, and which in turn then re-
turns to the former truth in such a way that what is at stake is taken to be exactly 
what it was in the fi rst place” (§ 78, trans. modifi ed).
5. “The fear of truth may lead consciousness to conceal itself both from 
itself and from others and to take refuge behind the appearance that holds that 
its fi ery enthusiasm for the truth itself makes it more diffi cult or even impossible 
to fi nd some truth other than the individual truth of vanity itself—that of being 
at any rate cleverer than any of the thoughts one might get from oneself or from 
others” (§ 80, trans. modifi ed).
6. Zweifel is etymologically related to Zwiefalt (twofold) and thus signifi es 
a doubling. In its vanity, the skeptic doesn’t hesitate to assume contradictory 
positions for the sake of always negating its opposite party: “If parity [Gleichheit] 
is pointed out to it, it points out disparity [Ungleichheit], and if it is reproached 
with the latter (about which it had just spoken), it quickly shifts over into point-
ing out parity. Its talk is indeed like that of a squabble among stubborn children, 
one of whom says A when the other says B, and says B when the other says A. 
By being in contradiction with himself, each of them purchases the delight of re-
maining in contradiction with each other” (§ 205). Enacting these contradictory 
roles, the skeptic can scarcely go on pretending to be a pure self- identical being-
 for- self. It must realize that, instead of one, it is (at least) two: “In skepticism, 
[self- consciousness] . . . it doubles itself to an even greater degree, and is in its 
own eyes now something twofold [ein Zweifaches]” (§ 206). Skepticism (Zweifel) 
splits consciousness in two (zwei) and thereby initiates the absolute movement of 
despair (Verzweifl ung). The prefi x ver, in that it means both consummation and 
negation, adds an additional speculative twist to the word.
7. Compare this restless consciousness in despair to the stoic conscious-
ness who “maintain[s] the lifelessness which consistently withdraws from the 
movement of existence, withdraws from actual activity as well as from suffering” 
(§ 199).
8. Malabou has developed the concept of “plasticity” that aptly captures 
both the power to shape and the capacity to self- differentiate, self- negate, or self-
 distance (see Malabou, The Future of Hegel). With my notion of a rubber subject 
or a rubber tumbler subject I take her concept to a playful extreme.
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9. Its wobbling motion (which would be Taumeln in German) is an effect 
of the bacchanalian revel (Bacchantischer Taumel) of truth. See § 47: “The truth is 
the bacchanalian revel where no member is not drunk.”
10. While “absolute knowledge” might be considered the end, it has no 
positive content beyond its function to ruin the natural certainty of each shred, 
fi gure, or shape of the whole.
11. For my spatial interpretation of Aufhebung, see chapter 2 (“Pathos”).
12. For the importance of deriving the concept of truth from the con-
sciousness one observes, instead of judging that consciousness based on an ex-
ternal standard of truth, see § 81– 85.
13. § 168– 76.
14. Hamacher, Bahti, and Clark fi nd Hegel eating fl esh to be ethically, 
epistemologically, politically, and aesthetically appalling. See Hamacher, Pleroma, 
230– 95; Bahti, Allegories of History, 80 and 109ff.; and Clark, “Hegel, Eating,” 
124– 30. I see eating in Hegel instead as a physical form of communication that 
engages with the other at the cost of (also) ruining the self. I thus agree with 
Rajan when she argues that “in Hegel’s lurid fi guration of nature as spirit and 
thus of mind as (human) nature or psyche, such organisms also consume them-
selves” (“(In)digestible Material,” 222). Rajan considers the physiological details 
of Hegel’s discussion of digestion and illness in the Encyclopedia’s “Philosophy of 
Nature” as “the logical organism’s rethinking of its subjectivity” as “inability to 
digest nature” (ibid., 220, 218).
15. For Lacan, non- human animals are incapable of lying (Lacan, Semi-
nar II, 244– 45).
16. See chapter 1 (“Heart”) and the beginning of this chapter’s section on 
“Narrative (Dis)organization.”
17. Lispector, The Passion According to G.H., 64: “Eating of living matter 
would expel me from a paradise of adornments”; and 107: “learn from this one 
who has had to be laid completely bare and lose all her suitcases with the en-
graved initials.”
18. So much attention has been paid to the all- devouring character of 
Hegelian thought that the inverse relation between eating and thinking has been 
overlooked.
19. “I had committed the forbidden act of touching something impure 
[immundo]” (Lispector, The Passion, 64).
20. Müller- Sievers’s vehement critique of epigenesis is based on the prem-
ise that “epigenesis is . . . the condition of the possibility of any claim to absolute-
ness, be this a philosophical or literary absolute” (Self- Generation, 4). Hegel shows 
how epigenesis undoes the absolute.
21. See my discussion of the interiority of reason in chapter 1 (“Heart”).
22. See my discussion of Hegel’s half- sympathetic speech acts in chapter 
4 (“Juggle”).
23. See, for example, the following passage where the phenomenologist 
moves from observing the phrenologist’s stance to identifying with his position 
to speaking in his voice: “However, the observing consciousness is not concerned 
with how to determine this relation. This is so because, in any event, it is not the 
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brain that stands on one side of the relation as an animal part. Rather, it is the 
brain as the being of self- conscious individuality. This individuality, as settled char-
acter and self- moving conscious activity, exists for itself and within itself. Its actual-
ity and its existence for others stand in opposition to being- for- and- within- itself. 
This being- for- and- within- itself is the essence and subject, which has a being in 
the brain, but this being, the brain, is subsumed under the former, and it receives its 
value merely by way of the indwelling meaning. However, the other side of self-
 conscious individuality, namely, that of its existence, is being as self- suffi cient and 
as subject, that is, as a thing, namely, a bone. The actuality and existence of man is 
his skull- bone” (§ 331; trans. modifi ed).
24. This is an example of Hegel performing what Riley calls “hate’s work” 
(Riley, Impersonal Passion, 24). By “hate’s work,” she means the long and laborious 
process of neutralizing hateful speech. See Impersonal Passion, 9– 27, in particular 
p. 22: “I’ll ignore the utterer, the better to dissect the utterance. To isolate the 
word as thing, to inspect it and refuse it, demands a confi dent capacity to act un-
naturally toward language, which normally functions as an energetic means of 
exchange.”
25. Compare Žižek, Parallax, 206: “If we penetrate the surface of an organ-
ism, and look deeper and deeper into it, we never encounter some central con-
trolling element that would be its Self, secretly pulling the strings of its organs. 
The consistency of the Self is thus purely virtual; it is as if it were an Inside which 
appears only when viewed from the Outside, on the interface- screen—the mo-
ment we penetrate the interface and endeavor to grasp the Self ‘substantially,’ as 
it is ‘in itself,’ it disappears like sand between our fi ngers. Thus materialist reduc-
tionists who claim that ‘there really is no self’ are right, but they nonetheless miss 
the point.” Žižek offers these thoughts in the context of a discussion of neuro-
science. Brain science is the twenty- fi rst- century version of “observing reason.” 
That is to say, the infi nite judgment that Hegel distilled from the phrenologist 
stance must be reformulated today as “the mental is the neuronal” or “the being 
of spirit is ‘the piece of meat’ that is the brain” (Parallax, 211).
26. See § 346: “The infi nite judgment as infi nite would be the fulfi llment 
of self- comprehending life, whereas the consciousness of the infi nite judgment 
which remains trapped within representational thought conducts itself like piss-
ing” (trans. modifi ed).
27. The infi nite judgment is the one judgment of existence that can be 
called true in a reasonable kind of way. The other judgments of existence are the 
positive and the negative judgment (The rose is red. The rose is not red.) They 
can be correct statements of facts, but not Vernunftwahrheiten. See Hegel, Hegel’s 
Science of Logic, 630– 43.
28. In the case of “The rose is a plant,” the rose, as the particular term, is 
subordinated to the general category of plant. In the case of “The rose is red,” 
the general characteristic of color is subordinated to the individual rose, which 
combines many characteristics in addition to color.
29. For my discussion of the beautiful soul as a fi gure that refuses pleasure, 
see chapter 1.
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30. Pinkard identifi es the acting consciousness as a Romantic ironist. See 
Pinkard, The Sociality of Reason, 214– 20.
31. If it is confusing that Hegel here claims that existence and judgment 
are not acknowledged, let me add that acknowledging always comprises a nega-
tive element. Acknowledging is always split into affi rmation and negation. When 
the acting consciousness says Ich bins, it both agrees with the other’s judgment 
and reveals the inherent hypocrisy of this judgment.
32. Malabou argues that there is an anticipatory structure to subjectivity as 
Hegel conceived it. Her speculative notion of this structure—which she calls le 
‘voir venir’—actually enables us to say that consciousness can anticipate its future 
while specifying that this anticipation consists in an openness to surprise. See 
Malabou, The Future of Hegel, 13: “It is an expression that can thus refer at one and 
the same time to the state of ‘being sure of what is coming’ and of ‘not knowing 
what is coming.’ It is on this account that the ‘voir venir,’ ‘to see (what is) com-
ing,’ can represent that interplay, within Hegelian philosophy, of teleological 
necessity and surprise.”
33. “The truth is the whole. However, the whole is only the essence com-
pleting itself through its own development” (das Wahre ist das Ganze. Das Ganze 
aber ist nur das durch seine Entwicklung sich vollendende Wesen, § 20).
34. Malabou articulates the tension between the relativity and the indepen-
dence of the fi gures of consciousness as one between two notions of time that 
are both put to work in Hegel’s narrative: a Greek sense of time that emphasizes 
synthesis and a modern sense of time that emphasizes the independence of mo-
ments along the line of Kantian hypotyposis (translation of the concept into the 
form of the sensuous). See Future of Hegel, 18 and 125– 30.
35. Compare Pinkard, Sociality of Reason, 11: “When confronted with self-
 generated skepticism, a refl ective form of life seeks reassurance in the accounts 
that it gives itself of what is authoritative for it. One of two things happens: either 
the reassurance is successful, and there is a renewal of that form of life; or it 
fails, and a new conception of what is authoritative—and thereby a new form 
of life—is required.” “Self- generated skepticism” is Pinkard’s paraphrase for 
“self- negation.” He thus attends to the double pull of self- affi rmation or self-
 reassurance and self- negation or self- doubt that consciousness experiences.
36. Hegel is well aware of the historical link of Christianity to the Greek 
cults of Demeter and Dionysus.
37. According to Greek myth, Dionysus was taken out of the burnt body 
of his mother Semele (fi rst birth) and inserted into his father Zeus’s thigh, out 
of which he was born again once fully developed. (See Hederich, Gründliches 
Mythologisches Lexikon, s.v. “Bacchus.” Hederich’s lexicon was the authoritative 
source on Greek mythology during Hegel’s time.) According to an Orphic ver-
sion of the myth, Dionysus was the child of Zeus and Persephone. Zeus’s jealous 
wife, Hera, incited the Titans to lacerate the child. Athena saved his pulsating 
heart and brought it to Zeus, who made a potion of it and gave it to Semele 
to drink. From this, she became pregnant with Dionysus (second birth) (see 
Tripp,  Crowell’s Handbook of Classical Mythology, s.v. “Dionysos”). Under the entry 
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“Dithyrambus,” Hederich explains that one epithet of Dionysus was Dithyram-
bus (“double door” or “twice- born”) because he was torn apart by the Titans 
and then put back together by Ceres. Dionysus’s dismemberment as a child is 
repeated in the stories of raving female followers (Maenads) who lacerate those 
who refuse to worship Dionysus.
Like all her siblings, Ceres was eaten by her father Kronos, but he vomited 
her out again after Metis had given him an emetic (see Gründliches Mythologisches 
Lexikon, s.v. “Ceres”). During the time of her grief for Persephone, Ceres hides in 
a cave. According to Hederich, this was meant to symbolize the seed in the earth, 
before it sprouts or comes to light (symbolized by Pan’s disclosure of Ceres’ 
dwelling place to Jupiter). Persephone spends part of the year in the underworld 
and part of the year with her mother Ceres above ground. Her name has been 
taken to mean “concealed fruit,” which can refer to the seed in the ground or 
to the harvest stored in the barn during winter (see Gründliches Mythologisches 
Lexikon, s.v. “Proserpina”).
38. Hartman quotes Derek Walcott.
39. See Žižek, Tarrying with the Negative, 122– 24, for an excellent explana-
tion of why the Hegelian synthesis is not based on complementarity.
40. Fragment 719 (Dind.), quoted from Lawson, Modern Greek Folklore and 
Ancient Greek Religion, 563.
41. Each piece of Dionysus is Dionysus himself.
42. Compare Grosz, “Animal Sex.”
43. Nobody since Wahl has analyzed this structure of Hegel’s dialectic as 
an emotional economy.
44. See the previous section, “Come Break My Heart.”
45. Compare Ahmed’s concern for “what sticks?” in Cultural Politics of 
 Emotion.
Epilogue
1. By violence, I mean here the unambiguous destruction or forceful 
eclipse of other realities. Determinate negation—even in its most bodily form, 
that is, as “eating alive”—is a different animal altogether. The ambiguity of eat-
ing alive—the fact that it gives life to the extent that it gives death (or takes death 
to the extent that it takes life)—creates interdependence.
2. Altieri prefers it when “dialectical reconciliation seems impossible be-
cause there is no mediating principle” (Particulars of Rapture, 206).
3. “The truth is the whole. However, the whole is only the essence complet-
ing itself through its own unfolding [Entwicklung]” (§ 20).
4. The French original perhaps even more clearly highlights the fabricated 
quality of experience: “Le sujet est, c’est- à-dire fait, l’experience de son être af-
fecté” (Nancy 1997, 63). Nancy dismantles here the phrase faire l’experience (“to 
have an experience,” literally: “make an experience”), which also exists in Ger-
man (eine Erfahrung machen).
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5. Transports both propel and slow down the development of the Phenom-
enology.
6. Hegel’s Aesthetics, 1035; for complete reference, see chapter 4.
7. Ngai, Ugly Feelings, 10.
8. Sokolsky, “The Resistance to Sentimentality,” 83: “The sentimental may 
be described as something more which subtly mocks the declaration of sincerity 
by being more than sincere.”
9. Most of the more interesting French readings of Hegel in the twentieth 
century have read his work through the paradigm of the unhappy consciousness. 
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